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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants 3 Current Status of Explosive Destruction Technologies INTRODUCTION The four explosive destruction technologies (EDTs) for chemical munitions that are evaluated in this report were initially evaluated and described by a National Research Council (NRC) committee in the International Technologies report (NRC, 2006). Since that initial evaluation, all of the technologies have been used for applications that postdate the 2006 report. As a result of the additional experience, each of the technologies has been modified to a greater or lesser degree. In this chapter, the changes to each EDT since early 2006 are described and the operating experience since that time is summarized. After each description and summary, the committee provides its thoughts on changes that could be made to enhance the performance of three of the technologies, as requested by Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) staff.1 These suggested changes are not characterized as findings or recommendations because the committee was unable to discuss the feasibility of implementing them with the technology vendors. The D-100 system being evaluated for the noncontaminated rocket motors at Blue Grass is also described. The chapter concludes with a discussion of regulatory approval and permitting issues and other considerations that could impact the implementation of each technology. SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE SINCE EARLY 2006 Since early 2006, after which time no more data were gathered for the 2006 NRC International Technologies report, additional use has been made of all four of the EDTs reviewed in that report. Summarized below and described in greater detail under each of the technology-specific sections of this chapter is the experience gained from these more recent deployments. The CH2M HILL transportable detonation chamber (TDC) TC-60 model chamber, designed for 60 lb TNT-equivalent net explosive weight (NEW), was subjected to tests at Porton Down in the United Kingdom. In 2004, nine mustard agent-filled and -fuzed projectiles were destroyed. In March 2006, 101 munitions were destroyed in testing to measure the throughput rate. From April to July 2008, this same TC-60 system was used at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii to destroy 71 World War I- and World War II-era phosgene-filled and chloropicrin-filled munitions. The DV60 version of the detonation of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber (DAVINCH) was used at Kanda Port in Japan between April and November 2006 to destroy 659 World War II-era bombs filled with a lewisite/mustard agent mix (Yellow bombs) and Clark I and Clark II vomiting agents (Red bombs). A version having a slightly greater explosion containment capability, the DV65, was then used at Kanda Port to destroy additional Yellow and Red bombs. As of mid-2008, 1,650 Red bombs and 400 Yellow bombs had 1 Personal communication between Joseph Novad, Deputy Operations and Engineering Manager, ACWA, and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, May 30, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants been destroyed by various versions of the DAVINCH technology at Kanda Port.2 More recently, a DAVINCH DV50 was installed at Poelkapelle, Belgium, where it is being used to destroy chemical warfare materiel. As of mid-July 2008, 639 chemical munitions containing Clark I and Clark II agents and another 35 conventional munitions had been destroyed. The Dynasafe static detonation chamber (SDC) model SDC2000 was used at the German government facility Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung Chemischen Kampfstoffe und Rüstungs-Altlasten mbH (GEKA) in Münster, Germany, to destroy over 13,000 German chemical warfare munitions filled with mustard agent (H), distilled (sulfur) mustard agent (HD), Clark I, Clark II, phosgene, and other chemical agents (Stock et al., 2007).3 This work was done over a 2-year period. The same unit has also been used in a test mode at GEKA to destroy 27 10-cm mustard agent-filled mortar rounds. Three explosive destruction system (EDS) units have been in operation since June 13, 2006, at the Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System (PBEDS) facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. One of these is an EDS Phase 1 unit (EDS-1) with a vessel volume of 0.19 m3 and a containment capacity of 1.5 lb (0.68 kg) TNT-equivalent NEW. The other two are the larger EDS-2 units, each having a 0.623 m3 volume and a 4.8 lb (2.18 kg) TNT-equivalent NEW containment capacity. The EDS units are being used to destroy 1,220 recovered chemical munitions, the majority of which are 4.2-in. mortar rounds and German World War II-era Traktor rockets. As of May 2008, 1,065 munitions had been destroyed. Most of the main characteristics of the three vendor-supplied EDT technologies are nearly the same now as they were in early 2006. The basic descriptions of technologies presented in the 2006 NRC International Technologies report are therefore still valid and are reproduced in Appendix A of this report. The Phase 2 version of the EDS system (EDS-2) is described in this chapter because it has not been described in detail in previous NRC reports. Changes to the design, configuration, or operating method of the technologies are described in the remainder of this chapter, along with a review of recent operating experience. It is recommended that before reading further in Chapter 3 readers not already familiar with EDTs begin by first reviewing Tables 4-10 and 4-11 in Appendix A. Table 4-10 in Appendix A summarizes engineering and operational parameters: throughput rate, destruction verification capability, largest munition that can be processed, reliability/operability, and transportability. Table 4-11 in Appendix A presents detailed information on throughput rates as a function of the nature of the munition being destroyed. The information is still correct. TRANSPORTABLE DETONATION CHAMBER TECHNOLOGY Changes to the Process Since Early 2006 No substantial changes have been made to the TDC process since the 2006 NRC International Technologies report was published (NRC, 2006). The model TC-60 process as configured for the testing at Porton Down is the same as that for the TC-25 controlled detonation chamber (CDC) system shown in Figure 4-1 of Appendix A. With one exception, the process flow diagram shown in that figure and the accompanying process description in Appendix A are still current and applicable to the TC-60. The “largest munition” rating of 60 lb TNT-equivalent NEW for the TC-60 (shown in Table 4-10 in Appendix A) is the design value, not the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) rating of 40 lb TNT-equivalent NEW for the Schofield Barracks event.4 If the TC-60 is to be used to detonate explosives of more than 40 lb TNT-equivalent, data generated by the detonation of an amount of explosives 25 percent greater than the desired DDESB approval rating will be needed. In addition to, or perhaps in connection with, the process for receiving approval from the DDESB for a particular TNT-equivalent NEW rating, the requirements of the recently published American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case for impulsively loaded vessels (Code Case 2564), which addresses the design of pressure vessels subject to repeated impact loadings, might have to be satisfied. However, the vendor 2 Joseph Asahina, Chief of Technology, Kobe Steel, Ltd., “DAVINCH detonation system—recent improvements and path forward,” presentation to the committee, May 28, 2008. 3 Harley Heaton, Vice President for Research, UXB International, Inc., “Dynasafe static detonation chamber (SDC) series status update,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008. 4 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, David Hoffman, CMA, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, May 12, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants TABLE 3-1 Concentrations of Volatile Organic Compounds at the Inlet and Outlet of Air Filtration Unit #2 of the TDC of CH2M HILL (parts per billion by volume) Volatile Organic Compound Inlet Concentration Outlet Concentration Ambient Concentration Methane 756.7 810.3 637.5 Propane 3,437.5 3,142.8 ND Acetone 99.2 624.0 1,416.3 Chloromethane 4.3 4.1 4.0 Dichlorodifluoromethane 11.7 11.5 14.1 Methyl ethyl ketone 11.6 53.0 47.6 Toluene 6.0 184.8 105.1 Trichlorofluoromethane 7.4 6.1 8.3 NOTE: ND, nondetect. SOURCE: DiBerardo, 2007. has pointed out that its vessels are “ventilated vessels,” as opposed to pressure vessels. The vendor’s analysis indicates that its design will comply with the basic requirements of the Code Case, despite the fact that the chambers are fundamentally different in design and operation from a total containment pressure vessel. When destroying munitions containing mustard or nerve agents but not phosgene, oxygen is added to the detonation chamber. The additional oxygen is not mentioned in the process description in Appendix A. However, this process feature was employed during the March 2006 testing at Porton Down and is described in the comprehensive report covering the Porton Down tests between July 2004 and July 2006 (DiBerardo et al., 2007). The initial testing used oxygen cylinders that were placed in the chamber and detonated together with the munition. This technique was later replaced by an automated oxygen feed system to meter oxygen into the detonation chamber just before the detonation. Additional Experience Since Early 2006 The TDC vendor, CH2M HILL, has gained some additional operating experience since the text of the 2006 International Technologies report was finalized. The coverage of the TDC from that report (reproduced in Appendix A) mentions that a series of tests at Porton Down was scheduled for early 2006.5 These tests were in fact successfully carried out, destroying U.K. 25-pounder mustard agent-filled projectiles. The results were presented in the previously mentioned report on the Porton Down testing prepared by the Edgewood to as the controlled detonation chamber (CDC). Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) (DiBerardo et al., 2007). Over a 2-week test period, 74 munitions were destroyed. The highest throughput was 42 munitions in less than 14.5 hours in the second week. Two munitions were destroyed in each detonation event. During the peak processing period, the time elapsed between detonation events was about 35 minutes. Extensive environmental tests were conducted under ECBC direction during the period of highest productivity at Porton Down in 2006 (DiBerardo, 2007; DiBerardo et al., 2007). Three sampling periods—280 minutes, 290 minutes, and 230 minutes—were used on three consecutive days. The masses of agent destroyed during these three periods were 18.84, 21.98, and 18.84 pounds, respectively. The key results are shown in Tables 3-1 through 3-4. Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 show measurements for the stream entering the final particulate filtration/activated carbon adsorption unit and for the stream leaving this unit. The stream at the outlet enters the atmosphere without further treatment. The conclusions presented in the report were as follows: No chemical agent was detected in the final air emissions. Additionally, no chemical agent was detected at the entrance to the activated carbon adsorbers. This corresponds to destruction efficiencies (DEs) of >99.9999 percent. The measured air emissions would be a minor additional source for Title V (Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990) permitting of the facility. Two of the solid waste streams, spent pea gravel and spent lime, would be defined as hazard- 5 The TDC in the 2006 NRC report was then known and referred
