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Examples of Projects and Initiatives

RONALD ATLAS
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE, UNITED STATES

Ronald Atlas is co-director of the Center for Health Hazards Preparedness at the University of Louisville in Kentucky. The Center provides training in responding to disasters, including infection control in the event of bioterrorism and medical and public health responses to pandemics. He is former President of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) and currently is co-chair of the ASM Biodefense Committee. He also chairs the Wellcome Trust Pathogens, Immunology and Population Health Strategy Committee. He is chairing a National Academy of Sciences-AAAS survey project aimed at assessing awareness of and reactions to the dual use dilemma among AAAS members in the life sciences.

MARTIN IAIN BAHL, ERIK HEEGAARD, NINA STEENHARD
NATIONAL CENTRE FOR BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE, DENMARK

Summary of Activities at the National Centre for Biological Defence, Denmark

The National Centre for Biological Defence (NCBD) coordinates all activities regarding surveillance of biological weapons (BW) and bioter-

NOTE: This appendix contains material provided by participants in the 2nd International Forum and has been edited only to provide a common format and editorial style.



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C Examples of Projects and Initiatives RONALD ATLAS uNIvERSITy OF LOuISvILLE, uNITED STATES Ronald Atlas is co-director of the Center for Health Hazards Pre- paredness at the University of Louisville in Kentucky. The Center pro- vides training in responding to disasters, including infection control in the event of bioterrorism and medical and public health responses to pan- demics. He is former President of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) and currently is co-chair of the ASM Biodefense Committee. He also chairs the Wellcome Trust Pathogens, Immunology and Population Health Strategy Committee. He is chairing a National Academy of Sci- ences-AAAS survey project aimed at assessing awareness of and reactions to the dual use dilemma among AAAS members in the life sciences. MARTIN IAIN BAHL, ERIK HEEGAARD, NINA STEENHARD NATIONAL CENTRE FOR BIOLOGICAL DEFENCE, DENMARK Summary of Activities at the National Centre for Biological Defence, Denmark The National Centre for Biological Defence (NCBD) coordinates all activities regarding surveillance of biological weapons (BW) and bioter- NOTE: This appendix contains material provided by participants in the 2nd International Forum and has been edited only to provide a common format and editorial style. 7

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8 APPENDIX C rorism at Statens Serum Institut. The center constitutes the point of con- tact for both national and international BW alarms, requests and sample analysis. NCBD houses the national preparedness operation unit, per- forms and develops assays for sample analysis, and is engaged in several biodefense research projects as well as intelligence work. Furthermore, the center is developing a biosecurity program. NCBD participates actively in the Australia Group (AG) and has lately been especially involved in discussions related to the misuse potential of synthetic biology i.e., the de novo synthesis of genes or even organisms from chemically synthesised oligonucleotides. Tasks of the NCBD, Denmark: • Operations (preparedness) (including analysis of samples) • Development and testing of assays • Biodefence research (European Union projects and national projects) • Development of a Biosecurity programme for Denmark • International BW work (i.e., EU, AG, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540) Biosecurity Biosecurity legislation in Denmark is expected to be passed by March 2008 and the centre therefore has many activities within the area of bios- ecurity research and development (R&D). Our activities within this area have focused on developing objective risk models for assessing the BW potential of various pathogens. We are currently working on an objective risk assessment model for sensitive equipment, technologies and know-how. Furthermore, we are outlining an implementation plan for biosecurity, including awareness activities and codes of conduct. ALExANDRE BARTSEv OECD, FRANCE OECD Best Practice Guidelines on Biosecurity Innovations derived from research on pathogenic microorganisms promise astounding benefits in health, agriculture and other domains of economic activity. The tremendous advances in biology, biotechnol- ogy, genomics, proteomics, synthetic biology and bioinformatics in recent years are almost certain to lead to improved health and well-being. Some such biological resources employed in (R&D) for diagnostics, vaccines

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 APPENDIX C and therapeutics, however, possess capacity for dual use; they may be misused to develop biological weapons. Research facilities entrusted with possession of such dual use materials have a responsibility to comply with biosecurity measures that are designed to prevent loss or theft and thereby reduce the probability of a bioterrorist attack. The OECD has provided a forum for its member countries to engage in a dialogue of international cooperation with a view to produce best practice that helps put in place biosecurity measures for Biological Resource Centres (BRCs), which are repositories and providers of high quality biological materials required for R&D and production in various areas of biotechnology. Some BRCs might handle and exchange hazardous biological materi- als that have a potential for so-called dual use. Society confers trust in BRCs as custodians of such materials, demanding that responsibility be taken for their safe keeping. In this context, culture collections have long recognized the duties of implementing proper containment procedures for hazardous biological material to safeguard workers against acciden- tal exposure and acting in accordance with legislation on export controls and transport safety measures. More recently, the menace of bioterrorism has added a new dimension to the responsibilities inherent in operating culture collections, namely ensuring security of biological materials with “dual use” potential. One of the principal challenges in addressing the issues of biosecurity is to find a balance between biosecurity measures that might be applied to BRCs or other research facilities and the access to hazardous biological materials that forms the base for delivering biotechnology innovations. To qualify the intricacies of such balance, in 2007 the OECD delivered the Best Practice Guidelines on Biosecurity for BRCs, which are intended to ensure security of all types of biological materials held by BRCs (e.g., microorganism- and human-derived) in proportion to the risk they pres- ent, and thereby marginalize any obstacle that BRCs might face in carry- ing out their usual operations. JANE CALvERT uNIvERSITy OF EDINBuRGH, uNITED KINGDOM Systems Biology Jane Calvert has been working for the last two years on the social dimensions of the new field of systems biology. She has been interviewing systems biologists, and has spent time at three systems biology laborato- ries. Dr. Calvert is planning to continue this work at the systems biology

