Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 272
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop APPENDIX D JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation U.S.-Russia Summit February 23-24, 2005, Bratislava, Slovakia The United States and Russia will enhance cooperation to counter one of the gravest threats our two countries face, nuclear terrorism. We bear a special responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material, in order to ensure that there is no possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands. While the security of nuclear facilities in the U.S. and Russia meet current requirements, we stress that these requirements must be constantly enhanced to counter the evolving terrorist threats. Building on our earlier work, we announce today our intention to expand and deepen cooperation on nuclear security with the goal of enhancing the security of nuclear facilities in our two countries and, together with our friends and allies, around the globe. To this end the United States and Russia will continue and expand their cooperation on emergency response capability to deal with the consequences of a nuclear/radiological incident, including the development of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and radioactive materials that are, or may be, involved in the incident. We will work together to help ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and early adoption of an International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. U.S. and Russian experts will share “best practices” for the sake of improving security at nuclear facilities, and will jointly initiate security “best practices” consultations with other countries that have advanced nuclear programs. Our experts will convene in 2005 a senior-level bilateral nuclear security workshop to focus increased attention on the “security culture” in our countries including fostering disciplined, well-trained, and responsible custodians and protective forces, and fully utilized and well-maintained security systems. The United States and Russia will continue to work jointly to develop low-enriched uranium fuel for use in any U.S. - and Russian-design research reactors in third countries now using high-
OCR for page 273
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop enriched uranium fuel, and to return fresh and spent high-enriched uranium from U.S. - and Russian-design research reactors in third countries. The United States and Russia will continue our cooperation on security upgrades of nuclear facilities and develop a plan of work through and beyond 2008 on joint projects. Recognizing that the terrorist threat is both long-term and constantly evolving, in 2008 our countries will assess the joint projects and identify avenues for future cooperation consistent with our increased attention to the security culture in both countries. We have established a bilateral Senior Interagency Group chaired by Secretary of Energy Bodman and Rosatom Director Rumyantsev for cooperation on nuclear security to oversee implementation of these cooperative efforts. A progress report will be due on July 1, 2005, and thereafter on a regular basis.
OCR for page 274
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION G8 Summit July 6-8, 2005, Gleneagles, United Kingdom We acknowledge, as we did at Evian and Sea Island, that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. The threat of the use of WMD by terrorists calls for redoubled efforts. All States have a role to play in meeting the challenge of WMD proliferation by upholding international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms. All must meet their obligations in full, and ensure effective implementation. We reaffirm our commitments in this regard. And we emphasise our determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national efforts and effective multilateralism. At Sea Island, we agreed an Action Plan on Non-Proliferation. During the past year, we have worked intensively with our international partners on all its aspects. Universalising and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime. Multilaterally agreed norms provide an essential basis for our non-proliferation efforts. We strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these norms. We will work to strengthen them, including through improved verification and enforcement. We call on all States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, to accede without delay. We remain ready to assist States to this end. We welcome the agreement by the international community of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, initiated by the Russian Federation. We look forward to its early entry into force. United Nations We acknowledge the role of the UN Security Council in addressing the challenges of proliferation. We welcome the fact that the majority of UN members have responded to UNSCR 1540 by submitting reports on their domestic non-proliferation provisions including export controls, and their contribution to international co-operation. We urge those who have not yet done so to submit reports without delay. It is essential that all states meet their obligations in full, by enacting and enforcing national legal and regulatory measures including appropriate criminal and civil penalties for violations, and by committing to international cooperation on non-proliferation. We stand ready to consider all requests from states seeking to develop their national procedures. We urge the 1540 Committee to work quickly and effectively, drawing on
OCR for page 275
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop the support of relevant international organisations. We also urge the Security Council to consider how best to ensure that the work of the committee makes an enduring contribution to non-proliferation. We welcome the attention given to non-proliferation by the UN Secretary General in his report “In Larger Freedom”. We stand ready to engage actively at the meeting of Heads of State and Government for the High Level Plenary Event of the General Assembly in September. We acknowledge the role of the Conference on Disarmament in advancing our non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and call on it to resume substantive work. We look forward to strengthening the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) by State Parties at the Diplomatic Conference in October. Proliferation Security Initiative We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative. We call on all States to commit themselves to deepen co-operation in order to counter trafficking in WMD, delivery means and related materials. We also call for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation networks and illicit financial flows by developing, on an appropriate legal basis, co-operative procedures to