The committee’s literature review focused on studies that allowed us to draw causal conclusions about the overall effects of test-based incentive programs. We looked specifically for information about outcomes other than the high-stakes tests that have incentives attached in order to avoid having our conclusions biased by the test score inflation that the incentives may have caused. We also attempted to contrast different incentive programs according to the key features identified by the basic research in economic theory (the first four features noted above): who is targeted by the incentives, what performance measures are used, what consequences are used, and what support is provided. The existing literature did not allow us to contrast incentive programs according to the way they frame and communicate incentives, the key feature identified by the basic research in psychology (the fifth feature noted above).

We focused on 15 test-based incentive programs, including the large-scale policies of NCLB, its predecessors, and state high school exit exams, as well as a number of experiments and programs carried out in both the United States and other countries. These various programs involved a number of different incentive designs and substantial numbers of schools, teachers, and students.


Conclusion 1: Test-based incentive programs, as designed and implemented in the programs that have been carefully studied, have not increased student achievement enough to bring the United States close to the levels of the highest achieving countries. When evaluated using relevant low-stakes tests, which are less likely to be inflated by the incentives themselves, the overall effects on achievement tend to be small and are effectively zero for a number of programs. Even when evaluated using the tests attached to the incentives, a number of programs show only small effects. Programs in foreign countries that show larger effects are not clearly applicable in the U.S. context. School-level incentives like those of the No Child Left Behind Act produce some of the larger estimates of achievement effects, with effect sizes around 0.08 standard deviations, but the measured effects to date tend to be concentrated in elementary grade mathematics and the effects are small compared to the improvements the nation hopes to achieve.

Conclusion 2: The evidence we have reviewed suggests that high school exit exam programs, as currently implemented in

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