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FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2015

Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

Ashot A. Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, Editors

Joint Committees on the Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015

Committee on International Security and Arms Control Policy and Global Affairs

In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

Washington, D.C.
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FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2015 Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Ashot A. Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, Editors Joint Committees on the Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Committee on International Security and Arms Control Policy and Global Affairs In cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu v

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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract/Grant No. 31867 between the National Academy of Sciences and Battelle Memorial Institute, Pacific Northwest Division (for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory). Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number 13: 978-309-13144-5 International Standard Book Number 10: 0-309-13144-8 A limited number of complimentary copies are available from the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20001; +202-334- 2811. Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2009 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. vii

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The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org vii

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COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2015 THE U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMIES ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, Cochair, Carnegie Moscow Center/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace LINTON F. BROOKS, Independent National Security Consultant MONA DREICER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory JAMES FULLER, University of Washington, Seattle RICHARD W. MIES, Independent National Security Consultant CHERRY MURRAY, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory M. TERESA OLASCOAGA, Sandia National Laboratories COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 2015 RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE ADMIRAL ASHOT A. SARKISOV, Cochair, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) REAR-ADMIRAL VYACHESLAV M. APANASENKO, Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences EVGENY N. AVRORIN, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics LEONID A. BOLSHOV, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS LEV D. RYABEV, Rosatom With the support of ANATOLY I. ANTONOV, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ANDREY A. KOKOSHIN, Institute for International Security Problems, RAS National Research Council Staff ANNE M. HARRINGTON, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control RITA S. GUENTHER, Senior Program Associate, Committee on International Security and Arms Control Russian Academy of Sciences Staff TATIANA POVETNIKOVA, Program Officer, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS OLGA KUZNETSOVA, Policy and Security Fellow, Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS YURI SHIYAN, Director, Office for North American Scientific Cooperation, RAS vv

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the nearly two decades of transition following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and the Russian Federation have jointly cooperated on several Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs designed to safely and securely manage Russia’s nuclear weapons and the materials used to build them.1 Through the joint implementation of these programs, U.S. and Russian experts have developed an effective working relationship, collaborating to improve the safety and security of nuclear materials across Russian civilian and military facilities, and to prevent the proliferation of these materials and associated expertise beyond Russia. As became particularly evident following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, these programs are of vital importance to the security of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the international community. Now, after years of productive cooperation, the relationship between the United States and Russia is evolving from one of assistance to one of partnership, which has demonstrated the potential to address a wide range of challenges facing the international nuclear security environment, including issues of non-proliferation, the global expansion of nuclear power, and nuclear terrorism. The two countries are therefore poised to carry their experience and expertise as advanced nuclear states into a new phase of partnership, leading efforts to strengthen nuclear security bilaterally and in broader regional and international contexts. The formal basis, upon which that partnership now rests, the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement between the United States and Russia, is scheduled to expire in 2013.2 Following this date, the Russian Federation will assume full programmatic and financial responsibility for managing and securing vast quantities of nuclear materials. During the February 2005 summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, Presidents Vladimir V. Putin and George W. Bush confirmed their commitment to strengthening their partnership as a means of addressing not only existing challenges of nuclear security and counter-terrorism, but also the challenges of coming decades.3 This commitment to continued cooperation provided the context for the joint National Academies’ (NAS)-Russian Academy of Sciences’ (RAS) public workshop on the Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015, held November 12-13, 2007, in Vienna, Austria, with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The papers contained in this proceedings were presented at this two-day workshop convened at 1 For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008. 2 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable materials protection, control, and accounting system be transferred to sole Russian Federation support no later than January 1, 2013. For further information regarding the Bob Stump Act, see http://www.army.mil/armybtkc/docs/PL%20107-314.pdf; accessed May 1, 2008. 3 For further information regarding the “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation,” of February 24, 2005, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html; accessed February 23, 2008. See also Appendix D for full text of this Joint Statement. vii

