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MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING: LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015

Dori Ellis, Byron Gardner, M. Teresa Olascoaga,

Sandia National Laboratories56

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990’s the United States began working with the Russian Federation and Newly Independent States to increase security and accounting of nuclear materials. This cooperation was initially part of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and was funded by the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.57 This legislation is now commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar Act. The goals of this program were to secure and eliminate nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and prevent proliferation of other potential weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union. This effort was implemented in 1992 as the Government-to-Government Program, administered by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a separate cooperative effort between the U.S. national laboratories and corresponding Russian institutes; this program was called Laboratory-to-Laboratory (Lab-to-Lab). In 1996, DOE took over funding responsibilities for these programs. Finally, in February 1997, DOE combined the two programs into the Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program.58

The MPC&A program is now administered by the DOE National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). The goal of the MPC&A program is to provide defense against nuclear

56

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under contract DE-A-AC04-AL85000.

57

For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008.

58

For further information regarding this program, see Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Russia: Lab-to-Lab Program,” April 13, 2001, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/labtolab.htm; NTI, “Russia: Government-to-Government Program,” April 13 2001, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/govtogov.htm; and, NTI, “Russia: DOE MPC&A Program,” February 1, 2005, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/mpca.htm. All cites accessed May 1, 2008.



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MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING: LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 Dori Ellis, Byron Gardner, M. Teresa Olascoaga, Sandia National Laboratories56 INTRODUCTION In the early 1990’s the United States began working with the Russian Federation and Newly Independent States to increase security and accounting of nuclear materials. This cooperation was initially part of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and was funded by the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.57 This legislation is now commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar Act. The goals of this program were to secure and eliminate nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and prevent proliferation of other potential weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union. This effort was implemented in 1992 as the Government-to- Government Program, administered by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. In 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a separate cooperative effort between the U.S. national laboratories and corresponding Russian institutes; this program was called Laboratory-to- Laboratory (Lab-to-Lab). In 1996, DOE took over funding responsibilities for these programs. Finally, in February 1997, DOE combined the two programs into the Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program.58 The MPC&A program is now administered by the DOE National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). The goal of the MPC&A program is to provide defense against nuclear 56 Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under contract DE-A-AC04- AL85000. 57 For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008. 58 For further information regarding this program, see Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Russia: Lab-to-Lab Program,” April 13, 2001, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/labtolab.htm; NTI, “Russia: Government-to-Government Program,” April 13 2001, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/govtogov.htm; and, NTI, “Russia: DOE MPC&A Program,” February 1, 2005, available at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/mpca.htm. All cites accessed May 1, 2008. 37

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proliferation and nuclear terrorism. To comprehensively address the scope of the problem, the program established three primary focus areas: Secure, Reduce, and Sustain. • Secure: Install physical security and accountancy upgrades appropriate for the level of material attractiveness and the threat of theft • Reduce: Consolidate material into fewer buildings at fewer sites, and convert excess highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium to reduce the number of theft targets and costs • Sustain: Encourage the development of Russian capabilities and commitments to operate and maintain these security improvements The MPC&A program has teamed with two primary entities in Russia to achieve significant risk reduction for special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons in Russia. These two entities are the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), which was formerly the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The national security of both the United States and Russia has been enhanced by this cooperation. The majority of security upgrades under the MPC&A program are to be completed by the end of calendar year 2008. Maintenance and sustainability assistance for these upgrades will be phased out gradually until 2013.59 As U.S. monetary assistance for the MPC&A program gradually phases out, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia in the nuclear security arena should move from one of assistance to equal partnership and joint leadership on the nuclear safety and security global stage. The objective for this new partnership should be to enable expansion of nuclear energy while enhancing nuclear safety and security worldwide. The lessons learned in the MPC&A program can be of significant value in shaping this future partnership. SCOPE This paper covers the relevant lessons learned from the MPC&A program that can be used in the formation of a new globally strategic nuclear safety and security partnership between the U.S. and Russia. The paper also covers the nature and goals of this partnership, and a process for facilitating the transition from assistance to a full partnership. RELATIONSHIP CHANGES FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP The Bratislava accords and the NNSA/Rosatom Joint Action Plan call for virtually all MPC&A upgrades to be finished by the end of calendar year 2008.60 Additionally, the Bob 59 For further information, see DOE, “FY2007 Congressional Budget Request,” February 2006, available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NSSA.pdf. 60 For further information regarding the “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation,” of February 24, 2005, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html; accessed February 23, 2008. See also Appendix D for full text of this Joint Statement. 38

