Appendix A
Chapter 4 from the 2006 NRC Report
Review of International Technologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel



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appendix a chapter 4 from the 2006 Nrc report Review of International Technologies for Destruction of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel 

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  4 Tier 1 International Munitions Processing Technologies INTRODUCTION for detonation processes would be useful to the U.S. Army because it would allow comparing the relative effectiveness In the course of its information gathering, the committee of different technologies. Also, although the level of perfor- recognized that one particular type of international technol- mance and the precise test used to measure such performance ogy has risen to prominence in addressing the cleanup of old is ultimately a decision for federal and state regulators, any and abandoned chemical weapons at sites in other countries. information the U.S. Army might obtain or generate on Detonation-type destruction technologies rely on the ability the performance of these technologies would certainly be of the energy from explosive charges within a containment helpful in obtaining regulatory approvals to deploy such vessel to efficiently destroy recovered chemical munitions technologies. Moreover, the process of developing a detailed and the agent and energetics contained therein. test procedure could form the basis for reaching a consensus There are several versions of detonation-type technolo- with regulators. Furthermore, many members of the public gies. An earlier version of the controlled detonation chamber interested in the destruction of CWM distinguish between (CDC) was reviewed by a previous National Research destruction efficiency (DE) and destruction and removal effi- Council committee. Since then, this technology has under- ciency (DRE).2 Thus, an accepted measure of performance gone further development and implementation in several for detonation technologies will assist the Army in address- European venues. Meanwhile, two more recent examples ing questions from the public (see also discussion of public of detonation-type technologies that are in use or being involvement in Chapter 2 and DREs in Chapter 3). developed for destroying recovered chemical warfare muni- However, determining such a measure of performance for tions have come to the committee’s attention, namely, the detonation processes appears to offer unusual challenges, Japanese detonation of ammunition in vacuum integrated and, based on the information available to the committee, the chamber (DAVINCH) technology and the Swedish Dynasafe committee believes the Army should specify requisite docu- technology. The committee considers these two technologies mentation from vendors and employ engineering contractors and the latest CDC technology as sufficiently capable and to review it to determine if the data provide a consistent mature to warrant Tier  status for further consideration by and reliable measure of performance. For other processes, the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) as an alternative to the explosive destruction system (EDS) currently used by NSCMP, or as a complementary means of 2For a definition of destruction efficiency, see . DE = 00 ((input output)/input) MeasUReMeNT Of PeRfORMaNCe fOR DeTONaTION TeCHNOlOgIes For destruction of a chemical weapon, input would be the quantity of agent in a munition and output would be the quantity of agent in all the final A discussion of the Tier  detonation-type technologies residual streams after the detonation process has destroyed that munition. For comparison, the definition of destruction and removal efficiency is will be informed by first considering appropriate means for gauging their performance. A measure of performance DRE = 00 [(feed rate emission rate)/(feed rate)] where emission rate is the rate at which the selected organic compound See the National Research Council report Systems and Technologies for exits the process in the exhaust gas stream. The DRE thus focuses on air the Treatment of Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel (2002). emissions while DE focuses on total destruction. 29

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  procedures have been established or are obvious and straight- entail process monitoring to ensure that they are operating as forward. Thus, the trial burn approach is well established for designed. Hence, in addition to being able to demonstrate an incinerators. A selected organic compound (which is more acceptable DRE, technologies must be able to demonstrate difficult to destroy than the typical waste burned in the incin- that agent is effectively destroyed and that secondary waste erator during normal permitted operation) is fed at a known streams, including gases vented into the atmosphere, do not rate to the process. The mass of each effluent stream is mea- contain agent above agreed-on levels. sured, along with the concentration of the selected organic compound. The degree of destruction is then calculated. For CONTROlleD DeTONaTION CHaMbeR TeCHNOlOgy incinerators, this is the DRE, which refers to “the percent of waste material that is either destroyed or otherwise removed Description from the waste feed” (ATSDR, 2005, p. 18). In the equation DRE = 100 [(feed rate emission The CDC, previously known as the Donovan blast cham- rate)/(feed rate)], the feed rate is the measured amount of ber or the contained detonation chamber, was developed and chemical in the wastes fed to the incinerator and the emis- is manufactured by DeMil International, Inc., of Huntsville, sion rate is the measured amount of a chemical in the stack Alabama. The CDC was applied earlier to replace open exhaust (ATSDR, 2005). The DRE measures the effective- detonation operations for destruction of conventional high- ness of the treatment process as a whole. explosive munitions. It provides a contained environment For neutralization, hydrolysis, and many other processes that prevents the release of blast fragments, heavy metals, that treat agent, the procedure is straightforward. Agent is and energetic by-products. It was later proposed that a CDC fed at a known rate or in a known amount to the process. could be used to destroy chemical warfare materiel (CWM) The mass of each effluent stream is measured, along with by detonation in its enclosed environment. The working the concentration of the agent. Generally, there is no formal assumption was that the heat and pressure of a contained DRE that applies to neutralization and hydrolysis processes, explosion would destroy the chemical agent, especially in the although one can perform such a calculation. wet environment produced by inclusion of water bags in the Detonation processes destroy whole munitions, in discrete detonation chamber. Initial tests on World War I munitions events. A procedure for determining the degree of destruction recovered in Belgium indicated that a high level of agent for a detonation process should ideally involve feeding com- destruction could be achieved. The preliminary results were plete munitions into the process; the feeding of neat agent reviewed in an NRC report (NRC, 2002). in place of complete munitions would not give meaningful Following the encouraging results of the Belgian tests, the information.3 U.S. Army has supported further testing in cooperation with One possible approach involves determining the mass of the British Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at the liquid in the munitions and the concentration of agent Porton Down, England. This further testing involved exten- in the liquid, then measuring the mass and agent concentra- sive modification of the basic Donovan blast chamber system tion in all the streams leaving the process. This approach to make it suitable for destruction of chemical munitions in could also involve measuring agent retained within the an U.S. regulatory context. The Belgian tests were performed system, i.e., within the detonation chamber, but this could with a relatively small T-10 unit that had undergone only be difficult. Information thus obtained could then be used to modest modifications to make it suitable for destroying toxic calculate the DRE. The committee anticipates that the DRE chemicals. The systems that have evolved from the Porton will be a more important number than the DE. It would also Down tests are much larger (requiring two 40-foot trailers be helpful to gather and report additional information gained for transport of the TC-25 or eight for the TC-60 vs. one for from analysis of effluent streams, such as quantity of dioxins the T-10). The larger systems can process larger weapons, and furans produced, quantities of Schedule 2 compounds, and most of the manual handling of munitions has been and the proportions of the three valence states of arsenic. eliminated (Bixler, 2005). Comparison of these measurements with similar EDS per- formance measurements would also be important. Description of Original Test Unit The DRE reflects how well the offgas management system is designed as well as how effectively the detonation destroys As tested in Belgium, the CDC consisted of three main agent. Both are important. In evaluating detonation-type components: the detonation chamber, an expansion chamber, technologies, the degree of agent destruction in the actual and an emissions control unit, the latter comprising a particle detonation event should be measured. Of course, permits filter and a bank of activated carbon adsorption beds (NRC, and regulatory approvals of such systems will typically 2002). The maximum explosive rating of the T-10 mobile unit is 12 pounds of TNT-equivalent, including the donor charge used to access the burster and the agent. 3As used here “complete munitions” means munitions containing either The detonation chamber is connected to a larger expansion agent or a chemical surrogate that is more difficult to destroy than the chamber. A projectile wrapped in explosive is mounted in the chemical agent that is most resistant to destruction.