identify, track and freeze relevant financial transactions and assets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) We emphasise that the NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. While we note with regret that it was not possible to achieve consensus at the 2005 Review Conference, we welcome the fact that all States Parties reaffirmed the validity of the Treaty. We remain determined that threats and challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime be addressed on the basis of the NPT. For our part, we pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT. We reaffirm our full support for the IAEA. We are working for the implementation of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol to become the universally accepted norm for verifying compliance with NPT safeguards obligations. The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will continue to work together to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We welcome the establishment of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, which will review the IAEA’s ability to ensure
OCR for page 276
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop compliance with NPT obligations and safeguards Agreements in the light of recent non-proliferation challenges. Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology Since Sea Island, we have worked to develop further measures to prevent the export of sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes or allow them to fall into terrorist hands, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the past year, we have made progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the decision at the recent Plenary Session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue. In aid of this process, we continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states. We continue to call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We also welcome the adoption by the NSG of important measures which restrict nuclear transfers to States which have violated their non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. We believe that strengthened conditions on the supply of sensitive technology should be accompanied by new measures to ensure that those states which forgo the nuclear fuel cycle and meet all nuclear non-proliferation obligations enjoy assured access to the market for nuclear fuel and related services. We welcome the efforts of the Expert Group, established by the Director-General of the IAEA, which has recently reported on possible Multinational Approaches to the Fuel Cycle. We will work together with all interested partners for a way forward which provides genuine access while minimising the risks of proliferation. Proliferation Challenges The example of Libya’s important renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates that the international community responds positively to States which desire to be a part of the global non-proliferation mainstream. In this spirit, we are working with determination to address current proliferation challenges. We express profound concern over the threat posed by DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme, particularly following its recent statements that it has manufactured nuclear weapons and in the light of its missile programmes and history of missile proliferation. The DPRK has violated its commitments under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT, and dismantle all its nuclear weaponsrelated programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. It is also essential that the DPRK not contribute to missile proliferation elsewhere, and maintain indefinitely its moratorium on the launching of missiles. We reaffirm our full support for the Six-Party talks, which represent an important opportunity to achieve a comprehensive solution. It is essential that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks immediately without preconditions, and participate constructively to this end.
OCR for page 277
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran’s advanced nuclear programme resolved. It is essential that Iran provide the international community with objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to build international confidence. We welcome the initiative of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union to reach agreement with Iran on long-term arrangements which would provide such objective guarantees as well as political and economic co-operation. We call upon Iran to maintain the suspension of all enrichment- related and reprocessing activities while negotiations on the long term arrangements proceed. We reiterate the need for Iran to co-operate fully with IAEA requests for information and access, to comply fully with all IAEA Board requirements, and to resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme. We also urge Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol without delay and, pending its ratification, to act fully in accordance with its provisions. Defending against biological threats We reaffirm our strong commitment to strengthening our defenses against biological threats. Over the last year, our efforts have focussed on enhancing protection of the food supply. We will continue efforts to address biological threats and support work in other relevant international groups. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. New biological threats mean that full compliance with the Convention remains as relevant today as it was at its inception. We encourage States Party to take a full part in the ongoing programme of work which this year will discuss the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. Further, we look forward to a substantive and forward-looking Review Conference in 2006. 2005 also marks the 80th anniversary of the opening for signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. We emphasise the continuing vital relevance of this multilateral rejection of the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. Chemical Weapons Convention We continue to support full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its non-proliferation aspects. While acknowledging the obligation to destroy chemical weapons within the time limits provided for by the chemical weapons convention and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities, we recall that States Party agreed in 2003 to an Action Plan which requires all to have national implementing measures in place by the time of the Conference of States Party scheduled for this November. We urge those States Party who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps to ensure the deadline is met. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance. We support the use of consultations and cooperation, as well as fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.