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants TABLE 3-2 Emissions to the Air of Metals from the TDC of CH2M HILL Metal Emission Rate (lb/hr) Antimony <0.0000158 Arsenic 0.000439 Barium <0.00000342 Beryllium <0.00000191 Cadmium 0.0000145 Chromium <0.0000381 Cobalt <0.00000624 Copper <0.0000123 Iron 0.00138 Lead <0.00000816 Mercury 0.00000767 Nickel <0.0000316 Selenium <0.000047 Silver <0.00000416 Thallium <0.0000233 Vanadium 0.0000323 Zinc 0.000285 SOURCE: DiBerardo, 2007. TABLE 3-3 Stack Emissions of Particulate Matter, Dioxin/Furan, HCl, and Semivolatile Organic Compounds from the TDC of CH2M HILL Emission Type Amount Particulate matter 0.03 lb/hr Dioxin/furan 10−13 g/Nm3 TEQ HCl 0.02 ppmv Semivolatile organic compounds <0.03 ppbv NOTE: TEQ, [international] toxic equivalency (the amount of 2,3,7,8-TCDD [2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin] with toxicity equivalent to the complex mixture of 210 dioxin and furan isomers with 4 to 8 chlorine atoms found in flue gases). SOURCE: DiBerardo, 2007. ous waste owing to their lead content. The lead measurements exceeded the limits given in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations at 40 CFR 261.24. During the March 2006 test period at Porton Down, the system generated about 0.4 pounds of scrap metal per pound of intact munition fed to the process. Spent pea gravel was generated only upon completion of operations. The system generated 1,939 kilograms of pea gravel during the 2006 campaign. The system generated 325 kilograms (estimated from volume) of spent lime; the lime was added downstream of the expansion tank to neutralize acid gases. The amount of spent lime produced is proportional to the number of munitions destroyed. The rate of generation is about 0.26 pounds of lime per pound of intact munition, or 19.8 pounds per detonation event. Spent activated carbon is generated only upon completion of operations. The system generated 1,100 kilograms of spent activated carbon. The activated carbon was not changed during or after the 2004 shutdown at Porton Down. Air emission samples were taken upstream and downstream of one of the two parallel high-energy particulate air (HEPA) filter/activated carbon adsorp-tion units in the pollution abatement system and tested for oxygen, carbon dioxide, water, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, total hydrocarbons, particulate matter, hydrogen chloride, chlorine, metals, C1 to C6 hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, dioxins, and furans. No emissions of regulatory concern were found. It was concluded as follows:6 There does not appear to be any impediment to obtaining an air quality permit for the TC-60 CDC based on the results of sampling and analysis. The TC-60 would be considered a minor source for Title V (Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990) applicability determination purposes because all air emissions were below emission thresholds used for a rule applicability determination. A Subpart X (Miscellaneous Treatment Unit) permit would be required for a RCRA-affected facility because the munitions to be treated would be a hazardous waste and the miscellaneous unit designation is the most appropriate for this process. (DiBerardo et al., 2007, p. 87) This Porton Down test report also provided details of earlier Porton Down testing that were not known when the NRC International Technologies report was prepared (NRC, 2006; DiBerardo et al., 2007). In September 2004, an operator observed that one of the expansion joints in the crossover pipes between the detonation chamber and the expansion tank had cracked. Subsequently, several of the expansion joints upstream and downstream of the expansion chamber were replaced, using a modified design. No further expansion joint failures were experienced during the testing at Porton Down. 6 The committee is simply quoting the cited report on the regulatory requirements and has not independently reviewed the applicability of the Clean Air Act or any other regulatory requirement.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants TABLE 3-4 Selected Total Metals Concentrations in Solid Waste from the TDC of CH2M HILL (milligrams per kilogram) Test Parameter Total Metals Fresh Pea Gravel Fresh Lime Spent Pea Gravel (from Detonation Chamber Floor) Spent Lime (from Lime Injection Systems) Barium 5 100 31 50 Chromium total 8.81 40 53 23.8 Copper 4 80 9,380 3,400 Iron 14,300 885 30,100 5,440 Lead 2.17 20 1,840 4,400 Nickel 5.75 80 84.3 24.8 Zinc 15.6 24.4 3,850 1,900 NOTE: No significant metal increase for antimony, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, cobalt, selenium, silver, thallium, or vanadium. SOURCE: DiBerardo, 2007. Later on, problems with incomplete destruction of agent and weapon bodies and a damaged heat exchanger were experienced and then resolved over the next 16 months. An important task during that period was the redesign of the donor explosives system. The use of the revised designed system solved the problem of incomplete destruction of agent. As previously indicated, final throughput rate testing was carried out at Porton Down in March 2006. During this testing, 101 mustard-containing 25-pounder projectiles were destroyed. The highest throughput rate was achieved on March 22, when 16 projectiles were destroyed in eight detonation events. The test report states that TC-60 operations were conducted safely during the 2004-2006 testing at Porton Down (DiBerardo et al., 2007). Upon completion of the Porton Down tests and closure of the site, the TDC system was prepared for shipment to Crescent City, Illinois, for storage. In December 2007 and January 2008, the system was prepared for shipment to Schofield Barracks in Hawaii.7 Several flexible connections were replaced. The flow control valves on the 3-in. and 10-in. pipes between the expansion tank and the air pollution control system were rebuilt. Tests were run using simulated equipment test hardware for 155-mm projectiles and 4.2-in. mortars in preparation for operations at Schofield Barracks. Planning was done for destruction of 155-mm projectiles in Hawaii; the TDC had not previously destroyed munitions of that size. The system was then shipped to Hawaii in February 2008. Operations were carried out during April and May of 2008, with the system set up in an open field at Schofield Barracks. The 71 munitions to be destroyed had been removed from a Schofield Barracks training range in 2006. The munitions dated from World War I and World War II and were thought to include the following: One 4-in. mortar filled with chloropicrin, Ten 4-in. mortars filled with phosgene, Thirty-eight 155-mm projectiles filled with phosgene, and Twenty-two 75-mm projectiles filled with phosgene. It was subsequently found during operations that one of the 75-mm projectiles was actually filled with chloropicrin. Daily operations were carried out by personnel from the U.S. Army ECBC. The initial two phases of operations were work-up trials and developmental testing. During these operations, two 4-in. Stokes mortars filled with phosgene and eight 155-mm projectiles filled with phosgene were destroyed. The next phase of operations was termed the operational testing: It called for the destruction of 30 155-mm projectiles filled with phosgene. One additional munition was destroyed, for a total of 31. The operations were carried out on April 21, 22, and 23, 2008, with 10, 10, and 11 detonations carried out on each of these days, respectively. The operations proceeded fairly smoothly. The 7 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, May 12, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants cycle times averaged 39 minutes on the first day and 37 minutes on the second and third days. No phosgene was detected in the vestibule, the system enclosure, or the air filtration units. The second phase of operations took place on May 12 and 13, 2008. These operations were witnessed by the chair of the committee, Richard Ayen. On May 12, 20 75-mm projectiles filled with phosgene were destroyed, with two projectiles destroyed in each detonation event. Minor problems were encountered with the detonator firing system. On at least two occasions, lack of electrical continuity in the firing circuit required an operator to reenter the area in front of the detonation chamber to adjust the connector to the “pass-through,” so called because it allows the electrical firing charge to pass through the walls of the chamber.8 On May 13, more serious problems were encountered with the detonator firing system. Planned production for the day was two 75-mm projectiles and eight Stokes 4-in. mortars, all filled with phosgene. Continuity problems and misfires resulted in the replacement of the pass-through and other firing system components. The accompanying delays resulted in the destruction of only the two 75-mm projectiles and two of the mortars. The firing plug, which connects the firing circuit to the chamber pass-through, was subsequently analyzed by the manufacturer, which determined that the firing plug had been incorrectly modified in the field at the project site, causing an internal electrical short. This has been corrected by a change to standard operating procedures preventing field modifications and mandating the use of firing plugs that have been tested and certified by the manufacturer. Other design or operational issues that arose during or after the campaign were as follows: After the campaign was completed it was discovered that approximately 50 gallons of acidic aqueous fluid (pH = 1) had accumulated in the expansion tank.9 Such an event had never before occurred. It was attributed to excessive moisture added to the system through the chamber purge air. The purge air feed system was subsequently modified to address this problem. During each detonation event, lime is automatically injected into the system. The lime feed was limited by the equipment’s maximum feed rate. CH2M HILL determined that a faster lime feed rate would be beneficial and the feed system is being modified to increase the lime feed rate. Late on May 13, it was discovered that a heat exchanger directly upstream of the activated carbon adsorber had failed; this was the same heat exchanger that had failed during the testing at Porton Down.10 It was subsequently replaced by a system with upgraded materials of construction: 316 stainless steel was used in place of 304 stainless steel, and various Heresite baked phenolic coatings were applied to the various parts. The committee expects that a connection exists between these three issues. Acidic materials are generated in the detonation chamber and collect in part in the expansion chamber. Some pass through into the pollution abatement system. If the lime feed system is not effective, is not operating reliably, or is set too low, some acidic materials will work their way downstream to the heat exchanger and other parts of the pollution abatement system. The modifications to the purge air and lime feed systems implemented by CH2M HILL are designed to prevent this problem from recurring. ECBC had obtained an emergency destruction permit from the state of Hawaii allowing 90 days of operation and the destruction of 90 munitions. Agreement with the state took 6 months. The permit was issued 12 months after applying, which is not atypical. A public meeting has been held in connection with applying for the permit; no opposition arose during the event. No opposition was expressed during the comment periods for either the environmental assessment or the permit. It was also necessary to obtain a DDESB site safety approval for the Schofield Barracks event. An event-specific approval was obtained. The TDC’s DDESB site safety approval allows detonation of no more than 40 pounds of TNT-equivalent NEW.11 8 For a picture of the pass-through, see Figure 2.2 in DiBerardo et al. (2007, p. 28). 