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PAPERBACK price:$42.00 add to cart Rights & Permissions Free PDF Access Sign in to download PDF book and chapters Free Resources PDF SUMMARY Display this book on your site! Related Titles Finding Common Ground:U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment Balancing the National Interest:U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition Other Related Titles Beyond 'Fortress America': National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World (2009) Development, Security, and Cooperation (DSC) Citation Manager Export the bibliographic data for this book in your chosen format Web Search Builder Use this book's key terms to search within this book, across our collection, or across the Web. Skim This Chapter Skim this chapter and use this chapter's key terms to search within this book. Reference Finder Paste in your own text to find books that relate to your topic. Citation Manager . "IV. Conclusion." Beyond 'Fortress America': National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009. Please select a format: Page 81   E-mail Share on facebook Facebook Share on delicious Delicious Share on stumbleupon Stumble Share on twitter Twitter More Sharing ServicesMore The following HTML text is provided to enhance online readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML. Please use the page image as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy. IV. Conclusion Visa regulations and export controls are not issues that provoke the attention of the nation’s citizens, and for that reason, have a seemingly “quiet” impact. Nevertheless, the combined effect of these controls over the last 20 years has been to corrode the very institutions they were developed to protect—our national economic security and well-being. We recognize that neither elected officials nor policy makers have incentives to spend political capital on issues that seem arcane and persist below the public’s radar screen. However, almost all of these serious problems can be corrected with one Executive Order from the President. For this reason, the committee has undertaken this study from the point of view of a presidential order and has confined its recommendations to the essential elements of such an order. As a nation, we cannot, and should not, abandon well-conceived efforts to keep dangerous technology and scientific know-how out of the hands of those who would use this knowledge to create weapons of mass destruction and other, equally dangerous military systems. However, such knowledge and technology represent a very narrow and limited set of goods, technology, and know-how. Our former unilateral strategy of containment and isolation of our adversaries is, under current conditions, a self-destructive strategy of obsolescence and declining economic competitiveness. A strategy of international engagement is a path to prosperity that can be coupled with a smart approach to security using an adaptive system of government regulation and incentives. The committee recommends the issuance of an Executive Order that implements the recommendations it has outlined as one of the first orders of business in 2009. Page 81 Front Matter (R1-R12) Summary (1-12) I. Introduction (13-16) II. Findings (17-58) III. Recommendations (59-80) IV. Conclusion (81-82) Appendix A: Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security Roster (83-84) Appendix B: The Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity Biographies (85-98) Appendix C: Background on the Roundtable/Commission on Scientific Communication and National Security (99-100) Appendix D: Recent Studies and Initiatives Outside the National Academies (101-106) Appendix E: Principal Studies Sponsored by the National Academies That Address the Impact of National Security Controls on the Conduct of Science and Technology (107-109) Appendix F: U.S. Government Agency Jurisdiction and Export Decision Tree (110-122) Appendix G: Possible Topics for Future Research (123-126) Appendix H: ITAR and CCL Control Lists by Category (127-128) Appendix I: Principles to Underpin the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) (129-130) Appendix J: Export Control Legislation in the 110th Congress (131-134) Appendix K: Commerce Control List Overlap with Multilateral Agreements (135-138)

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OCR for page 81
Beyond "Fortress America": National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World IV. Conclusion Visa regulations and export controls are not issues that provoke the attention of the nation’s citizens, and for that reason, have a seemingly “quiet” impact. Nevertheless, the combined effect of these controls over the last 20 years has been to corrode the very institutions they were developed to protect—our national economic security and well-being. We recognize that neither elected officials nor policy makers have incentives to spend political capital on issues that seem arcane and persist below the public’s radar screen. However, almost all of these serious problems can be corrected with one Executive Order from the President. For this reason, the committee has undertaken this study from the point of view of a presidential order and has confined its recommendations to the essential elements of such an order. As a nation, we cannot, and should not, abandon well-conceived efforts to keep dangerous technology and scientific know-how out of the hands of those who would use this knowledge to create weapons of mass destruction and other, equally dangerous military systems. However, such knowledge and technology represent a very narrow and limited set of goods, technology, and know-how. Our former unilateral strategy of containment and isolation of our adversaries is, under current conditions, a self-destructive strategy of obsolescence and declining economic competitiveness. A strategy of international engagement is a path to prosperity that can be coupled with a smart approach to security using an adaptive system of government regulation and incentives. The committee recommends the issuance of an Executive Order that implements the recommendations it has outlined as one of the first orders of business in 2009.

OCR for page 82
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