OCR for page 278
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and materials of Mass Destruction, and to the Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines. We will work to build on the considerable progress we have made to implement co-operative projects to which the G8 and thirteen other countries now contribute. We renew our pledge to raise up to $20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership priorities, initially in Russia. In this context, we will embark on new projects according to these priorities. We welcome Ukraine’s participation, and continue to discuss with a number of countries of the Former Soviet Union their interest in joining the Partnership. We reaffirm our openness in principle to a further expansion of the Partnership to donor and recipient partners which support the Kananaskis documents. Nuclear Safety and Security We welcome continued co-operation with the IAEA in the area of nuclear and radiological safety and security, including on strengthening regulatory infrastructures and the interface between safety and security. We support the establishment of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and welcome the progress which has been made so far. We welcome the results of the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security which was held in London in March. We have all signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and urge others to join us. Since the horrific accident in 1986, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the Chernobyl site. This year, together with the EU and 16 other countries, we have increased pledged funding for the construction of a new safe confinement over the remnants of the reactor to approximately $1 billion. We welcome Ukraine’s political and financial commitment to this project, and urge Ukraine to ensure that the project can be completed safely by 2009.
OCR for page 279
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop JOINT STATEMENT BY U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION PRESIDENT V.V. PUTIN ON COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND COUNTERING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION U.S.-Russia Summit July 15-17, 2006, St. Petersburg, Russia The United States and the Russian Federation believe that strengthening their cooperation in civil nuclear energy is in the strategic interests of both our countries. It will serve as an additional assurance of access for other nations to economical and environmentally safe peaceful nuclear energy. The United States and the Russian Federation are working together to meet the challenges posed by the combination of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. We recognize the devastation that could befall our peoples and the world community if nuclear weapons or materials or other weapons of mass destruction were to fall into the hands of terrorists. We are closely cooperating to lessen that unacceptable danger, including by strengthening the non-proliferation regime and ensuring the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy The United States and the Russian Federation are convinced that reliable and sufficient energy supplies are the cornerstone of sustainable economic development and prosperity for all nations, and a necessary condition for maintaining international stability. Today nuclear energy is a proven technology for providing reliable electric power without emission of greenhouse gases, and is an essential part of any solution to meet growing energy demand. We share the view that nuclear energy has an essential role in the promotion of energy security, which is an issue of special concern for the leaders of the G-8. Advancing nuclear energy will require further development of innovative technologies that reduce the risk of proliferation, provide for safe management of waste, are economically viable, and are environmentally safe. Being consistent in our approach to assure access to the benefits of nuclear energy for all nations complying with their non-proliferation obligations, we have each proposed initiatives on the development of a global nuclear energy infrastructure, specifically the Russian proposal to establish a system of international centers to provide nuclear fuel services, including uranium enrichment, under IAEA safeguards, and the U.S. proposal for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to develop innovative nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. Following up on these initiatives, the United States and the Russian Federation intend to work together, actively involving the IAEA, to allow all nations to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without pursuing uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities.