9 Communication via teleconference between David Hoffman, CMA, George Parshall and Douglas Medville, committee members, Richard Ayen, committee chair, Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, and Harrison Pannella, NRC, senior program officer, August 18, 2008. 10 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, August 15, 2008. 11 Limits on the maximum size of detonations are set by the DDESB. Physical strain measurements on the walls of the chamber are carried out during detonations in the chamber. These measure
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants Proposal for Static Firing of Noncontaminated Rocket Motors The committee was informed that the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), in partnership with CH2M HILL, had presented a proposal to the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) relating to Requirement BG-1.12 A CH2M HILL nontransportable D-100 detonation chamber has been installed at BGAD for destruction of conventional munitions (versus the chemical stockpile stored there). DDESB approval has been obtained for 49.3 pounds of total explosives in each detonation event.13 RCRA permitting of this system is under way. BGAD has proposed a program to BGCAPP to test the technical feasibility of using this existing D-100 CDC system to destroy the rocket motors by static firing.14 The D-100 is adequate in size for this purpose, having internal dimensions of 14 ft wide × 16 ft high × 20 ft long. The detonation chamber is connected to a cylindrical expansion tank made from mild steel, 10 ft in diameter × 71 ft long. The air pollution control system consists of a cartridge-type particulate filter with pulsed jet cleaning, followed by an exhaust fan. Before being processed, the rocket motors would be removed from their shipping and firing tubes (SFTs) and their fins would be banded. Banding the fins prevents them from deploying during subsequent processing. This allows easier handling when mounting the rocket motors in the firing stand and, after firing, removing the motors from the stand. The motors would then be loaded into a static firing stand, the stand moved into the detonation chamber, and the firing wires connected. After the chamber door is closed, the rocket motors would be ignited. The door would then be opened and the chamber ventilated for 5 to 10 minutes before workers enter. The firing stand would be removed and replaced with another firing stand freshly loaded with rocket motors. If attempts to use the existing igniters in the motors were unsuccessful, new igniters would be used. The BGAD-CH2M HILL proposal is for a series of tests with actual rocket motors to demonstrate that the static firing concept will work as anticipated. It is expected that between four and six motors could be destroyed in each firing cycle and that the throughput rate would be up to 18 motors per hour. Calculations based on a burn time of 2.5 seconds for 19.3 pounds propellant show that the temperature in the chamber would rise by 32°F for each rocket fired. Whether the rocket motors will be fired sequentially or all at once will be determined during these tests. Because the testing proposal states that sequential motor firing is preferred, sequential firing will be tested to determine technical feasibility. With the short 2.5-second burn time, whether the rockets are fired sequentially or all at once will not appreciably affect the throughput rate. Based on its past experience in obtaining DDESB approvals of its site safety submissions, CH2M HILL normally uses 2 pounds donor explosive for each pound of energetics in the munition for a controlled detonation. However, it claims this practice would not apply to the firing of rocket motors. The static firing is a deflagration over 2.5 seconds, not a detonation. It does admit that there is a remote chance of a detonation, but only one at a time, and the chamber, which has a 49.3 lb TNT-equivalent DDESB rating would accommodate this detonation. Hence, the D-100 chamber could be used to fire multiple (between four and six) rocket motors. The M28 propellant in M55 rocket motors contains 2 percent lead stearate—a significant amount—and the initiator might contain a smaller amount of lead azide (BGCAPP, 2004). BGAD anticipates that at least 99.999 percent of this lead would be captured by the particulate filters in the air pollution control system, based on previous testing with conventional systems. Various models of detonation chambers from CH2M HILL’s product line have been used for destruction of conventional weapons in the United States (Bixler, 2006). These systems have fewer unit operations in their pollution abatement systems and were intended to be used to destroy only conventional weapons. Some of the systems employed and examples of their application follow:15,16 ments are reviewed by experts, and the DDESB issues an approval letter that states the upper limit for size of detonations. 12 Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, “Destruction of chemical weapons using CH2M HILL’s transportable detonation chamber,” presentation to the committee, May 8, 2008. 13 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, July 23, 2008. 14 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 23, 2008. 15 Personal communication between Brint Bixler, Vice President, CH2M HILL, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, August 29, 2008. 16 Personal communication between Tom Cain, Senior Principal Engineer, Noblis, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, September 19, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants Use of a T-10 model to destroy white phosphorus munitions at Camp Navajo Army National Guard Base in Arizona; Use of a T-10 model to destroy munitions at four sites in California; Use of a T-10 model to destroy smoke, riot agent, and thermite grenades and cartridges at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama; Use of a D-200 model to destroy multiple conventional munitions at Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indiana; and Use of two D-100 models at Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Tennessee, for the destruction of 25,000 155-mm projectiles packed with submunition grenades.17 Thoughts on Design Changes and Upgrades Design changes and upgrades that could improve the ability of the TDC to destroy large numbers of munitions—for example, the 15,000 mustard agent H projectiles at BGAD—are as follows: Reliability Replacement of the detonator initiation system with a system with multiple firing redundancy for each detonator circuit—for example, the system used on the EDS or a similar system. Redesign of the TC-60 initiation system pass-through to make the technology more reliable. An alternative would be to use a better pass-through design from the EDS or another EDT. A thorough review of materials of construction along with a redesign of the system in accordance with the findings of the materials of construction review. An increase in the maximum feed rate of the lime feed system. Continued monitoring for accumulation of low-pH liquid in the expansion tank and, if necessary, further implementation of controls to prevent recurrence. Maintainability A redesign of the initiation system pass-through so that it can be replaced in a few minutes rather than a few hours. Capacity Obtaining DDESB approval for higher, e.g., 60 lb total TNT-equivalent NEW. This could be important for Requirement BG-2. Development of effective procedures for detonating munitions without removing them from over-packs and obtaining DDESB approval for them. This could be important for Requirement P-1, which would benefit from being able to destroy munitions in overpacks. DAVINCH TECHNOLOGY Changes to the Process Since Early 2006 The basic three-step process for destroying agent in the DAVINCH chamber under a near vacuum (0.2 psi) remains essentially the same as described in the 2006 NRC International Technologies report (NRC, 2006, pp. 36-39):18 Instant compression of the agent by a propagating shock wave resulting from detonation of an external emulsion explosive, Mixing of the agent and detonation gas at 3000 K and 10 GPa and expansion of the agent and detonation products into the surrounding vacuum, and Thermal decomposition of the agent by a 2000°C (2273 K) fireball in the chamber. This three-step process is shown in Figure 4-2 of the 2006 International Technologies report, and the simplified process flow is shown in Figure 4-3 of that report (see Appendix A). Since that report was issued, however, several changes have been implemented as part of the ongoing application of the DAVINCH technology at the Belgian military facility at Poelkapelle, Belgium. Among the changes made are the following: To reduce stress, the semiflat ends of the DAVINCH vessel have been replaced by rounded, 17 The D-100 was originally designated D-130 in the permitting documentation. 18 One change is that oxygen is now added, as explained below.