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  Current TC-25 and TC-60 Chemical Munitions detonation chamber. The floor of the chamber is covered Destruction Units with pea gravel, which absorbs some of the blast energy. The gravel is renewed periodically because it fractures during the The CDC T-10 model tested in Belgium can treat com- explosions. Bags containing water are suspended near the plete chemical munitions up to 105-mm in diameter. A larger projectile to help absorb blast energy and to produce steam, mobile unit (TC-25) was tested extensively at Porton Down, which reacts with agent vapors. After the detonation chamber England (Blades et al., 2004) (see Figure 4-1). A still larger is loaded, its entry port is sealed and the exit from the expan- unit (TC-60) with an explosive capacity of 60 pounds of sion chamber is closed. After the explosive is detonated, the TNT-equivalent is now available (Bixler, 2005). It can handle chambers are kept sealed for about 2 minutes to maintain munitions over 200 mm in diameter, according to the manu- heat and pressure. The gases are then vented through the facturer. Table 4-1 provides the dimensions of the pressure main duct to the baghouse and the carbon adsorption beds. chambers for the three CDC models. Gases are monitored at several points in the CDC system The latest versions incorporate a mechanical system to for agent, carbon monoxide, and volatile organics as well as move explosive-encased munitions from the preparation for agent at the exit duct outlet. The concentrations of par- area through a reduced pressure vestibule into the detonation ticulates suspended in the vapors, such as soot, gravel dust, chamber. Double doors on the detonation chamber minimize and metal oxides, were also monitored during the Phase 1 any chance that agent vapors or detonation debris might tests (De Bisschop and Blades, 2002). Water vapor from the escape. For standard varieties of munitions, the explosive explosives and from the explosion-quenching water bags charge is precast in a plastic form that can be slipped over the collects on the charcoal filters.4 projectile. This packaging mode minimizes worker contact After the detonation, the atmosphere in the detonation with the munitions and facilitates the mechanical transport chamber clears fairly rapidly as air is drawn through the of the projectile into the detonation chamber. Nonstandard system to remove residual organic vapors, thereby permitting items may require wrapping the munitions in sheet explosive, reentry for placement of the next round. During the tests in as was done in Belgium. Belgium, 15 chemical munitions were treated in the CDC in In the detonation chamber itself, armor plate can be 3 hours, including 20-minute breaks after every five muni- affixed to the walls to reduce the likelihood of damage by tions (U.S. Army, 2001). This amounted to an average treat- flying metal fragments. The experience to date suggests that ment time of 12 minutes per munition, including the time the chamber will retain full integrity for thousands of shots. for breaks. Analysis of the pea gravel and of wipe samples Predicted lifetime is greater than 200,000 shots (Bixler, from the chamber walls showed low agent concentrations 2005). Injection of hot air or gaseous oxygen into the deto- (1.2 to 64.4 mg/kg in pea gravel; 0.39 to 78.65 mg/m2 in nation and expansion chambers facilitates decomposition of wipe samples from detonation chamber) during the Belgian any chemical agent adhering to the walls or adsorbed on the test series (De Bisschop and Blades, 2002). pea gravel or other solids. The main waste materials from destroying chemical A significant change in operating procedure from that munitions were solids: soot, charcoal (from the filters), used in the Belgian tests is applied in decontaminating the pea gravel, inorganic dust, and metal fragments from the chambers in preparation for maintenance. In the early tests, weapons. The major liquid waste from the CDC was spent the walls of the chambers and the pea gravel were washed hypochlorite solution from decontamination of the system with sodium hypochlorite (bleach) solution to oxidize any prior to maintenance operations.5 The solids, which may residual chemical agent. This procedure was effective but have been contaminated with traces of chemical agent and required much manual effort and resulted in a liquid waste explosives residues, were packaged in plastic bags and that required separate disposal. In the revised procedure, the placed in shipping containers that were sent to a commercial chambers are flushed with hot (450 F) air for up to 24 hours hazardous waste incinerator for disposal. to destroy residual agent. An alternative procedure is to detonate a small explosive charge that destroys the residual agent thermally. Both procedures reduce worker exposure and eliminate the generation of a liquid waste stream (Bixler, 2005). The back end of the system, into which the offgases from the expansion chamber vent, has also been modified 4The committee noted that water vapor competes with organic species extensively (Blades et al., 2004). The vapors and particulates for sites on the charcoal filters. Saturation of these sites with water vapor could reduce the effectiveness of the filters in removing organic species from arising from the detonation of the munition pass through a the emission stream (NRC, 2002). In the current system, agent monitoring reactive-bed filter (hydrated lime or sodium bicarbonate) to between the two series-mounted carbon filter beds can detect overloading remove acidic gases and a porous ceramic filter to collect of the first filter bed before any possible breakthrough from the overall particulates, including soot and dust from the pea gravel. system. A lime precoating on the ceramic scavenges acidic vapors 5Personal communications between Herbert C. De Bisschop, Belgian Military Academy, and George W. Parshall, July 25, 2001.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  Reactor Blast Chamber Carbon Adsorption Beds Expansion Candle Catalytic Chamber Filter Cooler Oxidizer Process Fan Dilution Hot Gas Dilution Air Generator Air Temporary Spool Piece Lime Feed Decon Hot Gas Generator Test Building Inside Outside Air Water Tank Chiller Compressor Generator Propane FIGURE 4-1 TC-25 CDC system layout. SOURCE: Blades et al., 2004. TABLE 4-1 Dimensions of the Pressure Chambers in Three CDC Models Designed for Destroying Chemical Warfare Agents Detonation Chamber Expansion Tank Volume (m3) Volume (m3) Total Volume (m3) CDC Model Interior (m) Interior (m) T-10 1.524 1.524 1.524 3.5 2 2 2.3 9.2 12.7 TC-25 1.981 2.286 2.845 12.9 2.438 2.438 10.515 62.5 75.4 2.286 dia 10.516a TC-60 PD 2.438 2.438 3.657 21.5 43.1 64.6 aThe expansion tank for Model TC-60 PD is cylindrical. SOURCE: Briefing by CH2MHILL to Thales and the Délegation Générale pour l’Armament, October 2005. that escape the reactive filter. A catalytic oxidation unit the gas stream indicates that no detectable agent reaches the (CATOX)6 oxidizes carbon monoxide and organic vapors adsorption bed.8 from the gas stream prior to venting through a two-stage carbon adsorption bed system. MINICAMS7 monitoring of 6A CATOX unit facilitates the oxidation of carbon monoxide, hydrogen, and volatile organic compounds contained in an air stream such as that collects an air sample, performs an analysis, and reports the result. Reported emerging from the particle filter in the pollution control system of the CDC. agent concentrations above a user-set threshold generate an alarm status, Generally, the air stream is passed through a bed of a catalytic solid that acts which can be reported in various ways (see ). 7A MINICAMS is an automatic, near-real-time continuous air monitor- 8Controlled detonation chamber (CDC) update. Briefing by DeMil ing system using gas chromatography and sample collection with a solid- International to the Non-Stockpile Program Core Users Group, November adsorbent preconcentrator or fixed-volume sample loop. The MINICAMS 2004.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 Country-by-Country Experience Phase II demonstration/validation testing was conducted at Porton Down in 2004 (Bixler, 2005). The tests included Belgium is the only nation in which the CDC has been detonation of two munitions per shot, a key point in establish- used in a production mode for destroying chemical weapons. ing the potential throughput of the CDC. Extensive computer Although tests were carried out with a variety of World War control and safety interlocks were added to regulate contact I chemical agents and munitions, the CDC has been used of any agent vapors with the treatment system and to remove primarily to destroy German 77-mm artillery projectiles any opportunity for a detonation to occur before the complete containing Clark II (diphenylcyanoarsine) agent, an arsenical system is ready for operations. irritant. The system has been generally satisfactory, and over Another series of tests at Porton Down was scheduled 2,000 such projectiles have been destroyed in 5 years. for early 2006. A major goal of these demonstrations was The United States and the United Kingdom have col- to demonstrate the potential throughput of the TC-60 CDC. laborated on a series of tests that demonstrated the ability Modeling indicates that 22 shots (up to 40 munitions)9 can be of a transportable CDC to safely destroy other chemical conducted in a 10-hour shift (DeMil International, 2005a). munitions that may be found at sites in the United States and the United Kingdom (Blades et al., 2004). Many improve- Process Efficacy/Throughput ments have been made to the CDC system to reduce manual operations, to simplify waste disposal, and to ensure that The CDC appears to be well suited for destroying a range chemical agent vapors do not escape into the environment. of either chemical or conventional munitions (NRC, 2002). Pending successful completion of a test series under way in While it has yet to be tested for the destruction of nerve early 2006, the system should be ready for implementation agents (cf. Table B-2), the hot, wet, oxidizing atmosphere if it proves cost effective and publicly acceptable. in its detonation chamber can reasonably be expected to decompose these compounds rapidly. The CDC has also not Evaluation Factors Analysis for CDC been demonstrated for munitions encased in overpacks for storage. Process Maturity The DE achieved by the detonation alone appeared to be above 99 percent, as measured by the postdetonation envi- The use of the CDC to destroy chemical munitions has ronment in the Belgian tests (De Bisschop and Blades, 2002). been demonstrated in a series of campaigns over a 5-year A similar analysis done in the U.S. Army/U.K. Defence period. As mentioned above, the first tests were carried out Science and Technology Laboratory tests gave a DE from in Belgium in May and June 2001. During those tests, live detonation of 99.408 to 99.998 percent in a series of five munitions containing sulfur mustard agent, Clark arsenical tests with HD-loaded 4.2-inch mortars. In five tests in which agent, and phosgene were destroyed. The original Donovan agent destruction was enhanced by the addition of gaseous CDC system and the operating procedure were modified to oxygen to the detonation chamber prior to the blast, the DEs enhance worker safety and reduce potential emissions of from detonation ranged from 99.965 to 99.996 percent.10 residual chemical agent or agent decomposition products. These calculated efficiencies were based on measurement of Extensive monitoring was conducted to determine agent DE residual agent in the pea gravel and the walls of the detona- and establish the quantity and nature of the decomposition tion chamber. No residual agent was found downstream in products (De Bisschop and Blades, 2002). the expansion chamber or the pollution control system. Subsequently, the Belgian military used the TC-60 CDC The more important measure from the viewpoint of pre- in a production mode to destroy part of its large stock- venting releases that might endanger workers, the public, pile of recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) at or the environment is the DRE. No published DRE figure Poelkapelle. Over 2,000 German 77-mm projectiles contain- has been found, but it is likely to be as least 99.9999 per- ing Clark arsenical agents were destroyed in the T-60 unit cent (“six nines”) because the posttreatments reduce agent (Bixler, 2005). concentrations to below detectable levels as measured by a Following the success of the Belgian testing, the U.S. MINICAMS before the offgases reach the carbon adsorption Army supported a series of tests at Porton Down in the beds (Bixler, 2005).11 It does not, however, qualify as a hold- United Kingdom to demonstrate the usefulness of the CDC and-test system like the EDS. for operations in the United States. These tests included modifications of the system to enhance DE, to improve worker safety, to improve productivity, and to minimize any 9Multiple 75-mm projectiles or 4.2-in. mortars can be treated in a single possibility for escape of agent vapors. detonation operation. Phase I testing was carried out from April to September 10 Brint Bixler, CH2MHILL, responses to committee questions of 2003 (Blades et al., 2004). A variety of munition types contain- February 6, 2006. ing sulfur mustard agent, phosgene, a phosgene-chloropicrin 11Although the reference does not provide a method detection limit for the mixture, and a smoke composition were destroyed. MINICAMS as used in this situation, the MINICAMS can generally detect HD at levels of 0.001 mg/m3 and sometimes lower (NRC, 2005).