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Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that the Secretary of Energy develop a sustainable MPC&A program that will be supported solely by Russia no later than January 1, 2013.61 At this date, all NNSA funds for these activities will stop and Russia will assume full financial responsibility. Projects that are already finished are currently in an evolving maintenance and sustainability phase that includes seven key fundamentals: 1. Site MPC&A Organization 2. Site Operating Procedures (Instructions) 3. Human Resource Management and Site Training 4. Operational Cost Analysis 5. Equipment Maintenance, Repair, and Calibration 6. Performance Testing and Operational Monitoring 7. MPC&A System Configuration Management This end date for U.S. financial assistance is being treated very seriously by both sides. Both also recognize the benefit of some form of continuing cooperation that builds on the joint technical and project management expertise, team work, and relationships that have grown during the program. This joint experience could be of significant value to the national security of both nations and the promulgation of better nuclear safety and security worldwide. The United States and Russia have stated that although the number of contacts in the MPC&A arena will inevitably shrink, there needs to be a sanctioned mechanism for continued cooperation. IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED: KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER AS A HISTORICAL EXAMPLE In November 2000, the Russian MOD requested U.S. assistance to establish regional support centers. The Kola Training and Technical Center (KTTC) was designed and constructed to institutionalize a technical support infrastructure that includes training, maintenance and testing, lifecycle support, and spare parts inventory. This facility is unique in that it was designed and constructed based entirely upon the needs of the upgraded sites in the Kola region, located in the far north of Russia.62 The KTTC supports the overall MPC&A strategic goal of assisting Russia in enhancing capabilities and commitments to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security. More specifically it supports the strategic objectives of fostering the development of regulatory institutions, regulations, procedures, and training centers, and determining the level of sustainability assistance required to transition full operations and maintenance of MPC&A 61 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable materials protection, control, and accounting system be transferred to sole Russian Federation support no later than January 1, 2013. For further information regarding the Bob Stump Act, see http://www.army.mil/armybtkc/docs/PL%20107-314.pdf; accessed May 1, 2008. 62 For further information, see L.D. Lambert, W.J. Toth, S. Hendrickson, “Russian Federation Regional Technical Centers for MPC&A Sustainability Operations,” Forty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ, July 13-17, 2003. 39

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equipment. To meet these objectives, the KTTC provides training for key personnel at Russian sites.63 Physically establishing a location for the KTTC began by developing a conceptual design that documented Russian MOD-identified needs to support MPC&A system upgrades at their sites. Based on the conceptual design and documentation identifying Russian contributions to the project, a preliminary design for the facility was jointly developed to meet documented needs of the Russian MOD in the Kola region. The initial design activity involved describing and analyzing current or past practices to determine the areas in which they were adequate and areas in which additional processes were necessary. Proposed assets were evaluated against specific criteria (i.e., number of people to be trained) to determine their cost-effectiveness. Actual construction activities and equipment provisions were based on the final design of the facility. Construction of the KTTC facility commenced in March 2003 and was completed June 2005. The KTTC facility includes a training/administration building, emergency generator housing, a maintenance workshop building, and a power substation. The KTTC training program includes the development and implementation of courses for maintenance, operations, and management that are directly related to MPC&A systems installed within the Kola region. Course design and development follows the Instructional System Design for training development. The KTTC training team has adopted a “train the trainer” approach; such an approach provides for the long-term sustainability of a training system by developing a standardized course curriculum and a cadre of qualified instructors. A Russian MOD-led Training Advisory Committee was established with the responsibility of conducting quality training evaluations, reviewing the Quality Evaluation Guidelines, defining additional training needs, developing training standards, prioritizing training activities, coordinating work with other MPC&A training programs, and assisting in the development of training plans for specific sites. Equipment maintenance and testing is another primary activity associated with the KTTC conduct of operations. Maintenance tasks for items on the master equipment list focus on the areas of preventative maintenance, routine and corrective maintenance, a spare parts stock and maintenance plan, and maintenance tool acquisition and calibration. Performance testing methodology and planning is vital to the long-term sustainability of all MPC&A systems, such as physical protection, material control and accounting, and response forces. A centralized approach will also be used for testing, including integrated system acceptance testing, functionality testing, operability testing, and limited and broad scope performance testing.64 Computerized maintenance management tools for analyzing data acquired during routine operation or testing of MPC&A systems will be integrated into the KTTC internal infrastructure to provide continuous improvement and feedback. The KTTC has been equipped with the technical and maintenance equipment used at the sites the center supports and on which training will be conducted. This training will involve both the appropriate use and care of the equipment as well as how to maintain the equipment. Mobile maintenance vehicles were purchased for use by the KTTC and a garage is simultaneously being 63 For further information, see N.N. Nelson, P. O’Shell, S. Hendrickson, V. Sukhoruchkin, S. Antipov, E. Melkhov, N. Ponomarev-Steponi, N. Yurasov, “Cooperative MPC&A Enhancements at Russian Navy Sites,” Forty-second Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Indian Wells, CA, July 15–19, 2001. 64 For further information, see C. Harmon, L. D. Lambert, A. Khoudykin, and S. Matonin, “Fundamental Activities in Sustainability Development and Operations,” Forty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, AZ, July 2005. 40

