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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES Academician Ashot A. Sarkisov, Russian Academy of Sciences Presently, mankind is facing a whole host of complex issues stemming from the revolution in science and technology that began in the second half of the 20th century. These issues have been brought to the fore even more by the gradual globalization of political, economic, and social processes in the world. To resolve these issues, the entire international community needs to make consolidated efforts. Some of these issues revolve around the need to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat international terrorism, eliminate the legacy of the Cold War, and preserve the planet’s environmental balance. Unfortunately, most of them are not being addressed effectively enough: resources and funding allocated for these purposes are misused, and desired results take decades to materialize. The reasons for this low effectiveness lie in striking conflicts of political and economic interests among stakeholders. They are also manifested in the differences of culture, religion, and mindset among different peoples, in a great gap in levels of social development, and in many other factors. Additionally, one of the major obstacles standing in the way of a more dynamic movement toward resolution of these issues has to do with a lack of a single comprehensive approach. Quite naturally, such an approach is required simply because the scale and complexity of issues that arise require it. While most of the obstacles identified above are indeed hard to remove in the foreseeable future, there are no specific hurdles to the implementation of a comprehensive, systemic approach to the planning of activities required to resolve the issues under discussion. I would like to share my experience with respect to one such issue. In my opinion, the example is instructive in that we have been able to avoid inefficiencies while demonstrating new approaches to securing a more successful consolidation of participating countries’ efforts. In this paper, I will discuss an international project: the development of a Strategic Master Plan (SMP) for decommissioning nuclear-powered ships and vessels, and the environmental rehabilitation for their support infrastructure facilities located in the northwest region of Russia.93 I would like to emphasize that the methodology of SMP development, provided for this particular SMP case, can not be directly applied to the analysis of other problems and non-proliferation issues. 93 For more information about the Strategic Master Plan (SMP), see www.ibrae.ac.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=152&Itemid=198; accessed July 13, 2008.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop However, general principles and approaches used during SMP development are of a universal nature and can be adopted to solve other similar problems. MAIN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN: ROLES AND MECHANICS The Cold War has left some nuclear facilities located in the Russian northwest in the grip of numerous environmental problems. The extent of the threat caused by these problems has created the necessity for international collaboration and multilateral financing. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) responded by establishing a fund to support the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). One of the priorities of the ‘nuclear window’ of NDEP is to develop a controllable set of measures to efficiently reduce nuclear and radiation hazards presented by decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, surface ships with nuclear propulsion, and their support infrastructure facilities located in the Russian northwest. In partnership with Rosatom, the EBRD and its donor nations decided to develop a Strategic Master Plan in order to implement a comprehensive strategy to resolving the following problems: complex decommissioning of nuclear submarines and other floating sources of nuclear and radiation hazards rehabilitation, in a manner safe for people and the environment, of on-shore hazardous nuclear and radiological facilities strengthening physical protection of nuclear materials Unlike previously developed plans, the SMP viewed all facilities as a single interconnected entity or system. This ensured a coordinated approach to common problems and made it possible to avoid any unnecessary duplication. The SMP offers both a comprehensive strategy and individual, facility-specific strategies that will be conducive to achieving certain end-states in decommissioning and rehabilitation activities in the Russian northwest. The SMP, and the Complex Decommissioning Program (CDP) it contains, will serve as the basic guiding document for project implementation in order to reach these end states. The SMP should not, however, be viewed as a program for direct action. Rather, it is a framework program, doctrinal in nature and set up to facilitate and guide Rosatom in its development of short- and medium-term action plans. With this in mind, it is assumed that the SMP (CDP) will be a ‘living and breathing’ document that will evolve as additional research takes place and more detailed information becomes available. This will make future avenues of strategic development more informed. Development of the SMP was split into two stages. The first stage (preparation) [SMP-1] was completed in December 2004. Three leading research organizations participated in the development effort: the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE), the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, and the N.A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute for Power Engineering. This effort provided the necessary inputs and