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  TABLE 4-2 Estimated Throughput Rates for CDC TC-60 Munition Munitions per Cycle Cycles per 10-hr Day Munitions per 10-hr Day 4.2-in. mortar, M1 2 20 40 75-mm projectile, M64 2 20 40 5-in. projectile, MK VI 1 22 22 5-in. projectile, MK 54 1 22 22 155-mm projectile, MK II 1 22 22 8-in. projectile, T174 1 22 22 Bomblet, M139 3 20 60 105-mm projectile, M60 1 22 22 6a 100-lb bomb, M47 — 30 5b 115-lb bomb, M70 — 30 aAgent drained into five 20-lb lots; each lot detonated in CDC. Five 20-lb lots/bomb × 6 bombs/day = 30 cycles/day. bAgent drained into six 20-lb lots; each lot detonated in CDC. Six 20-lb lots/bomb × 5 bombs/day = 30 cycles/day. SOURCE: CH2MHILL, responses to committee questions of February 6, 2006. Models of the CDC up to the TC-60 are designed to be tions included washing the walls and floor of the chamber transportable although there may be some restrictions on with decontamination solution. Workers also packed agent- road transport because of the physical size of the detonation contaminated filter material for shipment to a TSDF (De chamber. These models are designed to be set up within Bisschop and Blades, 2002). 5 days. The typical operating crew comprises 18 staff, The modifications applied during the Porton Down including laboratory, safety and supervisory personnel tests reduced manual operations by slipping precast donor (DeMil International, 2005b). explosives over the projectile and mechanically moving the Because there is no time-consuming neutralization step, round into the detonation chamber. Even in the advanced the CDC’s throughput could be much higher than that of the TC-60 system, however, there remains a manual step. EDS, which conducts only one detonation every other day. Between shots, an operator must reach inside the door to However, the comparison is complicated by the fact that the the detonation chamber to unplug the electrical connector EDS can destroy more than one munition per shot, depend- for the detonator from the last detonation, then plug in the ing on the size of the munitions. The EDS-1 can handle three connector for the next detonation. This approach might mortar rounds, and the EDS-2 has destroyed as many as six slightly increase the potential for worker exposure, but it per shot. As noted above, the CDC has demonstrated destruc- eliminates the chance of mechanical failure of an automated tion of two munitions per shot and could potentially destroy plug connection system. 40 projectiles per 10-hour shift. Estimated throughput rates Routine munition preparation operations are conducted per 10-hour day for representative U.S. munitions are shown by workers in Level C PPE. Level B PPE, offering a higher in Table 4-2. The current CDC also has the advantage in level of protection than Level C, is used for maintenance operation of generating little or no liquid waste that requires work in and around the chambers (Blades et al., 2004). A subsequent processing, in contrast with the substantial process hazards analysis for the current TC-60 model was neutralent and rinsate effluents produced with the EDS. conducted in mid-2005 (DeMil International, 2004). Accord- ing to the technology proponent, it was a “qualitative analysis prepared in accordance with U.S. Army’s AR 385-64 and Process Safety AR 385-61 directives, and Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. . . .”12 The analysis covered an extensive range The continuing development of the CDC has significantly reduced the manual operations in the treatment of CWM. The of operations, failure modes, and corrective actions and original T-10 system tested in Belgium involved personal provided qualitative severity assessments of failure modes. protective equipment (PPE)-clad workers in operations Supporting systems such as that which supplies oxygen to such as wrapping projectiles in sheet explosive, moving the the detonation chamber were included in the evaluations and projectile into the detonation chamber, and connecting fuzes process modifications. It was reported by the technology and detonators. After detonation and cooling of the chamber, vendor that this process hazards analysis had been reviewed the workers had to prepare the chamber for reloading despite the presence of traces of agent on the chamber walls and 12 Brint Bixler, CH2MHILL, responses to committee questions of the pea gravel. Preparation for weekly maintenance opera- February 6, 2006.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  Lime from the reactive bed filter, and and agreed with by the U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.13 Carbon from adsorption units. The substitution of hot air purging for washing the It was reported that the hot air purging (450 F for chamber and detonation debris with decontamination solu- 24 hours) yields solids in a condition suitable for transport tion removed a set of operations that probably constituted under government control (Blades et al., 2004). Some post- a significant risk of agent exposure. The improvements to treatment, such as smelting for metal scrap or incineration for the pollution control system seem to have minimized agent- carbon, may be required if the solids are not to be disposed contaminated waste materials (Bixler, 2005). in a hazardous waste landfill. Public and Regulatory Acceptability in a U.S. Context Process Cost Issues The CDC has not been permitted for use in destroying No quantitative cost information was available to the com- CWM in the United States, although it has been used suc- mittee, but some qualitative factors indicate that the CDC cessfully in Europe. Additional testing of the CDC may be technology may be cost effective for some non-stockpile required if the system is to be permitted in the United States applications. Chief among these factors is the use of the for treatment of CWM. The system’s DE from detonation CDC for RCWM destruction operations in Belgium over a of 99 to 99.99 percent is modest; the DRE of the entire period of almost 5 years, including an upgrade in technol- system, including thermal decontamination and offgas treat- ogy from a prototype version of the T-10 model to the more ment, would be much higher. In extensive testing at Porton sophisticated TC-60 model. Down, agent vapors were never detected at the entrance to Similarly, extensive U.S. experience with destruction of the carbon adsorption bed, let alone the exit (DiBerardo, conventional and agent-like munitions (smokes, white phos- 2004). Evidently, the offgas cleanup prior to the adsorption phorus, CS agent) indicates that the basic CDC technology beds was effective, and a DRE of at least 99.9999 percent is cost effective for destroying projectiles and other types of may be assumed. explosive-containing munitions in a U.S. context. Unlike the EDS and the DAVINCH, the CDC does not Perhaps the most appropriate technology against which have provisions for holding, testing, and retreating detona- to compare cost effectiveness in non-stockpile applications tion debris before opening the detonation chamber, a feature is the EDS-2, which, like the CDC, performs the complete that many public stakeholders desire. sequence of accessing the chemical agent, destroying the Public concerns in the United States about using the agent, and yielding solid debris that may be disposed of by a CDC to treat chemical munitions are not known at this time. TSDF. For small caches of RCWM (one or two munitions), a However, the extensive U.S. use of the CDC for destruction comparison between the EDS and the T-10 model of the CDC of conventional munitions, including at the Naval Surface may be appropriate because they appear to be comparable in Warfare Center (Bixler, 2005), the Massachusetts Military complexity and mobility. A detailed analysis of costs, includ- Reservation, and the Blue Grass Chemical Depot, may con- ing those of waste disposal, would be necessary to see if the tribute to public acceptance. The operations at Blue Grass were conducted under a RCRA permit.14 The experience CDC offers any advantages over the EDS for sites involving “small finds,” i.e., limited numbers of items. with conventional munitions seems to demonstrate that the For large caches of RCWM such as may be found at old CDC can be operated without noise or vibration problems burial sites, the presumed greater productivity (munitions per for its neighbors. week) of the larger CDC systems would seem to offer a cost advantage over the EDS-2. Again, a detailed analysis based Secondary Waste Issues on productivity demonstrated in the 2006 Porton Down tests would be required to establish the presumed cost advantage. Since the introduction of hot air purging for the CDC In this type of operation, the CDC should also be compared system, the secondary waste concerns regarding CDC opera- to transportable versions of the DAVINCH and Dynasafe tions have been substantially reduced. The primary wastes systems. are solids: Munition fragments, Summary Pea gravel and dust, The CDC system is relatively mature, having been used in a production mode for destroying RCWM in Belgium for more than 4 years in addition to also having been used 13 Brint Bixler, CH2MHILL, responses to committee questions of extensively in the United States for destroying conventional February 6, 2006. 14Meeting between Brint Bixler and John Coffey, CH2MHILL, and com- munitions. Modifications made during testing at Porton mittee representatives, Keck Center of the National Academies, Washington, Down have minimized manual operations and have almost D.C., January 30, 2006.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  entirely eliminated the production of liquid wastes. Agent controlled detonation system for the disposal of chemical munitions.15 DAVINCH technology was developed by the emissions during normal operations appear to have been completely eliminated. Japanese company Kobe Steel, a manufacturer of large The basic design and operating principles of the CDC are steel pressure vessels. Munitions placed in the DAVINCH simple. Munitions are encased in explosive and loaded into vessel are detonated in a near vacuum using a slurry explo- a large, almost cubical, double-walled steel chamber along sive to open the munitions and access the chemical agent. with bags of water for thermal control and steam generation. The agent is destroyed as a result of the high temperature The system is sealed and the explosive is detonated. This (3000K) and pressure (10 gigapascals) generated by the explosion breaks open the munition, detonates any energet- shock wave, followed by high-speed cavitation and then a ics contained therein, and releases the chemical agent. The fireball. DAVINCH is a dry process in that no post-detonation heat, oxygen, and steam in the detonation and expansion reagent is used because the agent is destroyed in the vessel chambers destroy over 99.99 percent of the chemical agent. (see Figure 4-2). Starting immediately after detonation and proceeding over DAVINCH technology is a successor to an explosion a 10-15 minute period, the offgases are released to the pol- containment vessel (DV10) that was used in 2000 at Lake lution control system, where they are filtered, the acidity Kussharo on Hokkaido Island in Japan to explosively access is neutralized, and organic matter is oxidized catalytically. 26 World War II bombs containing a mixture of mustard These steps reduce the agent concentration below detection agent and lewisite (Yellow bombs). Holes were drilled in limits before the gases are vented through a bank of carbon the bombs and the agent was drained and neutralized. The adsorption beds. The internals of the destruction systems are drained bombs, containing explosives, were placed in the decontaminated with hot air, which also decontaminates the DV10 and destroyed using slurry explosives. A successor residual solids such as munition fragments. vessel was developed that was able to both access the agent The CDC is safe, reliable, and effective. It is made in three and destroy it, as noted above. This vessel, the DV45, has transportable versions that are appropriate for destroying been used at Kanda Port in Kyushu Island, Japan, to destroy small, medium, and large numbers of munitions. In addition, recovered Yellow bombs and recovered Red bombs contain- there is a large fixed model that could be used at a large burial ing Clark I and Clark II vomiting agents (DC/DA) (see Fig- site or firing range. ure 4-3). Between October 2004 and May 2005, 100 Yellow The smallest mobile CDC model (T-10) seems generally bombs weighing 50 kg each and 500 Red bombs weighing comparable to the EDS-2 in size and complexity. The T-10 15 kg each were destroyed in the DV45. The experience in has an advantage relative to the EDS in that it produces little using DAVINCH at Kanda Port is described in Lefebvre et or no liquid waste, but it lacks the hold-test-release capabil- al. (2005a), Asahina et al. (2005), and Asahina (2005). A ity of the EDS for assuring that offgases are devoid of agent detailed description of the DAVINCH, its design basis, its emissions. A detailed cost calculation would be required to structural and operational characteristics, and the testing conducted to date are found in Lefebvre et al. (2005b).16 determine the cost effectiveness of the CDC T-10 vs. the EDS-2 for disposing of small RCWM caches (ones or twos). The DAVINCH is a double-walled steel chamber. The The presumed greater productivity of the larger CDC models replaceable inner vessel is made of armor steel and the outer (TC-25 and TC-60) might make them more cost effective for vessel is made of multilayered carbon steel plates with a destroying large quantities of RCWM. corrosion- and stress-crack-resistant inner plate made of, The CDC might gain public and regulatory acceptance in for example, stainless steel, Hastalloy, or a similar material. the United States without excessive difficulty on the basis of The chambers are separated by air. Owing to its double-wall extensive prior operating experience and testing, but some design and the materials of construction, the DAVINCH community members may view the lack of a hold-test-release has the ability to confine high-pressure detonation gases, capability as a disadvantage. The committee does not believe eliminating the need for an expansion tank to contain them that this lack is a significant technical issue, given the batch following a detonation. nature of the process and the proven effectiveness of the The DV45 weighs about 75 tons and has an explosive con- offgas treatment system. Still, it believes that this is one of tainment capacity of 45 kg TNT-equivalent. Its inner vessel the many factors that must be considered when comparing has an inside diameter of 2.6 meters and an inner length of the CDC with other detonation technologies. 