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constructed to accommodate these vehicles. Equipment needed for replacement and continued functionality of MPC&A systems will be distributed to the sites through the KTTC. The Russian MOD and NNSA developed a strategy for transition and U.S. exit. Implementation of the KTTC training curricula and equipment testing and maintenance functions are being phased to ensure availability of core functions at the time of expansion to full functionality during the transition period. The KTTC will eventually assume full responsibility for sustainability of those sites within the Kola Region.65 A detailed transition plan was jointly developed. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED In reviewing the success of the KTTC project, one can identify several lessons learned that could be applied to similar projects.66 Training is best institutionalized by involving qualified training developers from the beginning. Developing indigenous training capabilities enables the long-term goal of sustainability. In the U.S.-Russian MPC&A program, involving qualified Russian developers from the beginning ensured that both the technical requirements were met and the end product was a lesson plan that could be certified by the Russian authorities. Train the operational staff to increase the level of on-site field maintenance, especially for remote sites. Almost all technical knowledge about the more sophisticated systems installed through technical assistance programs is held by Russian vendors. Site electricians and other craft personnel are not generally prepared to perform many routine maintenance functions, and are especially not capable of performing any technical equipment repairs. That technical knowledge can be shared with the proper facility personnel through training development efforts, but those activities take some time to accomplish. Match the technology used to indigenous capability to maintain it. During the design process, it is important to consider the indigenous technology capabilities in order to avoid inadvertently introducing technology that cannot be maintained or sustained. Match the project to the needs. The design process for the KTTC building began with function and training needs assessments to identify an appropriate scope and size of the facility. Data points on the curriculum to be taught, the throughput of trainees, and the number of instructors required to conduct the training were analyzed using standard DOE methodologies to calculate space and training equipment requirements, thus defining the size of the building actually needed. Efficiencies of scale related to training and spare equipment provision can be realized through the use of regional centers with a “depot” level focus. Having a smaller number of instructors at a regional center rather than duplicating instructors at individual sites allows for better utilization of Russian human resources. Less spare equipment needs to be 65 For further information, see C. Harmon, N. Peterson, L. D. Lambert, M. Elliott, W. J. Toth, S. Hendrickson, A. Khoudykin, “Challenges to Sustaining Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Systems in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense,” Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, FL, July 2004. 66 For further information, see M. O’Brien and D. Lambert, “Kola Technical Center Lessons Learned White Paper,” October 15, 2007. 41