OCR for page 280
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop The United States and the Russian Federation together with four other nuclear fuel supplier states have also proposed a concept for reliable access to nuclear fuel for consideration and development at the IAEA. We call upon other countries to join us to facilitate the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy worldwide. Proceeding from our national interests and common goals, and recognizing the benefits of civil commercial nuclear trade, we express our intent to develop bilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We have directed our Governments to begin negotiations with the purpose of concluding an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Countering Nuclear Proliferation We recognize the vital role of the NPT in the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the importance of the IAEA in implementing safeguards required by the NPT. We are working with our G-8 partners to make the Additional Protocol an essential norm for verifying compliance with nuclear safeguards obligations. We welcome the establishment of the IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification. We are actively fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT by substantially reducing nuclear forces as we implement the Moscow Treaty of May 24, 2002. We reiterate our support for effective measures to prevent transfers of sensitive nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists’ hands, and will work together to this end. We reiterate our commitments undertaken under the Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation of February 24, 2005. We have made substantial progress in the implementation of those commitments and we reaffirm our goal of completing nuclear security upgrades by the end of 2008. We welcome the continued cooperation and the recent extension of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement to ensure full implementation of the ongoing projects launched earlier under this Agreement. In this context we take note of the start of operations of the Mayak Fissile Materials Storage Facility. We continue discussions on how best to implement our commitments to the disposition by each side of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium. We applaud the extension of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the decision by the States Parties to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
OCR for page 281
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop We will continue to advance the objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which makes an important contribution to countering the trafficking in WMD, their delivery means, and related materials. We welcome increasing international endorsement for the initiative, as was demonstrated at the High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw. We take note of the discussion at that meeting on how PSI states can work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of UNSCR 1540. We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We welcome the important non-proliferation commitments India has made, and India’s closer alignment with the non-proliferation regime mainstream. We look forward to working with India on civil nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, and on further enhancing the global non-proliferation regime. We will continue to work together to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. We are especially concerned by the failure of the Iranian government to engage seriously on the proposals made by the P-5 countries and Germany. In this context, we stand fully behind the decision by Foreign Ministers on July 12. We are seriously concerned by North Korea’s ballistic missile tests and urge it to return to a moratorium on such launches, to the Six-Party Talks, and to full implementation of the September 19, 2005 agreement. The Russian Federation and the United States are actively working for the unity among the UN Security Council members on these sensitive issues. We will continue consultations with our G-8 partners to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime Through our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation we seek to improve the security of our own peoples and of all others in the world community. In doing so, we are building on the unique historic roles and responsibilities of the United States and the Russian Federation in nuclear science and technology, both military and civilian. We are united in our determination to help make the benefits of nuclear energy securely available to all for peaceful purposes.
OCR for page 282
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop JOINT STATEMENT BY U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION PRESIDENT V.V. PUTIN ANNOUNCING THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM U.S.-Russia Summit July 15-17, 2006, St. Petersburg, Russia The United States of America and Russia are committed to combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, which is one of the most dangerous international security challenges we face. Today we announce our decision to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Building on our earlier work, the Global Initiative reflects our intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share our views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities. These objectives are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism. The United States and Russia call upon like-minded nations to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis. Together with other participating countries and interacting closely with the IAEA, we will take steps to improve participants’ capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and to strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts. We stress that consolidated efforts and cooperation to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism will be carried out in accordance with international law and national legislation. This Global Initiative builds on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which the Russia and the United States were the first to sign on September 14, 2005. This unique international treaty provides for broad areas of cooperation between states for the purpose of detecting, preventing, suppressing, and investigating acts of nuclear terrorism. One of our priority objectives remains full implementation by all countries of the provisions of UNSCR 1540, which was adopted in 2004 as a result of joint efforts by the United States and Russia. This resolution is an important non-proliferation instrument aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from entering “black market” networks and, above all, keeping WMD and related material from falling into the hands of terrorists. The full
OCR for page 288
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop We stand fully behind the far reaching proposals presented to Iran on June 6, 2006 on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America with the support of the High Representative of the European Union for a long-term comprehensive agreement with Iran based on cooperation and mutual respect. We fully support the Statement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America issued on July 12, Paris, in which the Ministers and the High Representative of the European Union expressed their profound disappointment over the absence of any indication at all from the Iranians that Iran is ready to engage seriously on the substance of the above-mentioned proposals. Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA and supported in the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement. The Ministers therefore decided to return the issue to the United Nations Security Council. We, the Leaders of the G-8, fully support this decision and the clear messages it sends to Iran about the choice it must make. We support the Paris appeal to Iran to respond positively to the substantive proposals made on June 6, 2006. DPRK We welcome the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1695 which represents the clear and strong will of the international community. We condemn the launching by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) of multiple ballistic missiles on July 5 local time and express serious concerns as this jeopardizes peace, stability and security in the region and beyond. This action violated the DPRK’s pledge to maintain a moratorium on missile launches and is inconsistent with the purposes of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, in which all parties - including the DPRK -committed to joint efforts to lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We also express our grave concern about the DPRK’s indication of possible additional launches. We call on the DPRK to reestablish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launches and to refrain from contributing to missile proliferation. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1695 we will exercise vigilance in preventing any external cooperation with the DPRK’s missile and WMD programmes. These missile launches intensify our deep concern over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programmes. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. We reaffirm our full support for the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the Six-Party talks. We urge the DPRK to expeditiously return to these talks without precondition and to cooperate to settle the outstanding issues of concern on the basis of this Statement, which reaffirms the common objective of Six Parties; all participants should intensify their efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
OCR for page 289
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Global Partnership The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has continued its progress in the past year towards achieving the goals set out at Kananaskis. It has become a significant force to enhance international security and safety. Much has been accomplished in all areas but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives. We also reaffirm our openness to examine the expansion of the Partnership to other recipient countries and donor states which support the Kananaskis documents and to embrace the goals and priorities of all Partnership members. We welcome the progress GP members have made working with Ukraine. We appreciate the contribution of 13 non-G8 states who joined the Global Partnership. We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.
