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LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks,

Independent Security Consultant


This paper sets forth one American view of the ideal 2015 nuclear security relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation—a vision of partnership. Together with a companion paper written from a Russian perspective,6 it is designed to help frame a discussion of the context for future cooperation in the area of nuclear security. The paper makes no attempt to prescribe specific steps to reach this ideal relationship or to analyze the (considerable) obstacles that must be overcome en route. Instead, it is based on the premise that we must first establish a set of goals before we can determine the path to reach those goals.

U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT DURING THE COLD WAR

Of the many potential areas for cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, nuclear security is particularly attractive to Americans because of the common threat that both countries face. U.S. perceptions of the nuclear threat have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For decades, “nuclear threat” was a synonym for “threat from the Soviet Union.” Soviet forces dominated nuclear planning, and improving stability in a crisis with the Soviet Union was a major motivation for U.S. arms control efforts. Some American specialists also worried about China, but it was generally assumed that dealing with China was a lesser-included case of dealing with the Soviet threat. Analysts occasionally worried about a future Chinese build up, but these concerns played no significant role in U.S. nuclear policy or force structure. While the United States worked diligently (often in cooperation with the Soviet Union) to prevent nuclear proliferation, such proliferation was not seen as an immediate threat to the United States. Nuclear terrorism played a very limited role in U.S. thinking.

6

See the paper by Lev D. Ryabev in this volume.



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LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Independent Security Consultant This paper sets forth one American view of the ideal 2015 nuclear security relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation—a vision of partnership. Together with a companion paper written from a Russian perspective,6 it is designed to help frame a discussion of the context for future cooperation in the area of nuclear security. The paper makes no attempt to prescribe specific steps to reach this ideal relationship or to analyze the (considerable) obstacles that must be overcome en route. Instead, it is based on the premise that we must first establish a set of goals before we can determine the path to reach those goals. U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT DURING THE COLD WAR Of the many potential areas for cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation, nuclear security is particularly attractive to Americans because of the common threat that both countries face. U.S. perceptions of the nuclear threat have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For decades, “nuclear threat” was a synonym for “threat from the Soviet Union.” Soviet forces dominated nuclear planning, and improving stability in a crisis with the Soviet Union was a major motivation for U.S. arms control efforts. Some American specialists also worried about China, but it was generally assumed that dealing with China was a lesser-included case of dealing with the Soviet threat. Analysts occasionally worried about a future Chinese build up, but these concerns played no significant role in U.S. nuclear policy or force structure. While the United States worked diligently (often in cooperation with the Soviet Union) to prevent nuclear proliferation, such proliferation was not seen as an immediate threat to the United States. Nuclear terrorism played a very limited role in U.S. thinking. 6 See the paper by Lev D. Ryabev in this volume. 3

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CURRENT U.S. THREAT PERCEPTIONS In the post Cold-War world, and especially in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. threat perception has been totally reversed. The United States discounts any nuclear threat from Russia, despite the continued existence of a strong Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. Americans see no plausible source of armed conflict between themselves and Russia, and thus perceive no nuclear threat, except, perhaps, from miscalculation. This lack of concern is demonstrated by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review conclusion that the United States no longer needed to plan its nuclear forces as if Russia presented an immediate threat, by the lack of U.S. interest in including traditional crisis stability measures in the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, and by the indifference with which the United States has responded to Russian hints that it might deploy multiple warheads on the Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missiles.7 China remains of concern, at least for some analysts and officials, because of the fear of a potential nuclear confrontation over Taiwan. These analysts fear that China would use its nuclear weapons in non-traditional ways, for example by using high-altitude bursts to generate electro-magnetic pulse as a counter to U.S. naval superiority. The United States has not, however, taken any action in response to this concern. Other analysts fear that China is on the verge of significant modernization that could increase the future nuclear threat to the U.S. homeland. The Nuclear Posture Review call to dissuade potential adversaries from trying to match U.S. capabilities clearly was drafted with China in mind. This policy has not, however, had any practical impact. During the Cold War, nuclear proliferation was seen as a threat to international stability and a possible long-term threat to American security. In the post-Cold War world, proliferation, above all by Iran and North Korea, is seen as a direct, near-term threat to America. In the U.S. system, true policy is reflected not in rhetoric but in the budget. The U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses, narrowly designed to counter ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea (although having an innate capability that concerns China and Russia) is a reflection of the degree to which Americans see nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea as a threat. While diplomacy is America’s preferred method of reducing this threat, defenses—rather than deterrence—is seen as the appropriate course if diplomacy fails. This is not because such states are “undeterrable;” in principle deterrence can operate on any state. But many Americans are concerned that we may not understand the values, motives and decision-making style of the North Korean and Iranian leadership well enough for deterrence to be effective. 7 To read excerpts of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; accessed April 6, 2008. For further information about the Review, see http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_15a.html; accessed April 6, 2008. The text of the 2002 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Treaty of Moscow) is available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm#1; accessed April 6, 2008. Further information on the Treaty is available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_14a.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 4

