. "2 Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons." Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction
Defining CTR 2.0
CTR 2.0 is a set of programs and projects undertaken by the United States, as part of a cooperative network that includes a wide range of countries, international organizations, and nongovernment partners, to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate common threats to U.S. national security and global stability that have emerged in particular since the end of the Cold War. The preferred mechanism and long-term goal for the cooperation is partnership, which means that the countries participating should be ready to share responsibilities for project definition, organization, management, and financing according to a rational division of labor, capacity (including budget capacity), or technical capability. Although CTR 2.0 engagements may have to begin under less than ideal circumstances, the goal for countries engaged under CTR 2.0 is shared responsibility through engagement and partnership. CTR 2.0 should be capable of rapid response as well as longer-term programmatic engagement.
DEFINING CTR 2.0
In late 2003, Libya agreed to give up its WMD programs and join or rejoin relevant international institutions. Although the announcement was preceded by talks between Libyan, U.S., and U.K. government officials, Libya’s decision surprised many other than the few individuals directly involved in the negotiations. Weapons, materials, and systems needed to be removed quickly and with a high level of international coordination. U.S. and U.K. officials feared that the Libyans might reverse their decision, and a rapid and flexible response was needed.
Nuclear dismantlement required a creative partnership between Libyan, U.S., U.K., and Russian officials, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (a U.S. nongovernmental organization [NGO]). 1 The Libyan government agreed to dismantle its centrifuge program and convert its research reactor core from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Sensitive centrifuge equipment and both spent and fresh HEU fuel were removed under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Department of Defense (DOD) was asked to provide air or sea transportation for this cargo. Instead, transportation was secured by the State Department and funded by its Nonproliferation and
Paula DeSutter. 2004. Completion of Verification Work in Libya. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78305.htm.