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3 The Form and Function of Cooperative Threat Reduction 2.0: Engaging Partners to Enhance Global Security The committee identified several key Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 2.0 elements and examples of new engagement opportunities. These examples are not intended to be comprehensive or prescriptive, but are meant to stimu - late thinking about how CTR 2.0 can be implemented. kEY ELEMENTS OF CTR 2.0 Global Security Engagement CTR 2.0’s objective is to enhance global as well as U.S. national security, recognizing that reducing threats to other nations has direct benefits to U.S. security. Global security engagement assumes that new partners participate not only because they confront or represent some level of threat, but also because they are security partners. This partnership will be reflected in longer-term efforts to build relationships and capacity. The committee recognizes that not all new partners will be fully engaged at the outset or will even be fully cooperative. Similarly, partner attitudes may shift over time for political or other reasons, as has been the case with Rus - sia. The challenges being addressed, however, may be so compelling that the engagement should proceed, even if partner cooperation is not as complete as might be desired. Clear Strategic Plan To advance substantially from what currently exists, CTR 2.0 must have a clear strategic plan and strong senior leadership. These are core requirements. Cooperative Network A set of programs and projects will be implemented by the United States in cooperation with a network of countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental partners. The goal is to prevent, reduce, 

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0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT mitigate, or eliminate common contemporary threats to security and prepare for future threats. The United States has such a wide range of assets that can be applied to CTR 2.0 that effective implementation will require strong, high- leel, central leadership. Partnership as the Basic Mechanism for Cooperation Partnership in CTR 2.0 will mean that the countries participating must be ready to discuss and potentially support a rational division of responsibility for • Project leadership, including project definition and planning • Management, including project organization, implementation, and oversight • Resources, including personnel, technical capability, financial, and in- kind contributions A Creative, Flexible Approach to the Form and Substance of New Engage - ments A creative and flexible approach will be needed both to developing the form and to developing the substance of engagements, as well as to the metrics used to measure these. • Form CTR 2.0 will be capable of both long-term programmatic engagements and rapid response. Although both are possible under CTR 1.0, the committee believes that there should be more flexibility in programs across the U.S. government. Piggybacking or comingling funds, allocation of funding across U.S. government programs, the flexibility of funds, new approaches to contracting, and other issues are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4. • Substance CTR 2.0 will look broadly at how it can support both traditional cooperative threat reduction missions focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as new threats such as countering WMD terrorism and similar challenges. In this context, building capacity may be an important component, both in global commitment to security and in the ability to detect and respond to events. Various programs under CTR 1.0 supported important arms control treaty implementation commitments. CTR 2.0 will continue to support these activi - ties, but will also look specifically at ways to support new and expanded multilateral and international security instruments, such as the Group of Eight Global Partnership (G8 GP), the Proliferation Security Initiative, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The use of CTR 2.0 could help engage other countries as more active and effective participants in this new generation of security efforts.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 Coordinating CTR 2.0 CTR 2.0 requires a much higher degree of coordination than currently exists in the United States, or between the United States and other partners. Coordination is also one of the key points that Congress asked to have con - sidered in this report. The importance of coordination was also noted by the United Nations when it passed UNSCR 18101: Resolution 1810 (2008) encourages the 1540 Committee to work more closely, in its outreach activities, with global and regional intergovernmental organizations, and ar- rangements within and outside the United Nations system to foster the sharing of experience, create forums for discussion and develop innovative mechanisms to achieve the implementation of the resolution.2 The committee heard a consistent and strong emphasis from many U.S. and international experts on the need for a cohesive strategic approach as the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government (USG) CTR programs become global. One senior official of a G8 GP country commented that the United States tends to “move out when it sees opportunities and go it alone on a lot of issues. It [the United States] can do a lot, but it cannot do everything. We need to work out how to do things in a complementary way, before we begin approaching new countries.”3 As CTR 2.0 programs are implemented, they will need to take into account the myriad of other programs, organizations, and conditions in new high-prior- ity engagement areas. Regional development banks, and assistance programs from countries and organizations that were not part of the calculus in the for- mer Soviet Union (FSU) may become new partners. Other competing national and regional priorities, such as basic health, water, and food needs may limit how much can be done and in what time frame. Each new effort must begin with a clear strategy that assigns specific roles to U.S. government departments and programs and identifies the appropriate resources and capabilities for the task. This will be even more important as programs are implemented in the face of a deepening global economic crisis in which security may take a backseat to providing a population with the basic necessities of life. Policy makers also must have reliable data on existing programs to develop an effective strategy. In 1991, the authorizing legislation for the cooperative 1 UNSCR 1810, adopted April 25, 2008, extends the 1540 Committee mandate for three more years and calls on the 1540 Committee to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementa - tion of UNSCR 1540. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Terrorism%20SRES1810.pdf. 2 U.N. Security Council 6015th Meeting. November 12, 2008. New york, S/PV.6015. 4 pp. Available as of March 2009 at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Terrorism%20SPV%206015.pdf. 3 Mary Alice Hayward. 2008. Discussion at Committee Meeting #1. May 21.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT threat reduction and humanitarian assistance programs, the FREEDOM Sup - port Act (Public Law 102-511), established a “Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union.” This provided a central point in the Department of State that coordinated and monitored humanitarian and security assistance budgets and program implementation across all agencies. The database that once existed in that office is no longer maintained regularly, making it very difficult to see where there are program overlaps or gaps, or where programs could be integrated. The G8 GP has tried to maintain a database and several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) attempt to track budgets for CTR programs, but these do not compensate for the lack of a comprehensive U.S. government tracking system. Other countries, international organizations, NGOs, the academic com - munity, and industry will also have insights into issues that can materially affect the success of future security engagement efforts and can provide important program data. If marshaled effectively, these diverse resources can increase the probability of program success and sustainability. A high degree of leadership and coordination within the U.S. government, and from the U.S. government with partners inside and outside the United States, will be required. The com - mittee has not seen evidence that a model currently exists for this level of cooperative and collaborative interaction. Finding 3-1: The lack of a government-wide tracking program for USG CTR programs that cross agency budgets impedes the U.S. government’s ability to develop a strategic approach to CTR 2.0. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR ESTABLISHED PARTNERS Changing political dynamics may also have a profound impact on where and how CTR 2.0 programs are conducted. The tensions that have developed between the United States and Russia since the August 2008 Russian conflict with Georgia are an example. Russia remains a major recipient of USG CTR support and is the primary beneficiary of programs under the G8 GP. In addition to being a beneficiary, Russia could integrate that experience into approaches for global security engagements in new regions. Long-term ties between Russia (and in some cases the FSU) and countries such as the Demo - cratic People’s Republic of korea and Iran may make Russian participation indispensable if engagement opportunities open in those countries. Similarly, Russia’s educational ties with countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence may provide unique links that could be important in future security engage - ment efforts. The Russians should be able to bring important insights to CTR 2.0 that can help inform and shape future approaches. Temporary political perturba - tions should not be allowed to disrupt or curtail efforts to complete, continue,

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 and initiate threat reduction programs in Russia or to seek Russia’s participation in pursuing threat reduction in other countries. Successful CTR projects in Rus- sia, such as the Russian Methodological and Training Center at Obninsk 4 and the Animal Breeding Facility at the Pushchino Research Center, might serve as models for global efforts.5 THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP In August 2007, President George W. Bush signed into law a bill imple- menting the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.6 The law provides for the creation of a special White House office headed by the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, indicating Congress’s recognition of a need for greater leader- ship and integration of efforts across the U.S. government. The committee also recognizes that some form of strong central leadership will be essential to the successful implementation of CTR 2.0. We applaud a recent effort that we believe epitomizes the spirit of CTR 2.0. This interagency effort, “United States Bioengagement Strategy,” led by the National Security Council−Homeland Security Council (NSC-HSC) and begun in 2008, is a possible model for USG CTR’s evolution. It is different because it encompasses security and nonsecurity agencies and programs to explore how they all can contribute to a common strategy. Beginning with this foundation in biological engagement, the NSC- HSC team could reach out even more broadly to traditional and nontraditional partners, possibly focusing on one country as a pilot project. Once the system has been established and the mechanisms have been defined, other working groups could develop similar models, working with different challenges in dif - ferent countries and regions, to create the network we call CTR 2.0. Another possible approach is proposed by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR),7 which recommends fundamental reforms in the organization of the U.S. national security system similar to what the Goldwater-Nichols Act 8 did for the U.S. military in the 1980s. The project’s proposals are based on case studies that “assess a series of events and developments that would shed light on 4 A brochure describing the activities at the Russian Methodological and Training Center is avail- able as of March 2009 at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/rmtc/rmtc1.htm. 5 A brochure describing the activities of the center is available as of March 2009 at www.fp7-bio. ru/konferencii/v-international-symposium/pushchino-scientific-centre/at_download/file. 6 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53. 7 Project on National Security Reform. 2008. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.pnsr. org/web/page/682/sectionid/579/pagelevel/2/interior.asp. 8 U.S. Code: Title 10,111. Executive Department, Title 10 - Armed Forces/Subtitle A - General Military Law/Part I - Organization and General Military Powers/Chapter 2 - Department of De - fense. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?term s=goldwater&url=/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000111----000-notes.html.

