Appendix I
Principles to Underpin the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL)

Alan E. Haggerty, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, International Technology Security, asked COSSP to examine and recommend principles to underpin the MCTL. The committee derived the following principles from those outlined in Recommendation 2:

  1. Justify and limit each restriction: Restrictions can be justified only when they can be implemented effectively and when their security benefits clearly and specifically outweigh the harm they will necessarily impose to other values. Therefore, restrictions on a technology—which should include consideration of classification—should be implemented only when

    1. The United States alone, or the United States and cooperating allies, possess technology that leads not only to identifiable military advantage, but to an advantage that is likely to persist for many years (i.e., the time needed to field a system based on that technology);

    2. The United States, or the United States acting together with allies, control the technology such that they can prevent it from moving into the hands of possible adversaries;

    3. The restrictions do not impose costs and inefficiencies that are disproportionate to the restrictions’ security benefits;

    4. Restrictions are re-examined and re-justified periodically to ensure they remain appropriate.

  1. Define technologies narrowly and precisely: Serious complications can arise from treating system components, subsystems, and parts as critical technologies themselves when those subsystems and components draw from a commercial or global



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Appendix I Principles to Underpin the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) Alan E. Haggerty, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Inter- national Technology Security, asked COSSP to examine and recommend principles to underpin the MCTL. The committee derived the following principles from those outlined in Recommendation 2: 1. Justify and limit each restriction: Restrictions can be justified only when they can be implemented effectively and when their security benefits clearly and specifically outweigh the harm they will necessarily impose to other values. Therefore, restrictions on a technology—which should include consideration of clas- sification—should be implemented only when a. The United States alone, or the United States and cooperat- ing allies, possess technology that leads not only to identifi- able military advantage, but to an advantage that is likely to persist for many years (i.e., the time needed to field a system based on that technology); b. The United States, or the United States acting together with allies, control the technology such that they can prevent it from moving into the hands of possible adversaries; c. The restrictions do not impose costs and inefficiencies that are disproportionate to the restrictions’ security benefits; d. Restrictions are re-examined and re-justified periodically to ensure they remain appropriate. 2. Define technologies narrowly and precisely: Serious complica- tions can arise from treating system components, subsystems, and parts as critical technologies themselves when those sub- systems and components draw from a commercial or global 19

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10 APPENDIX I technology base. If a technology is to be defined as militarily critical, the system must be clearly delineated from everything else, and that definition should not extend controls over broad swaths of technologies with multiple applications. 3. Partner with Allies: The United States needs to create a basis for cooperative control of shared technology with friendly nations, that assures that timely agreement can be reached on what to control, and that all relevant parties have control systems that are as secure as our own. If controls on shared technology can- not be agreed and implemented on a multilateral basis, they cannot be effective. 4. Run faster: Advances in exploiting technology and in furthering research are typically made when the fundamentals of a field are understood, a process that takes generally place in the unclas- sified and the international communities. The United States must prevent technological surprise by being better poised to anticipate and capitalize on research breakthroughs than those who would use these advances to harm us or compete against us economically. The leading technology edge for militarily critical technologies should be delineated and re-examined on a peri- odic basis.