1
The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction

This chapter summarizes the evolution of cooperative threat reduction activities, beginning with the programs established to respond to the collapse of the Soviet Union through today’s broad range of U.S. government and international threat reduction efforts (see Appendix E). Just as programs evolved over time, so did the terminology used to refer to those programs. As explained in “A Note on Terminology,” this report has adopted the following terms to refer to various programs: programs exclusive to the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program are referred to as DOD CTR; the broader set of threat reduction programs that encompasses departments and agencies across the U.S. government are referred to as USG CTR; the entire set of programs to this point is referred to as CTR 1.0; and the committee’s concept of a future global security engagement program is referred to as CTR 2.0.

DOD CTR has played a central nonproliferation role since 1992, and successfully addressed a myriad of disarmament, dismantlement, and engagement challenges that emerged throughout the 1990s. Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar formally established the program in late 1991, but a history of limited and selective types of interactions between the United States and Soviet Union helped make it possible for the two countries to embark on such a groundbreaking effort. U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation and the Joint Verification Experiments are two such examples.

A 1985 report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) looked at the congressional debate on whether to revive the U.S.-Soviet space cooperation that had begun in the 1970s and was allowed to lapse in 1982.1 Several issues were considered, including scientific and practical benefits

1

U.S. Office of Technical Assessment. 1985. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space: A Technical Assessment. 1-3 pp. Availiable as of March 2009 at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_4/DATA/1985/8533.PDF.



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1 The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction This chapter summarizes the evolution of cooperative threat reduction activities, beginning with the programs established to respond to the collapse of the Soviet Union through today’s broad range of U.S. government and interna - tional threat reduction efforts (see Appendix E). Just as programs evolved over time, so did the terminology used to refer to those programs. As explained in “A Note on Terminology,” this report has adopted the following terms to refer to various programs: programs exclusive to the Department of Defense Coop - erative Threat Reduction program are referred to as DOD CTR; the broader set of threat reduction programs that encompasses departments and agencies across the U.S. government are referred to as USG CTR; the entire set of pro- grams to this point is referred to as CTR .0; and the committee’s concept of a future global security engagement program is referred to as CTR .0. DOD CTR has played a central nonproliferation role since 1992, and suc- cessfully addressed a myriad of disarmament, dismantlement, and engagement challenges that emerged throughout the 1990s. Senator Sam Nunn and Sena - tor Richard Lugar formally established the program in late 1991, but a history of limited and selective types of interactions between the United States and Soviet Union helped make it possible for the two countries to embark on such a groundbreaking effort. U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation and the Joint Verifica - tion Experiments are two such examples. A 1985 report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) looked at the congressional debate on whether to revive the U.S.-Soviet space cooperation that had begun in the 1970s and was allowed to lapse in 1982.1 Several issues were considered, including scientific and practical benefits 1 U.S. Office of Technical Assessment. 1985. U.S.-Soiet Cooperation in Space: A Technical Assessment. 1-3 pp. Availiable as of March 2009 at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_4/ DATA/1985/8533.PDF. 