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00 APPENDIX C centers in Edinburgh and the Imperial College London. Both of these centers also have interests in synthetic biology. Her main areas of interest in systems biology are: • the epistemic aspirations of the field • interdisciplinarity and disciplinary identity Publication: O’Malley, M.A., J. Calvert, and J. Dupre. 2007. The socioethi- cal study of systems biology. American Journal of Bioethics 7(4):67-78. Synthetic Biology Calvert’s interests in synthetic biology have grown out of her inter- ests in systems biology. She is a member of the UK’s Royal Academy of Engineering working party on synthetic biology, and she is also part of two synthetic biology research networks, which bring together natural and social scientists across the United Kingdom. Calvert’s areas of interest in synthetic biology are: • the relationship between systems biology and synthetic biology • the relationship between biology and engineering in synthetic biology • the treatment of complexity and its necessity for living systems • modularity and open source in synthetic biology • understandings of ”nature” in synthetic biology • the role of social scientists in synthetic biology Publication: O’Malley, M., A. Powell, J. Davies, and J. Calvert. 2008. Knowl- edge-making distinctions in synthetic biology. BioEssays 30(1):57-65. Intellectual Property in the Emerging Life Sciences Calvert has been working for several years on intellectual property (IP) issues in genomics and genetics and she is interested in pursuing those issues further relation to both systems biology and synthetic biol- ogy. She is interested in attempts to patent emergent biological systems and in the applicability of open source principles to the biosciences. Publication: Calvert, J. 2007. Patenting genomic objects: genes, genomes, function and information. Science as Culture 16:207-223.

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0 APPENDIX C Translational Research Dr. Calvert is also interested in the category of ”translational research” and asking exactly what this means in policy and scientific terms. DAvID CARR THE WELLCOME TRuST, uNITED KINGDOM The Wellcome Trust is the largest charity in the United Kingdom. It funds innovative biomedical research, in the United Kingdom and internationally, spending around £650 million each year to support the brightest scientists with the best ideas. The Wellcome Trust supports public debate about biomedical research and its impact on health and well-being. Over recent years, the Wellcome Trust has contributed actively to pol- icy discussions at the UK and international level on addressing risks that life sciences research could be misused for terrorist purposes. We pub- lished a position statement on “Bioterrorism and Biomedical Research” in November 2003, which sets out our position on these issues. In September 2005, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust published a joint policy statement on managing risks of misuse associated with grant funding activities. This statement identified a series of agreed actions that the three organizations have implemented to raise awareness and to help ensure that any risks of misuse associated with research proposals are considered at the grant application stage. We have introduced a standard question on application forms, and ask both our expert referees and our funding committees to consider any risks of misuse associated with the proposals they review. Further information on our policy work in this area can be found at: www.wellcome.ac.uk/About­us/Policy/index.htm. GEORGE CHAKHAvA TBILISI STATE MEDICAL uNIvERSITy, REPuBLIC OF GEORGIA My group focuses on biosecurity issues and national policy as it relates to health and biological sciences. These two areas have melded together in a number of ways since 2006, after avian flu attacks. First, there was a dramatic increase in research on bioterrorism threat agents including anthrax, tularemia, and others. One of the main topics of our interests are also neuroinfections caused by Herpes and Bunya viruses, slow viruses and other interested agents. With this increase came the frightening fact that we have also dramatically increased the number of scientists who have access to and the knowledge of how to handle these agents. Second,