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THE DOMINANT THREAT: NUCLEAR TERRORISM Since September 11, 2001, however, Americans perceive that the greatest nuclear threat they face is nuclear terrorism. Indeed, some of the concern over North Korea and Iran is because of their potential to facilitate and support such terrorism. Both have been state sponsors of terrorist groups in the past. Americans fear that a nuclear-armed Iran, with its strong anti-Israel bias, might transfer materials or even weapons to a terrorist group for ideological or theological reasons, especially in response to a future conflict involving American support for Israel. North Korea gets much of its revenue from such illicit activities as drug smuggling and counterfeiting. Americans fear that if the price was right, the North Korean leadership might be willing to transfer materials, knowledge or, perhaps, even a complete weapon if they thought they could do so with impunity. The growing American interest in nuclear forensics is, in part, intended to deter such transfers by making it likely that the United States could ascertain the source of material intercepted or used in an attack.8 The American concern with nuclear terrorism is not limited to terrorists supported by a state. Americans believe that if a terrorist organization could acquire sufficient fissile material, especially highly enriched uranium (HEU), it could construct an improvised nuclear device.9 Such a device would be crude, inefficient, and relatively large, but could still easily be transported by a small panel truck and could detonate with devastating physical effect and even more devastating psychological effect. There is solid evidence that Al Qaeda is seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability (although there is no evidence they have done so).10 This concern with terrorists stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon or the material to construct an improvised nuclear device is the major motivation for such efforts as the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism,11 the strong U.S. support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540),12 the large sums spent to assist Russia in improving weapons and material security, the U.S. global efforts to convert research reactors to low-enriched uranium and to repatriate the HEU,13 and for such port and border security efforts as Second Line of Defense, Megaports and the Container Security Initiative.14 Indeed, President 8 See the paper by Michael Kristo in this volume. 9 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defines an improvised nuclear device as “a device, incorporating fissile materials, designed or constructed outside of an official Government agency and which has, appears to have, or is claimed to have the capability to produce a nuclear explosion.” DOE Order 457.1, approved February 7, 2006. For further information, see http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/457/o4571.pdf; accessed May 1, 2008. An improvised nuclear devise using plutonium would be somewhat more difficult but is probably within the capability of at least some terrorist organizations. 10 For further information regarding this issue, see the National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland, available at http://dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html; accessed May 1, 2008. 11 For further information regarding the G8 Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, see http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/gp_stat-en.pdf; accessed on April 6, 2008. See also, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/69124.htm; accessed May 1, 2008. 12 To read the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, see http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement; accessed April 6, 2008. 13 See the paper by Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate in this volume. 14 Some of these programs are treated as non-proliferation efforts under the U.S. budgetary process, but they are more correctly thought of as counter-terrorist efforts. Improving security in Russia, for example, helps guard against 5