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT to be gained, the potential transfer of militarily sensitive technology or know- how, the foreign policy impact of space cooperation, why the Soviet Union wanted to pursue space cooperation, and how all of these issues factored into overall U.S.-Soviet relations. At the time of the report, the United States had a decade of experience with a Soviet relationship that was characterized by OTA as “strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous.”2 However, the report concludes: “From a scientific and practical point of view, past experience has shown that cooperation in space can lead to substantive gains in some areas of space research and applications, and can provide the United States with improved insight into the Soviet space program and Soviet society as a whole.”3 The OTA risk-benefit analysis came out in favor of cooperation. Similarly, the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement of May 31, 1988, addressed many sensitive nuclear testing issues and ultimately led to an extraor- dinary set of interactions that allowed scientists, technicians, and observers from the United States and the Soviet Union not only to observe an underground nuclear explosion experiment at each other’s test sites, but also to measure explosion yields and discuss the test results.4 Although clearly distinct from the beginning of the DOD CTR program, these U.S. efforts provided important underpinnings for the DOD CTR effort, especially on the Russian side. 5 The DOD CTR program has never operated in a vacuum, but rather as a component of much broader national and international efforts. The threats that the United States faces today and is likely to confront in the future are more diverse and complex than were those posed by the former Soviet Union (FSU). The committee has found that DOD CTR and other cooperative threat reduction programs have been successful in the past, and is confident that these programs can be adapted and applied to new situations. The DOD CTR program was created in response to the unique circum- stances surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union. The events leading to the August 1991 coup and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union had their roots in the accelerated change inspired by the 1980s glasnost’ (“openness”) policy 2 Ibid. p. 1. 3 Ibid. 4 “At a summit in Washington, D.C. in December 1987, the two countries agreed to a set of on-site reciprocal experiments to monitor nuclear explosions at their corresponding test facilities. This culminated in the Joint Verification Experiments (JVE) where Soviet experts monitored a nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site on August 17, 1988, and U.S. experts monitored a nuclear explosion at the Semipalatinsk test site on September 14, 1988. . . . The JVEs laid the foundation for future technical cooperation between Russian and American scientists.” National Academy of Sciences. 2005. Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosie Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 31-32 pp. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11265. 5 For a Russian perspective on the contributions of the JVEs, see National Research Council. 2004. Oercoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a Joint Workshop. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 71-72 pp.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION of Mikhail Gorbachev, but no one could have predicted or planned the way in which events transpired, including those in the vast Soviet military complex. As a result, “All of the [Soviet] military forces were left in place. There were 27,000 nuclear weapons, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, unknown quanti - ties of biological weapons materials, and 10 closed nuclear cities.” 6 Many, but not all, of these military assets were in Russia, but pieces of the Soviet Union’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) systems were distributed across other former Soviet republics. There were increasing fears in the West 7 about the stability of the Newly Independent States (NIS).8 Diversion of the former Soviet arsenal of WMD and related materials, delivery systems, and expertise later became the primary concern.9 This was new territory and there were few precedents for how to proceed. But U.S. and Russian officials came to under- stand that significant rapid action had to be taken to secure the vast arsenals in the NIS. The original U.S. negotiators arrived in Moscow for their first meeting with a blank sheet of paper, ready to listen to proposals from the Russians, who described activities that they felt responded to their highest priorities. Over a series of discussions that were both cooperative and collaborative, an outline of a cooperative threat reduction program began to take shape. The DOD CTR program was initially authorized in 1991 and supported by funds appropriated to the Department of Defense in Public Law 102-228. 10 The law defined three primary program objectives: (1) assist the former Soviet states to destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. In 1992, these objectives were expanded to include dismantling missiles and mis - sile launchers; destroying destabilizing conventional weapons; preventing diver- 6 Joseph P. Harahan. Discussion at CTR Study Committee Meeting #1. May 21, 2008. See Ap - pendix C for a list of references that address the history of the CTR program. 7 In November 1991, the Carnegie Corporation of New york convened a meeting to address the Soviet nuclear arsenal. After briefings from Ashton Carter and William Perry, Senator Sam Nunn, Senator Richard Lugar, and their senior staff worked together to draft legislation that passed the Senate later that month. See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry. 1999. Preentie Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 71-72 pp. 8 The Newly Independent States (NIS) refer to the countries formed on the basis of the former Soviet Republics, and does not include the Baltic States. 9 See for example Graham Allison et al., eds. 1993. Cooperatie Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds. CSIA Studies in International Security No. 2. Harvard Project on Cooperative Denucle - arization. Center for Science and International Affairs: Harvard University. 10 Public Law 102-228 (section 2551 [note], title 22, United States Code), Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, December 12, 1991. Congress initially authorized the transfer of $400 mil - lion in each of Fy 1992 and Fy 1993 for CTR activities under Section 108 of the “Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief from the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Act of Fy 1992,” P.L. 102-228, as amended and Section 9110(a) of the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fy 1993, P.L. 102-396.

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4 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT TABLE 1.1 DOD CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization ($ millions) Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Request $400 $400 $400 $400 $371 $328 $382.2 Authorized $400 $400 $400 $400 $300 $364.9 $382.2 Fiscal Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Request $440.4 $475.5 $458.4 $403 $416.7 $450.8 $409.2 Authorized $440.4 $475.5 $443.4 $403 $416.7 $450.8 $409.2 Fiscal Year 2006 2007 2008 Request $415.5 $372.3 $348.00 Total Requested Fy 1992-2008 $6,870.70 Authorized $415.5 $372.3 $428.05 Total Authorized Fy 1992-2007 $6,901.85 SOURCE: Amy Woolf. 2008. Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soiet Union. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 11 pp. Available as of March 2009 at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf. sion of weapons-related scientific expertise; establishing science and technol - ogy centers; facilitating demilitarization of defense industries and converting military capabilities and technologies; and expanding military-to-military and defense contacts.11 After a slow start-up process in 1992 and 1993, some individuals in Con - gress criticized the DOD CTR program for spending too much time and money on what were considered “soft” activities as opposed to the “hard,” more tangible, WMD dismantlement and destruction programs. In response to congressional preferences, some programs originally established and funded by the Department of Defense, as explained below, are now funded by the Departments of State and Energy. Other programs, such as Defense Conversion (investment assistance to convert former Soviet military infrastructure to peace - ful, civilian, commercial purposes) and Military Officer Housing (to accelerate the retirement of former Soviet military officers) lost congressional support and were eliminated altogether. The United States has invested more than $21 billion in USG CTR pro - grams since 1992, nearly one-third of which was for DOD CTR. See Table 1.1 for a summary of DOD CTR funding over the life of the program. Despite some difficulties over the years, the DOD CTR funding has accom- plished a great deal in the region to increase security and prevent the poten - tial diversion of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies, materials, and expertise. As of February 2009, the United States and the NIS have deactivated 7,504 strategic nuclear warheads, destroyed 742 interconti - 11 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 102-484, October 23, 1992, Title XIV − Demilitarization of the Former Soviet Union (also cited as the “Former Soviet Union Demilitar- ization Act of 1992”).