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4 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT the past performance of the United States Government in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from national security challenges.” 9 Some of the questions that guided the case studies in that report reflect the fundamental issues identified by the committee in its study of CTR programs: Were U.S. government efforts integrated and guided by an overarching strategy or were they ad hoc; and how well did the agencies and departments work together? The PNSR released its findings and recommendations to the White House and to congressional leaders in November 2008, and Volume 1 of its case studies in September 2008. The PNSR report contains sweeping themes and recom - mendations. The committee identified those that are fully compatible with the CTR 2.0 concept. These include the following: • Adopting new approaches emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration, agility, and a focus on national missions and outcomes. This point includes several recommendations including one that would prescribe in statute the national security roles of each department and agency, especially those that have previously been viewed as part of the national security system. This would solve a problem that is addressed later in this report. • Establishing clear White House authority for national security strategy coordination across the government and providing the resources to carry out this function. • Creating interagency teams to manage national security issues. • Revising the budget process to better link resources to national security goals. • Improving the ability to develop and share information across national security agencies. • Building a partnership between the executive and legislative branches. A similar approach with White House leadership and interagency collabo - ration was proposed in the 2007 report on the future of the Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense.10 Whatever approach is ultimately adopted, its goal should be to eliminate the overlap and duplication that exists in CTR 1.0. The committee was told by an officer in one of the Uni - fied Combatant Commands about a set of visits during 2008 to a Central Asian country by two different programs; one providing border security assistance and the other providing counternarcotics trafficking assistance. Both programs 9 Richard Weitz, ed. 2008. Project on National Security Reform: Case Studies Volume . Available as of March 2009 at http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20case%20studies%20vol.%201.pdf. 10 National Research Council. The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 54 pp. Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12005 as of March 2009.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 were dealing with the same agencies in the partner government, but unfortu - nately neither knew about the other’s efforts. Even with strong leadership from the White House, no new effort will succeed without the active and committed support of cabinet secretaries and other senior officials from all relevant agencies. It is difficult, however, to sustain senior-level engagement over the longer term. One possible solution would be to have regular White House-led reviews, perhaps on a biannual schedule, to drive higher-level attention and coordination. Finding 3-2: Responding to the new global security challenges requires a new model of interagency leadership. CTR 2.0 will function most effectively with strong leadership from the White House, and with the active involvement of relevant departments and agencies. Recommendation 3-1: CTR 2.0 should be directed by the White House through a senior official at the National Security Council and be implemented by the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, and other relevant cabinet secretaries. HAVING THE RIGHT TOOLS USG CTR currently has a substantial array of programs and resources, but new engagements may require new tools or old tools used in a new way. Although CTR 1.0 programs encountered problems implementing programs in the FSU because of difficult economic times or social and political stress, these may be minor compared to the challenges of engaging countries like Afghanistan or Pakistan. For example, where Russia and other countries of the FSU had well-educated populations and adapted quickly to the technology used in many USG CTR projects, it may be a challenge to find user-friendly and environmentally appropriate approaches for countries that are less developed. Officers from the U.S. Pacific Command pointed out that in their region the level of technical ability varies from country to country and can also vary sig - nificantly within countries. In these environments, program success will depend not only on the tools selected, but also on how well principles of sustainability are integrated from the outset of program development and implementation. In some cases, sustainability can hinge on something as basic as equipment maintenance. The original DOD CTR legislation had a “Buy American” provi - sion, which in some cases worked against program sustainability and long-term security impact, especially where the partner country had no local source for regular equipment maintenance and repair of U.S.-origin technology. Proj- ects that incorporate local equipment and technology may have had a greater degree of success. This became the approach that the Department of Energy (DOE) used successfully in its Russian nuclear material protection, control, and

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Partnership Continuum (Biology) Allies Jordan Georgia Disease Surveillance ch ar se Re int Jo Assistance Security of Facilities and Collections Partnership PH Capacity Building Iran North Korea Estranged FIGURE 3.1 Partnership Continuum (Biology) SOURCE: David R. Franz. accounting program. Not only have local technologies been used, the program Figure 3-1 has resulted in several spin-off companies that provide security equipment and (new) design security installations. R-1446 Figure 3.1 illustrates one way to analyze potential engagements, using biol- vector, editable ogy as an example. Countries on the north-south axis range from allies on the top that are on good terms with the United States and perceive threat in simi - lar ways to estranged countries on the bottom that have difficult or no formal relations with the United States and disagree with the United States on threat perceptions. The east-west axis runs from the countries that require assistance to carry out programs to the countries with their own resources. Based on this analysis, the upper right quadrant offers the richest opportunities for engage - ment, but at least some level of activity can be projected for all quadrants. If the figure is used to map a biosecurity strategy, it shows that disease surveillance activities can be pursued with almost any country, whereas more sensitive areas like the security of biological facilities and pathogen collections and engaging in joint research are reserved to a more select group of partners. Finding 3-3: CTR 2.0 will have to tailor approaches for each new engagement and associated threat, and use creative forms of collaboration, particularly in

