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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

required fuel (uranium blanket, BR>1).

Fermi was not convinced of his preliminary estimates, and the changeover to enriched uranium was not unlikely. Besides, he felt that “the public may not accept an energy source that is encumbered by vast amounts of radioactivity, and that produces a nuclear explosive, which may fall into hostile hands.”169

Before long, the uranium enrichment process, used for weapons production matured. This was further developed for nuclear submarine and thermal power reactors in the 1950s. Even simple assessments show that it would be better to start fast reactors on enriched uranium if only to reduce uranium consumption, to say nothing of the safety implications (estimates for modern light water reactors are given below).170 A breeding ratio of approximately 1 would be sufficient (with BR~1.05 being optimal),171 and fast reactors of moderate power density would naturally go into equilibrium ‘burning’ of U238, Pu, and minor actinides (MA). This would facilitate the resolution of safety problems (NPP, waste, proliferation) with the ensuing reduction of NPP costs. Although he was present during the start-up of EBR-I in 1951, Fermi himself never returned to the development of fast reactors. Instead, he delegated their development to ANL, where his outline evolved into the fast breeder concept, including:

  • Uranium blanket with weapons-grade Pu, and BR>1, which led to the reactivity margin ∆K>>βeff, with the risk of a prompt criticality excursion, and to separation of uranium and Pu in reprocessing

  • high fuel power density P and breeding rates ω~(BR-1)P

  • heat removal by light-weight and heat-conducting (but combustible and neutron-moderating) Na, which has a relatively low boiling point (Tboil ~ 900°C), close-packed lattice of fuel rods in tight shrouds; worse thermal hydraulics; flow blockage danger

Consequently, the inherent safety properties of FRs were left untapped. As with thermal reactors, the present-day fast neutron machines are also potentially prone to severe accidents, involving a prompt criticality excursion, loss of coolant with the additional hazards of Na exposure to air and water, and positive void effect in the event of rapid Na boiling. Moreover, the problems of waste and proliferation remain unresolved, and the FRs cost even more than the expensive thermal reactor facilities. Nevertheless, the idea of Pu breeding, which appeared correct at first glance, was embraced by major physicists. Eventually, this came into general use, was included in educational programs, and became a universally ingrained stereotype.

169

Ibid.

170

A 1 gigawatt (GW) light water reactor (LWR) with high burnup consumes 10 kt of natural uranium and generates about 7 tons of fissile Pu over 50 years. The latter allows integrating 1 GW from FRs into a closed nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) with about one year of cooling. The efficiency of U235 in FRs is a factor of 1.3-1.4 lower than that of Pu, so it would take about 10 tons of U235 (derived from 2 kt of natural uranium) to integrate 1 GW from FRs based on natural uranium into a closed NFC, which is 5-6 times less than that required for a “parent” TR, with the same being nearly true for separation work units.

171

The 16 Mt of “cheap” uranium allows for the deployment of LWRs to a capacity of 1.6 thousand GWe (gigawatts electricity) (~20 percent of electricity) in the 21st century, while FRs would provide more than 8,000 GWe (with more expensive uranium being also acceptable). FRs with a Th blanket in the future could provide another several thousand GW from TRs. Given breeding rations of ω~1 percent per year, nuclear power could grow to a level higher than 105 GWt (10 kW [kilowatt] per capita for 12 billion people, as in advanced countries). It is hardly necessary to seek more, nor is it advisable (from the standpoint of a balance with 108 GW of incident solar radiation).

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)