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), eliminated 496 ICBM silos, destroyed 143 ICBM mobile launchers, eliminated 633 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), eliminated 476 SLBM launchers, destroyed 31 nuclear submarines, and launched biological surveillance efforts in several NIS states. 12 Finding 1-1: The DOD CTR programs have demonstrated that DOD was able to mobilize and focus considerable resources creatively to meet new challenges in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. In particular, DOD showed that it could apply assistance to deactivate nuclear warheads, eliminate chemical munitions, delivery systems, and biological and chemical production facilities in a verifiable and transparent way. DOD CTR OPERATES IN TANDEM WITH OTHER U.S. PROGRAMS From the outset, DOD CTR program execution depended heavily on the diplomatic leadership of the Department of State and the nuclear weapons expertise of the Department of Energy (DOE). Both departments played active roles in the process of negotiating the DOD CTR Umbrella and Implementing Agreements, provided expertise, and initially received funds from DOD for program implementation. Although authorized, funded, and identified initially as a DOD program, over time, the concept of cooperative threat reduction has grown into an interagency enterprise that encompasses the resources and expertise of many U.S. government departments and agencies, including several that have not traditionally had a national security role. In 1996, responding to congressional criticism of the DOD CTR program, a decision was reached among the secretaries of defense, state, and energy to transfer funding responsibility for certain activities out of the Defense Depart - ment budget request to the State and Energy Department budgets. The State Department became responsible for annual appropriations requests for the WMD Scientist Redirection Program and the Export Controls and Border Security Program, and continued to fund the Nonproliferation and Disarma - ment Fund (NDF) under its existing FREEDOM Support Act authorities.13 The Department of Energy took responsibility for programs of Material Protection, Control and Accounting to protect, secure, and account for nuclear materials and for a new program aimed at facilitating the transformation and downsiz- ing of Russia’s large nuclear research and fissile material production facilities. Further devolution of program funding responsibility resulted from the George W. Bush administration’s Review of Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia, 12 See Appendix F for the most recent Nunn-Lugar Scorecard. Available as of March 2009 at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html. 13 See The FREEDOM Support Act, P.L. 102-511. October 24, 1992. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/docs/s2532.html.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT completed in December 2001. That review concluded that most programs were effective and well run, and made several recommendations that were reflected in the Fiscal year 2002 budget requests to Congress. In particular, this included the transfer of $74 million in funding as well as future funding responsibility for the project to Eliminate Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production to DOE. The one-time transfer of $30 million to the Department of State to fund Biological Weapons Redirection efforts was also recommended.14 Over time, other departments not typically considered to have a national security function were enlisted to support these efforts, particularly for pro - grams administered by the State Department. These include the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture, and the Environmental Pro - tection Agency, which support the WMD Scientist Redirection programs, and the Departments of Treasury and Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard, which support implementation of the Export Controls and Border Security Program. All of them brought scientific, technical, training, and other expertise necessary for program implementation and oversight that were not available elsewhere in the government. It has also become apparent that development assistance, such as that pro - vided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), also can play a role to support cooperative threat reduction efforts. In some areas of interest to USG CTR, such as projects related to disease monitoring and health, USAID’s programs and budgets can be leveraged to complement and supplement USG CTR efforts of other agencies, and often have much larger budgets. In addition, private foundations are now major players in funding a wide variety of programs that can operate synergistically with threat reduction programs. For example, the health investments of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Google.org, and others are examples of programs that could work with CTR 2.0 efforts in disease surveillance and biological threats. Similarly, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Global Green have worked with both govern - ments and international organizations to address nuclear and chemical security challenges. THE kANANASkIS G8 SUMMIT AND THE CREATION OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION In addition to expanding U.S. interagency involvement, USG CTR con - cepts also were firmly incorporated into the Group of Eight (G8) agenda at the 2002 kananaskis Summit, where leaders created the G Global Partnership 14The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. United States Government Nonproliferation/ Threat Reduction Assistance to Russia Fact Sheet May 24, 2002. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sort/fs-nonpr.html.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (G GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.15 The G8 GP defined its mission as preventing “terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and bio - logical weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.” 16 Programs were implemented initially in Russia, but later other countries of the FSU also participated. The G8 GP was a response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the October 2001 anthrax mailings. It defined its international efforts in terms of preventing weapons and materials of mass destruction acquisition by terrorists rather than on more traditional state-sup - ported programs. The 2007 G8 GP Mid-Point Review reflected progress in neutralizing and destroying Russian chemical weapons, dismantling decom - missioned nuclear submarines, disposing of fissile materials, employing former WMD scientists and engineers in civil activities, and enhancing the safety of nuclear materials. (See Box 1.1 below for details on the program to Eliminate Chemical Weapons in Russia.) The development of the G8 GP elevated cooperative threat reduction to a global enterprise that is now poised to extend beyond its original 10-year mandate. Common guidelines17 have been established for program implemen- tation and informal mechanisms have proven effective as a relatively low-cost, low-bureaucracy mode of program coordination. For example, ad hoc tech- nical coordination groups for chemical weapons destruction and submarine dismantlement projects meet only when necessary and conduct much of their business through e-mail, conference calls, and other similar means. At the 2008 G8 Summit in Japan, the G8 GP Report noted that “We also recognize that the GP must evolve further to address new, emerging risks worldwide if we are to prevent terrorists or those that harbor them from acquir- ing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons and/or missiles,” 18 and elaborates further on how the GP would be expanded, noting that 23 countries now contribute to GP efforts and that more should be encouraged to join.19 (See Box 1.2.) 15 G8 2002 kananaskis Summit Agenda. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.canadainter- national.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2002/index.aspx?menu_id=15&menu=L. 16 G8 Leaders. 2002. Statement at kananaskis Summit: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. June 27. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2002/global_partnership-partenariat_ mondial.aspx?lang=eng. See also Charles Thornton. 2002. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Nonproliferation Reiew. 9:3. 17 See Appendix G for the G8 GP Guidelines for New and Expanded Cooperation Projects. 18 G8 Countries. 2008. Report on the G8 Global Partnership. Hokkaido Toyako Summit. Avail - able as of March 2009 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/pdf/0708_ 12_en.pdf. 19 The participants in the G8 GP include the G8: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United kingdom, the United States, as well as Australia, Belgium, the