OCR for page 290
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop DECLARATION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NON-PROLIFERATION: JOINT ACTIONS U.S.-Russia Summit July 2-3, 2007, Kennebunkport, Maine We are determined to play an active role in making the advantages of the peaceful use of nuclear energy available to a wide range of interested States, in particular developing countries, provided the common goal of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons is achieved. To this end, we intend, together with others, to initiate a new format for enhanced cooperation. Bearing this in mind, we acknowledge with satisfaction the initialing of the bilateral Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. We share the view that this Agreement will provide an essential basis for the expansion of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and expect this document to be signed and brought into force in accordance with existing legal requirements. We share a common vision of growth in the use of nuclear energy, including in developing countries, to increase the supply of electricity, promote economic growth and development, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels, resulting in decreased pollution and greenhouse gasses. This expansion of nuclear energy should be conducted in a way that strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We strongly support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and are committed to its further strengthening. We support universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and call on those who have not yet done so to sign and ratify it. We support the activities of the IAEA with respect to both safeguards and promotion of peaceful nuclear energy, and fully understand the need for growth of its capabilities, including its financial resources, commensurate with the expanded use of nuclear energy worldwide. We are prepared to support expansion of nuclear energy in the following ways, consistent with national law and international legal frameworks. These efforts build on, reinforce, and complement a range of existing activities, including the work at the IAEA for reliable access to nuclear fuel, the initiative of the Russian Federation on developing Global Nuclear Infrastructure, including the nuclear fuel center in the Russian Federation, the initiative of the United States to establish the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Rectors and Fuel Cycles, and the Generation IV International Forum. Facilitating the supply of a range of modern, safe, and more proliferation resistant nuclear power reactors and research reactors appropriate to meet the varying energy needs of developing and developed countries. Arranging for participation in national and multinational programs to develop requirements for nuclear reactors for participating countries.
OCR for page 291
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Facilitating and supporting financing to aid construction of nuclear power plants through public and private national and multinational mechanisms, including international financial institutions. Providing assistance to states to develop the necessary infrastructure to support nuclear energy, including development of appropriate regulatory frameworks, safety and security programs to assist states in meeting international standards, and training of personnel. Developing solutions to deal with the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including options for leasing of fuel, storage of spent fuel, and over time development of technology for recycling spent fuel. Ensuring that the IAEA has the resources it needs to meet its safeguards responsibilities as nuclear power expands worldwide. Supporting expanded IAEA Technical Cooperation to help states build the necessary infrastructure for safe, secure, and reliable operations of nuclear power plants. Assisting development and expansion of regional electricity grids, to permit states without nuclear reactors to share in the benefits of nuclear power. Providing nuclear fuel services, including taking steps to ensure that the commercial nuclear fuel market remains stable and that states are assured of reliable access to nuclear fuel and fuel services for the lifetime of reactors, including through establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle centers, to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, including uranium enrichment, under IAEA safeguards. Supporting negotiation of long-term contracts for power reactors and research reactors, including assured supply of fuel and arrangements for management of spent fuel. We are prepared to enter into discussions jointly and bilaterally to develop mutually beneficial approaches with states considering nuclear energy or considering expansion of existing nuclear energy programs in conformity with their rights and obligations under the NPT. The development of economical and reliable access to nuclear energy is designed to permit states to gain the benefits of nuclear energy and to create a viable alternative to the acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The energy and non-proliferation challenges we face today are greater than ever before. We are convinced that this approach will permit substantial expansion of nuclear energy and at the same time strengthen non-proliferation. We welcome the cooperation of states that share this common vision and are committed to jointly taking steps to make this vision a reality.