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George W. Bush has repeatedly stated that thwarting nuclear terrorism is the highest U.S. national security priority. Americas thus see this area as an especially fruitful one for cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. THE PATH TO PARTNERSHIP For the past 15 years, the United States and Russia have jointly engaged in a number of nuclear threat reduction programs. While they involved extensive cooperation, these programs did not represent a true partnership, since they were almost entirely funded by the United States.15 Now this era of assistance is ending. By the end of 2008, the United States and Russia will have completed all the security improvements at Rosatom and Ministry of Defense nuclear facilities agreed upon at the February 2005 Bratislava summit (see Appendix D).16 By the end of 2010, all Russian plutonium production reactors will have been shut down. G8 Global Partnership activities will end in 2012. The sustainability transition phase of U.S.-funded security improvements will be completed by 2013; thereafter funding for the maintenance of these improvements will be entirely the responsibility of the Russian Federation.17 The conclusion of the period of assistance opens the path to true partnership. For such a partnership to work, the two sides will need to have an equal voice in selecting and managing projects. Each should bear its own share of costs (as was historically true for scientific cooperation between the two countries prior to 1991). This new stage will demonstrate the maturity of the relationship, which will be reflected in a number of ways. Because in our preferred future each country will have confidence in the adequacy of the internal security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials security in the other state, most partnership projects will take place in third countries, as Russia and the United States work together to improve global nuclear security. Eliminating a donor-recipient mentality will allow the best ideas of each country to be given appropriate consideration. While this new approach may result in fewer individual projects, it will also result in a stronger overall relationship. The challenge for the two countries in these waning years of assistance is to give more than rhetorical attention to the partnership concept and to devise the mechanisms for implementation of true partnership. In addition, it will be vital to identify individuals and institutions in each country who can serve as champions of cooperation and stewards of partnership. theft of material that might find its way into terrorist hands but is irrelevant to Russia’s strong non-proliferation record. 15 Russia provided significant contributions in kind in many cases and has always been responsible for operations and implementation. 16 For further information regarding the “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation,” of February 24, 2005, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html; accessed February 23, 2008. See also Appendix D for full text of this Joint Statement. 17 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable materials protection, control, and accounting system be transferred to sole Russian Federation support no later than January 1, 2013. For further information regarding the Bob Stump Act, see http://www.army.mil/armybtkc/docs/PL%20107-314.pdf; accessed May 1, 2008. 6

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THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE IDEAL FUTURE The potential for nuclear proliferation, the danger of nuclear terrorism, and the challenges of the coming renaissance in nuclear energy all combine to make the nuclear security landscape of 2015 a complicated one. As Security Council members, technologically advanced nuclear weapon states, and states with deep involvement in nuclear energy, Russia and the United States are ideally positioned to provide global leadership during this crucial period. Their influence and effectiveness will be far greater to the degree they are able to act in consort. Thus, from an American perspective, the ideal over-arching characteristic of the 2015 nuclear security environment would be global leadership through a strong Russian-American partnership. The components of this ideal nuclear security relationship are described in the remainder of this paper. PREREQUISITES FOR PARTNERSHIP: REDUCING MISUNDERSTANDING In the ideal relationship of 2015, the two sides understand each other’s perceptions of nuclear threats (although they may not completely agree with each other’s threat perceptions), including the degree to which each feels threatened by the actions of the other. They have reached agreement on measures to prevent misunderstanding. These include provisions for U.S. notification of the operational launch of conventionally-armed Trident missiles far enough in advance of launch to avoid any confusion in the Russian warning system, improved sharing of ballistic missile warning information through the Joint Data Exchange Center, and some mechanism to integrate (or at least accommodate) the U.S. ballistic missile defense system now being deployed in Europe. Because of extensive dialogue, between today and 2015, Russia and the United States view each others’ strategic forces with reduced concern. The two countries have agreed to replace both the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Treaty of Moscow with a formal mechanism for ensuring transparency and predictability of both strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces. This mechanism has been designed to meet the political and security concerns of both sides. The two countries maintain rough parity in their nuclear forces and continue to work together to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Because of these elements of predictability and parity, neither side is concerned with asymmetries in internal force composition, leaving each free to shape its forces as it sees fit. While in 2015 the two sides do not completely share a common nuclear threat perception, extensive discussions have brought their views closer to one another on both the threats from states such as Iran and North Korea, and the existence of other potential proliferator states. In addition, working through such mechanisms as the U.S.-Russian Counter Terrorism working group, the two sides have deepened their mutual understanding of the risk of nuclear terrorism and the threat from improvised nuclear devices. 7