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop identified the procedural basis for future work. Funding for a number of priority projects was provided based on major recommendations formulated in SMP-1. Development of stage two [SMP-2] was assigned to a Program Development Team (PDT) comprised of the most eminent experts from a number of relevant organizations. The PDT was set up under the auspices of the Foundation for Environmental Safety of Power Engineering co-located within IBRAE. The PDT was reinforced and supplemented by an international consultant (IC) that included representatives from Fluor Ltd. and British Nuclear Group Project Services (BNG PS). In compliance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the IC was integrated into the PDT structure and tasked to perform IC functions for each individual goal spelled out in the ToR. To illustrate, the IC was responsible for review and consulting, as well as for sharing of the most recent western experience on a wide range of issues associated with SMP development. According to the ToR, the SMP must: serve as a basis for strategic decision-making by the Russian Federation in such domains as management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive and toxic waste produced during project implementation be conducive donor nations’ technical and economic project evaluations based on such benchmarks as an increased level of safety and security in the region, better physical protection of nuclear materials, and an improved environmental status facilitate decision-making with due regard to relevant interests of the Russian Federation and donor nations PLANNING FROM THE TOP DOWN First, in characterizing the entire scope of accomplished work, I would like to stress that a systemic approach was used at all stages of SMP development. One of the fundamental principles of such an approach is planning ‘from the top down.’ This methodology implies sequential development of increasingly detailed plans for achieving end objectives of the program. This is logically illustrated in Figure 1 below.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 1 Strategic Planning “From the Top Down” [WBS= Work Breakdown Structure] The first step in the implementation of this logical progression is defining the expected end result (vision). Then, based on the expected end result, we must formulate the overall objective of the SMP development effort (mission). The next step in the top-down planning process is the identification of strategic end objectives for all key elements/facilities in the program (i.e., nuclear submarines [NS], nuclear powered surface ships [NPSS], reactor units [RU], nuclear maintenance service [NMS] vessels, and former coastal maintenance bases). To achieve these specific end objectives across the entire spectrum of facilities subject to decommissioning and environmental remediation, an integrated ‘roadmap’ was developed. It is a big-picture diagram that depicts all movements and transformations of CDP elements leading to the achievement of the strategic end objective. Then, every element in this top-level diagram was brought to a higher degree of granularity – as if looking at it through a ‘magnifying glass.’ As a result, functional diagrams (logical chains) were developed to describe the sequence of actions that have to transpire in order to achieve a certain pre-defined end state for a specific facility. On the basis of these logical chains and with an eye to interdependencies reflected in the top-level diagram, the work breakdown structure and CDP technical baseline were developed. After the information was synthesized, a final diagram of CDP implementation was assembled from the bottom up. It reflects the most critical program milestones and this program’s funding profile over the entire span of its lifecycle. Later in this paper, we will touch on the contents of individual tiers of this logical progression in more detail.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop MAIN GOALS AND FINAL PRODUCT OF THE SMP DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES Let us start at the top. The expected final result from implementation of all projects envisioned in the SMP Complex Decommissioning Program can be formulated as follows. First, the Russian northwest and neighboring countries will no longer be exposed to radioactive and toxic releases (from retired nuclear-powered ships and NMS vessels, as well as former maintenance bases) in excess of normative limits. Second, facilities, land, and water areas adjacent to the former maintenance bases will have to be rehabilitated to levels not harmful to human health or the environment if the land is to be used in the future. Let us now move one level down in the planning hierarchy. The cornerstone objective of the Strategic Master Plan is to create an integrated program and control system that would ensure that the expected end results can be achieved in the Russian northwest. The program covers NS, NPSS, NMS vessels, former coastal maintenance bases (CMB), and the entire scope of associated hazardous materials: spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste, and NMS vessel waste. The third tier in the top-down planning hierarchy refers to identifying end objectives relative to specific facilities subject to decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation. In short, these objectives can be summarized as follows: By 2015, all NS, RU, NPSS and NMS vessels must be decommissioned and their reactor compartments, NPSS reactor rooms (RR) and storage units on NMS vessels with solid radioactive waste inside must be placed in long-term storage (70 –100 years) at the Saida Bay temporary storage facility (TSF). By 2025, former CMB at the Andreeva Bay and