3.5 meters. In contrast, the U.S. EDS-2 has a diameter of 0.74 meters and a length of 1.42 meters. A larger version DeTONaTION Of aMMUNITION IN VaCUUM INTegRaTeD CHaMbeR 15Except where otherwise noted, the majority of the technical information in this section came from various meetings with representatives of Kobe Description Steel (Japan) (see Appendix D). 16Joseph Asahina, Kobe Steel, “DAVINCH: Detonation of ammunition DAVINCH is a trademarked acronym for the detonation in vacuum integrated chamber,” presentation to representatives of the com- of ammunition in a vacuum integrated chamber and is a mittee on November 11, 2005.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  Chemical Agent Area of Compression Shock Wave Detonation Wave Chemical Munition Donor Charge Chemical Agent Destruction Mechanism Instant compression by propagating shock wave 1st step pressure of 10 GPa (similar phenomenon is observed in cavitation bubbles when bubbles collapse sonochemistry) High-speed mixing of chemical agent with detonation 2nd step gas at high pressure and high temperature Thermal decomposition by the long-lasting fireball of 3rd step 2000 C for 0.5 sec. FIGURE 4-2 DAVINCH three-stage destruction mechanism. SOURCE: Joseph Asahina, Kobe Steel, December 8, 2005. Off-gas Controlled Treatment Detonation Identification Storage Hold Tank Meets STEL Charcoal Cold Plasma Drain 800 m Kanda Port about Fragments 600 munitions Drain (meets GPL level) To Conventional Waste Treatment Facility FIGURE 4-3 Outline of the Kanda project. SOURCE: Joseph Asahina, Kobe Steel, December 8, 2005.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006)  of DAVINCH, the DV65, has been fabricated and is available. is the volume of the DAVINCH inner vessel. As a result, an It has the same diameter as the DV45 but is longer and has an expansion tank is not needed. explosion containment capacity of 65 kg TNT-equivalent. The initial shock wave from the detonation of explosives Munitions to be destroyed in a DAVINCH vessel are increases the pressure in the inner vessel to up to thousands placed in a box one munition per box with spacers at each of atmospheres (10 gigapascals) in 0.3 milliseconds. As corner to provide room for injecting an emulsive explosive illustrated in Figure 4-2, agent is destroyed as a result of a around the munition. The explosive is extruded into the gap three-sequential-step process: between the munition and the inner wall of the box either manually or automatically. The emulsion explosive can also 1. Destruction by a propagating detonation shock wave be injected into the overpacks of leaking munitions or, if that compresses the agent. there is a filler between the overpack and the munition, the 2. Destruction due to high-temperature and high-pressure explosive can be placed outside the overpack. In this case, detonation gases. additional donor explosive is added to ensure that the explo- 3. Thermal destruction resulting from a 2000 C fireball sive in the munition burster is sympathetically detonated by in the vessel. A proprietary additive increases the time the blast. duration of the fireball to 0.5 seconds to ensure agent A detonator is inserted into the slurry explosive that sur- destruction. rounds the munition and the top of the box and a lifting sling is attached. The munition in its box, with the detonator and Following the detonation, air is introduced into the detonation wire attached, is lifted by the sling and carried inner vessel, with atmospheric pressure reached after about into the vessel by a robotic arm mounted on an operation 1 minute. Using the vacuum pump, the internal pressure deck that does not touch the inner walls of the vessel. The in the vessel is again reduced to a near vacuum in order to robotic arm hangs the sling from a hook on a linear rack at remove the offgases resulting from the detonation of muni- the top of the vessel and then connects the firing wire to a tions and destruction of agent and energetics. If agent is plug-in fixture mounted inside the vessel door. The prongs at detected in the offgas, the capability exists to recycle the gas the end of the detonation wire are inserted by the robotic arm back into the vessel. into a sealed, gas-tight port in the side of the vessel. Several methods are available to cleanse the DAVINCH The boxed munitions are positioned along the long axis vessels. An electrostatically charged decontamination aero- of the vessel a specific distance apart depending on their sol can be sprayed in the inner vessel and in the gap between configuration and contents. The DAVINCH contains an air- the inner and outer vessel in the event that any residual agent tight, circular, double-flanged door that is remotely opened is detected. This is done prior to removing the replaceable and closed. The door is not hinged but moves laterally until inner vessel. A water jet spray is available to rinse out this it is aligned with the vessel. It is then moved toward the decontamination solution. Finally, following the evacuation vessel until contact is established and then secured in place. of the offgas from the inner vessel, the DAVINCH door can Following a detonation, the door’s flanges and gasket can be be opened and an explosive cleansing shot can be placed cleaned using the same robotic arm that moves munitions inside. The door is closed and the explosive charge detonated into the inner vessel. in the empty inner vessel to destroy any residual agent by After the door is sealed, air is evacuated from the inner means of the shock wave and heat from the detonation of vessel using a vacuum pump. This process takes about the explosive. 10 minutes. The resulting vacuum reduces noise, vibra- Munition fragments are left in the inner vessel and are tion, and blast pressure, thus increasing the vessel life. The removed by the robotic arm after a period of time, about once munitions are then detonated under near-vacuum condi- per week. As a result of the heat generated by the fireball, the tions (about 0.2 psi). Using an electric delay detonator, the metal fragments are decontaminated to a point such that they munitions are sequentially detonated such that the second are releasable to the public that is, they do not exceed the munition is detonated before the shock wave from detonation Centers for Disease Control’s recommended general popula- of the first munition reaches it. The detonations are sequential tion limit (GPL) value for the agents destroyed (for mustard agent, this value is 10 6 mg/m3). to reduce the maximum pressure on the inner vessel walls. If more than two munitions are to be sequentially detonated Following the detonation, offgases are cleaned, filtered, (three have been sequentially detonated in the DV65), the and stored in a buffer tank. They are then pumped into a length of the inner vessel can be increased, holding the vessel combustion chamber and heated. The combustion gases are diameter constant. The munitions are imploded, reducing quenched and passed through an activated carbon adsorption noise, vibration, fragment velocity, and gouging/scoring bed before being released to the atmosphere. An alternative of the walls of the inner vessel. By detonating in a near to combustion that is under consideration involves sending vacuum, the volume of offgas to be treated is also reduced, the filtered offgas to a small, cold plasma arc unit to treat the since following a detonation, the vessel is repressurized to gas prior to its release. 1 atmosphere and the volume of offgas that is pumped out

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 00 TABLE 4-6 Size Specifications for Two Dynasafe Static Kiln Models SK1200 SK2000 Explosive containment TNT-equivalent, lb (kg) 2.64 (1.2) 5.06 (2.3) Length, m 4.5 6.0 Width, m 4.35 5.5 Height, m 6.0 8.0 Weight, kg 24,000 40,000 Approx. detonation chamber volume, m3 0.91 4.19 SOURCE: Information provided to the committee by UXB International, Inc., August 19, 2005; . Although application of DAVINCH technology to future shock wave from the detonation when this occurs, the result- U.S. non-stockpile disposal needs will depend on the nature ing gas pressure (measured at 10 bars, or 9.87 atmospheres), of the items to be disposed of, DAVINCH technology has and decomposition due to the heat in the chamber. No potential applicability at those U.S. sites where a tempo- explosive donor charge is used, and no reagent is needed to rary facility can be placed and could be used to dispose of neutralize the agent. The kiln operates in a semibatch mode. medium to large quantities (hundreds to thousands) of items Two sizes of the static kiln are available. Specifications are containing chemical agent or that are agent contaminated. provided in Table 4-6. It is probably not cost effective to dispose of items unlikely Chemical munitions are placed in a cardboard box or car- to contain agent, e.g., containers that have been previously rier, preferably by robot but if need be, manually. The box is burnt out, or for small numbers of small chemical-containing placed on an elevator for the SK2000 version or on a trolley items, e.g., bomblets or small caliber projectiles, where the conveyor for the smaller units and is transported to the top of EDS technology would have greater applicability. the kiln. Leaking munitions are placed in an airtight plastic bag and then in the box before being loaded. Munitions that are already in a single round container can be loaded onto DyNasafe TeCHNOlOgy the conveyor or elevator while in the container. The boxed munitions are fed into the kiln through two Description loading chambers (see Figure 4-4), each having its own Dynasafe is the tradename for a static kiln manufactured hydraulically operated door and inflatable seal. The upper by Dynasafe AB, a Swedish company that designs and loading chamber has airlock doors and the lower loading manufactures products for the containment of explosions, chamber has a hot blast door between it and the kiln’s including mobile explosion containment vessels used by detonation chamber. The doors, loading chambers, and deto- police departments and the Burster Detonation Vessel, used nation chamber are all designed to resist and contain the over- by the NSCMP at its Munitions Assessment and Processing pressure from a detonation of up to 2.3 kg TNT-equivalent. System facility in Edgewood, Maryland.17 An additional 2.3 kg TNT-equivalent of overpressure con- The Dynasafe static kiln is a near-spherical, armored, tainment is included in the design as a safety margin. To dual-walled high-alloy stainless steel detonation chamber provide total containment, the doors are gas-tight as well as (heated retort) inside a containment structure (Ohlson et explosion-resistant. The interior of the detonation chamber is al., 2004).18 The total thickness, including a safety layer, is not open to the atmosphere while munitions are loaded, and 15 cm. The detonation chamber can operate in a pyrolytic or the loading chambers are offset for safety purposes. oxidizing environment. Intact munitions are indirectly heated Using a hydraulic arm, the boxed munitions are pushed by electrical resistance elements between the inner and outer into the loading chambers, moving from one chamber to walls of the detonation chamber. The munitions are heated another, and are then dropped onto a heated (500 C-550 C) to a temperature of 400 C-600 C, resulting in deflagration, shrapnel (scrap) bed at the bottom of the detonation chamber. detonation, or burning of the munition’s explosive fill. The The maximum drop is about 2 meters. The purpose of this chemical agent in the munition is destroyed as a result of the bed is to protect the chamber walls from munition fragments when detonation occurs. If sufficient energy from energetics in the munition is released, no additional external heating from the electrical resistance elements is required. If the 17Except where otherwise note, technical information for this section came mostly from meetings with representatives of Dynasafe AB (Sweden) munition does not contain energetics, then additional heat and UXB International, Inc. (United States) (see Appendix D). can be provided by the electrical resistance elements. 18See also .