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT BOX 1.1 G8 Global Partnership Efforts to Eliminate Chemical Weapons in Russia In the 2008 Report on the Global Partnership, the following progress was highlighted in the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction project since 2002, noting that interna- tional contributions to the project include funding from the government of Russia: • Two chemical weapons destruction facilities were built: o Gorny ß Assistance is provided from the European Union (EU), Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland ß All chemical weapons stored there have been neutralized o Kambarka ß Assistance is provided from the EU, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland ß The facility became operational in December 2005, and has been neutral- izing chemical weapon stockpiles since • The facility at Shchuch’ye is being constructed: o Assistance provided from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, the EU, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States o Finland also plans to contribute to this project • Additional assistance will be provided to the facilities at o Pochep ß Assistance received from Germany and Switzerland ß Italy also plans to support this project o Leonidovka and Maradykovsky ß Switzerland has provided assistance to both sites o Kizner ß Canada is preparing to provide assistance SOURCE: Report on the G8 Global Partnership. 2002. Paragraphs 29-32. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/pdf/0708_12_en.pdf. Finding 1-2: The DOD CTR program in Russia and the former Soviet Union is a vital part of the broader interagency and international cooperative threat reduction efforts, and operates in the context of a broader group of U.S. inter- agency and international programs. Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New zealand, Norway, the Republic of korea, Sweden, and Switzerland.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION BOX 1.2 Expansion Of The G8 Global Partnership 29. Risks of the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide. The Global Partnership (GP) will address such risks through implementing proj- ects according to the GP common principles. In addressing threat reduction and non-proliferation requirements, the projects will be specifically aimed to implement and realize the GP common principles worldwide. To this end other recipient states and donor states accepting the GP principles and guidelines could be included on a case-by-case basis in an expanded GP for the implementation of projects in line with GP goals. At the same time, the GP will continue to focus on the ongoing GP projects. 30. At the same time, the GP will continue to provide assistance to ongoing GP proj- ects in Russia noting that the areas of the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines are priority areas for Rus- sia. We are determined in our commitment to accomplish projects, including those which Russia considers of primary importance, under this initiative in Russia. 31. Based on the agreement that the Global Partnership will address such risks world- wide, the partners will work together constructively and practically to identify spe- cific focuses of the expanded GP. The discussions on this issue will be conducted on a project based fashion and function-wise, inter alia, nuclear and radiological issues, chemical issues and biological issues. The GP welcomes the expertise of the [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons] OPCW on chemical issues and the [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA on nuclear and radio- logical issues in the implementation of GP projects in their area of competence and seeks such expertise regarding biological issues within the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The effective implementation of IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are areas where partners may seek to engage through the GP. A “model agreement” proposed by the UK was noted as a reference which could be helpful in enabling new projects to be put in place with minimum delay. 32. The Global Partnership currently encompasses twenty-three partners including the EU. Efforts should, however, continue to be made to find new donors. Endeav- ors to communicate with potential new donors can be undertaken by interested partners. SOURCE: Report on the G8 Global Partnership. 2008 Paragraphs 29-32. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/pdf/0708_12_en.pdf.