Gremikha must be rehabilitated to a level not harmful to human health or to the environment and be acceptable for future land use per Russian Government guidance. By 2018, reprocessable conditioned and damaged spent nuclear fuel from VVR reactors must be safely extracted and moved to Mayak. By 2015, non-reprocessable spent nuclear fuel must be placed in a safe configuration and held in long-term storage pending final decision. By 2025, most radioactive waste must be appropriately packaged and placed in safe storage facilities for long-term storage. The waste must be prepared for final disposal at a later time. If completed, the projects of the Complex Decommissioning Program will bring about these results. These objectives are quite ambitious and they too had a formative effect on the SMP. In order to achieve these objectives, all Navy nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities (and their supporting infrastructure) that present any nuclear or radiation hazard – no matter military or civilian and regardless of which agency jurisdiction under which they fall – were examined during the SMP planning stage. In fact, this is the aspect that distinguishes the SMP from all previously developed or currently active plans and programs in the field. The second important point is that all the facilities subject to decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation are viewed as a single integrated system linked by technological, manufacturing, and transportation ties.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop The third unique feature of the SMP is that the CDP developed within its framework is geared toward end objectives of decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation. This also sets it apart from other currently active programs, including federal programs for decommissioning of armaments and military equipment with a time horizon of just five to 10 years. Finally, another important difference has to do with the fact that specialized strategic studies were being conducted to secure an in-depth understanding of problems for which no conceptual solutions had been found previously. The end goals, strategic solutions, and specific implementation activities had to be identified in compliance with requirements and constraints of international and national laws. Therefore, one of the strategic studies was specifically dedicated to an analysis of the entire body of laws and regulations governing activities in this particular field. In the course of this strategic study, an updated list of decommissioning-related laws and regulations was compiled. It contains a total of 971 items. The study justified the need to develop four federal laws pertaining to the management of spent fuel, radioactive waste and radioactive materials. Here I would like to take note of just one specific proposal offered in the study. It calls for the creation of a special category of “very low level waste (VLLW)” and a justification for the underlying classification criteria (norms). SMP development activities have progressed in compliance with the following guiding principles taken from cutting-edge Russian and western practices: use of a single common technical approach to all facilities use of tested and verified solutions wherever feasible maximized use of existing production capabilities and infrastructure minimized construction of redundant waste/material management and storage facilities placement of new waste/material management facilities at points of greatest concentration of these materials consolidation of storage facilities (for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste) to achieve economies of scale and simplify security measures storage of VLLW at facilities of their origin This approach approximates a concept of safety used by the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. The concept is based on the recognition that the main objective is hazard minimization and environmental protection. Such an approach ensures quicker minimization of risks associated with facilities subject to decommissioning and leads to a better use of funding provided to complete these activities. General consensus is that it results in reductions of life cycle expenditures. The advantages of these principles and their positive contribution to strategy are obvious. For instance, the second principle, ‘use tried-and-true solutions wherever feasible,’ creates a high degree of assurance that required cost and programming benchmarks will be met. Practical impact of this principle on strategy comes in the form of using standard technologies for radioactive waste management and applying standard approaches to spent fuel management wherever possible. There have been, of course, necessary exceptions, for example, the technology for handling Spent Removable Core and liquid-metal coolant (LMC) reactors. They turned out to be new problems requiring unique solutions. The following types of inputs were used to develop the SMP and CDP (see Figure 2):