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LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP IN NON-PROLIFERATION In this ideal future, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains in effect in its current form.18 The United States and Russia have a common view of the importance of its implementation including the necessity for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol19 and to the requirements of UNSCR 1540. While preserving the concept of sovereignty in treaty-making, the two sides have taken the lead within the international community to make it difficult for a state to withdraw from the NPT and to preclude states from retaining the benefits they have received from nuclear cooperation under Article IV should they withdraw. The two countries also actively develop innovative approaches toward countries not party to the NPT in order to limit proliferation and to move non-parties toward the implementation of NPT norms. All plutonium and spent fuel in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been removed to Russia for reprocessing, with the cost burden borne equitably by all states whose security is enhanced by a nuclear-weapons free DPRK. The United States and Russia have worked jointly to play a leading role in verification of the elimination of the existing North Korean weapons program. Iran has abandoned its plans for nuclear weapons due to consistent international pressure under joint U.S.–Russian leadership. Iran has implemented the Additional Protocol and developed commercial nuclear power under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards using a fuel leasing approach with fuel supplied by Russia and spent fuel returned to Russia. The United States and Russia have improved their diplomatic coordination and normally take coordinated, coherent and effective positions in international fora designed to inhibit proliferation. They consistently work together to strengthen export control mechanisms and other elements of the international regime to counter proliferation and nuclear terrorism. They have cooperated to ensure negotiation and implementation of an effective Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with widespread (ideally universal) application.20 In 2015, the United States and Russia jointly take the lead to strengthen adherence to treaty commitments and international norms relating to nuclear security. Where states fail to comply with international non-proliferation and counter-terrorism regimes, the United States and Russia work jointly in the Security Council and elsewhere, to ensure adequate sanctions. They cooperate closely within the Proliferation Security Initiative and look for other innovative approaches to counter proliferation.21 In this ideal future, the United States and Russia both agree that the political conditions to permit the complete abolition of nuclear weapons are unlikely to exist for the immediate future. They also recognize that the technical ability to verify such abolition does not now exist, although scientists in both countries continue to work both independently and together to 18 To read the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 19 For further information regarding the Additional Protocol, see http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 20 For further information regarding the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/index.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 21 For further information regarding the Proliferation Security Initiative, see http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/; accessed May 1, 2008. 8

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improve verification techniques. The two countries (and, if possible, the other NPT nuclear weapons states) have cooperated in disseminating honest analyses that demonstrate these facts. This openness, coupled with continued reductions in the total arsenals of Russia and the United States, and increased transparency concerning the size and composition of those arsenals, has significantly mitigated (although not eliminated) the pressure from non-nuclear weapons states for the nuclear weapons states to take additional action in response to Article VI of the NPT. LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP IN NUCLEAR ENERGY The world of 2015 is undergoing a renaissance in nuclear power generation. This renaissance is driven in part by the recognition that nuclear energy is indispensable if the world is to meet its growing energy requirements without the unacceptable contributions to global climate change resulting from increased fossil fuel emissions. To ensure that this renaissance does not create proliferation problems, the United States and Russia support a common vision of discouraging the spread of sensitive technology associated with the fuel cycle based on a harmonization of the current U.S., Russian, and IAEA proposals. This common vision does not enhance a sense of discrimination among the non-nuclear weapons states because it does not ask them to abandon their legal rights. Instead, it offers incentives that make it financially, technically and politically attractive for states to take advantage of fuel supply and take-back services offered by several states in commercial competition with one another. The two countries complement this effort by working together to create an international nuclear waste management regime. Both countries recognize that a nuclear reactor accident anywhere in the world will bring this renaissance to a halt. Because they understand that a strong regulatory regime is a prerequisite for nuclear reactor safety, they work together to assist new reactor states in establishing such regimes. They also work with existing channels such as the IAEA, the World Nuclear Association, and the World Association of Nuclear Operators to help share nuclear safety best practices throughout the world, giving special attention to states with limited experience in operating reactors. LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM In 2015, both the United States and Russia have confidence that the nuclear weapons and materials in the other country are secure against theft from either terrorist attack or insider diversion. They routinely exchange best practices concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear material security and have found a mechanism to share information on security that builds confidence while not revealing specific information that would cause either state concern. Both countries make the consistent investments needed to ensure long-term maintenance of weapons and material security. Through appropriate and well designed transparency measures, they demonstrate to the international community that their weapons remain safe and secure, thus providing leadership by example to other nuclear weapon possessing states. 9