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0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT DOD CTR INITIAL PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS The DOD CTR program had few precedents to guide its initial develop - ment, but there was a sense of urgency that drove the first set of activities aimed at consolidating the former Soviet nuclear capabilities that were spread across four of the NIS (Belarus, kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine). That urgency was shared by leaders in both Russia and the United States, in some cases for differ- ent reasons. Russia’s new leaders were interested in remaining the sole nuclear power in the region, but also recognized that foreign financial assistance would be critical to consolidate, safeguard, and in some cases dismantle weapons sys - tems as well as to help the country through a turbulent economic period.20 U.S. leaders were concerned about the potential threat from four new nuclear states and about accountability for any U.S. assistance provided for threat reduction and how to ensure that assistance provided was not used to sustain or enhance former Soviet weapons capabilities. DOD policies, procedures, and rules developed to implement its CTR program were complex, and the process of putting agreements into place to govern the new program activities were unfamiliar to the leaders of the NIS. In the United States, some individuals in Congress were unconvinced that the USG CTR programs were in U.S. national security interests and saw the program more as foreign assistance.21 There was still distrust and fear of Rus- sian motives. That unease eventually resulted in very intense oversight of the program and restrictions placed on the types of activities that could be imple - mented. Auditing and accounting practices, limitations on liability, access to sensitive sites, and other factors became the subject of often lengthy negotia - tions. Congress has consistently maintained close oversight particularly over the DOD CTR program. Many DOD CTR programs have changed over the years, often in response to congressional directions, restrictions, prohibitions, and preferences. The original legislative mandate for the program required, among other things, a lengthy annual certification measuring against six crite - ria (including human rights). Oversight was also exercised through more than 40 congressionally requested Government Accountability Office reports on program activities, and there was a general sense of caution that came from wanting to avoid any appearance of programs contributing to helping Russia expand Soviet-era military power. These layers of oversight may have provided an increased sense of political and management security, but also resulted in a heavy bureaucratic burden and implementation delays. The challenge of dem - onstrating the national security benefits of CTR 2.0 will require an ongoing set 20 Joseph P. Harahan. 2008. Discussion at CTR Study Committee Meeting #1. May 21. 21 See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry. 1999. Preentie Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 74-75 pp. See also Richard Soll. 1995. Misconceptions About the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Director’s Series on Prolifera- tion, . Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the University of California.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION of consultations between the executive and legislative branches to ensure that members of Congress and their staffs understand the program’s strategy and approaches. Since 1995, the level of leadership of DOD CTR has been downgraded from a high-priority program managed by a deputy assistant secretary of defense for cooperative threat reduction and special assistant to the secretary of defense to a CTR Policy Office under a director for the CTR program. 22 Historically, DOD CTR has been very effective when it had the active and direct support and participation of the secretary of defense. This kind of sustained, senior-level support will be needed in the future. Since 1995, the level of leadership in DOD has been downgraded from a high-priority program managed by a deputy assistant secretary of defense for cooperative threat reduction and special assistant to the secretary of defense to a CTR Policy Office under a director for the CTR program. As DOD CTR grew through the 1990s, there was little corresponding growth in the size of the DOD CTR Policy Office staff that provided overall policy and program guidance. A small and dedicated policy team was expected to provide guidance and policy oversight for a burgeoning number of projects under the supervision of the DTRA CTR Implementing Office. In addition, the programs spread into Central Asia and the Caucasus regions, with each new country requiring an investment of time to establish new working relationships, which were primarily the responsibility of the policy staff. DOD and DOE CTR 1.0 programs benefited from having either DTRA or DOE staff at embassies in countries where programs were implemented. This in-country liaison and oversight function is important to the program, but will be harder to sustain as global expansion of programs puts even more demand on the limited number of staff. The use of large American contractors with experience working in inter- national environments and with DOD procurement rules initially was a key to successful CTR program implementation. These contractors took on the responsibility of integrating themselves and foreign subcontractors with local firms, and basically became the face of DOD CTR in countries across the FSU. yet, this growing reliance on contractors created greater separation between DOD CTR policy leaders and their counterparts in cooperating countries, weakening their development of close working relationships and undermining a primary benefit of the early DOD CTR program. The committee was told that for a period of time integrated program reviews were held quarterly for some programs that brought together DOD CTR officials, U.S. contractors, foreign 22 See Carter and Perry. pp. 72-73.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT contractors, and subcontractors, including nongovernment organizations. This approach apparently worked well, but was not applied uniformly across all programs. Finding 1-3: The size of the DOD CTR Policy Office staff has not expanded significantly over the life of the program even though the number of countries engaged has continued to grow, and it will need to expand further to meet the increased requirements of global engagement. Other transitions took place over time within the DOD CTR program as well as in the broader USG CTR efforts. Although the threats presented by military hardware were still important, the U.S. experience with terrorism demonstrated how important reaching the softer components of threats to security was, and more attention was focused on this area. For example, as the DOD CTR program focus moved from Russia into Central Asia and the Caucasus areas, there was less WMD equipment and infrastructure destruction and dismantlement work. Although there were WMD infrastructure and facili - ties to address, the programs shifted more to training personnel for security, protecting and securing highly dangerous pathogens, and preventing the move- ment of WMD materials across insecure borders. Similarly, other USG CTR programs added radiological security and security of highly toxic chemicals to their program portfolios. There was also a shift in how “threats” were defined. In the early years of the DOD CTR program, the emphasis was on WMD threats, particularly strategic weapons systems. Over time, policy makers came to understand that not only those with direct, past weapons experience pose a risk, but also those capable of creating weapons threats pose a risk and should be included in programs. These trends are good indicators of how the programs can evolve further in the future to address new threats. How to expand into some of these areas was not always well thought out, however. For example, the DOD CTR Threat Agent Detection and Response Program was designed to secure repositories of especially dangerous pathogens, enhance surveillance and response to disease outbreaks, and enhance local diagnostics capabilities. As documented in the 2007 study The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense,23 there were insufficient local consultations when developing the program, with the result that the program responded more to DOD CTR “wants” than any local “needs” that would help ensure sustainability. DOD CTR was eventually convinced to modify the list of pathogens that the program will monitor from only those on the U.S. list of 23 National Research Council. 2007. The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Depart - ment of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnership s. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_ id=12005.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION select agents to a somewhat broader list that included endemic disease of real relevance to the partner country. As a result, the partner attitude toward the project improved and the likelihood for sustaining the program into the future increased because of the higher level of local interest and commitment. The issue of data reporting, however, remains unresolved. The original plan was to transmit all data to a DOD end point in the United States, with no plan for how to then share the information with the World Health Organization. The host country would not agree to this plan, and an appropriate nonmilitary host for the data is being identified. Finding 1-4: The selection of activities in countries with which we engaged in CTR 1.0 was not always done with long-term strategic thought or appropriate awareness of country and regional concerns. From the Russian perspective, the early period of the DOD CTR program was dominated by the Russian presidential administration and powerful min - istries (such as the Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy), which strongly preferred operating in the context of legal frameworks and implementing agree- ments. There was strong Russian motivation to implement the program by several key military and nuclear complex leaders who shared U.S. concerns about treaty compliance and meeting treaty compliance milestones and nuclear security. In the early bilateral negotiations, the United States was able to obtain Russian agreement on virtually all of its many implementing requirements and procedures. Later, as Russia stabilized and grew wealthier, and particu - larly under the Vladimir V. Putin administration, the implementation environ - ment became increasingly challenging. Guidelines were included in the G8 GP agreement at the 2002 kananaskis Summit24 that reflected the difficulties that individual states had in winning Russian agreement to certain project ele - ments and overall Russian reluctance to work with other countries under the same conditions that were required by the United States. Access to facilities became increasingly problematic; liability for the actions of foreign contractors working in Russia became a “show-stopping” issue that took several years to resolve. Implementation roadblocks became a regular discussion item at G8 GP meetings. yet despite the bureaucratic challenges, there are still many tangible examples of DOD CTR accomplishments, as demonstrated on the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard25 and other assessments of USG CTR programs. The USG CTR programs also have produced equally important intangible benefits. The human relationships that have been formed at multiple levels are among the most important, enduring, and underrecognized benefits of these programs. Working from a basis of shared priorities, strategies, goals, and 24 See Appendix G for the G8 GP Guidelines for New and Expanded Cooperation Projects. 25 See Appendix F.