OCR for page 292
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop HEILIGENDAMM STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION G8 Summit June 6-8, 2007, Heiligendamm, Germany Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as effectively combating international terrorism are critical to international peace and security. We, the Leaders of the G8, remain resolute in our shared commitment to counter the global proliferation challenge and continue to support and implement all the statements on non-proliferation issued on the occasion of previous summits of the G8. The global proliferation challenge requires determined action and international cooperation on the basis of a broad and multifaceted approach. To be successful we need to work jointly with other partners and through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system, to strengthen all instruments available for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We will also continue to promote a stable international and regional environment in order to address the underlying factors for proliferation activities. We reaffirm our commitment to the multilateral treaty system which provides the normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. The strengthening and universalisation of WMD related treaties, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, are therefore a key priority. These three treaties continue to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and are the cornerstones of the international regime for non-proliferation and disarmament. We will continue to encourage states to fulfill their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes and to help states in effectively implementing those obligations at their national levels, inter alia by accounting for, securing and physically protecting sensitive materials. We place particular emphasis on urging the adoption of effective measures to combat illicit trafficking in WMD materials and their means of delivery, in particular through capacity building related to law enforcement and the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls, as well as through the Proliferation Security Initiative. We reaffirm our commitment at Gleneagles to develop cooperative procedures to identify, track and freeze financial transactions and assets associated with WMD proliferation networks. We agree that the United Nations Security Council resolutions, including 1540, 1695, 1718, 1737, and 1747, require all states to take actions against WMD proliferation and call upon states to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities against WMD proliferation finance. We reiterate the key role of the United Nations Security Council in addressing the challenge of proliferation. In this regard, we underline the importance of full implementation by all States of
OCR for page 293
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop the UNSC Resolution 1540 and we reiterate our support for the efforts of the 1540 Committee, including the sharing of best practices. The Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched five years ago at Kananaskis, is a unique and successful joint effort. At the midpoint of its lifespan we have reviewed the progress made so far and assessed the state of the cooperative projects undertaken. We acknowledge the progress that has been made since the launch of the Partnership in 2002 but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation. We remain firmly committed to completing the Kananaskis goals. We will discuss in due course whether the Partnership should be extended beyond 2012 and if so how to allocate the means for expanding its scope to address threat reduction and non-proliferation requirements worldwide, including those mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. We will discuss how other states, both donors and recipients, could be included in an expanded Global Partnership. We strongly support the endeavours underway to overcome the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. We reaffirm our support to the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We underline the crucial importance of ensuring compliance with the multilateral treaty system. To that end we need to strengthen verification and enforcement. We are committed to continue our efforts to make the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard for the peaceful use undertakings of the NPT. We will also work towards rendering the implementation of the CWC and BTWC more effective, in particular by promoting full and effective national implementation by all States Parties and full compliance with their obligations with regard to both Conventions. We are also committed to enhancing the effectiveness of the UNSC in meeting the challenge of proliferation and effectively fulfilling its role as the final arbiter of the consequences of non-compliance. We acknowledge that the nuclear non-proliferation regime faces serious challenges. We therefore reaffirm our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of all three pillars of the NPT and we will continue to work for its universalisation. We call on all states party to the NPT to make a constructive contribution to a balanced and structured review of the Treaty, which has successfully begun with the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 Review Conference. We will undertake all efforts to achieve a positive outcome of the review process with a view to maintaining and strengthening the authority, credibility and integrity of the treaty regime. We urge all states concerned to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article IV in conformity with all their Treaty obligations. To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technology, we welcome the continued discussion by the Nuclear Suppliers Group on
OCR for page 294