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02 APPENDIX C what we have not seen is a serious commitment to increasing our nation’s public health infrastructure to handle emergencies, including the threat of a pandemic outbreak of influenza. This is absolutely essential, not just for the nation’s national security as it pertains to bioterrorism, but for all public health emergencies. We seek contacts with other universities, societies and institutions to collaborate on joint projects in this field: building a “culture of responsibil- ity” (education and awareness raising, codes of conduct, etc.). DONGLI CHEN CHINA ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ASSOCIATION, CHINA The Biosecurity Program in the China Arms Control and Disarma- ment Association has joint projects with Beijing STS Advisory Center. Current projects include: • Policy study on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention; • Research and dissemination of international and national policies on biological non-proliferation and export control; • Impact of bioterrorism on bio-arms control and biosecurity; • Training and education on biosecurity and dual use issues of bio- technology. The project aims to improve awareness of officials, scien- tists, students and other people from government; medical institutions; research institutions; universities; and industry. This is the emphasis of our current activities. PETER CLEvESTIG STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITuTE (SIPRI), SWEDEN Dr. Peter Clevestig (Sweden) is a researcher in the Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme of the SIPRI Nonproliferation and Export Controls Project. He is studying the role and responsibility of the Swed- ish biomedical research community in preventing acts of mass-impact terrorism (funded by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency). The main objective of his project is to raise awareness of biosecurity issues in life science research at academic institutions. He is also developing documentation on biosecurity for use by researchers, heads of laboratories and laboratory management. An additional goal is to review how dual use research of concern is reviewed and assessed from initial conception through to final publication. Dr. Clevestig also has interests in the devel- oping field of microbial forensics in investigating bio-related terrorism

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0 APPENDIX C and crimes, as well as how emerging fields within life science research are considered from the perspective of dual use and biosecurity. A virolo- gist, Dr. Clevestig holds a doctorate in Infection Biology through his work on HIV-1 in vertical transmission from the Department of Microbiology, Tumor, and Cell Biology at the Karolinska Institute. He also holds a B.Sc. in biomedical laboratory science and B.M.Sc. in biomedical laboratory science. Before joining SIPRI, Dr. Clevestig was administrator of the Karo- linska Institute Biosafety Committee and has been an active member of the Nordic Biosafety Network. OTTORINO COSIvI AND EMMANuELLE TuERLINGS BIORISK REDuCTION FOR DANGEROuS PATHOGENS TEAM, DEPARTMENT OF EPIDEMIC AND PANDEMIC ALERT AND RESPONSE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIzATION (WHO) Life Science Research and Development for Global Health Security The overall goal of the project is to raise awareness and provide infor- mation and guidance to WHO Member States on the possible options for risk management to address dual use life science R&D. It underlines the importance of carrying out life science R&D for improving public health and, at the same time, highlights the necessity of understanding that access to, and research on, any type of dangerous agent or new agents may pose risks to public health and raise ethical and security concerns. It therefore aims at involving the public health community on this issue because poorly designed risk management measures will have implica- tions for public health. The issue is a cross-cutting one—it involves those working with dan- he gerous pathogens but also those working on health research policy, col- laboration and support, global health security and ethics. Hence our partnership with WHO departments and external experts that reflect such expertise. The project started in July 2004 with a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The following phase (2005-2006) of the project was finan- cially supported by the Sloan Foundation and the Ford Foundation. A third phase started (2007-2009) with the support of the Sloan Foundation. Others have expressed interest in financially supporting the project. Main Achievements • Establishment of an international network of experts on this subject and in-house collaboration with other WHO programs.

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0 APPENDIX C • Publication of working paper identifying the issues from a public health perspective (2005).1 • Meeting of a Scientific Working Group to provide guidance on the project activities and publication of the meeting report (October 2006). 2 • WHO co-sponsorship with the U.S. Government of the interna- tional meeting hosted by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) "International Roundtable on Dual Use Life Sciences Research," Bethesda, MD, February 24-27, 2007. • Organization and coordination of an online consultation (question- naire posted on WHO Web site) to receive feedback on the project activi- ties (June-September 2007).3 • Organization of a regional workshop on "Research Policy and Management of Risks in Life Science Research for Global Health Secu- rity,” Bangkok, Thailand, December 10-12, 2007 (in collaboration with our WHO Regional Offices for South-East Asia and for the Western Pacific and support from WHO departments on Ethics, Equity, Trade and Human Rights and Research Policy Cooperation).4 • Outreach activities to raise awareness about the project included publications5 and contributions to more than 30 international meetings and workshops. Technical support was also provided through the col- 1 WHO (World Health Organization). 2005. Life Science Research: Opportunities and Risks for Public Health. Geneva: World Health Organization. WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.20. Available at: http//www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_ 200_20/en/index.html. 2 WHO (World Health Organization). 2007. Scientific Working Group on Life Science Research and Global Health Security: Report of the First Meeting. Geneva: WHO. WHO/CDS/EPR/2007.4. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_CDS_EPR_2007_. 3 Online consultation: Scientific working group report feedback form. Available at: http:// www.who.int/csr/bioriskreduction/lifescience_project/en/index.html. Accessed on December 11, 2008. 4 The report of the meeting is being drafted. 5Reis, A. and E. Tuerlings. 2007. Bioethics and Health Security: The use and misuse of results of life science research. Abstract submitted for the 5th World Conference on Bio- ethics, Gijón, May 21-25; Tuerlings, E. 2007. Reflections—Governing dual use life science research: Opportunities and risks for public health. In A Web of Preention: The Life Sciences, Biological Weapons and the Future Goernance of Research, B. Rappert and C. McLeish, eds. London: Earthscan; Tuerlings, E., and C. McLeish. 2004. Is risk assessment a useful method to govern dual use research? Discussion Paper. 21st Pugwash CBW Workshop: The BWC New Process and the Sixth Review Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, December 4-5; WHO (World Health Organization). 2005. Life Science Research: Opportunities and Risks for Public Health. WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.20. Geneva: WHO. Available at: http//www.who. int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_200_20/en/index.html; WHO (World Health Organization). 2007. Scientific Working Group on Life Science Research and Global Health Security: Report of the First Meeting. Geneva: WHO. Available at: http://www. who.int/csr/resources/publications/deliberate/WHO_CDS_EPR_2007_.