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Fuel Oil Propane Cyclone Equalization Primary Air Off-gas Tank to Scrubbers Loading Quench Chamber 1 Loading Secondary Chamber 2 Combustion Chamber Dust Bin (for recycle) Blast Munitions Isolation Adsorption Beds Outer Destruction Chamber Wall Dust Disposal Overall Sweep Air Enclosure Inner Destruction Chamber Wall Scrap Chamber REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) Scrap Scrap Bin Pre-Heater Scrap Sorting/Inspection FIGURE 4-4 Dynasafe static destruction kiln process flow. SOURCE: Harley Heaton, UXB International, Inc., April 10, 2006. 0

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 Country-by-Country Experience During operations, conditions in the detonation chamber are monitored using an air-cooled camera located in a tube Dynasafe static kilns have been used to destroy a substan- that protrudes into the chamber. A slight negative pressure tial variety of conventional munitions in several countries. is maintained in the chamber to enable detection of the pres- The applications include these: sure pulse that takes place when a munition detonates. A microphone is used to detect the sound of a detonation, and Sweden, destruction of detonators and small arms vibration of the chamber is also recorded. ammunition in SK400 (1997) (no longer available). When the detonation chamber has a full scrap load, i.e., Spain, destruction of conventional munitions in when it is about 50 percent full, a clean burning period takes SK1200 (1997). place during which the scrap metal is heated to 550 C-650 C Sweden, destruction of conventional munitions in for several hours to meet GPL requirements. After comple- SK800 (1999) (no longer available). tion of the clean burning period, the detonation chamber Japan, destruction of antipersonnel mines and conven- disengages from the lower loading chamber and is rotated tional munitions in SK1200 (2000). almost 180 degrees clockwise in order that most of the muni- Portugal, destruction of antipersonnel mines and con- tion fragments can be dropped into a scrap bed in a bin. A ventional munitions in SK1200 (2001). low baffle plate in the detonation chamber, near the place Asia, destruction of conventional munitions in SK2000 where the scrap exits, retains some of the scrap/shrapnel for (2003-2004). the next load. The metal scrap bins are enclosed within the outer housing of the kiln to prevent dust from escaping and A prototype development unit has destroyed over 100 kg to allow confirmation that the metal can be released. When of mustard, lewisite, and Clark I and II agents, although these scrap removal has been completed, the kiln rotates back to agents were not contained in chemical munitions. In Febru- its upright position and the retained scrap in the detonation ary 2006, 100-mm German grenades containing energetics chamber falls to the bottom. and 1.5 kg of mustard agent fill were successfully destroyed During operations, offgases from pyrolysis and detonation in the Dynasafe SK2000 at the GEKA facility in Munster, are continuously evacuated from the kiln, and compressed air Germany.19 Three grenades were destroyed per feed cycle. is used to sweep all offgases from the combustion chamber. The ability of Dynasafe to access and destroy agent in thick- If the process is operated as a closed system that is, as a walled steel munitions will also be demonstrated at GEKA. batch reactor the offgases can be held inside the detonation A detailed description of the use of the Dynasafe SK2000 at chamber for as long as necessary to ensure that agent destruc- the facility is provided in Weigel et al. (2004). tion takes place. The offgases can also be analyzed prior to their release to the offgas treatment system. If necessary, Evaluation Factors Analysis nitrogen can be used as the sweep gas. When the process is operated as an open system, the offgases are transferred Process Maturity to a heated buffer that serves as an expansion tank and as a cyclone to remove coarse dust. European Union environ- The Dynasafe family of static kilns is a mature technology mental regulations require that to ensure agent destruction, that has been used for several years to destroy a substantial a secondary combustion chamber with a 2-second residence variety of conventional munitions, as noted above. The kilns time and operating at 1100 C must be used. Other offgas have been both safe and effective for this application. Using treatment steps may include use of a quench tower to cool the this experience as a basis, the Dynasafe static kiln has been gases to prevent dioxins and furans from forming, as well as modified to destroy chemical munitions and was doing so various scrubbers and equipment to capture fine particulates at the above-mentioned German government facility in and to remove heavy metals and metallic oxides. The use of Munster, Germany, when this report was being prepared. such equipment will depend on whether the Dynasafe unit As of April 21, 2006, at least 1,000 munitions containing is operated as an open or a closed system, the constituents of mustard agent, phosgene, or diphenylchloroarsine (Clark I) the offgas, and environmental requirements. agent had been destroyed. The elapsed time for a munition destruction cycle will Modifications include making the kiln gas-tight to contain vary with the explosive and agent content of the munition. any agent remaining in offgases, heating the scrap metal to For conventional munitions, throughput of 25-35 detonation remove all traces of agent on metal surfaces, and using an cycles per hour has been demonstrated for explosive loads of elaborate offgas treatment system to scrub the detonation 2 kg TNT-equivalent and can be greater for smaller explosive gases and remove any remaining traces of agent. loads. Daily throughput includes the clean burning time. The throughput for chemical munitions will depend on whether the Dynasafe is operated as an open or a closed system, the number of munitions that are fed into the detonation chamber 19GEKA, Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffe und per cycle, and the number of cycles per hour. Rüstungs-Altlasten.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 Although the Dynasafe static kiln has not yet been tested Finally, testing of explosively configured munitions or used to process U.S. non-stockpile chemical munitions, it containing agent simulants has been conducted to demon- appears to have the capability to do so since many of these strate accessing and destruction of the agent simulant in the munitions are within the size and explosive containment munitions. capabilities of the largest Dynasafe unit, the SK2000, and The technical director at GEKA has stated that the worst contain the same mustard agent fill found in the munitions case would be one in which a munition containing neither being destroyed in Munster. As this report was being pre- agent nor energetics is fed into the chamber: in that case, the pared, none of the Dynasafe kilns had been permitted for munition would experience nothing other than being heated operation in the United States for the destruction of chemical and would emerge as it entered and have to be opened under controlled conditions to ascertain its original condition. 22 munitions. Opening the munition would increase costs as well as the potential for human exposure. If processing needed to stop Process Efficacy/Throughput while the munition was examined to confirm that it is empty The Dynasafe static kiln heats munitions until the ener- and inert, throughput might also be reduced. getics within them detonate, causing the agent to be exposed The Dynasafe static kilns and related material handling to the resulting shock wave, blast pressure, and heat. It is equipment are large: For example, the largest unit, the possible, however, that for some items, the energetics and/or SK2000, is 6 meters long, 5.5 meters deep, and 8 meters high. agent will undergo deflagration (rapid combustion driven by The weight of this unit is 44.1 tons. A smaller version, the heat transfer). In fact, deflagration rather than detonation is SK1200, is 4.5 meters long, 4.35 meters deep, and 6 meters stated to be the usual destruction process in the detonation high. This unit weighs 26.4 tons, but a mobile version is chamber.20 Some items only contain agent, the energetics under development (Dynasafe, 2006). The mobile version having been removed or never having been placed in the consists of eight containers: three for the static kiln, three for munition (as would be true, for example, with a test round). the offgas treatment system, and two for spare materials and In these cases, although the agent may vaporize within the a workshop. These containers can be carried on three flatbed munition body and may rupture the munition body as a result, trailers, and the mobile version can be operated in either an this is not guaranteed to happen. In such cases, the manufac- open or closed mode. turer states that the agent will escape as it vaporizes, either The explosion containment capabilities of the Dynasafe through the threads in the munition nose closure or through static kilns are comparable to those of the EDS-1 and EDS-2 a weak point in the munition body. in use by the U.S. Army: 2.64 pounds TNT-equivalent for the In testing at GEKA in early 2006,21 empty inert grenades SK1200 vs. 3 pounds for the EDS-1 and 5.06 pounds TNT- were filled with water, welded shut, and placed in the SK2000 equivalent for the larger SK2000 vs. 5 pounds for the EDS-2. detonation chamber. The water fill vaporized and, as a result The detonation chamber of the SK2000 is substantially larger of the increased internal pressure, destroyed the grenades, than the EDS-2 chamber; it has the approximate shape of a 2-meter-diameter sphere and, thus, a volume of about 4.2 m3 as observed by the control room operators. In additional compared to a volume of 0.61 m3 for the EDS-2. The largest testing, partially sealed, water-filled grenades were placed in the detonation chamber and heated. As internal pressure munition that can be fed into the feed system of the SK2000 slowly increased, the water vapor escaped through screw currently in operation at Munster is 30 cm in diameter and threads. Absent the sudden destruction of the grenades, it was 60 cm long. The manufacturer states that the feed system not possible to detect the escaping vapor, and the grenades can be reconfigured to allow larger munitions, e.g., 8-inch emerged intact. The grenades were then x-rayed and cut open projectiles having a length of 89.4 cm, to be fed through the to verify that they were empty. loading chambers and into the detonation chamber if the Results to date indicate that the agent in all sealed or need arises. partially sealed inert munitions is destroyed, although In the event that larger items are recovered by the NSCMP operating results for grenades and other munitions that may (such as 100-pound, 500-pound, and 750-pound bombs), contain mustard agent heels were not available. However, the their treatment is more problematical because they are all absence of a positive indication that agent destruction has more than a meter long and contain significant quantities taken place for those munitions where agent slowly escapes of agent. For example, a 100-pound M47 bomb contains may be a concern, and it may increase process costs and 70 pounds of mustard agent and a 750-pound MC-1 bomb complexity if post-processing actions are required to confirm contains 220 pounds of sarin (GB). Although these items can that no agent remains in the munition. be processed through the SK2000, the technology provider states that the amount of agent in these items would require 20Meeting between representatives of DYNASAFE AB and a committee 22Hans-Joachim Grimsel, technical director, GEKA, in a meeting with fact-finding group, Munster, Germany, January 16, 2006. 