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the Austria Center (see Appendix A for the workshop agenda). The workshop was held in Vienna as a means of placing the discussion in the larger context of international developments in nuclear security, many of which (e.g. safeguards and international access to peaceful energy) involve various aspects of the IAEA. Throughout the workshop, IAEA experts participated in the discussions and provided useful insights into areas of technical cooperation that would benefit from joint U.S.-Russian involvement (see Appendix B for the list of workshop participants). The workshop was organized by joint committees of the U.S. National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences, co-chaired by Rose Gottemoeller and Academician Ashot Sarkisov (see Appendix C for committee bios). The joint committees met in Washington, D.C. in June 2007, and in Moscow in August 2007, to plan the workshop and to seek the views and opinions of experts knowledgeable about the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs and its potential for expanded cooperation and partnership. Workshop presenters from the Russian Federation and the United States included employees of national laboratories of the two countries, former government officials of the two countries, a United Nations representative, independent consultants, academics, and those currently serving in private industries and non-governmental organizations.4 Each was asked to address, in part or in full, the following questions: • What do U.S. and Russian experts perceive as the main challenges to nuclear security in 2015, and how can they work over the next decade to address these challenges as partners? • What factors might assist or obstruct the partners as they address those challenges? • How can this partnership concretely and effectively assist mutual non-proliferation goals in other regions such as Asia and the Middle East, and/or in multi-lateral arrangements such as the provision of international fuel services and broader technology cooperation? • How can the U.S. and Russia work to sustain the non-proliferation advances gained through more than a decade of material protection, control, and accounting and other cooperative efforts? • In addition to sustaining existing efforts, how can new approaches such as public- private partnerships, strengthened legal structures, and effective management tools be successfully employed to address emerging challenges? In their written as well as oral remarks, participants expressed their own individual views and did not represent the views or positions of their governments or employers. This facilitated an open and frank discussion, and while no formal consensus among participants was sought, a surprising degree of agreement was articulated, particularly on the trends in the nuclear security environment, priorities for the U.S.-Russian partnership, and available tools to address future security challenges. 4 For more general discussion of public-private partnerships and creative incorporation of private organizations into future bilateral and multi-lateral non-proliferation cooperation, see the paper by Vyacheslav Apanasenko in this volume. viii

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The workshop was designed to explore various views on where our U.S.-Russian security relationship in 2015 could and perhaps should be, and various means of achieving an “ideal relationship,” realizing that there are perhaps many “ideals.” Therefore, authors drew variously on past and present experiences to form their arguments and descriptions of that “ideal” future relationship. Some articulated these steps more clearly than others, but we hope that as a whole the volume is able to provide a broad spectrum of ideas and views for the future relationship in 2015. TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR EXPANDED PARTNERSHIP An important trend identified by many workshop participants is that Russia and the United States are continuing the transition from an assistance relationship, which was prevalent during the 1990s, to a partnership relationship. A partnership relationship implies that the two countries are willing to share in setting priorities for cooperation, managing projects, and funding cooperative efforts. Priorities for this evolving partnership include both persistent challenges, such as further reductions in nuclear weapons in the pursuit of fulfilling Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,5 and new challenges such as the expansion of nuclear energy technologies, nuclear forensics, nuclear terrorism, and challenges which may arise in third countries. Several workshop participants identified a particularly promising area for full partnership in efforts to develop nuclear fuel assurances for those countries seeking to expand nuclear power without developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. By partnering to address this immediate global opportunity, Russia and America may continue to lead the international community not only in scientific and technical advances, but also in nuclear non- proliferation policy. Fortunately, more than a decade of cooperation has provided a wide variety of tools to experts from both countries as they seek to address these priorities, including: government-to- government and non-governmental arrangements, systematic approaches such as that of Strategic Master Plans, and public-private partnerships. A solid yet flexible legal foundation for cooperation, political support at the highest levels, projects of appropriate size and scale for the tasks at hand and the resources of those involved, and sustained engagement by qualified and dedicated individuals are well-proven mechanisms for developing the mutual understanding, trust, and commitment required for Russia and the United States to remain productive partners. Much work remains, however, to ensure that a successful transition to full partnership is accomplished in the coming years, well before 2015. Now the third in a very successful series of joint NAS-RAS projects on nuclear security, this workshop proceedings serves as the basis for exploring the possibility of a further joint NAS-RAS effort to provide concrete recommendations for both Moscow and Washington on how they may proceed in transitioning to full partnership, in which both Russia and the United States can serve as leaders bilaterally and internationally in responding to the difficult nuclear security challenges that face us all in the coming decades. 5 To read the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. ix