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants hemispherical heads. Also, the saddle on which the DAVINCH vessel rests has been strengthened to reduce vibration, and the outside of the inner DAVINCH vessel has been reinforced with four mild steel plates. An automatic clamping system is used for the DAVINCH vessel door. Previously, two U-shaped clamps were used and were tightened manually. Currently, six independent clamps are used. These are hydraulically operated and clamp the flanges of the DAVINCH vessel door. Munitions are placed in slings and manually hung on the linear rack at the top of the inner vessel by workers in personnel protective equipment (PPE) while standing on a hydraulic lift. (In the operations at Kanda Port, Japan, munitions were hung on the rack with a robotic arm that extended into the vessel.) The pumpable emulsion of explosives that previously had been injected into boxed munitions has been replaced by aluminized emulsion explosives in flexible tubes that are strapped onto the munition bodies. The placement of these tubes around the munition, the number of tubes used, and the quantity of explosive charge depend on the munition size, wall thickness, and other factors. Following evacuation of the DAVINCH vessel to 0.2 psi, about 2 m3 of oxygen are injected into the vessel to assist in agent destruction and to reduce the quantity of dust produced by the detonation of munitions. Additional oxygen was used in operations at Kanda Port in Japan. The offgas treatment system at Poelkapelle has been modularized and placed on two skids, each 6 meters (20 feet) long and 2.4 meters (8 feet) wide (Lefebvre, 2008). A calcium peroxide chlorine scavenger is now mixed into the emulsion donor charge to control chlorine produced in the DAVINCH vessel during operations. This reduces the HCl in the off-gas and thereby minimizes pitting and corrosion in piping and other equipment. As a result, the chlorine concentration in dust in the inner vessel doubled and the HCl concentration in the stack (prior to release to the atmosphere) was reduced from 180-200 ppm to 0.1-0.5 ppm. Between 6 and 7 kg of CaCl2 are generated per shot; the CaCl2 is mixed with metal fragments and dust and is removed with these materials when the inner vessel is cleaned. To minimize the formation of dioxins in the off-gas, an air quench is used, cooling the offgas to 30°C. A perhaps more substantial change to the DAVINCH process is the use of a cold plasma oxidizer to treat the offgas rather than heating it in a combustion chamber.19 In the current configuration, the offgases resulting from agent destruction in the DAVINCH chamber are filtered to remove particulates and, with oxygen from an external supply, are pumped into the cold plasma oxidizer. The concentration of CO in the offgas is reported to be reduced from 35-40 percent to less than 0.05 percent between two diverging electrodes in a 900°C-950°C plasma arc reactor. The arc temperature is 1600°C and the residence time in the cold plasma oxidizer is 0.5-1.0 second. As a result of the 99.9999 percent agent destruction and removal efficiency (DRE) in the DAVINCH vessel, the technology provider, Kobe Steel, Ltd., states that there is no need to use the cold plasma oxidizer for additional agent destruction; however, it reports removal of remaining traces of residual mustard agent HD in the offgas of more than 99.99 percent in the cold plasma oxidizer (Katayama and Ueda, 2006; Asahina et al., 2007). The DAVINCH Glid-Arc cold plasma thermal oxidizer, illustrated in Figure 3-1, utilizes a small specially designed reactor with a “quasiperiodic ignition-spreading-extinction sequence of a series of electrical discharges” called gliding arcs. The gliding-arc discharge is somewhere between a luminescent discharge and an electric arc and is called “cold plasma.” Each arc glides along between two diverging electrodes for ignition of premixed combustible gases and generates some oxygen radicals by the high energy of electrons to assist the oxidation reaction.20 The gliding arcs between the electrodes of the Glid-Arc reactor are the energy source that ignite the incoming gases, resulting in a discharge that looks somewhat like a visible flame but is less defined and more like the flame of a candle than the stable visible flame envelope of typical commercial burners. “Cold plasma” is a term described by Orfeuil (1987, p. 629). The book explains the difference between thermal plasmas, in which the electrons and the heavier bodies are both at 10,000 K 19 This is described in the International Technologies report (NRC, 2006; Appendix A, p. 95, in the present report). 20 Personal communication between Frank Augustine, Chief Technology Officer, Versar, Inc., and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 7, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants FIGURE 3-1 The DAVINCH Glid-Arc cold plasma thermal oxidizer. SOURCE: Personal communication between Frank Augustine, Chief Technology Officer, Versar, Inc., and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 7, 2008. to 20,000 K, and “cold plasmas” (also called “non-thermal plasmas” or “luminescent discharges”), with electron temperatures of about 10,000 K and heavier body temperatures between 0.01 and 0.1 of the electron temperatures. As mentioned above, the cold plasma in the DAVINCH technology primarily serves to ignite the premixed combustible gases entering the Glid-Arc cold plasma reactor. Following a quench, the treated offgases are held in a retention tank, where they will be tested for any remaining agent and other organic compounds of interest. If the level of agent in the offgas is ≤1VSL for the agent involved, the gas then passes through HEPA filters and activated carbon filters and is released. If agent in the treated offgas is >1VSL, it is recycled through the detonation chamber and the cold plasma unit for further treatment. The process flow diagram shown in Figure 4-3 in the 2006 International Technologies report (see Appendix A) shows an offgas holding tank in front of the cold plasma unit. After the publication of that report and as shown in Figure 3-2 in this report, this has been moved downstream from the cold plasma unit and is now called the offgas retention tank. The offgas feed rate to the cold plasma unit in Belgium is 28 m3/hr and in this application, two cold plasma units in parallel are used to process the offgas. Since the volume of the inner vessel of the DAVINCH DV50 used in Belgium is 33 m3, processing takes about 35 minutes. During start-up and preheating, a fuel such as propane can be utilized with air as the source of oxygen. During operation following detonations in the DAVINCH chamber, the incoming gases to the Glid-Arc cold plasma reactor are rich in H2 and CO and include enough oxidizer (O2) to provide 99.9 to 99.99 percent oxidation after mixing downstream of the reactor and being held at 900°C-950°C for 0.5-1.0 second. Additional Experience Since Early 2006 By the time data gathering for the International Technologies report had been completed (early 2006), the DAVINCH technology had been used to destroy about 600 World War II-era Japanese bombs recovered from beneath Kanda Port in Japan. The unit used was a DV45, which had an explosion containment capacity of 45 kg TNT-equivalent NEW. Between April and November 2006 a larger DAVINCH unit, the DV60, was used at Kanda Port to destroy another 659 Red and Yellow bombs. The Yellow bombs contained a 50:50 mix of lewisite and mustard agent and the Red bombs contained Clark I and Clark II vomiting agents. Following that operation, a modified version of DAVINCH, the DV65, was used at Kanda Port to destroy nearly 800 Red and Yellow bombs. In all, 2,050 such bombs have been destroyed by the DAVINCH technology at Kanda Port. In July 2006, Kobe Steel, Ltd., contracted with the Belgian Ministry of Defense to install a DAVINCH system having a 50 kg TNT-equivalent explosion containment capacity—the DV50—at the military facility at Poelkapelle. This unit will destroy about 3,500 munitions over a 36-month period. Acceptance testing took place in January and February 2008 with 177 Clark agent-filled projectiles destroyed in 52 shots (detonation events) (see Figure 3-3). As of July 14, 2008, DAVINCH had destroyed 639 projectiles containing the Clark agents in 148 shots.21 The DV50 is 7.92 m long and has both an inner and an outer vessel. The wall thickness of the outer vessel is about 170 mm and the wall thickness of the inner vessel is about 220 mm. The 21 Personal communication between Joseph Asahina, Chief of Technology, Kobe Steel, Ltd., and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, July 23, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants FIGURE 3-2 Process flow diagram for DAVINCH. SOURCE: Joseph Asahina, Chief of Technology, Kobe Steel, Ltd., Ryusuke Kitamura, Kobe Steel, Ltd., and Koichi Hayashi, Kobe Steel, Ltd., “DAVINCH detonation system—Recent improvements and path forward,” presentation to the committee, May 28, 2008. inner diameter of the outer vessel is 2.67 m. The DV50 has an internal volume of 33 m3. The DV50 footprint at Poelkapelle, including the offgas treatment area and holding tank, is 20 m by 40 m, or about 8,600 ft2. The munition destruction record as of mid-July 2008 is summarized in Table 3-5. In acceptance testing at Poelkapelle, the DV50 has carried out 2.5 to 3 shots per 10-hour day for 5 days per week. During operations, the DV50 cycle times at Poelkapelle have been 60-70 minutes per shot and, in accordance with Belgian government policy, only three shots per day have been carried out. The cycle time per shot includes the removal of between 40 kg and 107 kg of metal fragments (depending on the size and quantity of munitions being destroyed) by workers in PPE following each shot. In operations at Poelkapelle, the placement of tubular donor charges around the munitions has resulted in smaller fragments and a more uniform distribution of metal fragments impinging on the surface of the inner vessel. Consequently, wear on the inner vessel walls has been reduced compared to previous operations in Japan, and the need to rotate the inner vessel to distribute wear has been eliminated. The expected inner vessel life is over 1,000 shots, according to the manufacturer. Routine scheduled maintenance activities at Poelkapelle include the removal of condensate water from the cold plasma oxidizer, cleaning of piping, and removal of filter dust. These and other activities take about 30 minutes per day, an additional 3 hours per week, and yet another 3 hours per month. Two unanticipated events took place at Poelkapelle. In one of them, there was some difficulty in opening the vessel lid. This was due to the deposition of dust on the traveling rail on which the lid moves laterally. Unscheduled downtime also occurred when a 21-cm