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0 APPENDIX C laboration with WHO biosafety and laboratory biosecurity workshops in Iran (October 2006) and Kenya (May 2007). Forthcoming Activities (2008-2009) In collaboration with the scientific working group and other WHO departments, the project is now developing a draft guidance document that will complement the two previous project publications. The docu- ment will provide guidance on the process to assess national needs and capacities (i.e., how to evaluate needs and capacities to address such risks) and will provide a framework of possible options to manage the risks from a public health perspective (i.e., options will include biosafety and laboratory biosecurity, research policy, and ethical frameworks). The project will also develop technical materials to provide training. This will be done in collaboration with external partners. To develop the draft guidance and the training, the project is expected to hold two meetings. One meeting will be to review existing risk man- agement practices on the risks posed by life science research and inform the guidance document development. The other meeting, the second meeting of the scientific working group, will be to review the progress of the project, including the final draft guidance and other materials. Additional outreach activities will be done through non-WHO publi- cations and through contributions to international meetings. For instance, the project will continue its collaboration with the WHO project on Bio- safety and Laboratory Biosecurity and will contribute to their regional workshops. Similarly, it will contribute to relevant meetings organized by national academies of sciences and other external partners. ROBIN COuPLAND INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) The “Web of Prevention”—A Call for Synergy of Action to Prevent Poisoning and Deliberate Spread of Infectious Disease The International Committee of the Red Cross launched a Public Appeal in September 2002 on “Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity.” The Appeal carried three messages: first, it drew attention to potential risks brought by advances in life sciences and biotechnology; second, it underscored the legal rules—both national and international—which might apply to poisoning and deliberate spread of infectious disease; and third, it identified responsibilities of both governments and the scientific community to ensure that such advances are used only for the benefit of humanity.

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0 APPENDIX C The possible measures to reduce the risk of poisoning and deliber- ate spread of disease lie in multiple domains, e.g., disease surveillance, criminal law, public health preparedness, international law, codes of con- duct, education, etc. Each such measure is necessary but not, in itself, sufficient to reduce this risk. This means that all preventive measures work to enhance each other that is, there is a synergy of action or “Web of Prevention.” This is a base concept of the ICRC’s initiative. The Web of Prevention makes obvious the links between different agencies working on issues related to biological weapons or chemical weapons, for example, police, scientists, nongovernmental organizations and diplomats. It also discourages compartmentalized thinking and action by different disci- plines. Codes of conduct and education within the scientific community only make sense if seen as part of the Web of Prevention. JOHN CROWLEy uNITED NATIONS EDuCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CuLTuRAL ORGANIzATION (uNESCO) John Crowley is Chief of Section responsible for science and technol- ogy in the Division of Ethics of Science and Technology of UNESCO’s Sector for Social and Human Sciences (SHS). He is also editor of the Inter­ national Social Science Journal. He was previously (2005-2007) responsible for SHS information, communication and publications. Before joining UNESCO in 2003, Dr. Crowley worked as an economist in the oil industry (1988-1995) and as an academic political scientist at the French National Political Science Foundation (1995-2002). His research interests cover a number of areas in political theory and comparative politics including, in the areas relevant to his UNESCO responsibilities, environmental ethics and political technologies of securitization. The section of which Dr. Crowley is head is responsible for three components of UNESCO’s programme in the ethics of science and technology: • Science ethics, including in particular international and interdisci- plinary cooperation on the development of codes of conduct for scientific activity, building on the 1974 UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers and on the outcomes of the 1999 World Science Conference; • Environmental ethics, with particular current emphasis on climate change; • Ethical challenges relating to emerging technologies, including in particular nanotechnologies, new information technologies and issues of biocontrol.