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4 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT responsibilities in a truly cooperative environment produces more than just tan- gible program success. The concept of long-term engagement, the development of lasting ties based on trust built through shared experience, defies the hard metrics that have become such an ingrained part of measuring program value, but can be the critical link to success of an immediate project and, perhaps more importantly, be the foundation for working together in future endeavors. These links have been major contributors to success in the former Soviet Union, and time and effort must be invested in each new environment to develop these relationships. Perhaps most importantly, these relationships have helped the United States gain insights into personalities and government structures that make it possible to design more effective approaches to cooperation. 26 This is true not only for the partner or recipient countries but also for the countries with which the United States collaborates through the G8 GP and other inter- national or multilateral structures. Finding 1-5: DOD CTR is a highly leveraged national security program for the United States that yields reciprocal insights and transparency that can lead to greater levels of trust and confidence. DOD CTR AT AN INFLECTION POINT As most DOD CTR activities in Russia move toward completion and as security threats beyond the FSU become a new priority, the DOD CTR pro- gram finds itself at an inflection point. In 2002, Congress began asking DOD to explore ways that the program could be used to meet new global challenges. 27 The DOD CTR authorizing legislation was changed in 2003 to allow activities outside the FSU and shortly thereafter a project was developed to help Albania destroy a chemical weapons cache left from the Cold War period.28 The initial scoping study for the project was undertaken by the State Department (NDF), and DOD CTR’s chemical weapons stockpile destruction assistance to Albania began in 2006, at a facility designed under DOD CTR supervision. The project was completed in 2007, and remains the only DOD CTR project undertaken outside the territory of the FSU.29 26 Charles Thornton. 2008. Discussion at the CTR Study Committee Meeting #1, May 21. 27 In 2002, Congress requested a report outlining a cooperative threat reduction program for India and Pakistan, including legal obstacles to implementing such a program, and an estimated budget. The report was apparently never produced and DOD could not provide any documenta - tion about the report to the committee. 28 Brianne E. Tinsley. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Albania Chemical Weapons Elimination Project. Project Overview. Breifing. Department of Defense. October 14, 2008. 29 “Project Peace” to eliminate the former Soviet Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) at Skrunda, Latvia, was funded under CTR in 1994-1995 from a $10 million earmark of CTR funds for con - ventional weapons dismantlement. The elimination of the LPAR was a primary obstacle to Russian