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 environments where the partners are reluctant, the political climate is adverse, or local conditions can only support limited levels of technology. Engagement Strategies CTR 2.0 programs must be guided by a clear strategy that includes shared responsibility with partner countries for program development, planning, resources, and implementation. This approach should produce a high level of trust and transparency, and promote sustainability. This may sound straight - forward, but it will require a leap of faith on the part of U.S. program imple- menters, who may be more used to “checkbook diplomacy” than true partner- ship—a “we pay, you do as we say” attitude. Although some CTR 1.0 programs are moving away from this model, the transition to a new, more collaborative model needs to occur quickly. Nontraditional partners may be able to play important reinforcing or even primary roles. Flexible NGOs or even other countries may be needed to take a lead role in certain circumstances. For example, an NGO partner may have long-term goals for a country or region and be able to maintain a low to moder- ate level of engagement for an extended period. Partnering may offer CTR 2.0 new opportunities for both sustaining program progress as well as monitoring ongoing implementation once responsibility is assumed by the partner country or countries for sustaining the activity. Just because a country may be hesitant to engage in the first instance with a U.S. gov- ernment program is not necessarily a signal that it will always oppose such engage- ment; it may just need to be engaged initially in a more creative and limited way. The challenges to launching a new security engagement may be significant. The committee is aware, for example, of the situation in one country named by several experts as a logical candidate for CTR 2.0 engagement where officials have communicated informally that they are not prepared to discuss USG CTR activities in the nuclear area. However, a USG CTR biosecurity engagement program has established a successful program based on a modest science coop - eration program started by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Just because a country may be hesitant to engage in the first instance with a government program is not necessarily a signal that it will always oppose such engagement; it may just need to be engaged initially in a more creative and limited way. The innovative use of a variety of partners could facilitate these early engagement approaches. The “soft engagement” strategy of working in tandem with nongovernment partners will be an important element in future program development. The broader group of CTR 2.0 partners can help establish initial contacts

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT and relationships in environments where government or international programs, such as support for UNSCR 1540, are desirable but not welcome or feasible in the near term. These facilitators can be the wedge in some circumstances that will pave the way for government programs to follow at a future time, or, in some cases, may have to play a long-term role. This type of soft engagement could involve many different activities, such as training programs, opportunities to participate in professional meetings with individuals or organizations that could be relevant to future efforts, or developing Internet-based networks as a way of initiating dialogue on topics of interest, to name a few. CTR 2.0, there - fore, will involve national and international coordination, possible government and nongovernment components, and activity in new regions, with all these elements influencing the shape and content of new engagement strategies. Finding 3-4: Strategies that employ soft engagement, sometimes facilitated by NGOs, academe, or other nontraditional diplomatic efforts, may be necessary to support or initiate CTR 2.0 engagements. Recommendation 3-1a: Domestically, CTR 2.0 should include a broad group of participants, including government, academe, industry, nongovernment orga - nizations and individuals, and an expanded set of tools, developed and shared across the U.S. government. Transparency will be a natural result of CTR 2.0, but the United States must be prepared to accept two-way transparency. One CTR 1.0 program has always had this element because of the way it was initially designed. The Science and Technology Centers (STC) program to redirect the former Soviet WMD scientists and engineers always had an international headquarters staff drawn from all countries, including the host countries, Russia and Ukraine. Although the agreements establishing the STCs require transparency in terms of access to the facilities where projects are funded and program audits, it is really the direct staff involvement that has had a lasting impact. The STC staffs participate in all levels of program implementation, providing significant transparency into operations and management. Because annual project and institutional audits are the norm, all staff members have learned to appreciate the value of oversight and accountability. As CTR 2.0 programs are developed, ways to design trans - parency into program plans and implementation need to be a priority. Finding 3-5: Transparency will be a hallmark of CTR 2.0 and will further strengthen commitments to threat reduction beyond any applicable legal obli - gations in a treaty, contract, or other legal instrument.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 New Approaches to Security The United States and other nations that share a common view of threats have demonstrated that working together to develop innovative approaches can reduce threats. Several efforts have emerged that operate in parallel with traditional arms control treaties. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 11 operates globally and grew out of the December 2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. PSI aims to interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or materials. The GICNT12 developed from a joint statement on July 15, 2006, by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin. It is designed to “expand and accelerate the development of partner- ship capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to the global threat of nuclear terrorism.”13 As of July 2008, 75 countries had signed on to the GICNT prin- ciples,14 including some that were named to the committee as possible CTR 2.0 engagement partners. Another opportunity for CTR 2.0 to support a new international security instrument is the potential for supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and subsequent related resolutions.15 UNSCR 1540 requires states “to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”16 The binding obligations of the resolution include a requirement that states “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, pos - sess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery,” and a requirement that states “take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” It also encourages international cooperation and has a mechanism that allows states to request assistance. The types of assistance under UNSCR 1540 include areas that would be appropriate for CTR 2.0 activities:17 11 Department of State. Proliferation Security Initiative. Available as of March 2009 at http:// www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. 