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants vendor does not believe that this is a serious issue.33 It expects that the motors don’t have enough mass or velocity to damage the 7.5-cm-thick inner chamber walls, let alone the 7.5-cm-thick outer chamber walls. The vendor has stated that if future testing or calculations show that the issue is real, one solution is to make two cuts: the first to separate the motor from the warhead and the second cut between the forward closure and the propellant to remove the former. If the forward closure is either removed from the motor or is ejected, the Engineering Assessment Attachment of the UXB International 2007 report states “… the case pressure will fall to the ambient (or nearly so), which will drop the burning rate to low values and cause the motor to be non-propulsive” (UXB International, 2007, p. 365). The Dynasafe technology has obtained a permit to destroy chemical weapons in Germany but not in the United States. Tests Conducted at GEKA Mustard Agent HD Test. The HD testing was conducted by operating the SDC unit in its normal mode, which was in compliance with all the environmental permits and procedures approved by the appropriate authorities of Germany. Three HD runs were conducted using 100-mm mortar rounds. For each run, either two or three mortars at a time were fed in a single batch to the SDC approximately three times per hour. The sampling for HD was at three ports, as shown in Figures 3-4a and 3-4b. These sampling ports were at the exit of the detonation chamber (Sampling Port 1), at the exit of the equalization tank and before the secondary combustion chamber (Sampling Port 1A), and at the exit of the quench (Sampling Port 2). Before the test could begin, a full day was spent calibrating the in-line flow meters for the air feed to the secondary combustion chamber. These calibrations were made using EPA standard protocols to validate this critical measurement. After this step was completed, the HD tests began. The HD tests were completed over 3 days. On all 3 days the test ran for 3 hours. On the first and third days, the SDC processed three HD projectiles per feeding, one every 20 minutes for a total of 27. On the second day, only two HD projectiles were fed to the SDC per feeding every 20 minutes for a total of 18. The results of the 3-day HD tests showed that a DE of >99.999999989 (nine nines) percent was achieved at Sampling Port 2 (after the secondary combustion chamber), with DEs ranging from 99.99481 percent to 99.99508 percent at Sampling Port 1 (before the secondary combustion chamber). A DE of 99.99988 percent was recorded at Sampling Port 1A. The results of this test would satisfy the requirements of the state of Kentucky for a DE of 99.9999 percent. Propellant Processing Configuration. The purpose of this test was to observe the behavior of propellant and aluminum as found in a noncontaminated M55 rocket motor and to demonstrate the ability of added water to absorb energy released from the propellant as that energy is conveyed to the offgas treatment system. Actual rockets were not used in the test. Instead, a propellant having characteristics similar to those of an M55 rocket and aluminum strips of the same composition as the fins in an M55 rocket were used. During the testing phase, the SDC was operated at its normal operating conditions and was fed containers with plastic bags holding 2.3 kg propellant, 2.3 kg aluminum pieces, and, in the later tests, water-filled 2-L plastic bottles with screw caps. Each container constituted a single feeding. During the 3 hours of testing, a processing rate of eight feedings per hour was maintained. The contents of each container in each hour were as follows: Hour 1 2.3 kg propellant, 2.3 kg aluminum strips, no water. Hour 2 2.3 kg propellant, 2.3 kg aluminum strips, 2.3 kg water. Hour 3 2.3 kg propellant, 2.3 kg aluminum strips, 4.6 kg water. There was no problem feeding the propellant or the aluminum or adding the water in 2 of the 3 hours. However, there was a problem with dumping the aluminum scrap. The material did not appear to be burning while inside the unit but began to burn when the chamber was detached from the feed section and rotated prior to dumping. It was decided to continue emptying the chamber. Some pieces of burning aluminum were discharged into the scrap bin, and the fire brigade controlled the burning using CO2 fire extinguishers. The scrap bin was then left to cool overnight. UXB said the 33 Site visit by Doug Medville, committee vice chair, to GEKA, Münster, Germany, August 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants FIGURE 3-4a Dynasafe SDC2000 flow diagram showing sampling ports. ET, equalization tank. SOURCE: UXB International, 2007. FIGURE 3-4b Dynasafe SDC2000 flow diagram showing sampling ports (continued). ID, induction. SOURCE: UXB International, 2007.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants test was a deliberate “overtest” of the ability of the SDC to handle aluminum. It reasoned that an M67 rocket motor normally contains only 0.28 kg aluminum per motor, giving an aluminum:propellant ratio of 3.2:100 rather than the 1:1 ratio in this test. More testing would appear to be warranted. The addition of the water also had a measurable effect on the peak stack gas flow, which decreased from 950 Nm3/hr without water to 860 Nm3/hr when an extra 2.3 kg (per feed) of water was added at every feeding. Also, the gas temperature at the exit of the SDC increased from 350°C to 400°C during the first hour without water but leveled off at 440°C during the second and third hours, when water was added. This shows that the addition of water keeps the SDC from overheating when propellant is fed and decreases the peak flow rates out of the SDC. The use of water could allow an increase in the rate at which munitions are fed to the SDC. Test Conducted at Structo The purpose of this testing, which took place in Kristinehamn, Sweden, was to confirm that the SDC was capable of processing noncontaminated M55 rocket motors without jamming or “bridging” of the metal parts when the scrap was removed from the chamber. Fifty simulated motor cases 110 mm in diameter × 1,092 mm long were made. The tubes were as long as the cylindrical cases of the rocket motors plus the closed fins (the uncut tubes). Since there was a possibility that the fins might deploy during the actual processing, 20 of the 50 tubes were modified to simulate a motor case with opened and locked fins (the cut tubes). During the tests, the SDC was operated in a cold mode, but the simulated rockets would not fit through the feed chamber at the top and had to be hand-fed through a chamber inspection door located on the side of the SDC outer closure. Since the feed chambers are sized according to the size of the different munitions, the vendor claims that this problem should be easily solved by enlarging the feed chamber on the SDC. With the SDC chamber rotated 90 degrees from its normal vertical orientation, simulated rockets were loaded so as to randomly orient the tubes. Three tests were performed. In the first test, 30 uncut tubes were fed into and removed from the chamber. In the second test, 20 cut tubes with attached parts simulating fins were fed and emptied. Finally, all 50 tubes, both cut and uncut, were fed and emptied. In all three tests the tubes “bridged” in the chamber, hindering their removal. The manufacturer claims this problem can be avoided by redesigning the discharge chute when a new system is built for application at BGAD or Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD). Thoughts on Design Changes and Upgrades The feed system and the scrap metal discharge system should be redesigned to resolve problems with processing whole M55 rocket motors. The redesigned systems would have to be tested to demonstrate their operability. Moreover, it would be prudent to obtain assurances that DDESB would grant approval to destroy whole noncontaminated rocket motors for the use of the SDC2000 system. EDS TECHNOLOGY The missions envisioned at the Blue Grass and Pueblo ACWA sites call for an ability to destroy more and larger chemical munitions than can be destroyed by the EDS Phase 1 (EDS-1). In response to the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project’s (NSCMP’s) requirement for similar capabilities, the EDS developer, Sandia National Laboratories, designed and fabricated the larger EDS Phase 2 (EDS-2). The discussion that follows focuses on the EDS-2. Because the EDS-2 was not fully described in the 2006 International Technologies report, the following section has more detail than the preceding sections on the vendor-supplied technologies. EDS-2 The EDS-2 can destroy munitions as large as 8-in. chemical projectiles. It can also destroy multiple chemical munitions at one time if the combined TNT-equivalent NEW of the rounds and of the shaped charges does not exceed the 4.8-lb NEW rating of the container.34 For example, it can destroy multiple rounds of smaller chemical munitions such as 75-mm artillery projectiles, 4.2-in. mortars, and German Traktor rockets.35 The EDS-2 is depicted in Figure 3-5. 34 Allan Caplan, System Development Group Leader, NSCMP, CMA, “Explosive destruction system (EDS)—A mobile treatment system,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008. 35 U.S. Army, “RCRA pre-application meeting for Pine Bluff explosive destruction system (PBEDS),” briefing on the NSCMP, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, April 22, 2004.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants FIGURE 3-5 Drawing of the EDS-2 vessel on its trailer. SOURCE: Allan Caplan, System Development Group Leader, NonStockpile Chemical Materiel Project, CMA, “Explosive destruction system (EDS)—A mobile treatment system,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008. The heart of the EDS-2 is an explosion containment vessel mounted on a flatbed trailer. The EDS-2 vessel has an inside diameter of 28 in., an inner length of 57 in., and a wall thickness of 3.6 in. It is fabricated from a 316 stainless steel forging and the door is fabricated from a separate forging. The vessel is designed to contain hundreds of detonations with explosive ratings of up to 4.8 lb TNT-equivalent NEW. It contains the explosive shock, metal fragments, and chemical agents released during the process that opens the munition. It also serves as a vessel for subsequent neutralization of the chemical agent and residual energetics from the munition. The neutralent is agitated during neutralization by rotating the containment vessel, which is heated by external band heaters. The operating cycle of the EDS-2 includes loading an unpacked munition, detonating shaped charges to cut open the munition and destroy its energetics, destroying chemical agent with neutralizing chemicals, and cleanup/maintenance. Loading The operating cycle begins when an unpacked chemical munition is placed in a fragment suppression system (FSS) consisting of two steel half-cylinders, one