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07 APPENDIX C The section also provides the Secretariat for the World Commission for the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), a body of independent experts established by UNESCO to advise the Director General on issues requiring ethical consideration and, where appropriate, the development of new mechanisms or instruments. In 2008-2009, the work of COMEST, which will next meet in extraordinary session in Paris in November 2008, will focus on science ethics and on climate change. MALCOLM DANDO BRADFORD uNIvERSITy, uNITED KINGDOM In cooperation with Alex Kelle and Kathryn Nixdorff, Malcolm Dando is developing the work they did on “Controlling Biochemical Weapons,” looking specifically at the potential misuse of neuroscience. With Brian Rappert he is working on awareness raising and education for life scientists using the interactive seminar that Brian designed. NEIL DAvISON THE ROyAL SOCIETy, uNITED KINGDOM The Royal Society continues to engage on dual use and biosecurity issues through its membership of the InterAcademy Panel on Interna- tional Issues (IAP) Biosecurity Working Group and through involvement in UK and international workshops and meetings. The society’s standing committee on the Scientific Aspects of International Security maintains a strong interest in this area. Other related areas of interest include export controls, particularly the UK government’s new Academic Technology Approval Scheme. GERALD EPSTEIN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STuDIES, uNITED STATES Global Forum on Biorisks (Initiated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies) The deliberate use of biology for harm can be at once a public health emergency, a crime, a terrorist incident, a disaster, a scientific investiga- tion, and a trade/travel crisis. Moreover, the problem is inherently inter- national, since groups based in one country can acquire resources in a second to attack a third, with the resulting disease spreading to additional countries and its indirect consequences being felt in yet more. Many dif- ferent professional communities have a role in preventing such incidents,

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 APPENDIX C • Establishing and helping to maintain regional infectious disease surveillance consortia to improve their technical capacity in rapid detec- tion, identification and response to infectious disease outbreaks. The prin- cipal groups being supported at present are the Middle East Consortium for Infectious Disease Surveillance and, in cooperation with the Rock- efeller Foundation, the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network. • Support for specific facilities and individuals in Russia aimed at enhancing biological safety and security. A critical element in these strands is the engagement of all sectors of the life science community including academia, government and the pri- vate sector. Of particular importance is seeking and encouraging public/ private partnerships to bring novel technical solutions and approaches to help reduce biological risks along the full spectrum from naturally occur- ring events, through accidents or negligence in laboratories to deliberately induced disease outbreaks. For more information, please see www.ghsi.org and www.iclscharter.org. RALF TRAPP INDEPENDENT CONSuLTANT Ralph Trapp is an independent consultant on disarmament of chemi- cal and biological weapons. He advises the OPCW on the preparation of the Second CWC Review Conference and acts as legal coordinator of the European Union (EU) joint action in support of the BWC (working through the Biological Weapons Prevention Project in Geneva). KOOS vAN DER BRuGGEN ROyAL NETHERLANDS ACADEMy OF ARTS AND SCIENCES A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity in the Netherlands: An Example to Be Followed? The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science asked the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) to provide it with advice and input for a national Biosecurity Code of Conduct for scientists, as recommended by the BWC, which was ratified in 1972. The request arose in part from the KNAW’s active contribution to the State- ment on Biosecurity issued by the InterAcademy Panel in 2005. If a code of conduct is to have the intended effect, it must reflect the experience and practice of the relevant actors. It was therefore decided to establish a focus group whose members would make comments and suggestions based on their practical experience as researchers and policy

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7 APPENDIX C makers. The first step of the project was to conduct a survey of measures already taken by central governments, fellow academies and research institutions in other countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. A further survey was made of current legislation and existing codes of conduct for biotechnology and microbiology with relevance for biosecurity. The findings of these surveys were used to identify how the adoption of a code of conduct can help to ensure that biosecurity issues are effectively addressed in scientific research. The Dutch Biosecurity Code of Conduct, published in October 2007, is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and a background review, which were also submitted to the working group and the focus group for comment. The aim of this code of conduct is to prevent life sciences research or its application from directly or indirectly contributing to the development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons, as described in the BWC, or to any other misuse of biological agents and toxins. Given this aim different target groups can be distinguished, varying from professionals engaged in the performance of biological, biomedical, biotechnological and other life sciences research to funding organizations and authors, editors and publishers of life sciences publications. The Code of Conduct on Biosecurity is intended to make all these groups aware of the potential dual use of the results of biological research and to make them follow some basic principles that can reduce the risks. How this process of this awareness raising on biosecurity issues can be organized will be elaborated and explained on the basis of the Dutch example. In the international context of the 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity attention will be paid to the question if and how the Dutch Code of Conduct on Biosecurity can be an example to be followed for other countries. CARRIE WOLINETz FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETIES FOR ExPERIMENTAL BIOLOGy (FASEB), uNITED STATES FASEB Engagement in Dual use Research Issues The Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology com- prises 21 scientific societies representing more than 80,000 biomedical researchers. FASEB’s mission is to advance biological science through col- laborative advocacy for research policies that promote scientific progress and education and lead to improvements in human health. Our societies’ members represent both basic and clinical researchers, primarily based in the United States but with a rapidly growing international membership as well.