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop a data base covering all facilities subject to decommissioning and rehabilitation and listing all support infrastructure required for project implementation results of strategic studies (SS) laws and regulations The process of strategic planning involves modern approaches that make use of such tools and methods as data collection, prioritization, programmatic risk assessment, quality assurance, strategic planning procedures, and others listed in the middle column in Figure 2. The right-hand column lists the main outputs of the CDP. Figure 2 SMP Inputs, Methods, and Outputs Strategic Approaches to Basic Tasks of Decommissioning and Rehabilitation of Facilities Presenting Nuclear and Radiation Hazards Before we move on to discuss the remaining levels of planning, which have to do directly with specific facilities subject to decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation, it would be worthwhile to put in perspective the scale of tasks that were tackled in the process of SMP development. Figure 3 below pinpoints the exact locations of all major facilities that were included in the SMP studies and review.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 3 Locations of Facilities Subject to Decommissioning and Rehabilitation in the northwest region of Russia As one can see from Figure 3, radiation-hazardous facilities intended for decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation in the northwest region of Russia are located at temporary storage facilities at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha, as well as on the grounds of the naval enterprises Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) Nerpa, FSUE Shipyard #10 [Poliarninksy SRZ] (which reports to the Russian Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), FSUE Atomflot, FSUE Zvezdochka, FSUE Sevmash, and at the long-term radioactive waste storage facility (LSF) at Saida Bay. An important point is that participating organizations belong to different chains of command, which make it challenging to effectively coordinate such activities as the spent nuclear fuel (SNF), radiological waste (RW) and TW management, transportation, and final disposal.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 4 Integrated Top-Level Strategy Based on input analysis and principles, and the results of strategic studies described earlier in this paper, an integrated top-level strategy was devised for the entire scope of activities
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop (see Figure 4). The strategy takes into account all facilities intended for decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation and keeps track of SNF, RW, and TW flows throughout the northwest region of the Russian Federation. The integrated top-level strategy served as a basis on which SMP management strategies were developed for individual facilities. They included NS, NPSS, NMS vessels and CMB at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha. The issue of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive and toxic waste management required a separate review. As an example, following is a brief description of the decommissioning strategy for nuclear submarines. On a practical level, it is comprised of the following constituent stages (see Figure 5 below): safe and controlled storage of submarines at bases prior to handing them over to shipyards for decommissioning cutting up and scrapping of submarines down to the level of producing a Reactor Units (RU) or Reactor Compartment (RC); the resulting solid radioactive waste shall be placed in the RC temporary storage of RU at Saida TSF prior to scrapping to the level of RC at Nerpa or Shipyard #10 [Poliarninksy SRZ] RC extraction and placement into LSF for at least 70 years Decommissioning of nuclear and reactor units crippled by accidents is to be performed in compliance with special procedures described in the SMP. The procedures will take into account the initial condition of the submarine/block and adjust the decommissioning plan accordingly.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 5 Strategy for Decommissioning of Nuclear Submarines and Reactor Units in the Russian Northwest COMPREHENSIVE DECOMMISSIONING PROGRAM The next stage in strategic planning was the development of a WBS. The WBS for the CDP was developed in accordance with the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBoK). We found that having five structural levels was sufficient for the purposes of strategic planning. Substantively, the activities reside on Level Four (Projects) of the WBS (see Figure 6). The first WBS level is represented by the CDP as a whole. This level has been assigned WBS Code 1. The second WBS level features 11 sub-programs. Their structure is shown in Figure 6. The third WBS level was introduced mostly for ease and convenience of classification. This level is populated by groups of projects unified by similarity of technologies, goals, resources, etc. (i.e., multi-projects such as decommissioning of different kinds of nuclear- 81
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop powered submarines) or by commonality of the object of decommissioning activities (i.e., mega-projects such as decommissioning disposition of the Lepse Vessel). From this point on, activities were mostly broken down according to a ‘one project for one object’ principle. Exceptions included sub-programs of environmental rehabilitation of a temporary storage facility at Andreeva Bay (TSFA) and a temporary storage facility at Gremikha (TSFG) where the number of sites is quite large and some of them are ‘mismatched’ (e.g., radioactive waste is being held at a spent nuclear fuel storage site or vice-versa). The WBS for these sub-programs was developed based on detailed flow charts depicting how the desired end states will be achieved. Graphically, steps in these flow charts represent individual projects. Overall, 233 Level 4 elements (projects) were identified. Level Five elements were introduced only when it was necessary to adjust inter-project linkages or update the activity cost structure. Figure 6 Generic View of the Work Breakdown Structure Selection of high-priority projects from the pool of identified potential projects is a critically important stage of planning. For the SMP, we adopted a prioritization procedure that is based on the method used by the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and adjusted it for local specifics and conditions of implementation (see Figure 7).