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The United States and Russia actively engage other states to encourage them to ensure that the security of nuclear materials and, where appropriate, nuclear weapons in these countries match the strong security in Russia and the United States. As part of this effort they work together to offer technical security improvements and the sharing of best practices to all states, working through the IAEA where feasible. They also work together to assist states in the effective implementation of both UNSCR 1540 and the Additional Protocol. As part of this effort, the United States and Russia have worked—and continue to work— to eliminate the non-military use of highly enriched uranium, especially in research reactors, to complete the return all U.S.- and Russian- origin HEU from research reactors in third countries, and to eliminate stocks of such material in all non-nuclear weapons states. To set an example for the world, Russia and the United States convert all of their own research rectors to use only low- enriched uranium. As one element in their broad technical collaboration on security, Russia and the United States take the lead in creating an international system of nuclear attribution based on a technical nuclear forensics capability. While recognizing the practical limits of nuclear forensics, they expect this system to help identify the origin of nuclear material seized from smugglers or terrorists as well as the origin of any device actually detonated. Both Russia and the United States make it clear that if a state assists terrorists in obtaining a nuclear weapon or the materials to construct an improvised nuclear device and terrorists subsequently detonate such a device, both the United States and Russia will have a high probability of knowing where the material originated. Both states make it clear that terrorist use of nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices anywhere in the world will inspire universal condemnation. They also each make it clear that they will regard nuclear terrorism within their respective states as justifying a response against the supplier of the weapon or material in accordance with the inherent right of self- defense cited in Article 51 of the United Nations charter. This nuclear forensics and attribution effort is part of a continuing effort in organizing and leading the global community under the auspices of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This joint U.S.-Russian initiative, involving 53 states as of the fall of 2007, has continued to grow and by 2015 is a leading vehicle for preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism. SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF PARTNERSHIP In 2015, the United States and Russia have expanded and deepened their science and technology coordination in order to provide new technical tools for counter-terrorism, for verification of reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, for safeguards, for improving detection of nuclear weapons and materials, for materials protection, control and accounting, for reactor technology (including safety), and for spent fuel management. In the last two areas, they have built on the plan for nuclear energy cooperation they established jointly in 2006.22 They work together to make these new tools available to other states and urge their 22 Report of the U.S.–Russian Civil Nuclear Working Group: A Bilateral Action Plan to Enhance Global and Bilateral Energy Cooperation, transmitted by the U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and Rosatom Director Sergei Kirienko to their respective Presidents December 15, 2006. 10