21Holger Weigel, Dynasafe Germany, presentation to the committee on a fact-finding group of the committee, Munster, Germany, January 17, March 1, 2006. 2006.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 TABLE 4-7 Estimated Dynasafe SK2000 Throughput Ratesa Munition Munitions per Cycle Cycles per Hour Munitions per Hour Munitions per 10-hr Day 4.2-in. mortar, M1 4 3 12 120 75-mm projectile, M64 9 3 27 270 5-in. projectile, MK VI 4 3 12 120 5-in. projectile, MK 54 3 3 9 90 155-mm projectile, MK II 2 2 4 40 8-in. projectile, T174b 1 2 2 20 Bomblet, M139 16 3 48 480 105-mm projectile, M60 4 3 12 120 aBased on operation as an open (continuous mode) system versus a closed (batch mode) system. bA fragment shield would be placed around the body of the 8-inch projectile to protect the detonation chamber walls. SOURCE: Harley Heaton, UXB International, presentation to the committee on February 15, 2006. TABLE 4-8 Agent Quantities Destroyed per Dynasafe SK2000 Cycle Munition Agent and Weight Items per Cycle Agent Weight per Cycle (lb) 4.2-in. mortar, M1 Mustard agent, 6.5 lb 4 26 75-mm projectile, M64 Mustard agent, 1 lb 9 9 5-in. projectile, MK VI Mustard agent, 5.4 lb 4 21.6 5-in. projectile, MK54 GB, 4.2 lb 3 12.6 155-mm projectile, MK II Phosgene (CG), 11 lb 2 22 8-in. projectile, T-174 VX, 15.7 lb 1 15.7 Bomblet, M139 GB, 1.3 lb 16 20.8 105-mm projectile, M60 Mustard agent, 3.2 lb 4 12.8 SOURCE: Harley Heaton, UXB International, presentation to the committee on February 15, 2006. that the bulk of the agent be removed from the ordnance Dynasafe representatives and are shown in Table 4-7. These before treatment. The drained agent and ordnance item rates are for a Dynasafe SK2000 operating in a continuous would be treated separately. The method to be used for agent mode. destruction is not specified.23 The quantity of agent that can be destroyed in a single The demonstrated throughput for the SK2000 processing cycle will also vary. Table 4-8 gives these quantities for the conventional munitions has varied with the explosive load- same munitions listed in Table 4-7. ing. For a load of 4.4 pounds (2 kg) TNT-equivalent, the The average throughput rate will include the periodic SK2000 can accept at least 20 loads per hour, a cycle time multihour clean-burning period, when munitions are not of 3 minutes per load. The throughput rate for operation with fed into the detonation chamber, and the scrap metal in the chemical munitions will be less and will depend on how the bottom of the chamber is heated to 550 C-650 C to meet Dynasafe is operated, the explosive loading, and the compo- general population limit (GPL) requirements. Dynasafe is sition and quantity of agent to be destroyed. If operated as a capable of handling mixed loads as long as the explosive con- closed system with the offgas held and tested prior to release tainment capacity of the detonation chamber is not exceeded. to the offgas treatment equipment, then one cycle per hour The DRE for chemical agent destroyed in Dynasafe kilns and is expected. If operated as an open system, then two to three postprocessing units has been measured at 99.9999 percent cycles per hour are expected. and greater, down to the limit of detection for the instruments The number of munitions fed per cycle will depend on the used. This DRE was demonstrated in a subscale model of munition size, the quantity of agent to be destroyed, and the the detonation chamber at the GEKA facility in Munster explosive content (net explosive weight). Estimated hourly in 2002. Up to 5.5 pounds per hour of mustard agent was throughput rates for some munitions have been provided by destroyed, as well as Clark I and Clark II vomiting agents and AsCl3, with 220 pounds of these agents destroyed under pyrolytic conditions. This prototype, however, was not a 23Information provided by UXB International in response to committee blast chamber, and apparently the agents were destroyed by questions of February 2006.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 heating and gasifying them in the chamber. The fate of the followed if Dynasafe were used in the United States for arsenic in the agent was not specified. destroying non-stockpile chemical materiel are to be deter- Although agent destruction was demonstrated, the agent mined. Minimal agent monitoring equipment is used with was not contained in real or simulated munitions and ener- the Dynasafe at the GEKA facility, as a result of an operat- getics were not present. Tests of the Dynasafe detonation ing philosophy that emphasizes robust engineering, vapor chamber using nerve agents have also not been conducted containment, and extensive offgas treatment. and are not planned since these agents are not present in the German chemical items to be destroyed at GEKA. Public and Regulatory Acceptability in a U.S. Context As noted above, pyrolysis in the detonation chamber is to be followed by offgas treatment, including, as needed, Although Dynasafe has not been permitted for use in the a cyclone, a combustion chamber, a quench tank, and United States for chemical munitions, it will be undergoing various scrubbers and filters. This offgas treatment process, extensive operational use with German chemical munitions although standard, is fairly complex when compared to other and will be required to meet all European Union environ- detonation-based technologies, and its reliability, cost, and mental regulations. The Dynasafe manufacturer believes effectiveness when processing chemical munitions needs that it will also be able to meet all U.S. environmental to be demonstrated. It should be noted that this extensive regulations, although this remains to be demonstrated. If offgas treatment is specific to the Dynasafe installation in operated as a closed system, postdetonation gases can be Munster, Germany, where a substantial variety of agent fills held in the detonation chamber and monitored for agent. If are anticipated and where the operator wishes to be able any agent is detected, heating of the gases can be continued to process every expected gas constituent. For a Dynasafe until agent concentration drops to an acceptable level before operating in the United States where agent fills may differ the gases are processed further. This ability to hold and test and where the regulatory requirements for secondary waste the gases prior to either continued heating in the chamber or processing may not be the same as the requirements in the release to offgas processing equipment should increase the European Union, the offgas treatment facility configuration acceptability of Dynasafe technology to U.S. regulators and may differ and could be either more or less elaborate than interest groups. If operated as an open system, the offgases at the facility in Munster depending on the agent fill and on are further treated and any remaining agent is destroyed in whether the Dynasafe operates as a closed (batch) or an open an afterburner (combustion chamber). If this treatment is (continuous) system. viewed as an incineration step, it may be considered to be The Dynasafe static kiln and its related equipment take a negative factor in terms of the acceptability to the public about 3 months to assemble once the equipment is on site. and to regulators. Following its use, the installation takes about three months Odors, vibrations, noises, and other sensory impacts to disassemble. While in operation, four to eight people are should not be noticeable to the public while the Dynasafe needed to operate the unit: control room staff, a loading static kiln is in operation. The detonation takes place in a supervisor, and an on-call engineer. For operations with thick, double-walled chamber inside a containment structure, chemical items, more staff may be needed, but the number and the external impacts, if any, should be minimal. was not available to the committee. Secondary Waste Issues Process Safety As noted above, offgases can be cleaned, tested, and The potential for worker exposure to agent is about the treated prior to release. The scrap metal removed from the same as with any other operation where RCWM need to be bottom of the detonation chamber is claimed to meet GPL handled, boxed or packaged, and moved. Dynasafe workers requirements. If the chemical munitions contain tarry agent do not use any protective clothing, although those handling heels from polymerized or thickened mustard agent, then munitions are in Level D PPE. A facility may be required for it may be difficult to destroy this material in the detona- workers who prepare and repackage munitions to suit up and tion chamber. In that situation, prolonged postdetonation take off the PPE. Any contaminated PPE or other equipment treatment via continued heating of the metal in the clean- is disposed of in the Dynasafe detonation chamber. burning period may be required. This clean-burning period The technology vendor states that boxed munitions can is expected to last several hours, but the actual time required be removed at any time from the loading chambers and that for the agent concentration to be reduced enough to meet the once in the detonation chamber, sufficient residual heat GPL is not known. remains to destroy the munition, even if there is no external A second issue regarding waste treatment involves the energy (i.e., electricity for the resistance heaters) to further accumulation and disposal of arsenic following the detona- heat the chamber. tion. The technology proponent acknowledges arsenic will The monitoring instrumentation used (e.g., MINICAMS), accumulate on the walls of the detonation chamber and states location of the monitors, and monitoring procedures to be that the arsenic will be removed from the chamber walls by