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants above and one below the munition. The FSS takes the impact of small fragments in order to protect the wall of the EDS containment vessel. If multiple chemical munitions are to be treated simultaneously, they are placed in a rack supported in the FSS. The FSS also serves to mount and properly locate the shaped charges used for explosively opening the chemical munition in the EDS. The loaded FSS is placed inside the EDS-2 vessel using a movable loading table. Following preparation of the door sealing surface and installation of a new O-ring, the chamber door is closed and a leak test is conducted. While unpacking is the normal procedure, loading a munition in an overpack into the EDS and detonating through both the overpack and the munition has been done during NSCMP operations.36 Detonation The explosives used include linear and conical shaped charges. The linear shaped charges are used to explosively cut open the chemical munition and access its contents for chemical treatment. For treatment of a single munition, a conical shaped charge is used to detonate the burster inside the chemical munition. When multiple munitions are processed, linear charges are used to access the agent as well as the bursters. During the loading process, detonators are attached to the explosive shaped charges and shorted for safety. The detonator lead wires are connected to the external control by wires leading through a pass-through in the door of the containment vessel. Three pairs of wires provide redundant detonation circuits if the first (and second) attempt to initiate the detonation fails. The system is very reliable—the detonation system has never failed in all the field deployments of EDS systems.37 The chemical safety submittal for the EDS system to the DDESB was approved on a systemwide basis, which facilitates use of the EDS in various jurisdictions. Agent Neutralization After detonation has taken place, a neutralizing reagent is pumped into the EDS-2 vessel to treat the chemical fill and any remaining explosives. Reagents used in EDS systems include 20 percent aqueous sodium hydroxide for phosgene, 90 percent monoethanolamine (MEA)/water for nitrogen mustard (HN) and sulfur mustard (HD), and 45 percent MEA/water for the nerve agent GB (NRC, 2001). Reagents have also been developed and demonstrated for the destruction of nerve agent VX and the blister agent lewisite.38 Reactions take place at low pressures and low, but above ambient, temperatures. The solution containing neutralized chemical agent is retained in the vessel until analysis shows that the agent concentration is below its particular VSL. The liquid neutralent is treated as a hazardous waste and shipped to a permitted TSDF for treatment and disposal. Cleaning and Maintenance Following treatment of the chemical munition, the EDS-2 vessel is rinsed, cleaned, and inspected. This includes inspection of the sealing surface and the chamber door as well as replacement of the all-metal seal that contains the detonation and the O-ring seals that prevent release of the contents of the vessel. The vessel is washed with chemical reagent, if needed, and rinsed with water and detergent. Upon completion of a disposal campaign, final washes (e.g., water/acetic acid) are made. The resulting aqueous waste has traditionally been sent to a permitted TSDF for treatment and disposal. At the conclusion of the lewisite tests, the airborne levels of arsenic and mercury were found to be below the 8-hour time-weighted average limit adopted by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.39 The typical quantity of liquid wastes is 8-10 gallons per operating cycle. The expected source and nature of these wastes are presented in Table 2-2 of Systems and Technologies for the Treatment of Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel (NRC, 2002). 36 Personal communication between Allan Caplan, System Development Group Leader, NSCMP, CMA, and Margaret Novack, NRC, study director, November 5, 2008. 37 David Hoffman, CMA, “Transportable detonation chamber (TDC) at Schofield Barracks,” presentation to the committee, May 29, 2008. 38 Trish Weiss, EDS Systems Manager, Project Manager for NSCMP, “Explosive destruction system (EDS) lewisite and VX testing,” presentation to the committee that wrote the International Technologies report, September 7, 2005. 39 Trish Weiss, EDS Systems Manager, PMNSCMP, “Explosive destruction system (EDS) lewisite and VX testing,” presentation to the committee that wrote the International Technologies report, September 7, 2005.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants Changes in the Process Since Early 2006 The operating sequence that evolved during the production-scale operations at Pine Bluff Arsenal permitted efficient use of crews and equipment (Friedman, 2007). Typically, a day is required to load a set of chemical munitions into an EDS unit, detonate the shaped charges, inject and heat the neutralizing reagent, agitate the chamber to mix the reagent and residual agent, and wet the vessel’s inner walls. After the vessel cools overnight, the neutralent is analyzed to establish that it is suitable for further (off-site) treatment and disposal. During the second day of the work cycle, the vessel is drained and rinsed. Then the door is opened, debris is removed, and the vessel is cleaned and inspected to ensure that no damage occurred. The EDS unit is then ready for another cycle of operations. In the interest of safety and for staffing reasons, paired EDS-2 units carry out their detonations on alternate days. In this way, it was possible to destroy up to 30 small chemical munitions, such as 4.2-in. mortars, in a normal week.40 Additional Experience Since Early 2006 The original EDS-1 proved its worth in a series of field operations in the continental United States. The sites included Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado (10 GB bomblets); Camp Sibert, Alabama (one CG mortar round); and Spring Valley in Washington, D.C. (15 mustard agent HD artillery rounds). One EDS-1 and two EDS-2s have been used in the ongoing project to destroy 1,220 recovered chemical munitions at Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), Arkansas, as described below. To update the history of EDS units, operations since 2004 are tabulated in Table 3-6. The campaign at Pine Bluff is especially relevant to the potential ACWA applications because it involves the destruction of hundreds of old munitions, some of which were not suitable for safe dismantling. At least partly in response to NRC recommendations, the Army discontinued plans for a fixed facility at PBA (NRC, 2004). Instead, a team of mobile EDS units was deployed to PBA to destroy the 1,220 World War II chemical munitions stored there. Most of the 4.2-in. mortars were empty, but more than 100 con- TABLE 3-6 Recent Deployments of EDS Units Date Site Munitions Destroyed 2004 Dugway Proving Ground (Utah) 15 GB- or H-filled RCWM; 7 DOT bottles 2004-2006 Dover Air Force Base 9 HD 75-mm projectiles 2005 Aberdeen Proving Grounds (Maryland) 8 cylinders (7 AC, 1 CK) 2006 to present Pine Bluff Arsenal 1,065 to date; 4.2 in. mortars (HD); German Traktor rockets (HN-1) NOTE: AC, hydrogen cyanide; CK, cyanogen chloride; HD, distilled mustard; HN-1, nitrogen mustard; RCWM, recovered chemical warfare munitions. tained blister agents or unknown liquids. Only a few of the German Traktor rockets contained both chemical agent and propellant. There were also many other miscellaneous chemical munitions and samples. In the destruction operations, munitions removed from storage were inspected to determine whether they contained agent and/or energetics and if they did, which type of agent/energetic was involved. Those containing agent or energetics were destroyed in one of the three EDS units (one EDS-1, two EDS-2s) deployed to Pine Bluff. Typically, only two were operated simultaneously. The third was kept on standby or was dispatched for use at other locations. Future Plans To accommodate future requirements for the EDS concept, the Army and Sandia National Laboratories have generated conceptual designs for a larger, more productive EDS in Phase 3 of the EDS program (EDS-3). The development work has not yet been funded pending identification of an application in the NSCMP—for instance, a large burial site, where many hundreds of chemical munitions might need to be treated. The requirements fall into two categories: A larger double-chambered EDS vessel that would accommodate more chemical munitions. One objective would be to destroy up to four 155-mm chemical projectiles simultaneously, 40 Allan Caplan, System Development Group Leader, NSCMP, CMA, “Explosive destruction system (EDS)—A mobile treatment system,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants thus increasing the throughput with these large chemical munitions. Another would be to destroy a complete M55 rocket, including agent and propellant, although this would necessitate enhancing the explosion containment capacity. It is forecast that an EDS-3 version could destroy up to 12 mortar rounds or 12 75-mm projectiles at once. Another high-throughput concept would employ two double-chamber vessels that would be able to process 12 4.2-in. mortars at a time and to complete five process cycles per week (60 mortars).41 A new heating system based on the injection of steam into the containment vessel, which would entail replacing the external band system for heating the EDS-2 chamber. When combined with an active cooling system, this approach is expected to allow one detonation every day instead of one every other day by speeding the heating and cooling processes, which are currently considered to be rate limiting. REGULATORY APPROVAL AND PERMITTING General The primary environmental regulations that apply to the treatment of chemical munitions include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Air Act (CAA), and RCRA. In addition, DOD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards (DOD 6055.9-STD) mandate DDESB approval of a site safety submission for each application, although systemwide approval can be obtained allowing use anywhere in the United States with minimal supplementary information. NEPA requirements apply equally to all the EDTs. Under NEPA, the federal government must evaluate the environmental consequences of proposed actions and alternatives at federal facilities, considering public input. The NEPA process for ACWA was initiated shortly after passage of the National Defense Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-208), which established the ACWA program. In 2002, the ACWA program published a final environmental impact statement (EIS). Pursuant to the EIS, a Record of Decision was issued in July of that year that called for neutralization followed by biotreatment at PCAPP and in February 2003, for a Record of Decision calling for neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) at BGCAPP. The EDTs were not evaluated in the draft ACWA EIS of 2001. These technologies will need to be evaluated under NEPA. While an EIS could be required for these technologies, if their application is determined to have no significant impact, an environmental assessment could be all that is needed. Environmental assessments typically take far fewer resources and much less time to prepare than EISs. Because the NEPA process can take several years to complete, evaluation of NEPA requirements seems desirable for the use of EDTs at Pueblo and Blue Grass. From a regulatory perspective, all the EDTs evaluated in this report should be able to meet environmental regulatory requirements and achieve permitted status at both BGCAPP and PCAPP. The EDS has received permits in several states for destruction of chemical weapons. The TC-60 TDC has received a RCRA permit from the state of Hawaii for the destruction of chemical weapons. However, each EDT has some nuances that pose a challenge to regulatory approval and permitting. RCRA insists that a technology must demonstrate that it will be sufficiently protective of human health and the environment42 and has stringent requirements for public involvement in the permitting process. Also, the ACWA program should know that thermal treatment technologies for treating EDT offgas may be of particular concern to the public. Application of EDTs at ACWA sites will require RCRA operating permits. However, RCRA provides a research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) mechanism for obtaining permits for some technologies, particularly those that are new or that are intended to be used for waste materials whose destruction using the technology has not been yet demonstrated. The RD&D permit mechanism gives a permittee a lot of flexibility to adjust process and conditions to maximize treatment effectiveness, throughput, and efficiency. For both PCAPP and BGCAPP, the Army’s plan, approved by state regulators, has been to begin the neutralization/ 41 Allan Caplan, System Development Group Leader, NSCMP, CMA, “Explosive destruction system (EDS)—A mobile treatment system,” presentation to the committee, May 7, 2008. 