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8 APPENDIX C Dual Use/NSABB Subcommittee: FASEB’s policy development process occurs through its Science Policy Committee, which functions through subcommittees or working groups of experts. In response to the U.S. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity’s proposed oversight framework, FASEB formed a subcommittee to address dual use issues generally and the NSABB proposal specifically. The chair of that subcom- mittee, Dr. Avrum Gotlieb, participated in the November dual use meeting organized by the Polish Academy of Sciences (see above). The subcommit- tee and staff continue to monitor and respond to dual use issues as they arise and develop policy statements as appropriate. FASEB has worked to raise awareness of dual use research issues through periodic publications in society newsletters, as well as our own electronic newsletter. Related Actiities: We have surveyed the FASEB leadership and mem- bership about dual use research issues and have found very low levels of awareness. Respondents suggested that scientific meetings would serve as a valuable outreach tool, although this conflicts with our experience. Typically, the attendance at policy sessions during society meetings is fairly low. Moreover, FASEB member societies have their own priorities for the limited policy sessions at scientific meetings and dual use research was identified as a low policy priority. FASEB has supplied a number of informative articles on dual use research and the activities of NSABB for society newsletters, as well as our own electronic newsletter, the FASEB Washington Update. In addition, FASEB has been actively engaged indi- vidually and with coalition partners in policy development on a number of related issues, including deemed exports, visa issues, and Select Agent regulations. THE INTERACADEMy PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL ISSuES (IAP) The IAP, founded in 1993, is a global network of 100 science acad- emies in partnership designed “to help its members develop the tools they need to participate effectively in science policy discussions and decision making.” The current co-chairs are Chen Zhu (Minister of Health, China) and Howard Alper (RSC: The Academies of Arts, Humanities and Sci- ences of Canada). More information can be found on the IAP Web site at http://www.interacademies.net/. The IAP Executive Council established a Biosecurity Working Group (BWG) in 2004 to coordinate its activities in this area; its members are the academies of China, Cuba, the Netherlands (chair), Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The BWG has undertaken a number of activities related to dual use issues. In March 2005, the IAP, the International Council for Science (ICSU), the InterAcademy Medical Panel (IAMP) and The National Academies of

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 APPENDIX C the United States hosted the International Forum on Biosecurity in Como, Italy. The Forum was designed to serve as a convening and coordinating mechanism to share information about activities under way or being planned and to broaden the debate and advance the awareness in the life sciences and biomedical research communities—and in the international scientific community more generally—about the challenges posed by the “dual use” dilemma. In December 2005, the IAP released a Statement on Biosecurity, which has been endorsed by over 70 national science academies. The statement provides principles for academies and other scientific bodies preparing codes of conduct that address five fundamental issues facing scientists working in the biosciences—awareness; safety and security; education and information; accountability; and oversight. In September 2006, IAP, ICSU, and the Royal Society hosted the work- shop Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Biologi- cal and Toxin Weapons Convention. The workshop brought together 84 scientific and policy experts from 23 countries to consider recent develop- ments in the biosciences and their potential implications. A statement and report were produced from the meeting that aimed to inform delegates at the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC. THE INTERACADEMy MEDICAL PANEL (IAMP) The InterAcademy Medical Panel, a global network of academies of science and medicine, is committed to improving health world-wide. Cur- rently the IAMP has 64 members; more information can be found on its Web site (http://www.iamp­online.org/). The current co-chairs are Guy de Thé, Académie de Médicine, France, and Anthony MBewu, Academy of Sciences of South Africa. Its activities focus on institutional collaboration to strengthen the role of all academies to alleviate the health burdens of the world’s poorest people; build scientific capacity for health; and pro- vide independent scientific advice on promoting health science and health care policy to national governments and global organizations. THE INTERNATIONAL uNION OF BIOCHEMISTRy AND MOLECuLAR BIOLOGy (IuBMB) The International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology— founded in 1955—unites biochemists and molecular biologists in 66 countries that belong to the Union as Adhering or Associate Adhering Bodies, representing biochemical societies, national research councils, or academies of sciences. The IUBMB is devoted to promoting research and

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0 APPENDIX C education in biochemistry and molecular biology throughout the world and gives particular attention to areas where the subject is still in its early development. It achieves this in several ways. Every three years the IUBMB sponsors an International Congress of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology. Cosponsorship of these Congresses by Regional Organizations of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology is an increasing trend. These Congresses are major international meetings where current research in all fields of biochemistry and molecular biology is considered. Thousands of individual research projects are presented in poster sessions and leading investigators from many nations survey their fields and describe their own research in symposia and plenary lectures. Since 1992 IUBMB has also sponsored IUBMB Conferences and Special Meetings, held in the years between the International Congresses. The IUBMB provides financial support for international symposia on biochemical and molecular biological research topics of current interest. It organizes or sponsors workshops, symposia and training sessions on bio- chemical and molecular biological education and provides free textbooks and journals to training institutions in developing nations. The IUBMB also funds short-term fellowships for younger biochemists and molecular biologists to travel to other institutions to perform research not possible in their own laboratories, and provides Travel Fellowships for young sci- entists to attend its Congresses. Sponsorship of meetings and fellowships is restricted to regions that belong to the IUBMB. As well as reaching biochemists through its own meetings, the IUBMB works closely with the four regional organizations that unite the bio- chemical societies of Asia and Oceania (Federation of Asian and Oceanian Biochemists and Molecular Biologists), Europe (Federation of European Biochemical Societies) the Americas (Pan-American Association for Bio- chemistry and Molecular Biology) and Africa (Federation of African Soci- eties of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology). Indeed all four are linked formally with the IUBMB as Associated Regional Organizations and three of them receive substantial financial support from the IUBMB. The Inter- national Federation of Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine, the International Society for Neurochemistry, the International Organization for Free Radical Research, and the International Society of Vitamins and Related Biofactors are also Associated Organizations of IUBMB. Reaching individual biochemists is also the purpose of another very important function of the IUBMB, that of publishing news, reviews, infor- mation, original research, and nomenclature. Trends in Biochemical Sciences (TiBS) is seen monthly by over 100,000 readers, keeping them informed of research progress across the broad field of biochemistry and molecular biology, as well as of news of meetings, people and biochemical events. Biotechnology and Applied Biochemistry publishes original research find-