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 subsequent detonations and that the chamber can be steam duration of operation, state and federal permit requirements, cleaned to remove the arsenic. Removal of arsenicals in the and the nature of the materiel to be treated. offgas is also an issue. Since arsenic will be present in some of the munitions to be destroyed, e.g., Clark-type agents Summary in the German grenades, its treatment and recovery will take place in an ionizing wet scrubber to remove arsenic- The Dynasafe technology has been demonstrated to be containing dust. effective in destroying small conventional munitions and The Dynasafe technology generates some liquid wastes. explosives, in destroying some chemical agents, and in These come from the use of steam to clean the detonation destroying mustard agent-filled, explosively configured chamber, from the quench tank, and from various scrubbers German grenades. If, during continued operation at GEKA used to treat the offgas. The volumes are small compared with in destroying German munitions containing a variety of those generated from agent neutralization technologies. agent fills (which was in progress as this report was being prepared), the Dynasafe static kiln demonstrates the ability to safely and effectively access the agent in such munitions, Process Cost Issues destroy the chemical agents inside, and process secondary Although no quantitative cost information was avail- wastes, then it could be a viable technology for use in dispos- able to the committee, qualitative factors indicate that the ing of U.S. non-stockpile chemical munitions. Dynasafe SK2000 static kiln could be cost effective when The Dynasafe technology could find application at U.S. used to destroy chemical munitions that are commensurate sites where fairly large numbers of chemical munitions with its size. The Dynasafe SK series of static kilns is a such as bomblets, mines, 105-mm projectiles, and 155-mm well-established product line routinely used to destroy con- projectiles are recovered and where effective use could be ventional explosively configured small arms and munitions. made of its high throughput capacity. Its limited explosive Thus, there is an operational track record to indicate that containment capacity, however, limits it to destroying items they can compete with other methods for destroying such of up to 5 pounds TNT-equivalent, about the same as the items. One version of the Dynasafe kiln is being used by the EDS-2. This limited capacity also places a requirement NSCMP to destroy bursters in a burster detonation vessel at on the Dynasafe operator to not introduce high-explosive the Munitions Assessment and Processing System facility rounds into the Dynasafe detonation chamber that would in Edgewood, Maryland. The acquisition cost of this unit exceed the chamber’s explosive containment capacity. Even should provide a benchmark for estimating a comparable cost with a 100 percent safety margin allowing up to 10 pounds for a Dynasafe unit used for chemical munition processing TNT-equivalent of explosive loading the detonation of such since the operation of the loading and detonation chambers rounds could reduce the life of the chamber and, as a worst should be similar. case, could severely damage it. As of the preparation of this report, the Dynasafe static The Dynasafe technology depends on heat rather than kiln had been used to destroy some German chemical donor charges to destroy energetics within a munition and to weapons; however, cost data for operating the kiln were not access the agent fill. This process is expected to be effective available. Since the kiln only requires two staff to operate for chemical munitions that contain energetics but may be and two to four more for supervision and in a control room, more problematic for inert chemical munitions if the muni- labor costs are expected to be low. A more substantial cost tion emerges from the detonation chamber intact and in situ component may be for operating and maintaining the fairly agent destruction needs to be confirmed. Such confirmation complex offgas treatment system (e.g., a cyclone, a combus- will be required to verify agent destruction does take place. tion chamber, quench, scrubbers, and filters) used in conjunc- Following this verification of agent destruction, the Dynasafe tion with the Dynasafe static kiln when processing chemical static kiln can be considered to be an effective and flexible munitions. The complexity of the gas treatment system will technology for destroying large quantities of chemical muni- depend on the offgas constituents to be treated, regulatory tions within its explosive containment and munition size requirements, and whether or not the system is operated in constraints. a continuous (open) or batch (closed) mode. Thus, it is not possible to estimate the capital and operating costs for a COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS OF TIER 1 MUNITIONS Dynasafe offgas treatment system in the United States based PROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES on the experience in Germany, although the complexity of that system may suggest an upper bound on such costs. As defined in detail in Chapter 3, the committee used five As with other munition destruction systems, the Dynasafe basic evaluation factors to assess the status of Tier 1 tech- will incur costs for setup, teardown, regulatory compliance, nologies. These factors were commented on earlier in this monitoring, lab support, and disposal of treated residuals chapter in the respective evaluation factors analysis sections such as metal fragments. The magnitude of these and other for each of the three Tier 1 international munitions process- operating costs will depend on the specific application, the ing technologies.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 TABLE 4-9 Evaluation Factor Rating Comparison of Tier 1 Munitions Processing Technologies with U.S. EDS Evaluation Factors (Ratinga)b Public and Regulatory Process Efficacy/ Acceptability in a Secondary Waste Technology Process Maturity Throughput Process Safety U.S. Context Issues U.S. EDS + + + + 0 CDC + + + 0 0 0c DAVINCH + + + + +d Dynasafe + + 0 0 aLegend: +, acceptable; 0, partially acceptable; , unacceptable; ?, inadequate information. bCosts associated with purchasing and operating a given technology would also be a significant criterion, but the committee did not have access to capital or operating cost data. cDAVINCH is more likely to be acceptable to the public than the CDC and Dynasafe because of its demonstrated ability to hold and test waste gases, but it has not yet been permitted (see the section “Public and Regulatory Acceptability in a U.S. Context” in Chapter 4). dRating is contingent on the ability of the Dynasafe process control system to confirm agent destruction in all munitions that do contain agent. Table 4-9 rates the Tier 1 munitions processing technolo- technology for a given or anticipated scope of work gies according to these evaluation factors and compares them (number and sizes of munitions, agent types, etc.) at a to the EDS technology that is presently in use by the NSCMP. specific location. The symbols used in the ratings scheme are also defined in more detail in Chapter 3. Chamber lifetime is among the considerations that would The committee next considered several engineering have a significant impact on cost, reliability, and safety. parameters important to any comparison of these technolo- Were the U.S. Army to further investigate any of the detona- gies. This comparison is presented in Table 4-10 for specific tion-type technologies examined in this report, a structural versions of each of the technologies rated in Table 4-9. The integrity assessment for the number of detonation cycles that importance of these engineering parameters can be indicated could be anticipated for the life of the detonation chamber as follows: with respect to the types of munitions to be processed would give important information. Likewise, a failure modes and Throughput rate. Maximum throughput rate may not effects analysis for each type of detonation system under be important for the disposal of small numbers of consideration would be highly desirable. munitions but may be significant where a large number The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) of munitions are to be destroyed. The estimated daily has formulated design codes to ensure the safe and reliable throughput rates for the three detonation technolo- operation of pressure vessels. ASME has formed a committee gies are compared in a more quantitative fashion in to examine the design of pressure vessels subjected to inter- Table 4-11. mittent impact loadings (i.e., vessels in detonation services). Destruction verification capability. Whether the agent Two of the companies that supply detonation chambers destruction can be confirmed before the liquid or gas is (DAVINCH and CDC) have representatives on that commit- released to secondary treatment (hydrolysate disposal tee. The committee responsible for this report understands or offgas treatment) may be a consideration that is that the design requirements for pressure vessels subjected to important to public stakeholders and regulators. This intermittent impact loadings will be defined in a Code Case is often referred to as a hold-test-release capability. that is essentially an addendum to the ASME Section VIII Largest munition. The largest munition and the largest pressure vessel code. The ASME Code includes significant explosive loading that can be handled by a specific safety factors in terms of the yield and ultimate strength unit will be important in assessing which technologies values that are used and, where appropriate, requirements should be considered for a given mix of munitions. for impact testing. In reply to specific questions, each of the Reliability/operability. The experience that a given suppliers of detonation chambers indicated that they will be type of system has accumulated in processing conven- able to comply with the requirements of the ASME Code for tional and chemical munitions is a significant factor pressure vessels subjected to intermittent impact loadings. indicator in the choice of technology. In general, costs associated with purchasing and operating Transportability. Whether a specific technology is a given technology constitute a significant criterion, but the transportable that is, whether it is movable from committee did not have access to data on capital or operating place to place, as required, or must be built as a fixed costs. Similarly, when considering a technology choice, the facility may be a significant factor in selecting a composition, or anticipated composition of the munitions to

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 TABLE 4-10 Specific Engineering Parameters for Existing Munitions Processing Technologies Technology Destruction Verification Model Throughput Rate Capability Largest Munition Reliability/Operability Transportability EDS-2 1 detonation every other Liquid and gaseous 5 lb TNT-equivalent; Extensive experience Fully transportable; day; up to 6 munitions effluents can be held and wide range of weapons with chemical munitions 1 trailer per detonation tested before release acceptance; maximum: 155-mm projectile; physical size of munition determines throughput rate CDC (TC-60) Up to 20 detonations per Monitoring of offgas 60 lb TNT-equivalent; Extensive experience Transportable on 10-hr shift; estimated prior to release to carbon 210-mm projectile with conventional 8 tractor trailers potential throughput adsorption bed system munitions; has given by technology demonstrated reliability; proponent as 22-40/day; 4 years experience in actual will be determined production mode without in 2006 failure DAVINCH Yellow bombs: 9/day Detonation gases held in 65 kg TNT-equivalent; Experience with DV-60 designed to (DV-60) Red bombs: 18/day tank and tested for agent expected to be an 8-in. destruction of 600 be a fixed facility, 75-mm, 90-mm before decision made projectile or a small Japanese Red and not transportable munitions: 36/day to release or provide bomb Yellow chemical bombs additional treatment containing various agents Dynasafe Varies greatly with Open system (continuous 5 lb TNT-equivalent; Extensive experience SK2000 designed to (SK2000) munition and operating mode): none prior 8-in. projectile, if with conventional be a fixed facility, mode; if used as an to offgas treatment; fragment shield used to munitions; some not transportable open system (continuous closed system (batch protect chamber; up to experience with German mode), sample mode): hold and test in 750-lb bomb if most of chemical munitions throughput rates are expansion tank agent is drained first 20/day for 8-in. projectile, 40/day for 155-mm projectile, 120/day for 105-mm projectile and 4.2 in. mortar round TABLE 4-11 Estimated Daily Throughput Rates for Three Detonation Technologies (10-hr Day) Munition CDC TC-60 DAVINCH DV65 Dynasafe SK2000 4.2-in. mortar, M1 40 36 120 75-mm projectile, M64 40 30 270 5-in. projectile, MK VI 22 18 120 5-in. projectile, MK 54 22 12 90 155-mm projectile, MK II 22 12 40 8-in. projectile, T174 22 6 20 Bomblet, M139 60 72 480 105-mm projectile, M60 22 30 120 6a 20b 100-lb bomb, M47 6 5a 20b 115-lb bomb, M70 6 aBomb is drained into 20-lb lots and each lot separately destroyed in CDC-60. bBulk of agent is removed before treatment in SK2000. Drained agent and the item are treated separately. SOURCES: CDC: CH2MHILL response to committee questions of February 6, 2006; DAVINCH: information provided by Kobe Steel, Ltd., to the committee on March 25, 2006; Dynasafe: information provided by UXB International to the committee on February 15, 2006.