42 The EDTs, being technologies that do not fit into established waste treatment categories under RCRA, will probably be permitted under RCRA Subpart X—Miscellaneous Units. Subpart X entails a performance demonstration. Rather than meeting set requirements, permittees for Subpart X units must demonstrate that technologies will be sufficiently protective of human health and the environment.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants biotreatment and neutralization/SCWO (respectively) processes under an RD&D permit and then, once the technologies have been demonstrated and become more routine, to transition seamlessly to a full RCRA operating permit.43 For the noncontaminated rocket motors, another concern involves PCB contamination of the M55 rocket SFTs. As noted in Chapter 1, M55 rocket SFTs are known to be contaminated with PCBs. If SFTs containing >50 ppm PCBs were to be treated using any of the EDTs along with or separately from the rocket motor itself, the EDT would require a facility permit under 40 CFR Part 761 of the TSCA. However, ACWA intends to separate the rocket warheads from their SFT segments, and the latter are to be disposed of off-site at a permitted TSCA facility. Also, Dynasafe has said it does not intend to process the SFTs through the Dynasafe SDC2000 facility.44 The situation for the SFT segments encasing the noncontaminated rocket motors had not been resolved at the time this report was being prepared.45,46 Lastly, a regulatory concern with all EDTs, including the EDS, involves the disposition of heavy metals that may be present in the munitions to be treated. For example, lead is a component of the propellant used for the M55 rockets. Mercury is known to be a contaminant in some of the mustard agent formulations. The Army and the technology providers must ascertain what issues, if any, must be addressed in managing whatever heavy metals may be present in secondary wastes. TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS The following subsections provide information on the regulatory situation for each of the EDTs under consideration. As mentioned in the Preface, useful input on this topic was obtained in discussions with Colorado and Kentucky regulators. Many questions were asked about the acceptability of certain features of the various EDTs to the regulators. In both states and for many, if not most, of the questions asked, the response by a regulator began with the words “The public will….” or “The public will not….” Regulators in both states made it very clear that activist public positions and regulatory decision making are inextricably linked. TDC The TDC system destroys the bulk of the agent and explosives in the chemical munitions by detonating donor explosives wrapped around the munitions. The agent and explosives are destroyed by the donor explosive detonation, achieving an initial DE of 99.99 percent for the agent. With the addition of thermal treatment of the offgas by catalytic oxidation (CATOX), the system achieves a DRE in excess of 99.9999 percent. Because of the offgas treatment system, the TDC would need to be added to the existing Title V Clean Air Act permit held by both BGCAPP and PCAPP; however, since the air emissions are considered a minor release an addition to the air permit is not expected to be an issue. As indicated previously, the TDC has been operated for munitions containing phosgene and chloropicrin chemical weapons in the United States (Schofield Barracks, Hawaii) under a RCRA emergency permit. Simpler versions of the technology have been operated at several locations within the United States for conventional weapons. The TDC technology, because it has not yet been applied for chemical weapons other than phosgene and chloropicrin in the United States, should be a good candidate for beginning operations through the use of an RD&D permit. Considering that the TDC produces a relatively small amount of secondary waste, including scrap metal, pea gravel, and spent lime, off-site treatment and disposal of secondary wastes are not going to be a big concern. Much less secondary waste will be produced by the TDC than by the planned neutralization of the bulk of the chemical weapons at both BGCAPP and PCAPP. In addition, off-the-shelf treatment technologies are available in the United States for treatment of the secondary wastes produced by the TDC. The primary concern with the TDC from a RCRA permitting perspective is the operation of the CATOX thermal treatment unit and the lack of a hold-test-release capability for the offgas. There may be some 43 Teleconference with Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, May 22, 2008; teleconference with Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection, July 22, 2008. 44 Personal communication between Harley Heaton, Vice President for Research, UXB International, Inc., and Richard Ayen, committee chair, August 3, 2008. 45 As also noted in Chapter 1, some of the SFT segments encasing some rocket motors are difficult to remove from the rocket motor body. However, Noblis claims to have developed and tested an effective procedure for removing the SFT segments from the rocket motors. 46 Personal communication between Tom Cain, Senior Principal Engineer, Noblis, and Richard Ayen, committee chair, September 19, 2008.
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants concern also about the formation of dioxins and furans in the treated offgas. Technically, the initial detonation combined with catalytic oxidation should preclude agent and other organics, including dioxins and furans, from being released into the atmosphere untreated. The CATOX technology, while a form of thermal treatment, is not an incineration technology. It must also be remembered that the bulk of the destruction of the chemical agent within the munition (on the order of 99.99 percent) is accomplished by the initial detonation. The treatment of the offgas is intended to destroy the 0.01 percent of agent potentially remaining in the offgas. From this perspective, that the TDC employs a CATOX process for treatment of the offgas should be a very minor concern to the public. Special studies assessing risk, such as multipathway health-risk assessments (MPHRAs), which are often conducted for incinerator operations, are not necessary. Catalytic oxidation is not incineration. From the regulatory perspective, as long as the technology can be shown to protect human health and the environment, there should be no impediment to use of a CATOX technology for treatment of the offgas. However, if the TDC were operated with a hold-test-release capability, it would probably be more palatable to public interest groups. The TDC also has received DDESB approval for its application at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Because the system does not have systemwide approval, DDESB would have to approve its application at Pueblo or Blue Grass. DAVINCH The DAVINCH system destroys the vast majority of the agent and explosives in the chemical munitions by detonating donor explosives wrapped around the munitions. The agent is destroyed by this detonation, which achieves an initial DE of >99.9999 percent. With the addition of cold plasma for thermal treatment of the offgas, the system achieves a DRE in excess of 99.999999 percent. Because of the offgas treatment system, the DAVINCH would need to be added to the existing Title V CAA permit held by both BGCAPP and PCAPP; however, the air emissions are considered a minor release, and achieving the addition to the air permit is not expected to be an issue. As indicated previously, the DAVINCH has not been operated for chemical weapons or any other explosive waste materials in the United States. For this reason, it should be an ideal candidate for beginning operations via an RD&D permit. Considering that the DAVINCH produces a relatively small amount of secondary wastes, including scrap metal, dust, calcium chloride, and aluminum oxide, off-site treatment/disposal of secondary wastes is not going to be a primary concern. Much less secondary waste is produced by the DAVINCH than is produced by the planned neutralization of the bulk of the chemical weapons at both BGCAPP and PCAPP. In addition, off-the-shelf treatment technologies are available in the United States for treatment of the secondary wastes produced by the DAVINCH. Because the DAVINCH employs a hold-test-release capability for the offgas, hold-test-release is not going to be a concern to public interest groups and should make the technology more palatable to regulators and public interest groups. The cold plasma technology, while a form of thermal treatment, is not an incineration technology. It must also be remembered that the bulk of the destruction of the chemical agent within the munition (on the order of 99.9999 percent) is accomplished by the initial detonation. The treatment of the offgas destroys more than 99.99 percent of the 0.0001 percent of agent potentially remaining in the offgas. From this standpoint, a cold plasma oxidation technology for treating the DAVINCH offgas should be of very little concern to the public. From the regulatory perspective, as long as the technology can be shown to be protective of human health and the environment, there should be no impediment to use of a cold plasma technology for treatment of the offgas. Because the DAVINCH, like the TDC, has not received DDESB approval of a site safety submission for application within the United States, DDESB approval would be required to apply it at Pueblo or Blue Grass. Dynasafe SDC The Dynasafe system destroys most of the agent and explosives in the chemical munitions by deflagration or detonation and subsequent heating of the munitions in an electrically heated containment vessel. No donor charges are needed. The heated containment vessel causes deflagration or detonation of the explosives within the munition, releasing agent. Some treatment is accomplished by the initial deflagration or detonation, but the bulk of treatment is accomplished by the heat imposed from within the containment vessel,