12 State Department. 2006. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: U.S. Russia Joint Statement. St. Petersburg. July 15. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ c18406.htm. 13 Ibid. 14 See the current list at State Department. 2008. Global Initiatve Current Partner Nations. Avail- able as of March 2009 at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/105955.htm. 15 See United Nations Security Council. Resolutions. 2004. Available as of March 2009 at http:// www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html for the text of the resolution. See also UNSCR 1673 (2006) and UNSCR 1810 (2006), available as of March 2009 at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions06.htm. See also UNSCR 1810 (2008) available as of March 2009 at http://www. un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT priators to ensure that the agency receiving funds has the flexibility to create appropriate accounts to accept other agency funds. The preferred approach leads to a larger issue of how much funding should be allocated, and to which budgets, to support critical security engagement work. At present, each agency develops its own budget, which goes through a stove-piped process to OMB, where budgets are adjusted to meet a maximum presidential budget figure for any given fiscal year. Gordon Adams, a former senior official at OMB, describes this as “the diaspora of foreign assistance pro- grams.”18 In addition, the 2009 DOD Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review “supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing national security challenges,” including the budgets of national security pro - grams.19 In the current system, there is no referee at the White House level looking across the many agencies and programs that could contribute to CTR 2.0 to determine if adequate resources are going to the programs best able to accomplish the priority tasks that have been defined in the White House-led strategic planning exercise. Recommendation 3-3a: Program planning should be developed out of a stra - tegic process and be matched by a strategic budget process that produces a multiyear budget plan and distributes funding across agencies based on agency ability to respond to program requirements. As needed, agency legislative authorities should be revised to include a national security dimension. Funding with International Partners The congressional request for this study expressed a particular interest in how USG CTR programs can work more effectively with international partners and how, through those partnerships, the United States can encourage more partner funding. In reviewing this question, the committee determined that the current lack of comingling authority needs to be addressed. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires that money received by the U.S. government be deposited into the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. The act was passed to ensure that, as a general matter, government agencies do not bypass the appropriations authority of Congress by augmenting their budgets 18 Gordon Adams. 2008. Smart Power: Rebalancing the Foreign Policy/National Security Tool - kit. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hearing on a Reliance on Smart Power–Reforming the Foreign Assistance Bureaucracy. July 31. 19 Department of Defense. 2009. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Reiew Report. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. 31 pp. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.defenselink.mil/ news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 via other means. The Carter-Joseph Report urged Congress to exempt DOD CTR from the Miscellaneous Receipts Act20 by authorizing DOD CTR to accept funds from foreign countries and to comingle those with appropriate DOD CTR funds. This would enable countries, for example, to contribute to DOD CTR in fulfillment of their G8 GP commitments without having to negotiate their own separate umbrella agreements. Such comingling authority exists broadly in other countries, such as the United kingdom and Canada, and has been provided by Congress for some specific DOE programs, including Second Line of Defense21 and Global Threat Reduction Initiative. This issue was raised with several G8 GP partner countries, who argued that this ability was critical for securing the contributions of small donors who otherwise would not apply their funds to CTR-type programs. The committee believes that if Congress provides all agencies operating under CTR 2.0 with such comingling authority for CTR purposes, it will increase the potential for countries to share in program costs. Having this authority would also help address the issue of differing authorities, budgets, and time lines of international partners. The case frequently arises where a country’s desire to contribute to a project does not mesh with its legal and budgetary structures. Comingling authority adds the additional flexibility that may make participation possible in such cases. Recommendation 3-3b: Congress should provide comingling authority to all agencies implementing programs under CTR 2.0 as a way to encourage other partners to contribute funds to global security engagement efforts. Legal Frameworks U.S. government programs have adopted a variety of legal frameworks under which CTR 1.0 has been implemented. The committee believes that implementation of the DOD CTR program is hindered by the relative lack of flexibility in its legal frameworks and authorities. These include the following: • umbrella agreement issues relating to liability, taxes, and access • geographic limitations and burdensome contracting procedures that could be eased by the provision of “notwithstanding authority” • the lack of “comingling authority” 20 Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b)(2006). Available as of March 2009 at http:// frwebgate3.acces.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=01862318241+0+1+0&WAISactio n=retrieve. 21 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 2008. NNSA’s Second Line of Defense Program. Department of Energy. Available as of March 2009 at http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/992. htm.

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0 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Finding 3-9: Many of the legal and policy underpinnings of the current DOD CTR program that were established for accountability and protection of U.S. implementing agencies are cumbersome, dated, and limiting, and often dimin - ish the value and hinder the success of program assistance and partnerships. The DOD CTR Umbrella Agreement: Issues Relating to Liability, Access, and Taxation The DOD CTR bilateral umbrella agreement is well established as the mechanism under which programs are implemented. Its provisions have changed little over time, and recent experiences, including multiyear negotiations to extend the Russian umbrella agreement and to establish an umbrella agreement with kazakhstan, signal that it may be time to consider other approaches. On June 19, 2006, the United States and Russia signed a protocol to extend for another 7-year period the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement, which entered into force in 1992, and was first extended in 1999. As a result of protracted negotiations over the agreement’s liability protections, the 2006 Extension Protocol was signed less than a week before the agreement was due to expire.22 Press reports portrayed the DOD CTR program as nearly derailed by the dispute.23 The DOD CTR agreement’s access and taxa- tion exemption provisions have also been the subject of contention. Disputes over liability, access, or taxation could again threaten the umbrella agreement’s extension when the 2006 protocol expires in 2013. Liability and access issues in particular could also hinder progress in the interim. The 2006 DOD CTR extension protocol kept the original umbrella agreement liability protections in place for existing projects, but left protection language for future projects subject to negotiation.24 The access provisions of the DOD CTR umbrella and related agreements provide the U.S. government the right to examine the use of materials or ser- vices provided by it as part of the assistance process. However, a February 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned of continuing restrictions on U.S. access to facilities that store, manufacture, or dismantle 22 Peter Baker. 2006. U.S., Russia Break Impasse on Plan to keep Arms from Rogue Users. Washington Post. June 20. A11 pp. 23 Peter Eisler. 2006. U.S., Russia reach deal on securing Soviet WMD; Post-Cold War program nearly derailed by dispute. USA Today. June 16. See also, Michael Crowley. 2007. The Stuff Sam Nunn’s Nightmares Are Made Of. New York Times. February 25. The two sides signed an agree- ment to move ahead with plutonium disposition in 2000, but the deal could not be implemented until a liability protocol was signed some 5 years later. See U.S., Russian Officials Sign Liability Protocol for Plutonium Disposition. Inside the Pentagon. September 21, 2006. 24 Eisler.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 Russian nuclear weapons.25 The GAO report noted that “access difficulties at some Russian nuclear warhead sites may . . . prohibit DOE and DOD from ensuring that U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.” 26 For example, “Russia has denied DOE access at some sites after the comple - tion of security upgrades, making it difficult for the department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades are being properly spent.”27 Specifically, neither DOE nor DOD had “reached an agreement with the Russian [Ministry of Defense] on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the agencies are installing secu - rity upgrades.”28 Absent such agreement, DOE and DOD “will be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts.”29 Such limitations could impede compliance with U.S. laws requiring verification of the proper use of U.S. government funds. Perhaps the best-known standoff over access involves the DOD-funded Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak.30 The United States and Russia from the outset of the project agreed in principle that the United States would have the right to some form of monitoring of this site, to ensure that it is being used for its intended purpose. However, 5 years after the site was commissioned and 10 years after transparency negotiations began, a transparency agreement has not been concluded. The umbrella agreement issues have been the subject of tensions not only between the United States and Russia but also between U.S. departments and agencies. As the State and Energy departments began to join the Defense Department in funding and implementing CTR-type projects, the former Soviet states and especially Russia learned to play U.S. agencies off each other—seek - ing weaker legal protections from one U.S. department and then arguing the new provisions served as a precedent for other U.S. departments. Arguably, if it takes 2 or more years to put an umbrella agreement in place before any work begins, the nature and urgency of the threat being addressed has to be questioned. 25 GAO. 2007. Progress Made in Improing Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades is Uncertain. Available as of March 2009 at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d07404.pdf. 26 Ibid., p. 22. 27 Ibid., p. 26. 28 Ibid., p. 29. 29 Ibid. 30 Matthew Bunn. 2007. Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Available as of March 2009 at http://www.nti.org/ e_research/cnwm/securing/mayak.asp.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT As we look forward to broadening engagements, it is time to look carefully at what mechanisms are required and how they should be applied. If CTR 2.0 programs are to form a meaningful response to situations that pose a threat to U.S. national security, implementation mechanisms will have to be put in place in a timely manner. Arguably, if it takes 2 or more years to put an umbrella agreement in place before any work begins, the nature and urgency of the threat being addressed has to be questioned. As a result of the 2008 G8 Summit, the G8 GP has accepted the principle of expanding beyond the former Soviet Union.31 The G8 GP already has a set of guidelines for new programs, and the committee was informed that an effort may be under way to develop a model G8 GP project agreement. If basic model project agreement terms could be articulated, this might help accelerate the process of putting new agreements in place. Other rapid contracting mechanisms also should be explored. DOD would benefit from undertaking a systematic study of its umbrella agreement and other contracting mechanisms. It needs to identify where the DOD CTR program is currently prohibited by law from starting