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 APPENDIX C ings and reviews in the expanding domain of the practical applications of the subject. IUBMB Life expedites the publication of short communica- tions, identified by their novelty and the need for urgent dissemination. Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Education is dedicated to publishing articles, reviews and editorials to assist the teaching of biochemistry and molecular biology to science and medical students throughout the world. BioEssays, cosponsored by the IUBMB and seven other ICSU biological Unions, is the monthly current-awareness journal that displays progress across the fields of molecular, cellular and developmental biology. BioFac­ tors publishes reviews and original communications on growth factors and regulatory substances. Molecular Aspects of Medicine publishes reviews that aim to link clinicians and biomedical scientists. The IUBMB is one of 29 Scientific Unions affiliated with the Interna- tional Council of Science, an umbrella organization for scientists world- wide. ICSU was created in 1931 to encourage international scientific activity, to affirm the rights of scientists without regard to race, religion, political philosophy, ethnic origin, sex or language to join in international scientific affairs for the benefit of mankind. The IUBMB has been a mem- ber of ICSU since 1955 (until 1991 as IUB). The IUBMB representative serves as a member of the General Assembly of ICSU and ex-officio takes part in the work of the ICSU working group of the Biological Sciences. Through ICSU the IUBMB has been able to generate broad and often highly productive contacts with other international bodies, including some joint programs. Further information is available online at www.iubmb.org. THE INTERNATIONAL uNION OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (IuBS) The International Union of Biological Sciences is a non-governmental, non-profit, scientific network founded in 1919. The membership of IUBS presently consists of 44 Ordinary Members, adhering through Academies of Sciences, National Research Councils, national science associations or similar organizations, as well as 80 Scientific Members, all of which are international scientific associations, societies or commissions focusing on a wide array of biological disciplines. IUBS was one of the founding unions of the International Council for Science, and IUBS continues to contribute to the work of ICSU’s scientific committees and programs. The objectives of the IUBS are: to promote the study of biological sciences; to initiate, facilitate and coordinate research and other scientific activi- ties necessitating international, interdisciplinary cooperation; to ensure the discussion and dissemination of the results of cooperative research, particularly in connection with IUBS scientific programs; and to support

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2 APPENDIX C the organization of international conferences and assist in the publica- tion of their reports. IUBS organizes triennial General Assemblies, which are flanked by a scientific symposium organized in cooperation with the National IUBS Committee of the host country. It also conducts scientific programs, which currently include Biological Diversity, Integrative Biol- ogy, Biological Education, Bioethics, Integrative Climate Change Biology, Bio-Energy, Biology & Traditional Knowledge and the 2009 Darwin Cel- ebration Year. IUBS publications include the quarterly periodical Biology International, the IUBS Monograph Series, the Methodology Manual Series and the Proceedings of the General Assemblies. Further information is available online at www.iubs.org. THE INTERNATIONAL uNION OF MICROBIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES (IuMS) The International Union of Microbiological Societies is one of the 29 Scientific Unions of ICSU. It was founded in 1927 as the International Soci- ety of Microbiology, and became the International Association of Micro- biological Societies affiliated with the International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS) as a division in 1967. It acquired independence in 1980 and became a Union Member of ICSU in 1982. IUMS currently has 113 member societies and 14 associate members representing well over 100 countries. Members are National Societies and Associations for Microbi- ologists and associate members are other institutions with an interest in microbiological and connected sciences. The objectives of the Union are to promote the study of microbiologi- cal sciences internationally: initiate, facilitate and coordinate research and other scientific activities that involve international cooperation; ensure the discussion and dissemination of the results of international conferences, symposia and meetings and assist in the publication of their reports; rep- resent microbiological sciences in ICSU; and maintain contact with other international organizations. The major goal of IUMS is to promote research and the open exchange of scientific information for advancement of the health and welfare of humankind and the environment and strongly discourages any uses of knowledge and resources to the contrary. In particular, the IUMS strives to promote ethical conduct of research and training in the areas of bio- security and biosafety so as to prevent use of microorganisms as biological weapons and therefore to protect the public’s health and to promote world peace. IUMS seeks that all its member societies adopt or develop a Code of Ethics to prevent misuse of scientific knowledge and resources. The IUMS Code of Ethics Against Misuse of Scientific Knowledge, Research and Resources is available from the IUMS Web site at http://www.iums.org/

