• (+) a reduced risk of hazardous technology proliferation

• (+) a path toward civilized NPP and nuclear fuel markets

• (−) enhanced discrimination between countries

• (−) the need for effective verification and protection measures

• (−) increased nuclear material transportation (vulnerable to terrorists)

• (−) such a division will only be effective for a limited time because traditional thermal-neutron NPPs are to be replaced by fast-neutron ones as technology improves and resources of cheap uranium are exhausted

So these proposals cannot radically resolve the problem of proliferation.

It would seem that the risk of proliferation can be eliminated only if the international mentality gradually changed. The policy of using a ‘stick,’ such as suspicions, threats, and, sanctions must be ruled out of international practice. Instead we must turn to the policy of using ‘carrots,’ such as assistance in the development of nuclear power, the establishment of and payment for verification measures, and material considerations for refusal of hazardous technologies.

Placing hope on such an improvement of the international climate would possibly seem too optimistic, but this is apparently the only way to bring the non-proliferation dead-lock to an end. In this way it would be possible to start departing from national nuclear power systems to a completely international one (such as Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Concept). Most of the non-proliferation measures proposed require concerted (or, still better, joint) actions by nuclear powers, the first by the United States and Russia. These actions need to be implemented at different levels including:

• intergovernmental

• lab-to-lab

• bilateral expert groups

• scientific exchanges

• International Science and Technology Center projects

• joint participation in IAEA inspections and other verification measures

Competition in the market for nuclear technology and equipment must proceed within the framework of unified non-proliferation standards, including criteria to identify hazardous technologies, requirements for exported reactors, an all-embracing list of verification and protection measures for importing countries, nuclear fuel supply conditions, the status of international enrichment and recycle centers, and the status of a nuclear fuel reserve. The United States and Russia could initiate the development of such standards.

Joint scientific and technological developments could be of great help for the development of advanced nuclear power technologies. These include:

• innovative, higher proliferation resistant reactor projects

• innovative nuclear fuel cycle technologies (especially for international nuclear fuel cycle centers)

• developments and improvements in methods for mathematical modeling of nuclear reactors and the nuclear fuel cycle