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purchased when management of the maintenance and replacement effort is concentrated at a regional level where a “bigger picture” perspective is possible. Russian institutes are interested in western methodologies for gathering and analyzing data on the installed technical systems. Their interest is high, primarily because they need to know how to determine failure rates, replacement life-cycles, and other attributes for themselves without relying totally on vendors. Organizational Lessons Learned from the MPC&A Program In addition to the specific lessons learned in MPC&A, there are more general lessons that can be applied to facilitate the cooperative efforts on a broader scale. Commitment at the highest levels within each of the partner organizations and governments has a significant benefit. One of the most important lessons learned has been the positive benefit of having extremely high-level commitment for the program. The program has made the most progress when high-level commitment has been codified into joint action plans. For example, the program significantly accelerated with the Bratislava Initiatives (see Appendix D). These initiatives defined the entire scope of remaining MPC&A assistance and established the goal of 100 percent completion by the end of calendar year 2008. Presidential direction (Presidents Vladimir V. Putin and George W. Bush) strongly contributed to rallying action; this direction substantially accelerated the placement of remaining contracts, the pace of upgrades implementation, and the amount of training underway to operate the soon-to-be-completed security upgrades. Engagement between the laboratories also needs to start at the Laboratory Directors’ level to assure that resources and processes meet the needs of the cooperative efforts. Strong relationships contribute to success, so it is important to minimize changeover in personnel. The MPC&A program has achieved the most success when key individuals are in positions long enough to develop productive working relationships based on joint goals and trust. This joint trust allows for cooperation to proceed at a progressively faster and bureaucratically easier pace. Where there is trust, there has been action, creative problem solving, and results. Outside-of-the-box thinking allowed by trusting and open relationships yielded some of the most creative solutions to bureaucratic obstacles, which produced tangible results. For example, the U.S.-Russian disagreements over on-site inspections delayed the upgrades to a number of weapons storage sites. The impasse was resolved when two long-time participants in the program worked with their respective governments to establish a system of “assurances” rather than intrusive monitoring. Relationship stability also led to the development of agreements and procedures that allowed for the continuation of the program in spite of necessary personnel changes, and minimized the impact of those changes. Occasionally, the MPC&A program experienced slowdowns as key individuals changed at the governmental, institute, and national laboratory levels. Focus on the most important projects/problems for the maturity level of the collaboration. MPC&A cooperation was most efficient when the cooperation focused on the highest priority problems, such as highly attractive nuclear materials. In part, projects addressing the highest risk materials received more funds sooner. However, the faster pace was also a result of the clarity of the mission. When both sides were in perfect agreement on the goals and urgency for a particular objective, contracts were more easily placed, projects were completed in little time, access issues were resolved, and maintenance and sustainability and training issues were solved. Note, however, that the objectives of the program evolved over time. In the early 42

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stages of a partnership, building trust and relationships are important; as a result, it may be better to start with lower risk objectives. Establish a clear legal framework for the cooperation. MPC&A cooperation was sanctioned under the “Agreement Between the United States and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation,” of June 17, 1992. This is known as the “Umbrella Agreement.” The Russian MOD and Rosatom and the DOD and DOE each negotiated implementing agreements under this umbrella agreement. Key provisions with respect to liability, access to sensitive facilities, access lists, and protection of sensitive information were not adequately defined in the umbrella agreement or in individual implementing agreements. This resulted in periods where the cooperation was significantly handicapped because neither side was getting the assurances needed to allow work to proceed. Although work proceeded under the authority of the chairman of the DOE/MOD Joint Coordinating Group (JCG) and the DOE/Rosatom Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) both sides were at some risk because of the lack of formalized expectations and procedures. This period, which lasted several years, was heavily relationship-driven. The pace of cooperation and results significantly accelerated when the Administrative Arrangements and Access procedures were signed in early 2000. Insulate the program from political issues to the extent possible. Since the start of U.S.-Russian cooperation in 1992, the projects have been relatively insulated from impacts of non-MPC&A U.S.-Russian political issues. This allowed the completion of important projects in spite of issues that occasionally caused great tension between the United States and Russia. It is believed this phenomenon existed because both sides realized the importance of the cooperation and took actions to reduce the impact of tensions. Without this insulation, the cooperation would not be at the evolved state that has been achieved with the end in sight. Establish efficient organizational structures and delegate programmatic decision- making authority as low as possible. MPC&A achieved the most fruitful cooperation when the chairmen of the various implementing committees (JCG and JCC) had full authority to set the direction of the program. With programmatic directional authority residing at the chairman level, decisions could be made rapidly to enable the required pace of cooperation. Prior to the creation of these committees under the implementing agreements, decisions on both sides took more time. This periodically resulted in program delays or slowdowns. Inevitably, some high- level decisions were required at the Minister, Secretary, and/or Interagency levels. However, the decentralized decision-making authority residing at the chairman level was extremely beneficial to MPC&A program implementation. Authority at this level allowed inclusion of necessary expertise from Russian contractors and institutes and from U.S. national laboratories and contractors, as needed. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS FOR A NEW MODEL The joint experience gained in the MPC&A program could be leveraged to support a new model of joint partnership based on fundamental, mutually agreed-upon goals and objectives. The partnership should expand beyond a United States-Russian-centric approach and undertake a broader, global engagement with both sides contributing personnel, expertise, technology, and resources. Possible global goals and objectives to build from could include: 43