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and technology. We regret that they did not reach consensus on this issue by 2007 as called for in St. Petersburg. We urge the NSG to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus. We agree to continue to undertake previously agreed actions on the understanding that should the NSG not reach consensus on appropriate criteria by 2008, we will seriously consider alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies. We also stress the importance of developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as a possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities. Following the IAEA special event in September last year we are now looking forward to the suggestions that the IAEA Director General will be presenting to the IAEA Board of Governors later this month. In considering the suggestions we will be guided by the criteria of added value to the non-proliferation regime, confidence in the reliability of supply assurances, compatibility with Article IV of the NPT, and the need to avoid any unnecessary interference or disturbance with the functioning of existing commercial markets. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the highest possible non-proliferation, safety and security standards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy are observed. We appreciate suggested initiatives in the field of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the Russian initiative on multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, the US initiative on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Six-Party proposal of a standing mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, the Japanese initiative on an IAEA standby arrangements system for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, the UK proposal for non-revocable advanced export approval and the German initiative to establish a special territory under the exclusive control of the IAEA where enrichment could take place on a commercial basis. We reiterate that participation in any mechanism dealing with multilateral approaches should be carried out on a voluntary basis and should not preclude any state from purchasing nuclear fuel cycle services on the existing market, beyond the frameworks of multilateral mechanisms. We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means. We remain united in our commitment to resolve the proliferation concerns posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. We deplore the fact that Iran has so far failed to meet its obligations under UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 and will support adopting further measures, should Iran refuse to comply with its obligations. We again urge Iran to take the steps required by the international community, and made mandatory by these resolutions, to suspend all its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and allow negotiations to begin. International confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme would permit a completely new chapter to be opened in our relations with Iran not only in the nuclear but also more broadly in the political, economic and technological fields. In this regard, we support the action of the IAEA and call on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency. Regarding the Korean Peninsula we are continuing to support the Six-Party Talks and swift implementation of the initial actions agreed on 13 February, 2007 as a first step towards full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September, 2005, including the resolution of the outstanding issues of concern. At the same time, we condemn the DPRK’s nuclear test which is a clear threat to international peace and security. We urge the DPRK to comply with the UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718, strictly to refrain from any further nuclear test or missile launch, and
OCR for page 295
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as all other existing WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards. At the same time, we expect all states to fully implement the UNSC resolutions. We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime. The threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be a matter of grave concern to us. We are therefore committed to broaden participation in and further develop the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism that was launched last year at St. Petersburg. We invite all EU member states to join the initiative, the EU to support our efforts and the EU-institutions to join the intiative as observer. We call on all states to endorse the Statement of Principles adopted at the Initiative’s meeting in Rabat on 30 and 31 October 2006 and join in strengthening our preparedness and defenses against this threat consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks. We urge States that have not done so to sign and to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in its amended version. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC, which is the first disarmament treaty freeing the world from a whole category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification and within a specific timeframe. The anniversary is an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of that Convention so far and to set the stage for the Second Review Conference scheduled to take place in April 2008. We believe that at the Conference States Parties should reaffirm their commitment to full compliance with the obligations under the Convention and to further strengthen the regime established by it. Determined to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons, we welcome the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006, which made a significant contribution to strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. We are committed to fully comply with the decisions taken by that conference and to work for successful outcomes of the meetings during the intercessional period leading to the next Review Conference in 2011. We will continue to promote efforts to address the threat posed by proliferation of means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. In this regard we remain committed to implementing the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and call upon other subscribing States to follow suit. We also intend to render it more effective and urge all states which have not done so, to subscribe to the Code without delay.