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION Another opportunity for DOD CTR program expansion was in response to Libya’s announcement in December 2003 that it was giving up its WMD programs. Among the WMD elements almost ideal for DOD CTR program involvement were providing the transportation for the removal of gas centri - fuges and nuclear material and destroying Libya’s chemical weapons, precursor chemicals, and related manufacturing capability. However, the DOD CTR pro- gram estimate of time, cost, and complexity significantly exceeded the estimates from the State Department’s NDF, which could operate with greater flexibility given its “notwithstanding any other provision of law” authority (which allows it to operate legally in any environment, even when sanctions or other measures may be in place). Although NDF ultimately did not implement the Libyan chemical weapons destruction program, the committee studied the Libya case to understand better why DOD CTR was not involved.30 Future DOD CTR and other USG CTR programs may be similarly affected by evolving political and economic relationships with partner nations. Tensions with Russia after its August 2008 conflict with Georgia raised questions at the leadership level for USG CTR implementing agencies, but at the program level there was little impact. Congressional committee staff with direct interests in USG CTR efforts were uniform in their support for sustaining USG CTR programs, including DOD CTR, despite growing tensions with Russia.31 As the global security environment continues to evolve, there will be times when the United States, Russia, the participants in the G8 GP, or others may be at odds over objectives or courses of action for issues with no direct relationship to cooperative threat reduction. It would be a great loss for U.S. and interna - tional security if temporary political turmoil were to have a negative impact on the long-term efforts under the DOD CTR program, USG CTR programs, or G8 GP efforts. Stepping away from programs in Russia would have risked sacrificing many gains that have been made in the past decade and a half and which, once lost, might never be regained. This is not an option when Russia and other countries are partners in important global security efforts, such as the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of korea. In the course of the study that led to this report, the committee explored how the CTR concept can be applied to contemporary threats. When the CTR programs were conceived, they were intended to address the primarily monolithic problem of the Soviet Union’s WMD capacity and related prolif - eration risks. Although a diverse and complex set of challenges, those issues and Latvian agreement on the removal of Russian troops from Latvian territory. Although the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, this annexation was never officially recognized by the United States, which continued to consider the Baltic States as independent nations. 30 See further discussion on Libya in Chapter 2. 31 Communications with Senate and House Armed Services Committees staff and Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT were largely concrete and identifiable. The threats that the world confronts in the 21st century, however, are of a fundamentally different nature. Because of rapid globalization of communications, transportation, and knowledge, threats are networked, agile, adaptable, and difficult to quantify; our tools to respond to this kind of threat must be similarly nimble. In the committee’s view, a new approach to CTR is now required. Finding 1-6: The DOD CTR program will require new energy and creativity to deal with the changing global security environment, whose challenges are different from those that came at the end of the Cold War. The world has changed enormously since the DOD CTR program was established. The events of September and October 2001 triggered a fundamen - tal rethinking of how the United States defines threats and how to respond to them. WMD proliferation focus began to shift from destroying weapons and materials and preventing the flow of expertise and technology from state pro - grams to preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD. Threats from the dual-use potential of known and emerging technologies also had to be managed, as well as the potential for the diversion of industrial chemical or biological materials to malevolent use. Another new challenge was the ability of an individual or group to cause enormous damage, disruption, and economic loss to the United States, even without widespread death or illness. As demonstrated by the terrorist and bio - logical attacks of 2001, neither massive Soviet-style weapons production facili - ties nor ICBMs loaded with biological or nuclear payloads are needed to have a significant impact on our society. In addition to the potential for nonstate actors to pose significant threats, many states now have the latent scientific and techni- cal capability to move rapidly into WMD development. Policies should aim at preventing this, but conversely, we must also be prepared to respond positively to countries that may decide to relinquish their weapons programs. The case of Libya demonstrated that such decisions can be made somewhat abruptly and that the United States and other nations require program flexibility to be ready to respond to such unanticipated opportunities and to sustain that response. Finding 1-7: Most future threats to the United States are likely to have smaller footprints, less distinct signatures, and be more closely associated with indus - trial activities related to energy, biology, health, or chemistry rather than highly centralized, large-scale national weapons programs. Recommendation 1-1: The DOD CTR program should be expanded geograph- ically, updated in form and function according to the concept proposed in this report, and supported as an active tool of foreign policy by engaged leadership from the White House and the relevant cabinet secretaries.