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widespread adoption. By doing so, the two countries seek to create an international strategy of continuous improvement in nuclear safety and security. The expanded scientific cooperation in support of nuclear security is part of a broad overall program of scientific cooperation, built around strong relationships between the various U.S. and Russian national laboratories. Russia and the United States both recognize the scientific benefits available from more extensive collaboration. As a result, while carefully protecting access to national security information, they have worked to expand overall scientific and technical cooperation, including joint projects and exchanges of personnel. Both countries are committed to facilitating these scientific exchanges through the timely review and issuance of visas. They have explored the potential of a special visa regime for key scientists whose expertise may be needed in the event of a nuclear crisis. POSSIBLE INHIBITIONS TO COOPERATION Relations in the area of nuclear security will inevitably reflect the overall political relationship between the two states. Both Russia and the United States have consistently expressed a desire for close, collegial working relations based on partnership and mutual respect. Both seek to maintain and deepen their ties. Leaders of both Russia and the United States have repeatedly stated that if their two countries are not yet allies, both are determined to avoid once again becoming adversaries. Yet it would be unrealistic to ignore the probability that significant political strains will remain in 2015. While both countries will work to reduce current tensions, they may not be completely successful. While political conditions could improve, they may remain the same or even deteriorate. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that in 2015 the United States will be concerned, as it is today, with an apparent Russian drift toward authoritarianism and away from pluralism. If so, Russia will regard, as it does today, U.S. pressure as an inappropriate interference in Russian internal affairs based on a failure to appreciate the special character of the Russian political system and the difficulties of Russia’s post-Soviet transition. Similarly, in 2015, Americans will continue to regard the continuation and expansion of NATO as a way to draw all European states into a 21st century international regime and will assert that Russia should not find this threatening. Russians will continue to ask who such a military alliance is aimed at and will have difficulty accepting that many European states formerly allied with (or part of) the Soviet Union seek military ties to the United States and links to its extended nuclear deterrent because they fear a future return of an expansionist Russia. Americans will continue to seek ballistic missile defenses aimed at Iran and North Korea, while Russians will fear such defenses could (and may be intended to) weaken the Russian nuclear deterrent. In 2015, Americans will continue to look askance at periodic apparent Russian nostalgia for a Soviet-era past that Americans see as marked by despotism and aggression. Russians will continue to recall the international respect they gained as one of the two superpowers more clearly than they recall the accompanying problems of that bygone era. And no amount of desire for partnership can alter the fact that two major powers with global interests will sometimes find that their national interests are in conflict. Sound analysis and wise policy demand that the two sides not ignore these enduring tensions. Nor should they fail to recognize that political developments within Russia might 11

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make cooperation more difficult in the coming decade. But it would be a serious error of both analysis and policy to believe that either internal political developments or the existence of such tensions precludes strengthened cooperation in the area of nuclear security. Even at the height of the Cold War, when military planners on both sides thought that nuclear war was a real possibility, the United States and the then-Soviet Union cooperated to help create the international non-proliferation regime that, despite the challenges it faces today, has served humanity well. The challenge for today’s policy makers and analysts is to find those areas where cooperation is possible and build on them to strengthen the overall relationship. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES-RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES EFFORT AS A STEP TOWARD PARTNERSHIP Finding areas where cooperation is possible is a major purpose of the current project. There have been many studies, articles, and papers calling for improved cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Most of their recommendations have not been implemented. Thus, the task facing us is not to generate bold new ideas for cooperation, but rather to focus on two types of ideas. The first are those where the conditions for implementation (including political acceptability) exist now. These ideas should be seized upon and implemented to help create the future world of partnership, even if the specific ideas are relatively modest. In building a true partnership over the next several years, it will be far better to succeed in small areas than to fail in big ones. The second important set of ideas is that which are crucial to a true partnership but where the time is not yet ripe for implementation, whether for political or technical reasons. Here the task will be to identify the obstacles and assess whether they can be removed and if so, how. This aspect of building a true partnership will be time-consuming and, often, frustrating, but the long term benefits to security and stability of a world in which Russia and the United States exercise global leadership in nuclear security through a truly equal partnership will be worth the effort. CONCLUSION The vision set forth in this paper is demanding. It will almost certainly be impossible to reach all of the goals set forth above by 2015 or by any fixed date. That is the nature of visions. Further, much will depend on factors outside the control of the nuclear community in either Russia or the United States. Mutual suspicion, political issues, and commercial conflicts could impede progress. There will doubtless be setbacks and difficulties. But no single item described in this paper is impossible. The closer the two states and the two nuclear communities can come to this vision, the greater will be the security of both the United States and the Russian Federation and the greater will be the stability of the global nuclear regime. 12