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 APPENDIX C about/about_us­Codeethics.html. The Code has been approved by the Execu- tive Board and the approval of the member societies has been requested. Further information is available online at: www.iums.org. THE INTERNATIONAL uNION OF PuRE AND APPLIED CHEMISTRy (IuPAC) The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry serves to advance the worldwide aspects of the chemical sciences and to contrib- ute to the application of chemistry in the service of humankind. As a scientific, international, nongovernmental and objective body, IUPAC can address many global issues involving the chemical sciences. IUPAC was formed in 1919 by chemists from industry and academia. Over nearly nine decades, the Union has succeeded in fostering world- wide communications in the chemical sciences and in uniting academic, industrial and public sector chemistry in a common language. IUPAC has long been recognized as the world authority on chemical nomenclature, terminology, standardized methods for measurement, atomic weights and many other critically evaluated data. The IUPAC continues to spon- sor major international meetings that range from specialized scientific symposia to CHEMRAWN (CHEMical Research Applied to World Needs) meetings with societal impact. During the Cold War, IUPAC became an important instrument for maintaining technical dialogue among scientists throughout the world. IUPAC is an association of bodies, National Adhering Organizations, which represent the chemists of different member countries. There are 45 National Adhering Organizations, and 20 other countries are also linked to IUPAC in the status of Associate National Adhering Organizations. Almost 1,000 chemists throughout the world are engaged on a voluntary basis in the scientific work of IUPAC, primarily through projects, which are components of eight divisions and several other committees. Further information is available online at: www.iupac.org. THE INTERNATIONAL uNION FOR PuRE AND APPLIED BIOPHySICS (IuPAB) The International Union for Pure and Applied Biophysics is a mem- ber of the ICSU family. Affiliated to it are the national adhering bodies of 50 countries. Its main objectives are to support research and teaching in biophysics, promote communication between the various branches of biophysics and allied subjects, and to encourage cooperation between the societies that are interested in the advancement of biophysics in all of its aspects.

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 APPENDIX C In order to achieve these objectives, the Union organizes triennial International Congresses and General Assemblies, which will next be held in China in 2011. IUPAB has four Task Forces concerned with major areas of biophysics: Bioinformatics, Capacity Building and Education in Biophysics, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance in Biological Sciences, and Bio- medical Spectroscopy. The Task Forces also arrange specialist meetings either associated with the Congresses or, more commonly, in the intervals between Congresses. The Union also supports conferences, schools and workshops, with priority given to events that will promote biophysics in the developing countries and that will facilitate the participation of young scientists in the conferences that it supports. Further information is available online at www.iupab.org. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES The National Academies of the United States comprises the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the National Research Council (NRC). Some of the most relevant international Biosecurity work includes: • The International Biosecurity Project works to promote imple- mentation of the international recommendations of the 2004 NRC report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism. A collaboration among sev- eral units at the National Academies, the project’s overarching goal is to develop and promote more effective international strategies to reduce the risk that advances in life sciences research could be misused. A key ele- ment involves working with international partners―other academies and international scientific organizations, as well as a wide range of intergov- ernmental and nongovernmental organizations. • The Biological Threats Panel brings together National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) and non-CISAC experts to address the scientific and technical dimensions of biological weapons, bioterrorism, issues related to successful imple- mentation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, biosecurity, and other contemporary challenges related to rapid growth in biotech- nology. The Panel coordinates across the Academies with ongoing efforts and develops its activities in partnership programs inside and outside the Academies. The Biological Threats Panel continues work started in 1986 by CISAC's Biological Weapons Working Group (BWWG), whose initial focus was on continuing concerns about Soviet compliance with the Bio- logical Weapons Convention. In the mid-1990s the BWWG played a lead- ing role in fostering U.S. government support for cooperative research programs between American scientists and scientists from former Soviet

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 APPENDIX C biological weapons research institutes. Recently CISAC’s Biological Threats Panel has established counterpart groups through the Russian Academy of Sciences CISAC and with the Chinese Biological Scientist’s Group of the Chinese People’s Association of Peace and Disarmament. • The Board on International Scientific Organizations (BISO) exam- ines issues related to the conduct of science, evaluates opportunities for international collaboration in scientific research, and strengthens U.S. participation in international scientific, engineering, and medical organi- zations. The Board also oversees a network of more than 20 U.S. national committees corresponding to ICSU scientific member bodies, seeks com- mittee input on issues confronting ICSU and its bodies, and informs them of the input NAS is considering in its role as a national member of ICSU. Scientific unions in the biological and chemical sciences with which BISO is involved include IUBS, IUBMB, IUMS, IUPAB, IUPAC, and others. Further information about The National Academies can be found at http://nationalacademies.org/. Information about its work in biosecurity can be found at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/biosecurity/.

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