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• global leadership in nuclear safety and security (Russia and the United States using their collective expertise to push for more effective nuclear safety and security standards) • enhanced sustainable worldwide security of global nuclear material stockpiles, including material consolidation, inventory reduction to necessary levels, and robust material controls • commitment to safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant growth of nuclear energy • investment in science and technology development • measures to combat terrorism, including security of radioactive sources Furthermore, this new model should be based on a joint needs assessment that focuses on what each side really wants from the relationship and what each side is willing to commit to the relationship. This carefully constructed assessment should be based on active listening and understanding what each side needs, wants and can commit. The new partnership could include governmental representatives, national laboratory/institute representatives, and selected non-governmental organizations from both countries, such as representatives from Rosatom, DOE, Russian MOD, DOD, Eleron, U.S. national laboratories, etc. However, it is extremely important that the new relationship be sanctioned by an appropriate agreement. Potential areas of cooperation for the new partnership include the following: • joint implementation of projects based on high-security experience and technical expertise (such as expedited denuclearization of a clandestine nuclear program) • joint technology development projects (sensors, assessment, access delay, simulation and modeling, measurement methods, safety systems, etc.) • joint technology performance testing projects (tests of systems against capabilities of evolving threats, including cyber and other highly technical attack methods) • observation and evaluation of large-scale safety and security exercises • joint training and technical exchanges, both bilateral (Russia-U.S.) and trilateral (Russia-U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency) • hyper awareness of threat changes (sharing of information on adversary capabilities, tactics, and targets) METHODS TO IMPLEMENT NEW RELATIONSHIPS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES This new Global Nuclear Partnership between the U.S. and Russia needs to be established while the relationships developed under the MPC&A still exist. The relationships that form the foundation for such a partnership can take years to develop. Work should begin now to establish this partnership because of its potential importance. As the amount of U.S.- funded cooperation begins to diminish, the amount of personal contact between the two sides will start to erode, making it imperative that concrete steps be taken now. The following recommendations layout the roadmap for this future partnership: 44

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• Establish a Framework Agreement for the Elements of the Partnership, as appropriate—This agreement could be modeled on the umbrella agreement or one of the implementing agreements. There also may be another set of U.S.-Russian agreements this new partnership could leverage. Historically, new agreements can take up to two years to codify, even with high-level support from both sides. In any case, the pursuit of a framework agreement needs to begin now. Recommendations for this transition should be made at high levels within the respective U.S. and Russian government agencies. Additionally, requests for creation of the partnership should be made in the joint protocols of the JCC and JCG meetings in 2008. A key issue to be addressed in a framework agreement is sharing of sensitive information. • Create Charter, Organizational Structure, and Project Implementation Plan for activities under the New Partnership—This work should be based on results of a joint needs assessment that attempts to clearly define what each side wants from the partnership and what each is willing to invest in it. The documents should clearly state which organizations are involved and which organization on each side is the lead agency responsible for direction of the partnership. Schedules and milestones must be clearly stated to provide a method to measure success. • Address Visa Issues—There has been an inequity in processing visas for entry into the United States for Russian citizens. U.S. visas for Russian citizens take much longer than Russian visas for U.S. citizens, which has caused cancellations and delays that interfere with cooperation. The United States should consider expedited visa processing for Russian personnel involved in the new partnership to ensure this does not happen. • Identify Funding Sources and Scope—The funding requirements for the partnership need to be identified early and budget requests made as soon as possible to ensure partnership activities can begin at the pilot project level. Because pilot projects have been the best sounding board for new modes of cooperation, this concept should be used as the catalyst to refine how the new partnership will operate. For example, follow-on MPC&A activities could be used as a pilot to begin to establish the relationship. Initially, funding needs to cover only a few projects to kick off the new partnership. • Jointly Develop and Select a Number of Pilot Projects—The first steps in establishing this new way of cooperating will lay the foundation for the longer-term cooperation. Therefore, the scope of the first projects needs to be relatively small but should address critically important topics. The pilots should also be chosen to exercise the full range of logistical, bureaucratic, and security hurdles so future projects can proceed without obstacles. Pilots could be selected to address potentially sensitive and previously difficult topics, but probably should not require any access to sensitive facilities in either country. Teams working on the pilot projects need to be relatively small to ensure agile response and clear delegation of responsibilities. This will also reduce security concerns on both sides. Topics for the pilot projects could include the following: o Joint technical exchanges with other weapons states hosted by the United States and Russia on nuclear weapons safety and security. This technical 45