work and which specific contracting procedures may be responsible for the DOD CTR program’s inability to move with requisite speed and efficiency. It is better that these obstacles be identified now, and if appropriate, removed quickly, rather than be identified at a time when the provisions stand in the way of accomplish- ing a high-priority national security goal. This will provide needed CTR 2.0 program flexibility and allow programs to respond to important opportunities that may be lost while waiver authority is sought. Recommendation 3-3c: To maximize the effectiveness of CTR 2.0, the DOD CTR legal frameworks and authorities should be reassessed. DOD should undertake a systematic study of the CTR Umbrella Agreement protection provisions, what purposes they serve in particular circumstances, whether there might be less intrusive means of accomplishing the provisions’ goals, and when the provisions are necessary in their present form. In addition, all USG CTR programs should identify legal and policy tools that can promote the sustainability of U.S.-funded CTR work and provide greater implementa - tion flexibility. Geographic Limitations, Contracting Procedures, and “Notwithstanding Authority” As a practical matter, the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund largely operates in the absence of government-to-government liability, taxation, and access protection provisions. It relies instead on mechanisms such as contracts with its foreign counterparts, and asserts that its diminished protections have not led to problems. 31 See Appendix G.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 This committee agrees with individuals at DOD and elsewhere who have suggested that the traditional DOD CTR Umbrella Agreement may not be necessary for some countries to which DOD might expand. Depending on the anticipated scope of work, this is undoubtedly correct as a matter of law. As a practical matter, the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) program largely operates in the absence of government-to-govern- ment liability, taxation, and access protection provisions. It relies instead on mechanisms such as contracts with its foreign counterparts, and asserts that its diminished protections have not led to problems. NDF and its flexible structure will be an important element of CTR 2.0. Because of the difficulty of negotiating and extending traditional DOD CTR Umbrella Agreements and NDF’s success in operating in their absence, a study that looks at the two models could contribute significantly to enabling DOD CTR to operate more nimbly. DOD (and other U.S. government agen- cies) could also study other existing arrangements between the United States and potential partner countries, such as science and technology, health, or other agreements, to assess whether these might provide an adequate framework, particularly for any initial engagement work. While the NDF receives its funding from Congress for expenditure “not - withstanding any other provision of law,” DOD CTR has no such notwith- standing authority. As a result, DOD CTR is subject to geographic limitations, contracting procedures, and other restrictions that do not apply to NDF. Geographic Limitations Beginning with the Fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Act, Congress began authorizing the President to use a portion of DOD CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union in emergency situations. The George W. Bush admin - istration exercised this authority for the first time in mid-2004, when it provided assistance to Albania for the elimination of chemical weapons. In 2007, Con - gress expanded the authority to spend DOD CTR funds outside the FSU by eliminating the restriction that this occurs only in emergency situations. How - ever, the program is still subject to the Glenn Amendment32 and other similar sanctions, which could be an obstacle to work in countries subject to those sanctions.33 The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 provided the Presi - dent with Glenn Amendment waiver authority with respect to CTR-type work 32 The “Glenn Amendment,” or the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, imposes sanc - tions under several conditions, including on nonnuclear states that detonate nuclear explosions. See also the Glenn-Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1977 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. 33 For many years, Congress conditioned funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the president making an annual certification that each recipient nation was “committed to” certain goals. However, in 2007, Congress eliminated the certification requirements.

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4 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT in the Democratic People’s Republic of korea (DPRk). The Glenn Amendment was lifted with respect to India and Pakistan shortly after September 11, 2001. Sources with whom committee members spoke disagreed as to whether DOD CTR work in Iran or any other country is currently barred by a federal law or laws that cannot be waived by the president. However, existing waiver authori - ties do not take into account the potential for future sanctions that may not be subject to waiver. For example, the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism can be revised, and any country added to that list would be subject to sanctions. In such cases, it may not be possible to engage under any program other than the NDF. Given NDF’s relatively small annual appropriation, it is possible that the bulk of its funds might be used by a single program (such as denuclearization in the DPRk), leaving no backup program with similar flexibility to take on a new activity. There also can be specific prohibitions contained in appropriations language, as is the case for DOD and the DPRk. Contracting Procedures Unlike NDF, DOD CTR is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regula - tions and other federal contracting procedures and restrictions. Several sources opined to the committee that these requirements were a major reason why DOD CTR is sometimes unable to match NDF’s speed and lower cost estimates. “Notwithstanding” Authority The geographic limitation and contracting issues can be addressed through limited provision of notwithstanding authority. Senator Lugar has proposed that the DOD CTR program be given authority to act “notwithstanding” any sanction or other provision of law, to ensure that the program would have the ability to respond rapidly to new nonproliferation opportunities. The Carter-Joseph Report also recommended that Congress provide DOD CTR with notwithstanding authority comparable to that enjoyed by NDF or, failing that, provision for specific waivers in high-priority cases.34 Although several congressional staff members with whom committee members spoke expressed opposition to providing DOD CTR with blanket notwithstanding authority, the committee believes that limited notwithstanding authority is needed to provide the U.S. government with adequate flexibility. Specific exceptions, such as the 34 Ashton B. Carter, Robert G. Joseph, et al. 2008. Reiew Panel on Future Directions for De- fense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction . Cambridge: Harvard University. Available as of March 2009 at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/18307/review_panel_on_future_directions_for_defense_threat_reduction_agency_ missions_and_capabilities_to_combat_weapons_of_mass_destruction.html?breadcrumb=%2F.