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This publication was made possible through the support of the U.S. Department of Energy. The Russian Academy of Sciences and the International Atomic Energy Agency also provided critical logistical and administrative support in both Moscow and Vienna, without which the preparatory meetings and workshop would not have been possible. Such generous support, whether in the form of financial contributions, visa invitations, administrative assistance, or transportation, is greatly appreciated. This volume has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for quality. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this volume: Sergei Vyachaslavovich Astapov, Institute of Strategic Stability; Lewis Dunn, Science Applications International Corporation; Sergei Ruchkin, World Nuclear Association; Halvor Andre Undem, International Atomic Energy Agency; Ned Wogman, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and Sergei Aleksandrovich Zelentsov, Institute of Strategic Stability. Although the reviewers listed above have provided constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the content of the individual papers. Responsibility for the final content of the papers rests with the individual authors. We also wish to thank the following individuals for their cooperation and support, for their assistance in making the workshop possible, and subsequently for their assistance in producing these proceedings: Christopher A. Eldridge (IAEA), Eva Fritz (IAEA), Rita Guenther (Committee on International Security and Arms Control), Tatiana Povetnikova, (Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS), Yuri Shiyan (RAS), and Olga Smyshlyaeva (Nuclear Safety Institute, RAS). We are also grateful to Tariq Rauf (Office of the Director General, IAEA) for his participation in the workshop and the paper provided for this proceedings. Finally, we are grateful to Sergei Astapov and Sergei Zelentsov of the Institute of Strategic Stability for their comments on select papers. Rose Gottemoeller Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov U.S. National Academies’ Cochair Russian Academy of Sciences’ Cochair x

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CONTENTS OVERVIEW OF U.S.-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS 1 OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 3 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Ambassador Linton Brooks FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE 13 NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS Lev D. Ryabev ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM 27 COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION 29 ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS Sergei V. Antipov, Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Vladimir K. Sukhoruchkin MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING: LESSONS 37 LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 Dori Ellis, Bryon Gardner, M. Teresa Olascoaga THE KOLA TECHNICAL AND TRAINING CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 49 Sergei V. Antipov, Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Vladimir K. Sukhoruchkin PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: 57 A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK 59 FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY Tariq Rauf xi

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FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND 69 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS 71 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: 89 A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND 105 TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE Eric Novotny A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND 111 ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: 113 A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION Sergei V. Ruchkin NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START 125 Viktor V. Orlov LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND 135 IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY Alexander A. Pikaev PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR 145 NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE Academician Evgeny N. Avrorin CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW’S CHALLENGES: 151 OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES 153 Cristina Hansell xii

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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: 163 FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN – AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON- PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Vyacheslav M. Apanasenko U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR 179 FORENSICS Michael Kristo MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: 203 LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES Orde F. Kittrie NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING 215 DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 217 Viktor S. Koltunov, Vitali L. Kotyuzhansky, Yuri F. Zabaluyev APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY 229 Pavel S. Zolotarev NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA 237 Joel Wit BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: 245 TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, 247 PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION Rose Gottemoeller and Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov LIST OF ACRONYMS 255 APPENDIXES 259 A FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 261 2015 WORKSHOP AGENDA B FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN 265 2015 WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS C JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES’-RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF 267 SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES xiii

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D JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN 273 AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY E AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 301 STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY xiv