Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction (2009)

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Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Committee on International Security and Arms Control Policy and Global Affairs 

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS   500 Fifth Street, N.W.   Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract No. DTRAA01-02-D0003, DO#8 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number-13:  978-0-309-13106-3 International Standard Book Number-10:  0-309-13106-5 Library of Congress Control Number 2009929437 Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334- 3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu Copyright 2009 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. 

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COMMITTEE ON STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM David R. Franz (Co-Chair), Midwest Research Institute Ronald Lehman (Co-Chair), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Robert B. Barker, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired) William F. Burns, U.S. Army War College Rose E. Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace John Hamre, Center for Strategic and International Studies Robert Joseph, National Institute for Public Policy Orde Kittrie, Arizona State University James LeDuc, Galveston National Laboratory Richard W. Mies, private consultant Judith Miller, Manhattan Institute George W. Parshall, Du Pont (retired) Thomas R. Pickering, Hills & Company, International Consultants Kim Savit, University of Denver and private consultant National Research Council Staff Anne Harrington, Study Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control Rita S. Guenther, Senior Program Associate, Committee on International Security and Arms Control Benjamin J. Rusek, Senior Program Associate, Committee on International Security and Arms Control La’Faye Lewis-Oliver, Administrative Coordinator Yousaf Butt, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy Graduate Fellow Clark Cully, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy Graduate Fellow Jessica Meisner, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy Graduate Fellow  



Preface The success of the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (DOD CTR) program at the end of the Cold War was not a foregone conclu- sion. The program to reduce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats was a bold idea in a time of transition and uncertainty. The risks seemed every bit as evident as the benefits. Generating action throughout an overburdened U.S. government at a time of budget cuts and change required an agility sel- dom found except in times of great urgency.  Placing the initial responsibility for CTR in DOD and drawing upon the organizational energy of the one department most practiced at rapid mobilization of resources was a primary reason for the early success of CTR.  Because DOD had, through its regional political-military responsibilities and arms control coordination, diverse skills, experienced people, and a habit of interagency networking when confronted with new challenges, the program took off.  Quickly, other departments and organizations were participating as well. While not on the scale of the Marshall Plan, history will record that the DOD CTR—or Nunn-Lugar Program—also generated great hope and stabil- ity in a time of political and economic crisis and then provided the resources for cooperation to former Cold War adversaries to enhance the well-being of all. Over time, many of its revolutionary activities became routine, and as such came to reflect all the advantages and disadvantages of being taken for granted. Bureaucratization, micromanagement, and the Washington turf wars invited rigorous measures of merit even as bigger questions were asked about the appropriateness of the program for today’s circumstances. Still, scholars and policy makers continue to speculate on how bad the outcomes might have been had a CTR program not been created in 1992. In the years ahead, we face new challenges for which tools originally developed by the DOD CTR program and then in the Departments of State vii 

viii PREFACE and Energy, and elsewhere, may again be mobilized along with new tools that are desperately needed.  Whether the long-run trend for most of the world is toward greater security, prosperity, and freedom is unclear, and many parts of the world seem destined toward turmoil and violence with a global impact.  The advance and spread of dual-use technology will increasingly make access to highly destructive or disruptive technology easier and cheaper for small coun- tries and smaller groups of nonstate actors.  No “silver bullet” is likely. It is in this context that the committee believes a fresh look at DOD’s CTR program is most warranted. In its own work, the committee recognized that many CTR tools had already been modified to meet evolving circumstances. In considering how these CTR tools might be exploited further, members of the committee began to refer to proposed enhancements as CTR 2.0. This shorthand, drawn from the software industry, reflected both step-by-step problem solving and the ongo- ing applicability of many existing CTR approaches to new challenges and new regions. While acknowledging existing momentum, however, the term CTR 2.0 came to reflect also the committee’s conclusion that a more aggressive upgrade to CTR was needed. To meet the magnitude of new security challenges, par- ticularly at the nexus of WMD and terrorism, more and more deeply embedded cooperation involving security and threat reduction is vital. This requires more than small fixes. Our conclusion is that a bold vision is again required and that DOD and the entire U.S. government should reexamine what CTR has already accom- plished and refocus efforts to promote global security engagement in the 21st century. Ronald F. Lehman David R. Franz Co-chair Co-chair 