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants achieving an initial DE of 99.99 percent. With the addition of the secondary combustion afterburner for thermal treatment of the offgas, the Dynasafe system at Münster (Germany) achieves a DRE in excess of 99.9999 percent. However, the proposed U.S. version of the Dynasafe system would employ an FTO and there would be no secondary combustion chamber. Because of the offgas treatment system, the SDC would need to be added to the existing Title V CAA permit held by both BGCAPP and PCAPP; however, the air emissions are considered a minor release and getting the SDC added to the air permit is not expected to be a problem. As already mentioned, the Dynasafe technology has not been operated for chemical weapons or other waste explosives in the United States and should be an ideal candidate for beginning operations via an RD&D permit. Considering that the Dynasafe technology would produce a relatively small amount of secondary wastes, including scrap metal and a scrubber salts filter cake, off-site treatment and disposal of secondary wastes is not going to be much of a concern. The amount of secondary waste produced by the proposed U.S. version of the Dynasafe system will be much smaller than the amount of waste produced by the planned neutralization of the bulk of the chemical weapons at both BGCAPP and PCAPP. In addition, off-the-shelf treatment technologies are available in the United States for treatment of the secondary wastes produced by the SDC. The main concern with the Dynasafe technology from the perspective of RCRA permitting would be the operation of the secondary combustion thermal treatment unit and the absence of a hold-test-release capability for the offgas. Technically, because the secondary combustion unit will employ an open flame, it would be defined as incineration. This could be a concern for public interest groups, which have long opposed incineration technologies, particularly for chemical agents. To avoid this, Dynasafe has proposed the use of a flameless thermal oxidizer in place of secondary combustion. Technically, the initial deflagration or detonation combined with thermal treatment and secondary combustion should preclude agent and other organics from being released into the atmosphere untreated. The bulk of the destruction of the chemical agent within the munition (on the order of 99.99 percent) is accomplished by thermal treatment within the system. The treatment of the offgas is intended to destroy the 0.01 percent of agent that might remain in the offgas. From this perspective, whether the Dynasafe system employs secondary combustion or a flameless thermal oxidizer for treatment of the offgas should be a very minor concern to the public. But because the secondary combustion technology is incineration, if secondary combustion is used for the Dynasafe, the regulatory authorities may consider requiring in-depth studies, such as an MPHRA. Again, considering the fact that the offgas treatment technology is to be used to treat only the 0.01 percent of agent that may remain following initial treatment, the committee believes that an MPHRA is unnecessary. However, if Dynasafe employs secondary combustion and if the regulatory authorities determine that some type of risk assessment is needed, a screening-level MPHRA should suffice—a detailed MPHRA is not required unless the screening-level MPHRA shows the potential for concern. Of course, if a flameless system (which is not incineration) is used, a study assessing risk, often conducted for incinerator operations, is not necessary. From the regulatory perspective, as long as the technology chosen for treatment of the offgas can be shown to be protective of human health and the environment, there should be no impediment to its use. However, if the Dynasafe system employs secondary combustion technology, a hold-test-release capability becomes more important for public interest groups. Even if a flameless system is used, the presence of a hold-test-release capability would make the technology more acceptable to the public. As reported by Dynasafe, the system can be operated in a hold-test-release mode, but when operated in this manner it may not be as productive as the earlier design. The Dynasafe system also has not received DDESB approval for its application in the United States, which it would need for application at Pueblo or Blue Grass. EDS The EDS uses small shaped charges to open the chemical munition and consume the explosive in the burster and fuze. The agent is destroyed by the subsequent neutralization process, achieving a DRE of >99.9999 percent. Because no offgas treatment system is needed for the EDS, no addition to the CAA Title V permit for BGCAPP or PCAPP is needed. Similarly, because there is no offgas treatment, the potential production of dioxins and furans is not a concern. The EDS has been operated under RCRA permits at a variety of locations throughout the United States,
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Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants and regulators, the general public, and public interest groups have achieved a level of comfort with it. The system can therefore be operated under a full operating permit; a RCRA RD&D permit is not needed. The main concern with the EDS from a RCRA permitting perspective is the amount of secondary waste, specifically hydrolysate, produced when chemical weapons are treated. Because it is a RCRA hazardous waste that may contain agent degradation products, it will require subsequent treatment at a RCRA-permitted TSDF. The hydrolysate produced by the system can be tested for the presence of agent prior to subsequent management, effectively providing the system with a hold-test-release capability. Although the EDS produces large amounts of secondary wastes (primarily the 8 to 10 gallons of monoethanolamine (MEA)-based hydrolysate per detonation), the amount produced is much less than the amount of aqueous hydrolysate produced by the planned neutralization of the bulk of the chemical weapons at both BGCAPP and PCAPP. The disposal of EDS wastes by shipment to a TSDF for treatment has not been a problem in the many jurisdictions in which the EDS has operated. While environmental regulators will require that TSDFs be permitted for treatment of the waste hydrolysate, there is typically very little concern about the capability of the TSDFs to safely and effectively treat the waste. However, the general public and public interest groups may take issue with shipping the EDS hydrolysate to off-site locations, even considering its relatively small amount. If the EDS is selected for one or more applications at PCAPP, however, the Army will need to dispose of the MEA-based hydrolysate produced by the EDS in a treatment facility other than the planned biotreatment operation at PCAPP. The EDS also enjoys the advantage of having already achieved systemwide approval of the site safety submission from the DDESB. None of the other technologies evaluated in this report have received this type of broad approval. REFERENCES Asahina J., K. Koide, T. Shirakura, M. Ouchi, and T. Tada. 2007. Study on controlled detonation chamber system of chemical weapons (II): Implosion and sequential detonation. Science and Technology of Energetic Materials 68(2): 48-54. Beerens, K., B. Vanclooster, and M. Katayama. 2008. Construction Record of DAVINCH at Poelkapelle. Presented to the 11th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Interlaken, Switzerland, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2008/index.php. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. BGCAPP (Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant). 2004. Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act Research, Development and Demonstration Permit Application. Richmond, Ky.: Blue Grass Army Depot. Bixler, B. 2006. Controlled detonation of chemical munitions. Presented at the 9th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Luneburg, Germany, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2006/index.php. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. DiBerardo, R. 2007. Environmental characterization of the TC-60 Controlled Detonation Chamber. Presented at the 10th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Brussels, Belgium, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2007/. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. DiBerardo, R., T.A. Blades, and N. McFarlane. 2007. Demonstration/Validation of the TC-60 Controlled Detonation Chamber Porton Down, U.K., Final Demonstration Test Report, ECBC-SP-021, June. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center. Friedman, L. 2007. Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System (PBEDS). Presented at the 10th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Brussels, Belgium, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2007/. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. Katayama, M., and M. Ueda. 2006. Optimal treatment of detonation chamber off-gas. Presented at the 9th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Luneburg, Germany, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2006/index.php. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. Kitamura, R., M. Ueda, and J.K. Asahina. 2007. Surrogate test for M55 nerve agent rocket mortar by DAVINCH. Presented at the 10th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Brussels, Belgium, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2007/. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. Lefebvre, M.H. 2008. Controlled Detonation Chamber (CDC)—Achievements & Challenges. Presented to the 11th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Interlaken, Switzerland, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2008/index.php. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. Orfeuil, M. 1987. Electric Process Heating: Technologies/Equipment/Applications. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press. NRC (National Research Council). 2001. Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Disposal of Liquid Wastes from the Explosive Destruction System. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2002. Systems and Technologies for the Treatment of Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2004. Assessment of the Army Plan for the Pine Bluff Nonstockpile Facility. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2006. Review of International Technologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Stock, T.H., H. Heaton, H. Weigel, and H. Moskal. 2007. The Static Detonation Chamber—Agent destruction efficiency in a 10 cm HD mortar destruction campaign. Presented at the 10th International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in Brussels, Belgium, May. Available online at http://www.dstl.gov.uk/conferences/cwd/2007/. Last accessed on February 17, 2009. UXB International, Inc. 2007. Static Detonation Chamber Testing Using a Dynasafe SDC 2000. Final Report. Richmond, Ky.: Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant.