. "2 Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons." Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
2
Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons
CTR 2.0 – FROM PATCHWORK PROGRAMSTO HOLISTIC APPROACH
As the change in version number indicates, CTR 2.0 is a major program upgrade, not just a set of minor patches.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 1.0 has matured and developed, and the time has come to move beyond an ad hoc collection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet states. That set of programs was a highly creative response to unique security challenges and geopolitical changes, particularly in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A new, equally creative set of integrated and coordinated global security engagement programs is now required to address a broader range of WMD and terrorist threats on a global scale—CTR 2.0. As the change in version number indicates, CTR 2.0 is a major program upgrade, not just a set of minor patches. The committee envisions a version of CTR that builds on a proven platform and the lessons learned from the FSU experience, but with substantially new features. As CTR 2.0 grows, it will absorb the lessons learned from the original programs, and will be structured to respond to a rapidly changing environment. CTR 2.0 will not be the domain of a single U.S. department or even of the U.S. government, and the White House will need to play an active leadership role. To succeed, it will need to be an integrated, cooperative, collaborative, global enterprise that is responsive, flexible, and adaptable (see Box 2.1).
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
2
Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons
CTR 2.0 – FROM PATCHWORK PROGRAMS TO HOLISTIC APPROACH
As the change in version number indicates, CTR 2.0 is a major program upgrade, not just a set of minor patches.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 1.0 has matured and developed, and the time has come to move beyond an ad hoc collection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet states. That set of programs was a highly creative response to unique security challenges and geopolitical changes, particularly in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A new, equally creative set of integrated and coordinated global security engagement programs is now required to address a broader range of WMD and terrorist threats on a global scale—CTR 2.0. As the change in version number indicates, CTR 2.0 is a major program upgrade, not just a set of minor patches. The committee envisions a version of CTR that builds on a proven platform and the lessons learned from the FSU experience, but with substantially new features. As CTR 2.0 grows, it will absorb the lessons learned from the original programs, and will be structured to respond to a rapidly changing environment. CTR 2.0 will not be the domain of a single U.S. department or even of the U.S. government, and the White House will need to play an active leadership role. To succeed, it will need to be an integrated, cooperative, collaborative, global enterprise that is responsive, flexible, and adaptable (see Box 2.1).
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BOX 2.1
Defining CTR 2.0
CTR 2.0 is a set of programs and projects undertaken by the United States, as part of a cooperative network that includes a wide range of countries, international organizations, and nongovernment partners, to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate common threats to U.S. national security and global stability that have emerged in particular since the end of the Cold War. The preferred mechanism and long-term goal for the cooperation is partnership, which means that the countries participating should be ready to share responsibilities for project definition, organization, management, and financing according to a rational division of labor, capacity (including budget capacity), or technical capability. Although CTR 2.0 engagements may have to begin under less than ideal circumstances, the goal for countries engaged under CTR 2.0 is shared responsibility through engagement and partnership. CTR 2.0 should be capable of rapid response as well as longer-term programmatic engagement.
DEFINING CTR 2.0
In late 2003, Libya agreed to give up its WMD programs and join or rejoin relevant international institutions. Although the announcement was preceded by talks between Libyan, U.S., and U.K. government officials, Libya’s decision surprised many other than the few individuals directly involved in the negotiations. Weapons, materials, and systems needed to be removed quickly and with a high level of international coordination. U.S. and U.K. officials feared that the Libyans might reverse their decision, and a rapid and flexible response was needed.
Nuclear dismantlement required a creative partnership between Libyan, U.S., U.K., and Russian officials, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (a U.S. nongovernmental organization [NGO]). 1 The Libyan government agreed to dismantle its centrifuge program and convert its research reactor core from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Sensitive centrifuge equipment and both spent and fresh HEU fuel were removed under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Department of Defense (DOD) was asked to provide air or sea transportation for this cargo. Instead, transportation was secured by the State Department and funded by its Nonproliferation and
1
Paula DeSutter. 2004. Completion of Verification Work in Libya. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78305.htm.
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Disarmament Fund (NDF), which leased aircraft and a cargo ship. Senior U.S. government officials that were directly involved in the discussions informed the committee that DOD claimed that wartime constraints on military aircraft made it impossible to provide the capability that was needed to remove the equipment and material.
Libya also agreed to destroy their chemical weapons stocks and dismantle their production capability.2 More than 23 tons of mustard blister agent along with 600 tons of precursor chemicals had to be destroyed.3 The DOD CTR program and NDF were both asked to submit time and cost estimates. NDF proposed a significantly lower budget and a shorter time line, and it was therefore selected to carry out the task. NDF subsequently contracted with an Italian company to build an incinerator to destroy the chemical weapons material.4
Large infrastructure projects were hallmarks of DOD CTR in the FSU and responded to the needs of the massive Soviet military infrastructure–warhead storage facilities, chemical destruction plants, and replacement power plants for plutonium production reactors. A similar situation is likely to be rare in the future. None of the nuclear or chemical engagement in Libya5 involved DOD CTR in large measure because the existing program is not structured to respond quickly and the senior DOD officials who can direct resources are not sufficiently engaged. The Libyan example shows the need for and importance of a robust, fast, and flexible U.S. government (USG) CTR capability to meet new challenges when they arise.
Finding 2-1: CTR 1.0 was a highly creative response to unique security challenges and geopolitical changes in the former Soviet Union. The new threats we face require similar innovation to create CTR 2.0. Coordination and leadership from the White House will be required, and relevant departments and agencies will need to engage to ensure that there is a clear connection between the policy intent and program implementation, as in the case of Libya.
2
Joseph Cirincione et al. 2005. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological and Chemial Threats: Second Edition. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowement for International Peace. 324 pp.
3
Ambassador Donald Mahley. Committee consultation. See also Donald Mahley. 2004. Dismantling Libyan Weapons: Lessons Learned. The Arena. Chemical And Biological Arms Control Institute. November.
4
Libya, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reached an agreement whereby an exception would be made for the part of the Rabta Industrial Facility that was never intended for chemical weapons production. That portion of the facility will be allowed to be used for civilian pharmaceutical production. See OPCW. 2004. OPCW Executive Council Approves Recommendation to Allow for Conversion of Former Chemical Weapon Facility in Libya. October 18. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.opcw.org/news/news/article/opcw-executive-council-approves-recommendation-to-allow-for-conversion-of-former-chemical-weapon-fac/.
5
Libya did not maintain a state-sponsored biological weapons program. See Cirincione et al. 2005. 324 pp and Mahley. 2004.
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To succeed, it will need to be an integrated, cooperative, collaborative, global enterprise that is responsive, flexible, adaptable, and able to respond to the new security threats that it will need to counter.
CTR 2.0 is likely to be characterized by smaller projects that not only seek to reduce threats but also have the goal of helping others prepare to prevent or respond to new threats. The report of the Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 2008 (hereafter referred to as the Carter-Joseph Report) concluded that the DOD CTR program should expand its focus on counterproliferation activities, including threat awareness, equipment, and consequence management training and exercises, aimed at building national and regional capacities.6 These should become major program themes in future cooperative threat reduction efforts. Similarly, given new WMD proliferation threats from terrorism, the DOD CTR Proliferation Prevention Initiative should undertake a larger role along with enhanced and integrated efforts to provide assistance with export controls, border security, shutting down trafficking routes, and stemming piracy, which all can contribute to controlling WMD proliferation in meaningful ways.
Such efforts contribute to building capacities that can enable states to more effectively engage in efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). Each of these new areas, however, will require the establishment of new or improved relationships with allies or partner countries. Just as a beachhead was established in Moscow in the early 1990s by taking the time to identify shared priorities and to codevelop a strategic approach, many new beachheads will have to be established in the future to initiate the next generation of cooperative threat reduction programs: CTR 2.0.
Finding 2-2: CTR 2.0 efforts will likely be smaller and distributed across a larger number of countries carefully targeted on the sources of new threats rather than the large, physical infrastructure dismantlement or construction projects that were the hallmarks of the programs in the former Soviet Union.
Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) Program has the potential to be an even more important element of CTR 2.0. The DMC Program started under
6
Ashton B. Carter, Robert G. Joseph, et al. 2008. Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Cambridge: Harvard University. Available as of March 2009 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18307/review_panel_on_future_directions_for_defense_threat_reduction_agency_missions_and_capabilities_to_combat_weapons_of_mass_destruction.html?breadcrumb=%2F.
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CTR 1.0, but became disconnected over the years from the DOD CTR program goals it was initially designed to support. DMC activities build a partner’s capacity and can be a mechanism for exploring and establishing relationships in new partner countries and regions. Senior officers at three of the Unified Combatant Commands support expanding the DMC Program and linking it strategically to other U.S. security assistance efforts. Current DMC Program examples include the following:
Traveling Contact Teams (TCTs) for maritime interdiction and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical warning and detection
Antiterror TCTs
Military Police familiarization exchanges
National Guard State Partnership Program familiarizations and contact visits
Regional counterproliferation and counterterrorism exercises
Disaster preparedness/consequence management TCTs
Support for other regional security initiatives
There is also significant potential for building new relationships through existing civilian and military health and infectious disease programs, and through other scientific and technical collaborations that engage local expertise. This topic is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
Finding 2-3: CTR 2.0 should include long-term relationship and capacity building that can be the basis for future cooperative threat reduction activities, through defense and military-to-military engagement and other peer-to-peer engagement, such as in science.
The new security environment requires that the USG reassess the eligibility criteria for USG CTR assistance. This should allow more effective leveraging of resources, help avoid duplication among agencies, and ensure that programs are prioritized as part of a national security strategy. Traditionally, factors that have been taken into account included the following:
Is the security threat high and direct?
Does assistance respond to one or more U.S. national security strategy priorities, such as compliance with treaties, fulfillment of existing nonproliferation or security agreements, or participation in new nonproliferation or security initiatives?
Is the partner willing to cooperate and are they in critical need of technical or financial assistance?
Is the partner willing to provide access to the key individuals, facilities, or materials?
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Are other countries or organizations willing to cooperate and provide additional technical or financial resources?
Is there congressional authority and are there appropriations that will support the effort?
Have NGOs or the private sector been engaged?
Is there a probability of success?
The United States and others involved in CTR 2.0 should continue to prioritize programs according to these criteria, at the same time realizing that the priorities among criteria may change over time. It may not always be possible for CTR 2.0 to tackle the highest and most direct threat first, but it may be possible to make real progress on other important but slightly lower priority threats.
Finding 2-4: Traditional criteria for determining eligibility for cooperative threat reduction engagement may need to be adjusted to reflect the changing security environment.
There may be instances where there are open disputes with parts of a partner country government, but receptivity in other parts of the same government; there may be opportunities to engage where access to facilities is not as open as the United States or others would prefer, but where incremental forward progress and the development of trust demands flexibility. Programs under CTR 2.0 will challenge those who implement them to fashion new approaches to each set of circumstances, balancing the interests of all sides.
Finding 2-5: As the lessons learned from the Libyan experience make clear, to make cost-effective contributions to U.S. national security in the future, USG CTR programs must be less cumbersome and less bureaucratic in order to provide agile and timely contributions. They must take greater consideration of the needs and wants of reluctant partners even as we keep focused on core U.S. objectives.
DEVELOPING MEANINGFUL METRICS
Most current metrics for tangible program success measure U.S. program performance, not the impact of the programs and measures of success in the cooperating countries, which arguably should be the more important focus.
CTR 2.0 will operate under congressional authorities and appropriations and must account for how it spends taxpayer dollars and demonstrate the national security benefit it produces. The metrics that have been used tradition-
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ally to produce the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard (see Appendix F) are not necessarily the right metrics for measuring the impact of CTR 2.0, for which intangible metrics—relationships and processes—will be harder to measure. Traditional, “hard” metrics are important program indicators, but do not necessarily capture some of the important high-value “soft” program results.
An essential issue in developing and using program metrics to understand and assess the success of USG CTR programs is to pair the specific metrics employed with the stated program goals and objectives. Each partner, however, may emphasize different goals and objectives even for the same project. It is essential that not only the goals and objectives be discussed among the partners during the development of programs, but also that the measures of program effectiveness be discussed and mutually agreed to before the initiation of the program. Some of these metrics may be oriented toward developing a sense of trust, facilitating a better understanding of threat perceptions and prioritization of risk, fostering sustained support for addressing threats, or engaging a more diverse group of experts to develop creative ways to address threats. In these cases, each partner may present a different set of indicators, which would independently evaluate the effectiveness of USG CTR programs from their own perspective. Discussing and comparing the results of program effectiveness against mutually agreed, but independently assessed, metrics may provide another valuable opportunity for strengthened engagement.
Traditional “scorecard” metrics are too often very quantitative in nature and are not always adequate measures of a program’s success.
Developing a new approach to metrics will also demand an appreciation by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), department-based program auditors, and Congress that hard “scorecard” metrics, often very quantitative in nature, are not always adequate measures of a program’s success. This is particularly true when relationship and capacity building are the objective. The current OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool,7 which is used to measure program performance across the government, is particularly ill suited to this kind of evaluation.
There also has been a tendency in CTR 1.0 to define metrics from the U.S. perspective without incorporating metrics from the partner country’s perspective. Since sustainability is an important element of decreasing threat and increasing security, meeting the partner’s expectations will be another tool to
7
The Program Assessment Rating Tool is used across the government to assess and improve program performance of federally funded programs. Its uniform design and approach to milestones makes it difficult to reflect progress in diplomatic negotiations and other areas where intangible results are important. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part_default/.
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project whether a program or project has any likelihood of being sustained in the long term by the partner. Aspects of programs that can help measure the impact in the partner’s environment could include the following:
Contributions (in-kind and financial) of the partner country—Has the partner been engaged from the beginning stages in a way that gives them a sense of ownership and responsibility for the program? Is there a desire on the part of the partner to see the program succeed and to sustain the program into the future?
Transparency—Has the partnership developed under the program enhanced levels of trust and helped both sides understand the other better, for example appreciating differing perspectives on threat and response?
There may be additional measures for specific programs such as for biological threat programs. Examples include:
Measurable improvement in speed of response to outbreaks
Improved quality of disease reporting
More active regional engagement
More scientific and technical collaborations of a strengthened nature
Similarly, rather than counting numbers of sensors installed or training sessions conducted, alternative metrics for nuclear security programs could include the following:
Reduction in nuclear smuggling incidents
Increase in the number of regular and realistic exercises of nuclear security response structures
Reductions in nuclear materials stockpiles
Consolidation of nuclear material storage sites
Development of security cultures
Many of these kinds of metrics can only be measured over a period of years and will not satisfy the annual demands of the budget cycle, but there has to be recognition that forcing traditional metrics requirements onto programs designed to have long-term impact will not work. Different metrics need to be explored and adopted. The DOD CTR Biological Threat Reduction Program ran an exercise in the fall of 2008 to test the biological detection and surveillance system in Georgia that has resulted from a USG CTR program. The conclusions of that test should be reviewed as a possible model for future metrics design.
Metrics also need to be reviewed and updated regularly as situations and U.S. goals evolve. For example, a lesson learned from some of the DOE CTR
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programs was that as programs evolved to meet changing needs, metrics were not adjusted in parallel. Consequently, when the program achievements were reviewed, there was a mismatch between new program goals and old metrics, leaving room for misinterpretation and criticism.
One possible example of an analytical model to map or measure the relationship aspect of CTR 2.0 is Social Network Analysis (SNA).8 SNA is a mathematical technique for analyzing sets of relationships between individuals and organizations. It has grown in sophistication and application over the past several decades and may be a useful tool for identifying tangible benefits of the relationships developed under cooperative threat reduction programs.
In addition, more attention needs to be paid to how metrics are linked to criteria for determining program priorities and program success. If flexible criteria are used to decide which program efforts go forward, then metrics have to be similarly flexible to reflect the key issues that were part of the policy decision. Calibrating metrics to criteria will require greater thought than has typically gone into developing USG CTR program metrics. For example, a modest program to redirect a group of scientists can have a major impact locally or even regionally, but the program probably should not be advertised as having broad global impact.
As a recent National Research Council report has concluded,9 determining adequate measures of program effectiveness is particularly difficult when the goals and objectives of specific programs are largely unquantifiable, such as in relationship building and strengthening partnerships. As a means of attempting to address this challenge, many international organizations have sought to more fully employ impact evaluations as a means of understanding what has been most successful in their programs and why. While sophisticated social science methodology is often used to conduct impact evaluations,10 the four essential factors in attempting to establish the success of a particular program are as follows: (1) clearly defining what is being evaluated; (2) identifying a set of desirable outcomes that might reasonably result from the program (based on realistic expectations as to what might be accomplished by specific programs); (3) determining specific indicators of success calibrated to the specific desired
8
See, for example, Ulrike Gretzel. 2001. Social Network Analysis: Introduction and Resources. Available at http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/tse-portal/analysis/social-network-analysis/.
9
National Research Council (NRC). 2008. Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
10
The NRC report notes that “impact evaluation is the term generally used for those evaluations that aim to establish, with maximum credibility, the effects of policy interventions relative to what would be observed in the absence of such interventions. These require … : collection of baseline data; collection of appropriate outcome data; and collection of the same data for comparable individuals, groups, or communities that, whether by assignment or for other reasons, did and did not receive the intervention.” Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research. 47 pp.
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outcomes; and (4) measuring program outcomes against these indicators. Employing relevant techniques of impact evaluations may better position USG CTR 2.0 to assess its successes, particularly when program goals and objectives are not easily quantifiable and do not translate easily onto a scorecard.
Finding 2-6: The traditional metrics of DOD (and USG) CTR success are often useful for program evaluation. Warheads or delivery systems and launchers destroyed, weapons materials secured, and contractor full-time equivalent on target are more concrete than just total dollars spent, but these metrics do not adequately reflect threat reduction impact or account for the value of potential CTR 2.0 engagement against new threats in this century. The challenge remains to find measureable performance indicators that capture the true value of important future successes that may be less tangible and more difficult to document. Efforts to contrive such measures, however, can result in burdensome and misleading data that may distort sound assessments of policy implementation. For example, the dollar value of locks and alarms procured, or even the number, is less important than the degree to which an institute plans, trains, and practices security against intruders and the “inside threat.” These latter considerations are more important, but less transparent and measureable.
CTR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OBJECTIVES
What are WMD and other strategic threats to the United States?
The universal availability of information and the highly dual-use nature of many technologies, particularly in the biological and chemical fields, make it possible to develop a WMD without having previously worked directly in a state WMD program.
National security threats during the Cold War were not confined to the bilateral superpower relationship, but they were defined largely by a known adversary and the threat of nuclear war and other WMD. Even though the relationship was far more complex than that, nostalgia exists for the days when the greatest threat could be defined by the Cold War paradigm of the United States versus the Soviet Union. Today, the United States faces security challenges from a wide range of countries with existing as well as latent WMD capability; from nonstate actors; and from countries known to be proliferators or where weak, unstable governments enable individuals or groups to proliferate with the tacit or active knowledge of the government. A strategy focused on immediate, direct threats may not be as wise or relevant in the 21st-century environment as understanding change and risk and how to keep risks from developing into
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threats.11 This is the environment in which CTR 2.0 must operate. Some of the challenges to be considered include the following areas:
Nuclear Challenges In addition to concerns about an expanding number of countries having declared nuclear weapon programs, there is increasing concern that the spread of nuclear technologies, particularly as a result of the increased global focus on nuclear power, will enable more countries to become latent nuclear states with the expertise, technology, and materials that can be rapidly converted to weapons use. As the use of nuclear power expands, cooperative government and industry efforts to develop more proliferation-resistant technologies, the possible establishment of an international fuel cycle program, and related efforts will all contribute to addressing these new challenges. Control over material is the final defensive line, but left as the only major defense, it can be weakened in the face of covert activity, third-party assistance, and treaty breakout. The IAEA, nuclear industry, cooperative research, and even military-to-military interactions can provide greater transparency and confidence building, but few insightful specific measures currently exist to support, monitor, or verify these capabilities. For example, military-to-military ties have weakened over the years in several countries of concern, sometimes replaced by NGO or Track II activities that may or may not compensate for a lack of peer-to-peer embedded engagement on a continuing basis. Even where military-to-military relations or other peer engagements are conducted, it is difficult to gauge how much they support USG CTR objectives, but they often do.
Chemical Weapons Challenges In addition to countries with known or suspected chemical weapons programs, any country with a reasonably advanced chemical or petrochemical industrial sector has the latent capability to develop chemical weapons. Over the past several years, even what defines a “chemical weapon” has been challenged, for example, by the innovative use in Iraq by al Qaeda of chlorine gas tanks—either alone or in combination with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to execute chemical attacks.12 There has been international concern for many years over the lack of security at chemical facilities that could be targets for terrorist acquisition of components of a chemical weapon or simply releasing toxic industrial chemicals as a weapon. Because chemical weapons do not have the same potential strategic and catastrophic impact that nuclear and biological weapons do, there has been relatively little attention paid to developing a broad effort to increase security or to understand the
11
See Appendix H for a comparison of the characteristics of Six Weapons Systems from the Perspective of a State of Terrorist Organization.
12
Kirk Semple and Jon Elsen. 2007. Chlorine Attack in Iraq Kills 20. New York Times. April 16. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/world/middleeast/06cnd-iraq.html.
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countries. For example, 112 American Chambers of Commerce currently operate in 99 countries,22 and generally have close ties both with the host country as well as with the U.S. embassy, and chambers of commerce representing the interests of other governments.
Another way to reach out to the U.S. private sector may be through the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), which held its 23rd Annual Briefing with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on November 19, 2008. OSAC was started in 1985, as a forum to share ideas between the public and private sectors in recognition of the growing threat posed by international terrorism to U.S. citizens living and working abroad. The council, which now comprises a dozen federal agencies and more than 5,600 private-sector groups, meets annually to share ideas, and plays “an important role in helping to shape the world’s view of America, how we maintain our security and how we engage with our neighbors in their countries.”23 Secretary Rice cited several areas where OSAC had played a role in 2008, including at the time of the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad: “OSAC quickly gathered security information and shared that information, and that was used, in turn, to brief senior [State] Department officials and … chief security officers.”24 OSAC could play a role in the CTR 2.0 model.
Clearly, other governments and international organizations have played a strong role in CTR 1.0 and should continue to do so in CTR 2.0. The conceptual difference, however, is that in the CTR 2.0 model, new program engagements would begin by sharing information, identifying areas of risk and opportunity, and jointly planning responses. In the past, the United States has often been very parochial in its approach to program planning, and on many occasions this has had very negative consequences. An early example of this was the decision in 1992 to respond to Ukraine’s objection to participating in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) WMD scientist redirection program based in Moscow. Because there were compelling reasons to keep Ukraine involved in broad CTR efforts, the United States agreed, but did not consult, with its ISTC partners before announcing its commitment to a new center—the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine. Because it had not been involved in the decision to pursue a separate center in Ukraine, the European Union (EU) opted not to participate and Japan made a similar decision. Although the EU eventually joined the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine several years after its creation, the situation might have been avoided or
22
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2009. American Chambers of Commerce Abroad. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.uschamber.com/international/directory/default.
23
Condoleezza Rice. 2008. Secretary’s Remarks: Keynote Address at the Overseas Security Advisory Council 23rd Annual Briefing, November 19. Available as of March 2009 at http://vienna.osac.gov/page.cfm?pageID=4942.
24
Ibid.
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other solutions to Ukraine’s objections could have been explored if the matter had been handled differently.
If the CTR 2.0 model is to work well, countries other than the United States will also need to adopt a commitment to consultation and coordination–a habit or culture of partnership. This will require diplomatic effort, but the existing bilateral, multilateral, and international channels of communication should provide ample opportunity for this.
CTR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LESSONS
The Shchuch’ye Example
The development, design, and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in western Siberia is a good example of what is described above. In its 14-year history, the project has taken on many CTR 2.0 characteristics. It began as a typical CTR 1.0 project based on a bilateral agreement, and implementation was overseen by a U.S. prime contractor. However, when faced with obstacles, such as a congressional restriction that U.S. funds were to be used only for construction of the demilitarization facility and not for the essential supporting infrastructure, it became critical for DOD CTR to identify and engage new partners. The EU and 12 nations contributed funds, materials, and expertise for infrastructure construction at the facility (Box 1.1 in Chapter 1). Canada was particularly interested in the railroad construction project. It matched a $1 million challenge grant from the NTI with approximately $35 million to fund the construction of a rail line from the weapons storage area to the destruction facility.25 Another important NGO partnership developed when Russian public opposition to the project developed over environmental concerns. Global Green USA, the U.S. affiliate of the Russian NGO, Green Cross, was engaged to survey public opinion and establish a public involvement program.26 Global Green has now opened and managed more than a dozen local outreach offices at chemical (and nuclear) CTR sites to facilitate threat reduction projects. This was done in coordination with Green Cross Russia and Green Cross Switzerland, and with the support of about a dozen Global Partnership members.27
25
Laura Holgate. 2008. Discussion at CTR Committee Meeting #2, July 8.
26
Igor Khripunov and G. W. Parshall. Nongovernmental Actors in U.S. and Russian Chemical Demilitarization Efforts. Demokratizatsiya. 9:10. 422-457 pp.
27
More information on the Shchuch’ye effort can be found at Global Green U.S. 2009. Security and Sustainability. Available as of March 2009 at www.globalgreen.org/wmd.
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The Vinca Example
Another example is the role played by NTI in removing nuclear materials from the reactor in Vinca, Serbia. When Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was ousted, the U.S. government decided to include Project Vinca in its package of support, but would only deal with the highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the reactor, which it viewed as the immediate proliferation threat. NTI, however, saw a link between the 40 kilograms of HEU and the opportunity to remove spent fuel from the unstable environment. A seven-party action plan was devised involving the IAEA, the Department of State, DOE, the Serbian government, a laboratory, NTI, and the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Because NTI was not covered for liability under the Memorandum of Understanding that governed the project, the work was managed directly by the IAEA. NTI provided funding to the IAEA, becoming the first nonstate donor to the IAEA.28 The project helped highlight the need to phase out the use of HEU in civilian facilities.
This joint and highly collaborative project had several successes by the summer of 2008: the removal of fresh fuel in 2002 through a transparent, seven-party process and removal of nearly all the spent fuel. In addition, the IAEA raised more funding, and the project helped highlight the need to phase out the use of HEU in civilian facilities.
What Makes NGOs Different?
NGOs typically do not depend on government money and NGO officers are not government officials. This leaves NGOs able to criticize government approaches, be more responsive to recipient concerns, act quickly, remain flexible, and be more willing to accept risks. NGOs are also unfettered by federal acquisition regulations and can design any kind of contracting mechanisms that will meet requirements. An NGO can pick and choose among different projects and focus on those it feels are closest to the organization’s mandate, and can bring in expertise either through their staff or through networks of experts. In many cases, NGO boards include international experts that lend a high level of prestige and credibility that helps gain access.
There can be possible disadvantages to working with NGOs as well. For example, there is the risk that a foreign government might think that an NGO is speaking on behalf of the U.S. government. NGOs may not have the same level of accountability as the government, may not have the necessary technical expertise, or may even work at cross purposes with the government.
28
Nuclear Threat Initiative. Press Release. NTI Commits $5 Million to Help Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Weapons Material. Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 23, 2002. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_082302.pdf.
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NGOs Then and Now
The potential for developing constructive and effective working relationships with NGOs is higher now than it was in the early days of CTR, when concepts were new and every program was a learning process. Now, several NGOs have boards and staffs that were intimately involved with USG CTR efforts and understand the underlying security issues, congressional dynamics, and budgetary constraints.29 Not only do the individuals involved have requisite expertise, their organizations have also gained reputations in the field for carrying out programs and activities in support of the CTR mission.
NGOs, especially those with a demonstrated track record, can work with USG CTR programs in different ways that need to be explored more systematically.
Pioneers, or “wedge strategies” – NGOs can take risks that governments may not be ready to take. This may be particularly important when exploring the potential to engage a new partner country.
Analysis leading to catalysis – NGOs can undertake analytical efforts designed to solve a problem, including undertaking independent approaches to resolve political questions that are impeding action.
Design sharing – NGOs can work with the government on projects where each has a defined role.
Gap filling – NGOs can fill gaps when the government either does not see the gap or cannot participate.
Deal closer – NGOs can pressure groups to get them to honor their agreements.
Setting benchmarks and evaluating – NGOs can be an independent voice to evaluate programs.
Safe convener – NGOs can also get agencies or even countries around a table when there are disagreements or frictions that prevent constructive dialogue.
Programs that address threats to national security will predictably involve types of information that may not be appropriate to share with nongovernmental organizations. Judgments made based on sensitive diplomatic, security, proprietary, or privacy issues may need to guide aspects of program design, implementation, and oversight, and it may not be possible to be completely open and transparent. However, a great deal can be accomplished if guidelines set appropriate boundaries. There is already a substantial history of successful nongovernmental partnerships with organizations such as the National Acad-
29
For example, the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (www.crdf.org) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org) both have board and staff members who have long been active in CTR activities.
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emies, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Global Security Partnership, and others.
Sustainability
The issues of financial and other commitments from CTR program partners link directly to both integrating partners into initial program development and designing programs to be sustainable. If the United States expects increased financial commitments from partner countries—both those in which programs will be implemented and those who can contribute to implementation—it cannot maintain the paternalistic approach that has characterized past programs. The CTR 2.0 goal of building partnerships through shared program development, mutually agreed-upon goals, and joint funding—defined to include inkind as well as direct contributions—has a much greater likelihood of leading to sustainable, mutually beneficial activities.
In the case of Russia, where the committee believes cooperative work should continue, the issue of funding could be addressed in three ways. First, no systematic mechanism was ever developed that adequately reflects the contributions that Russia (and other former Soviet states engaged in USG CTR activities) have made. Although these contributions were largely in-kind, they were often significant. Some efforts were made through the ISTC’s scientist redirection program, for example, to require participating institutes to cover part of every project’s costs. Overhead for projects was capped at a very low percentage and only a portion of nontechnical staff involved in any project could be covered, leaving it to the institute—or the government—to cover the remaining overhead and personnel costs. These and other in-kind contributions need to be captured and acknowledged to encourage future partnerships, particularly in environments where cash contributions are unlikely.
Second, although a country may need extensive support at the beginning of a project, economic factors may change that would allow that country to take on a higher share of the implementation burden. This is now the case with Russia, but no provision was ever included in agreements that would allow for this. The ability to assume a higher burden for in-country costs, however, should not signal the end of the partnership. The Libya example shows that having the financial resources to support a project does not mean that a partner does not need technical or other assistance, or should not continue to be engaged as part of a sustainability strategy.
Third, a partner country that initially receives assistance can evolve into a future implementation partner. This may be particularly useful where it may be difficult for the United States to engage a new partner. Chemical weapons destruction in the Middle East is a possible example. If the United States works with Iraq to destroy its remaining chemical weapons stockpile and trains an
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Iraqi chemical weapons disposal unit, it may be possible to develop a project where the Iraqi unit—with continued U.S. technical support—engages with other countries in the Middle East on chemical weapons destruction issues rather than the United States. Along similar lines, it is hard to imagine any kind of security engagement program in North Korea that does not involve Russia. When new efforts are being designed, a useful planning exercise would be to think forward about the role that a new engagement partner might play in the future.
The committee also believes that fundamental changes in circumstances, such as those that have taken place with Russia, need to be governed by frameworks that can reflect a rebalancing of the relationship. Whether or not this is under a nuclear cooperation agreement or some other framework matters less than having a legal structure that covers not only what the United States and Russia do bilaterally, but also what they might do together elsewhere.
The committee also observed that DOD and DOE have taken steps to factor sustainability more specifically into program implementation. A February 2007 Government Accountability Office report states that “during our visit to Russia, officials at three of the four civilian nuclear research institutes we visited told us that they are concerned about their sites’ financial ability to maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades after … DOE financial support ends in 2013.”30 DOD has announced plans to halt funding for analogous activities in 2011. In April 2007, the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration announced that it had reached a nonbinding agreement with Russia’s Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) on a plan for Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material sites after DOE ceases its financial support.31 Separate discussions have reportedly taken place with regard to Russia sustaining U.S.-funded work performed at sites with nuclear warheads and at nuclear material sites controlled by other agencies. Additional, legally binding bilateral arrangements may have a useful role to play in ensuring that operation and maintenance of U.S.-funded security upgrades continue to receive the requisite levels of Russian funding after 2011 and 2013. Consideration could also be given to how to address similar sustainability challenges with respect to U.S. and other international efforts to engage former Soviet WMD scientists in
30
Government Accountability Office. 2007. Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. GAO-07-404. 26-27 pp. In section 3156(b)1 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, Congress directed as follows: “The Secretary of Energy shall work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to develop, as soon as practicable but no later than January 1, 2013, a sustainable nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting system for the nuclear materials of the Russian Federation that is supported solely by the Russian Federation.”
31
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 2007. U.S. and Russia Agree to Sustain Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Facilities: Agreement Helps to Ensure that U.S. Investments Will be Maintained. March 29. Available as of March 2009 at http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/1131.htm.
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non-WMD-related employment, and CTR 2.0 activities both within and outside the former Soviet Union.
One of the lessons learned from USG CTR programs operating in the former Soviet Union is that sustainability has to be part of the original program plan, not something that is an afterthought. Under CTR 2.0, advance planning carried out in cooperation with the partner should be standard practice. Other agencies and entities that provide foreign assistance—such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other nongovernmental organizations—have developed their own mechanisms for promoting sustainability after the conclusion of donor funding. Reaching out to such foreign assistance providers in order to identify and, where appropriate, replicate their best practices would contribute to DOD and other USG CTR program effectiveness and may offer new opportunities for program leveraging.
Finding 2-12: Engagement programs are more effective and have a higher likelihood of being sustained if they are developed in partnership with the engaged country, are tailored to the region, and are seen as beneficial to both partners.
Recommendation 2-1: The White House, working across the executive branch and with Congress, should engage a broader range of partners in a variety of roles to enable CTR 2.0 to enhance global security. At a minimum this will require
Becoming more agile, flexible, and responsive
Cultivating additional domestic and global partners to help meet our goals
Building mutually beneficial relationships that foster sustained cooperation
EVOLVING FROM CTR 1.0 TO CTR 2.0
Implementing CTR 2.0 will be an incremental process. The United States needs to continue to address old challenges as it organizes to meet new ones. A well-crafted plan can ensure that good practices of CTR 1.0 are embraced and carried forward, and unproductive ones are shed. One possible model is to build on the current National Security Council– Homeland Security Council bioengagement coordination efforts. Although relatively new, it already has learned lessons about the challenges of getting diverse communities to work together productively and is a first step toward CTR 2.0 implementation. Other lessons learned should be incorporated into the transition process as well. The committee was told that DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration has
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developed a useful methodology for prioritizing countries that may participate in the Megaports Program.32 This methodology might be applied across any number of programs or modified as appropriate. Another promising example is a new joint project between the U.S. Department of Agriculture, DOD CTR, and a host of other partners. The program design and funding engages Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States as partners to establish an animal health disease surveillance system in the Stavropol region of Russia. The project aims to coordinate all efforts from the beginning of engagement to ensure an efficient use of funds and maximum participation from a leading group of international scientists and veterinarians. In addition to supporting a veterinary disease monitoring system in an important geographic nexus between Russia and Europe, the project also aims to identify multiple subsequent opportunities for Russian Federation veterinary scientists to engage in long-term collaborative research projects with equivalent scientists based in Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Parts of this project were built on program concepts developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Finding 2-13: There needs to be a distinct transition plan to move between the current cooperative threat reduction programs and CTR 2.0.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding 2-1: CTR 1.0 was a highly creative response to unique security challenges and geopolitical changes in the former Soviet Union. The new threats we face require similar innovation to create CTR 2.0. Coordination and leadership from the White House will be required, and relevant departments and agencies will need to engage to ensure that there is a clear connection between the policy intent and program implementation, as in the case of Libya. To succeed, it will need to be an integrated, cooperative, collaborative, global enterprise that is responsive, flexible, adaptable, and able to respond to the new security threats that it will need to counter.
Finding 2-2: CTR 2.0 efforts will likely be smaller and distributed across a larger number of countries carefully targeted on the sources of new threats rather than the large, physical infrastructure dismantlement or construction projects that were the hallmarks of the programs in the former Soviet Union.
Finding 2-3: CTR 2.0 should include long-term relationship and capacity building that can be the basis for future cooperative threat reduction activities,
32
National Nuclear Security Administration. Megaports Initiative. Department of Energy. Available as of March 2009 at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1641.htm.
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through defense and military-to-military engagement and other peer-to-peer engagement, such as in science.
Finding 2-4: Traditional criteria for determining eligibility for cooperative threat reduction engagement may need to be adjusted to reflect the changing security environment.
Finding 2-5: As the lessons learned from the Libyan experience make clear, to make cost-effective contributions to U.S. national security in the future, USG CTR programs must be less cumbersome and less bureaucratic in order to provide agile and timely contributions. They must take greater consideration of the needs and wants of reluctant partners, even as we keep focused on core U.S. objectives.
Finding 2-6: The traditional metrics of DOD (and USG) CTR success are often useful for program evaluation. Warheads or delivery systems and launchers destroyed, weapons materials secured, and contractor full-time equivalent on target are more concrete than just total dollars spent, but these metrics do not adequately reflect threat reduction impact or account for the value of potential CTR 2.0 engagement against new threats in this century. The challenge remains to find measureable performance indicators that capture the true value of important future successes that may be less tangible and more difficult to document. Efforts to contrive such measures, however, can result in burdensome and misleading data that may distort sound assessments of policy implementation. For example, the dollar value of locks and alarms procured, or even the number, is less important than the degree to which an institute plans, trains, and practices security against intruders and the “inside threat.” These latter considerations are more important, but less transparent and measureable.
Finding 2-7: The globalized environment will be characterized by the increasingly rapid spread of technology, major changes in how the traditional nation-state structure works or nongovernmental organizations engage, diffusion of threats, and changes in the nature of the threats (including the convergence of technology, new patterns of technologies, Internet-facilitated communications, and complex relationships).
Finding 2-8: Proliferation challenges and opportunities to control proliferation vary greatly geopolitically and across the three major WMD systems of concern as well as other areas of concern, and a diverse set of tools and approaches is needed to respond. Addressing these challenges will require the involvement of partners beyond the traditional government players and geostrategic allies.
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Finding 2-9: Relationships on multiple levels with allies, threat-reduction partners, academe, NGOs, and others are necessary for effective engagement with countries and regions on nonproliferation activities.
Finding 2-10: There are many potential partners and resources that can be employed for CTR 2.0 that currently are not being tapped.
Finding 2-11: There is national security benefit in sustained partnerships, collaborations, and joint activities that link individuals and institutions in productive, mutually beneficial pursuits that can withstand political, economic, and other disruptions. This sustained engagement is the foundation for a “habit of cooperation.”
Finding 2-12: Engagement programs are more effective and have a higher likelihood of being sustained if they are developed in partnership with the engaged country, are tailored to the region, and are seen as beneficial to both partners.
Recommendation 2-1: The White House, working across the executive branch and with Congress, should engage a broader range of partners in a variety of roles to enable CTR 2.0 to enhance global security. At a minimum this will require
Becoming more agile, flexible, and responsive
Cultivating additional domestic and global partners to help meet our goals
Building mutually beneficial relationships that foster sustained cooperation
Finding 2-13: There needs to be a distinct transition plan to move between the current cooperative threat reduction programs and CTR 2.0.
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