A Note on Terminology The committee responsible for this report discovered early in its discus- sions that the terminology used to describe Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program activities was varied and often confusing. Some call CTR the Nunn-Lugar Program, others associate CTR primarily with the Department of Defense, and in recent years CTR has been used generically to refer to the broad group of CTR programs spread across U.S. government departments and agencies. To facilitate its discussions, the committee established a set of terms that it uses throughout this report. In considering how best to express its vision of a future version of CTR, the committee concluded that an expression borrowed from the software industry that refers to a new version of an existing program is a useful way to describe the more advanced and comprehensive approach to cooperative threat reduction that is advocated in this report. CTR – generic reference to cooperative threat reduction CTR 1.0 – the original cooperative threat reduction program developed at the end of the Cold War and implemented by multiple U.S. government programs in the former Soviet Union CTR 2.0 – a set of programs and projects to be undertaken by the U.S. govern- ment, as part of a cooperative network that includes a wide range of countries, international organizations, and nongovernment partners, to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate common threats to U.S. national security and global sta- bility that have emerged since the end of the Cold War ix 

 A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY DOD CTR – programs under the policy direction of the secretary of defense and as defined by the annual National Defense Authorization Act. These pro- grams are implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Program (DTRA) and by contractors supported by DTRA USG CTR – the set of programs across the U.S. government that are now associated with cooperative threat reduction activities 

Acknowledgments In carrying out this study, committee members and staff benefited greatly from the insights and observations of many experts and scientific colleagues. The views obtained during these discussions provided the essential input for the study. The committee expresses its gratitude for the time that these many colleagues devoted to ensuring that this study is as comprehensive and accurate as possible. The study has also benefited from the insights of individuals who have worked with the U.S. government Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro- grams for many years. In particular, the committee would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions during the open sessions of the committee meetings: Joseph Benkert, Department of Defense (DOD); Joseph DeThomas, Civilian Research and Development Foundation; Joseph P. Harahan, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Mary Alice Hayward, Department of State; Susan Koch, Department of State (retired); Kenneth Luongo, Partner- ship for Global Security; Charles Lutes, National Security Council; Neile Miller, Office of Management and Budget; Mary Beth Dunham Nikitin, Congressional Research Service; Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Amy Smithson, Monterey Institute of International Studies; William Steiger, Department of Health and Human Services; James Tegnelia, DTRA (retired); Charles Thornton, University of Maryland; William Tobey, Depart- ment of Energy (retired); and Elizabeth Turpen, the Henry L. Stimson Center. The committee was also fortunate to have the opportunity to interact with individuals who worked directly on important national security efforts in Albania and Libya, whose input provided key insights. The committee is grateful to Karin Look, Department of State; Donald Mahley, Department of State (retired); Steven Saboe, Department of State; Kenneth Ward, Department xi 

xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS of State; and Kenneth Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for the time they spent speaking with various committee members. As DOD begins to look at expanding its CTR activities globally, the com- mittee thought that it was important to understand the relationship between what DOD CTR does programmatically and the missions of the Unified Com- batant Commands. The committee discussed sets of questions with the senior leadership and staff of three commands and is grateful to Major General Vern T. Miyagi at U.S. Pacific Command; Major General Paul G. Schafer at U.S. European Command; and Vice Admiral Robert Moeller and Ambassador Mary Yates at U.S. Africa Command for the time and attention they provided. The committee would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Mark Drabecki, Lieu- tenant Colonel Charles Tennyson, and Lieutenant Colonel Shannon McCoy for arranging the consultations. This study has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of these independent reviews is to provide candid and critical com- ments that assist the institutions in making this study as sound as possible and ensure that the study meets institutional standards for objectivity and accuracy. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago; Ambas- sador Linton Brooks, Department of Energy (retired); Mona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Margaret Hamburg, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Susan Koch, Department of State (retired); Kenneth Luongo, Partnership for Global Security; Adel A. F. Mahmoud, Princeton University; Sharon Squassoni, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Paul Walker, Global Green. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the publication, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of the report was overseen by Stephen E. Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon University, and Alvin Trivelpiece, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired). Appointed by the National Academies, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this publication was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully consid- ered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committees and institutions. 

Contents Executive Summary 1 Overview 5 Introduction 17 1 The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 21 2 Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons 39 3 The Form and Function of CTR 2.0: Engaging Partners to Enhance Global Security 69 4 The Role of the Department of Defense in CTR 2.0 99 5 CTR 2.0: Implementation Checklist 117 List of Acronyms 123 Appendixes A H.R. 1585: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 129 B Biographical Sketches of Committee Members 133 xiii 

xiv CONTENTS C Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program History: References 139 D List of Committee Meetings and Speakers 141 E The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs 143 F Nunn-Lugar Scorecard 149 G The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects 151 H  Comparison of the Characteristics of Six Weapons Systems A from the Perspective of a State or Terrorist Organization 155 I Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs 159 J Congressional Guidelines and Corresponding Findings and Recommendations 163