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 congressional waiver authority provided to the Glenn Amendment for CTR- type work (including by DOE) in the DPRk, are not sufficient and do not take into account the limitations of possible future sanctions. Recommendation 3-3d: Congress should grant DOD limited “notwithstand- ing” authority for the CTR program—perhaps a maximum of 10 percent of the overall annual appropriation and subject to congressional notification—to give the program the additional flexibility it will need in future engagements. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Finding 3-1: The lack of a government-wide tracking program for USG CTR programs that cross agency budgets impedes the U.S. government’s ability to develop a strategic approach to CTR 2.0. Finding 3-2: Responding to the new global security challenges requires a new model of interagency leadership. CTR 2.0 will function most effectively with strong leadership from the White House, and with the active involvement of relevant departments and agencies. Recommendation 3-1: CTR 2.0 should be directed by the White House through a senior official at the National Security Council and be implemented by the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, and other relevant cabinet secretaries. Finding 3-3: CTR 2.0 will have to tailor approaches for each new engagement and associated threat, and use creative forms of collaboration, particularly in environments where the partners are reluctant, the political climate is adverse, or local conditions can only support limited levels of technology. Finding 3-4: Strategies that employ soft engagement sometimes facilitated by NGOs, academe, or other nontraditional diplomatic efforts, may be necessary to support or initiate CTR 2.0 engagements. Recommendation 3-1a: Domestically, CTR 2.0 should include a broad group of participants, including government, academe, industry, nongovernmental organizations and individuals, and an expanded set of tools, developed and shared across the U.S. government. Finding 3-5: Transparency will be a hallmark of CTR 2.0 and will further strengthen commitments to threat reduction beyond any applicable legal obli - gations in a treaty, contract, or other legal instrument.

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 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Finding 3-6: In addition to supporting traditional arms control and nonpro - liferation agreements, CTR 2.0 can be used to advance other multilateral (Proliferation Security Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terror- ism) and various international security instruments such as UNSCR 1540 and related resolutions. Finding 3-7: The holistic approach of CTR 2.0, including engagement with international partners, can be useful in post-conflict environments. Recommendation 3-1b: Internationally, CTR 2.0 should include multilateral partnerships that address both country and region-specific security challenges, as well as provide support to the implementation of international treaties and other security instruments aimed at reducing threat, such as the G8 Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative, UNSCR 1540, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Finding 3-8: The benefits of personal engagement survive beyond the formal implementation of programs and projects. Recommendation 3-2: The executive branch and Congress need to recognize that personal relationships and professional networks that are developed through USG CTR programs contribute directly to our national security and that new metrics should be developed to reflect this. Recommendation 3-3: The legislative framework, funding mechanisms, and program leveraging opportunities should be structured to support more effec - tive threat reduction initiatives across DOD, other U.S. government depart - ments and agencies, international partners, and NGOs. Recommendation 3-3a: Program planning should be developed out of a stra - tegic process and be matched by a strategic budget process that produces a multiyear budget plan and distributes funding across agencies based on agency ability to respond to program requirements. As needed, agency legislative authorities should be revised to include a national security dimension. Recommendation 3-3b: Congress should provide comingling authority to all agencies implementing programs under CTR 2.0 as a way to encourage other partners to contribute funds to global security engagement efforts. Finding 3-9: Many of the legal and policy underpinnings of the current DOD CTR program that were established for accountability and protection of U.S. implementing agencies are cumbersome, dated, and limiting, and often dimin - ish the value and hinder the success of program assistance and partnerships.

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 FORM AND FUNCTION OF CTR .0 Recommendation 3-3c: To maximize the effectiveness of CTR 2.0, the DOD CTR legal frameworks and authorities should be reassessed. DOD should undertake a systematic study of the CTR Umbrella Agreement protection provisions, what purposes they serve in particular circumstances, whether there might be less intrusive means of accomplishing the provisions’ goals, and when the provisions are necessary in their present form. In addition, all USG CTR programs should identify legal and policy tools that can promote the sustainability of U.S.-funded CTR work and provide greater implementa - tion flexibility. Recommendation 3-3d: Congress should grant DOD limited “notwithstand- ing” authority for the CTR program―perhaps a maximum of 10 percent of the overall annual appropriation and subject to congressional notification—to give the program the additional flexibility it will need in future engagements.

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