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 EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION CHAPTER SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Finding 1-1: The DOD CTR programs have demonstrated that DOD was able to mobilize and focus considerable resources creatively to meet new challenges in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. In particular, DOD showed that it could apply assistance to deactivate nuclear warheads, eliminate chemical munitions, delivery systems, and biological and chemical production facilities in a verifiable and transparent way. Finding 1-2: The DOD CTR program in Russia and the former Soviet Union is a vital part of the broader interagency and international cooperative threat reduction efforts, and operates in the context of a broader group of U.S. inter- agency and international programs. Finding 1-3: The size of the DOD CTR Policy Office staff has not expanded significantly over the life of the program even though the number of countries engaged has continued to grow, and it will need to expand further to meet the increased requirements of global engagement. Finding 1-4: The selection of activities in countries with which we engaged in CTR 1.0 was not always done with long-term strategic thought or appropriate awareness of country and regional concerns. Finding 1-5: DOD CTR is a highly leveraged national security program for the United States that yields reciprocal insights and transparency that can lead to greater levels of trust and confidence. Finding 1-6: The DOD CTR program will require new energy and creativity to deal with the changing global security environment, whose challenges are different from those that came at the end of the Cold War. Finding 1-7: Most future threats to the United States are likely to have smaller footprints, less distinct signatures, and be more closely associated with indus - trial activities related to energy, biology, health, or chemistry rather than highly centralized, large-scale national weapons programs. Recommendation 1-1: The DOD CTR program should be expanded geograph- ically, updated in form and function according to the concept proposed in this report, and supported as an active tool of foreign policy by engaged leadership from the White House and the relevant cabinet secretaries.

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