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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

Today, we can already summarize some of the results of the enormous amount of work that has been done to reduce weapons stockpiles. From 1990 through December 2001, the number of delivery vehicles for strategic offensive weapons has been reduced from 2,500 in the former Soviet Union and 2,246 in the United States to 1,600 on either side. The number of warheads has been cut from approximately 10,000 to 6,000. According to public Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) strategic data exchange information, in January 2006, Russia had 771 delivery vehicles and 3,319 nuclear munitions in its strategic nuclear triad, and the United States had 1,079 delivery vehicles and 4,986 nuclear munitions.26 Many hundreds of missiles (specifically, 1,846 in Russia and 846 in the United States) have been eliminated in compliance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces.27 A large number of nuclear-powered submarines (148) have been dismantled in Russia.

Additionally,

  • nuclear stockpiles, including tactical nuclear weapons, have been dramatically reduced

  • further accumulation of nuclear weapons materials (uranium and plutonium) has been stopped

  • production of nuclear munitions has been reduced by a factor of more than 10 in Russia and has been suspended altogether in the United States

  • five hundred tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium has been de-weaponized, along with 34 tons of plutonium on each side

  • a portion of weapons-grade materials has been downblended to non-weapons grade material

  • nuclear testing has been banned

  • several production facilities in the nuclear weapons complex have been shut down

  • personnel of the military industrial complex have been significantly reduced

We are seeing tangible results of the joint efforts to eliminate the accumulated military capabilities. These efforts have been based on mutual interest and funding by the United States and other countries. This work will be completed in 2012.

In 2003, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions entered into force between the United States and Russia.28 It calls for strategic offensive reductions to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads on either side by 2012. Unfortunately, however, the treaty has no clear schedules, interim milestones, or verification provisions. This is the first treaty that does not call for a commensurate reduction in delivery vehicles and does preserve (for the United States) the warheads which can easily be returned to operationally deployed status. In 2009, START I and its verification mechanisms are scheduled to expire, and so far no steps have been taken to extend them. All of this is reversible at any time. The United States has clearly lost interest in future steps to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles. At the same time, it has become abundantly clear that even the 1,700 to 2,200 warheads that will be left on either side in 2012 are still

26

To read the text of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/index.html; accessed April 6, 2008.

27

To read the text of the INF Treaty, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf2.html; accessed April 6, 2008.

28

To read the text of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-3.html; accessed April 6, 2008.

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)