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exchange would discuss safety, non-sensitive protection methods, and means for analysis and performance testing of these systems. The goal of this exchange is to encourage all states with nuclear weapons to ensure adequate safety and protection, and to increase awareness of the risks facing their materials. The United States and Russia have extensive experience that could be beneficial to other weapons states. This pilot fits the goals of the United States and Russia providing worldwide leadership and stewardship of nuclear stockpiles. o Small joint implementation project to secure nuclear material in a third country. This pilot would use the expertise gained during the MPC&A program in a team effort to secure material at risk in a third country. Russia and the United States would work together to secure the materials at an ultra-rapid pace. This pilot could serve as the model for many such projects and would further the U.S.- Russian leadership role in global nuclear security. o Joint program to support global implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Convention on the Physical Protection on Nuclear Material (CPPNM).67 In this pilot, the United States and Russia could collaborate in the development of assistance programs to support other States’ in the implementation of domestic controls, export control regimes, and international cooperation in support of Resolution 1540 (that “all States shall act to prevent proliferation of mass destruction weapons”) and the amendment to the CPPNM. This pilot would further U.S. and Russian leadership in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and appropriately securing materials and assets. Because the amended CPPNM has expanded jurisdiction from international transport of nuclear materials to include nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport, an example activity would be to assist other IAEA Member States in implementing a physical protection regime based on the fundamental principles contained in the amended CPPNM. o Civilian nuclear energy cooperation. Signature of the U.S.-Russian 123 Agreement68 would establish a framework agreement to enable cooperation on civilian nuclear energy. Collaborative pilot projects in civilian nuclear energy cooperation could include advanced safeguards; nuclear waste storage and disposition; nuclear energy safety; and analysis and development of proliferation resistant processes, technology, and fuel cycles. Such pilots would further U.S. and Russian leadership in the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy. 67 To read the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, see http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement; accessed April 6, 2008. See also Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which entered into force on February 8, 1987. The text and amendments are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html; accessed May 1, 2008. 68 The 123 Agreement refers to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires a bilateral agreement between the United States and any country wishing to receive U.S. exports of technology and equipment related to civilian nuclear energy. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/ml022200075-vol1.pdf; accessed April 8, 2008. The 123 Agreement was signed May 6, 2008, in Moscow and submitted for ratification. For further information, see Vestnik Atomproma, N. 5, May 2008. See also the papers by Orde F. Kittrie and Alexander Pikaev in this volume and Appendix E for the text of the U.S.-Russian 123 Agreement. 46

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Similar projects could easily fall within the scope of the new partnership. The important element is that they address issues that are both U.S.-Russian-centric as well as those more global. Success in these pilots can solidify the new partnership—financially and politically. The pilot phase for the new partnership should end no later than 2013. The partnership should be fully functioning by 2014 to ensure meaningful progress through 2015 and beyond. CONCLUSION The time is right for the formation of a new U.S.-Russian partnership focused on global nuclear safety and security. U.S. assistance programs are winding down and projects are transitioning into the maintenance and sustainability phase. All U.S. financial assistance is expected to end by 2013. In order to capitalize on the joint cooperative experience and expertise gained in the MPC&A program, a plan for a new partnership needs to be undertaken soon. The goals for this new partnership should include the following: • worldwide nuclear safety and security leadership • commitment to the safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant growth of nuclear energy • measures to combat terrorism, including the security of radioactive sources • science and technology collaboration to enable joint goals Specific programs under this new partnership need a solid legal framework, high-level commitment, identification of funding and personnel resources, solid project management, and initial pilot projects to be successful. Starting the process today will ensure a strong, fully implemented global nuclear security partnership between Russia and the United States in 2015 and beyond. 47

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