For the other partnerships discussed, goals were much more closely aligned. In the case of the Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance (SFPGA; Chapter XI), government, NGO, and private sector partners shared a commitment to reducing illegal logging and expanding the market share of sustainable products. However, each was also motivated by a secondary—but not necessarily overt—objective. The U.S. Agency for International Development sought to demonstrate that market-based tools are more effective than enforcement in curtailing illegal logging, and to generally build relationships with business; the NGOs (World Wildlife Fund and Metafore) sought to increase their own legitimacy through an association with the U.S. government, and also access additional funds to carry out their work; and the private companies liked being associated with government (to aid relations with producer countries, as well as avail themselves of USAID’s in-country expertise). They believed that the partnership could improve their reputations, and finally, that it increased their supply chain efficiency through this linkage to other companies with a similar commitment.
Acceptance was a critical issue for Agua para Todos (APT; Chapter X) because it grew out of a politicized and volatile atmosphere—the “Cochabamba Water Wars” of 2000. Dynamic leadership on the part of the private sector appeared to be an essential factor in catalyzing the partnership. The private business, Agua Tuya, was well known and respected within the technical community. Essentially, leaders within Agua Tuya were able to convince other potential partners that working together would add value to their individual efforts. The public sector partner (SEMAPA) lacked capacity in terms of resources and skills, and so was naturally drawn to a private sector partner that could provide this additional capacity. Local water committees were important to the overall system because they were able to build more secondary systems, though they relied on SEMAPA to provide their main supply of water. The community accepted this partnership largely because the local partners, namely the water committees, had already bought in.
The Green Power Market Development Group (GPMDG; Chapter VII) was described as a club—it had not previously existed, and so partners endeavored to create it. Led by an NGO, the World Resources Institute, which desired to promote “green power” as a concept, several corporations with existing sustainability strategies and commitments to improve their environmental records joined together in a partnership. The GPMDG offered the “club goods” of knowledge and information diffusion, along with reputational recognition for their efforts. On the face of it, this might have appeared self-serving, but partners pointed out that these club goods should also lead to broader public goods, i.e., more green power on the market. GPMDG companies pointed out that they could have done what