OCR for page 296
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop REPORT OF THE G8 NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY GROUP G8 Summit June 6-8, 2007, Heiligendamm, Germany At the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Leaders agreed to establish a G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG). The NSSG, responsible to Leaders, will, according to its mandate, provide technically informed, strategic policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in close cooperation with multilateral organizations and avoiding duplication of tasks or responsibilities that are being addressed adequately by existing organizations or entities. We are committed to continue to consider nuclear safety and security issues in the Nuclear Safety and Security Group. We will continue to develop a common approach to selected nuclear safety and radiation protection issues and their regulation, by Sharing our experience feedback and our vision; Developing a common understanding of internationally acceptable safety and security levels in the fields of nuclear installations, radioactive sources, decommissioning, radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities in order to benchmark our national practices. Importance of Nuclear Safety and Security The G8 are committed to the “nuclear safety first” principle, to recognised international accepted principles and best practices and to the highest level of standards in nuclear safety and security. We recognise the international conventions and IAEA standards form a good basis for the continuous improvement of national nuclear regulatory systems and nuclear safety as necessary. It is our common interest to maintain and if necessary to improve nuclear safety, radiation safety, waste management, nuclear security and nuclear liability in our respective countries, and we call upon all other States to do the same. Nuclear Regulatory Infrastructure In view of the continuous safety and security challenges, we will continue to support measures to promote nuclear (safety and security) regulatory best practices. We stress the need for effective national regulatory infrastructures, in particular the importance for national regulatory bodies to have sufficient authority, effective independence, competence and adequate resources. The G8 have made use or intend to make use of the IAEA “Integrated Regulatory Review Services” to review and further improve their national regulatory bodies.
OCR for page 297
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop National Nuclear Safety and Security Infrastructure and Partnerships We will promote strong and competent national nuclear safety and security infrastructure. We recall that the nations forming the G8 have initiated and monitored major national and international programs to address nuclear safety and security needs and to establish partnership relations on these issues. We welcome continued cooperation with relevant international organizations active in this area. Priority actions are: Use of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management for open and critical peer review and a source for learning about the best safety practices of others; Promote utilization of IAEA Safety Standards for the modernisation of national safety regulations, to the extent feasible; Promote exchange of operation experience for improving operating and regulatory practices; and Multinational cooperation in the safety review of nuclear power plant designs. The full implementation of international conventions on nuclear safety and security, the commitment to promote nuclear safety standards and security guidelines as well as the increased use of integrated review services are important prerequisites for the world’s community to establish a global nuclear safety and security partnership. We call upon all states to join, as appropriate, and implement the respective international instruments. Chernobyl Commitments We reaffirm our commitments under former G7 / G8 summit declarations and memoranda of understanding – to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the dam-aged reactor unit site into safe conditions and to make available safe and reliable facilities at Chernobyl NPP site necessary for a safe decommissioning of the shut down reactor units. We urge the Government of Ukraine in collaboration with EBRD, to take all necessary measures to assist in timely and efficient implementation of these programmes and projects within the agreed frameworks. Nuclear Safety of NPP Medzamor, Armenia We urge Armenia to undertake further upgrades necessary to ensure that NPP Medzamor can operate in a safe manner until it can be shut down and decommissioned. Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources We will continue to support international efforts to enhance controls on radioactive sources. We welcome the fact that more than 88 countries have committed to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and urge all other states to adopt the code. We further note that to date 38 countries have committed to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and we encourage all states to support international activities aimed to harmonizing the implementation of provisions of the guidance.
OCR for page 298
Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Global Nuclear Safety Network We will continue to strengthen the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Partnership. We will support the further enhancement of the evolving web-based systems and networks for information exchange and co-operation in nuclear safety matters, as implementation of nuclear conventions, co-operation on safety standards, and harmonization of safety approaches, exchange of operational experience and resolution of generic nuclear safety issues. This evolving global nuclear safety network is based on considerable work of international organizations in particular the IAEA and OECD-NEA. It will substantially contribute to maintain competence and to continuously develop effective protection against nuclear hazards. We note the efforts for the collection and dissemination of regulatory information, actions, initiatives and lessons learned as an appropriate means to strengthen the effectiveness of national nuclear safety and security regulators. Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response At previous summits, we agreed to enhance global controls on nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities in order to minimize the risk of the malicious use of these materials and facilities. We are implementing those decisions. However, we recognize that we must also enhance as necessary our ability to effectively respond to nuclear and radiological accidents and incidents if they do occur. We welcome the establishment of the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre and will support the IAEA in this work.