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 be destroyed would also be an important factor. Insofar as testing in the United Kingdom has pointed to its acceptability it is uncertain which non-stockpile sites may be chosen for in the United States in terms of efficacy and safety. Public remedial action in the near term (post 2007) future,24 as is acceptance might be qualified because the CDC is not a the amount of resources that would be dedicated to recovery hold-test-release system, although it has been used here for operations and thus the rate of recovery, the committee did the destruction of conventional munitions. It is the only one not address how a technology or mix of technologies might of the three detonation-type technologies that at present can be implemented for a specific site situation. Moreover, there be considered to be transportable (but mobile versions of is considerable uncertainty surrounding the Army’s site the other two types of detonation technologies have been inventory data in terms of the specific conditions, relative designed). locations, remaining amounts of agent fills, and other char- Finding 4-4. Of the detonation-type technologies, the acteristics of munitions to be encountered during recovery operations. DAVINCH is the only one that currently has demonstrated The committee also addressed the subfactors given in the ability to hold, sample, and analyze waste gases prior to Chapter 3 for each of the five main evaluation factors. The releasing them into the offgas treatment system. It has the subfactor questions for the Tier 1 international technologies largest explosive containment capacity of the detonation- that are suitable for munitions processing along with the EDS based technologies and appears to be suitable for destroying technology are addressed in Tables B-1 through B-5. These moderately large quantities of a large variety of chemical tables provide a convenient side-by-side means for compar- munitions. ing some specific aspects of the technologies in terms of the Finding 4-5. The Dynasafe static kiln technology has been available data and the expert judgment of the committee. demonstrated to be effective in destroying small conven- tional munitions and explosives, small chemical munitions FINDINgs aND ReCOMMeNDaTIONs containing explosives, and in destroying some chemical Finding 4-1. The U.S. Army’s EDS, although proven to be agents. The ability to confirm the release and destruction of safe and effective, has a low throughput rate, is limited in the agent contained in chemical munitions that do not contain size of the munitions it can handle, and generates a liquid energetics needs to be demonstrated. The Dynasafe technol- waste stream that must be disposed of. Consequently, while ogy appears to be suitable for destroying large quantities of it will continue to have application for small quantities of small to medium-sized chemical munitions. munitions, EDS would be expected to have limited applica- Finding 4-6. Each detonation-type technology has different bility to the destruction of the anticipated large quantities and variety of munitions and agent-contaminated items expected characteristics such as destruction rate, initial capital and to be found at large burial sites in the United States. operating costs, and ability to be moved from one location to another that are relevant to the selection of a system for a Finding 4-2. Detonation-type technologies offer comple- particular project. Structural integrity, defined as a specified mentary capabilities to the EDS and all have the following allowable number of detonation cycles, is another factor to characteristics: be considered, as would be the results of any failure modes and effects analyses. There is no agent neutralization step. Recommendation 4-1. The U.S. Army should select a All are total solutions that is, they all access the agent, destroy the energetics and agent, and decon- detonation-type technology for destroying recovered chemi- taminate the munition bodies. cal munitions excavated from a large burial site, although the All require secondary thermal or catalytic treatment of EDS will continue to have application, especially at small offgases. sites. In view of the rapidly evolving development efforts on All have a higher throughput than the EDS and the the three international detonation-type technologies, the U.S. same or greater explosive containment capability. Army should monitor the operations and capabilities of these All have been operated safely. technologies and collect cost and performance data with the goal of selecting one of them as the primary technology. Finding 4-3. The CDC is a mature technology that has Finding 4-7. Procedures for measuring the destruction and destroyed 2,500 chemical munitions in Belgium. Additional removal efficiency (DRE), destruction efficiency (DE), or some other metric of performance for detonation-type pro- cesses do not appear to have been established in the United 24As noted in Chapter 2, following completion by April 29, 2007, of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty requirements applying to CWM States. This gap will seriously hinder future evaluations of that has already been recovered, no specific subsequent site remediation such technologies for possible application to non-stockpile mission had been defined for the NSCMP at the time this report was being prepared.

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REPRINTED CHAPTER 4 (NRC, 2006) 0 operations. Such destruction and removal information is DiBerardo, R. 2004. Demonstration/Validation Testing of the Controlled important for both regulators and the public. Detonation Chamber (CDC). Available online at . Last accessed March 1, 2006. Recommendation 4-2. To further the evaluation of NRC. 2002. Systems and Technologies for the Treatment of Non-Stockpile detonation-type technologies for non-stockpile applica- Chemical Materiel. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. tions, the U.S. Army should establish accepted procedures NRC. 2005. Impact of Revised Airborne Exposure Limits on Non-Stockpile that effectively and efficiently determine the degree of agent Chemical Materiel Program Activities. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. destruction or in some other way measure the performance U.S. Army. 2001. Memorandum for Record: Initial Assessment of the of these processes. The procedures should involve the feed- Donovan Controlled Chamber (CDC) Used in Belgium from 14 May ing of complete munitions to the process—that is, munitions through 22 June, June 28. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Program containing either agent or a chemical surrogate that is more Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. difficult to destroy than the chemical agent that is most resistant to destruction. Both the degree of agent destruc- DAVINCH Cold Detonation Chamber tion in the actual detonation event and the degree of agent destruction in the system overall should be determined. Such Asahina, J. 2004. Kanda Project, Its Outline and Public Acceptance. Available online at . Last accessed March 1, 2006. relevant stakeholders. Asahina, J. 2005. Destruction of OCW at Kanda Project. Available on- line at . Last accessed March 1, 2006. RefeReNCes Asahina, J., K. Koide, and K. Kurose. 2005. “DAVINCH” Controlled Detonation Process Applied to Destroy 50 kg Yellow Bombs and 15 kg Measurement of Performance Red bombs at Kanda. Available online at . Last accessed ATSDR (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry). 2005. March 1, 2006. Public Health Assessment for Oak Ridge Reservation (USDOE) Lefebvre, M.H., S. Fujiwara, and J. Asahina. 2005a. Disposal of Old TSCA Incinerator, U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reserva- Chemical Weapons by Controlled Detonation: Performance Analysis tion, December 27. Available online at . Last accessed gov.uk/news_events/conferences/cwd/2005/proceedings15.pdf>. Last March 10, 2006. accessed March 1, 2006. Lefebvre, M., S. Fujiwara, and J. Asahina. 2005b. “Disposal of non- stockpile chemical weapons by controlled detonation.” Theory and Prac- Controlled Detonation Chamber tice of Energetic Materials, Vol. 6, Proceedings of the 2005 International Autumn Seminar on Propellants, Explosives and Pyrotechnics. W. Yajun, Bixler, B. 2005. Controlled Detonation of Chemical Weapons. Available H. Ping, and L. Shengcai, eds. Beijing, China: State Key Laboratory of online at . Last accessed February 28, 2006. Blades, T.A., R. DiBerardo, G. Misko, and N. McFarlane. 2004. Demon- stration/Validation of the TC-25 Donovan Blast Chamber Porton Down, Dynasafe static Detonation Chamber U.K., Final Demonstration Test Report, April-September 2003, ECBC- TR-362, May. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Edgewood Chemical Dynasafe. 2006. Mobile Demilitarization System for Munitions: Static and Biological Center, Chemical Biological Applications and Risk Kiln SK1200CM and Off-Gas Cleaning, January. Karlskoga, Sweden: Reduction Business Unit. Dynasafe AB. De Bisschop, H.C., and T. Blades. 2002. Destruction of Chemical Weapons: Ohlson, J., H. Weigel, T. Stock, H. Tsuboi, and K. Yokoyama. 2004. Destruc- Evaluation of the Donovan Contained Detonation Chamber (CDC) in tion of CW Type Ammunition Shells Filled with Surrogate Agents in a Poelkapelle, Belgium. ECBC-SP-010, July. Aberdeen Proving Ground, DYNASAFE Static Kiln SK2000. Available online at . Last DeMil International. 2004. System Hazard Analysis: TC-60 Controlled accessed March 2, 2006. Detonation Chamber, Draft Report, June 7. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Weigel, H., J. Ohlson, and T. Stock. 2004. The DYNASAFE Static Kiln Md.: U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical-Biological Command. SK2000: Its Application for Old Chemical Munitions Destruction at DeMil International. 2005a. Throughput Analysis Controlled Detonation Munster. Available online at . Last accessed March 2, Support Center. 2006. DeMil International. 2005b. Deployment Plan Controlled Detonation Chamber System, March. Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Engineering Support Center.