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 7 Factors That Were Taken into Account When Implementing the Prioritization Procedure Eight basic criteria were selected as a skeleton of an expert evaluation. For each, several factors important in the context of a specific criterion were identified. Overall, the model is built on 28 factors (from one to nine). Numbers in the outer circles indicate the number of factors and their average weighted coefficient of applicability to every criterion. In calculations, every factor was used in conjunction with an individual weighted coefficient determined and assigned by experts.94 There were 14 experts representing various Russian agencies and organizations. To determine a priority ranking order, 123 projects (both mega-projects and multi-projects) were selected from across five thematic categories. The selection was made based on the following requirements: The project must be ongoing at the present time or must be prepared for implementation by 2011, provided there is funding for it. 94 Values represented in Figure 7 are obtained by means of averaging of weighted coefficients as per particular more detailed factors each of which refer to the correspondent group. Values represented in Figure 7 are not used in calculations directly. They provide averaged experts’ vision of the importance of the correspondent factor groups.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop The project must be substantively mature, in terms of scope of activities and envisioned end objectives. This will make it possible for experts to provide objective evaluations. All predecessors of the project must be ongoing at the present time or satisfy both of the above requirements. To bring expert evaluations closer together, priority-ranking was done using the Delphi Technique. In the end, 50 top-priority projects (ten from each thematic category) were chosen. They, together with their predecessor projects and projects currently nearing completion, constitute the initial stage of the CDP. CDP scheduling was being done per PMBoK principles. We also kept in mind that the SMP is unique in that it is not a recipient of any direct funding. The CDP Schedule was developed on the basis of detailed flow charts (logically constructed sequences) developed for all facilities, information provided by implementing organizations regarding progress in execution of current projects, as well as in keeping with the WBS and prioritization results. Total CDP costs include two constituent components: investments required for project work life cycle expenses required to maintain the facilities and support the CDP infrastructure Investment numbers included in Project Identification Sheets contain cost estimates obtained using different methodologies, including Justification of Investment, historical data, and expert estimates. The expenditures over the 2008 – 2025 time frame amount to ~ €2 billion (see Figure 8). This number covers four line items: accountable life cycle expenses existing and committed funding new required funding possible optional funding that may be required if the decision is made to lift and remove for decommissioning of the sunken nuclear-powered submarine November (Noyabr) (2010–2012) any future operations with SRC from LMC reactors are sought by the Scientific Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (post-2010)
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 8 CDP Baseline In Figure 9 below, we have summarized some main parameters in the integrated planning process. The schedule and associated costs will bring about the end result of all decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation activities in Russia’s northwest region for the uppermost tier. To achieve this end result, the CDP looks to complete 233 projects. Numbers of projects specific to individual facilities and thematic categories are shown in Figure 9.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop Figure 9 Main Achievements of the CDP Development Effort The budget curve is characteristic of typical decommissioning and rehabilitation projects in which emphasis is placed on a rapid reduction of radiation hazards and speedy completion of complex high-priority activities. These requirements call for large investment expenses at an early stage of program implementation. The SMP strategy is to expedite the removal of spent nuclear fuel from the region and preparation of radioactive waste in scattered locations for long-lasting isolation from the surrounding environment. For this to happen, several large-scale projects and mega-projects will have to be completed in the next several years. Specifically, this includes: projects contributing to the establishment of a complex for SNF management at TSFA at a cost of ~€75 million projects to build SNF management infrastructure in the region at a cost of ~€85 million; the goal is to provide for uninterrupted removal of spent nuclear fuel from the area projects to build a Regional Center for Conditioning and Long-term Storage at a cumulative cost of ~€170 million; these projects will allow for safe RW management during the expedited preparations to remove SNF from TSFA and TSFG The possibility of suspending or delaying the decommissioning activities associated with buoyant facilities (e.g., NS, heavy nuclear missile cruisers [HNMC], NMS vessels, including Lepse) was ruled out from the start. Any slowdown in the rate of the ship/vessel decommissioning activities in Russia’s northwest region was assumed to result in a greater risk of sinking due to physical degradation, underutilization of industrial capabilities, and social strife in the industry. As direct funding is not envisaged under SMP project, and taking into account the large scope of decommissioning facilities and timeframes needed for decommissioning-related work,
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop the SMP is to be considered a program at the doctrinal level. At the same time the SMP provides an effective tool, which allows one to observe the problem as a whole, plan and control on-going steps for their compliance with the defined strategic directions, and set final objectives. In this regard, the SMP serves as a/an: reference point for the development of federal targets and other programs justification for making strategic decisions and setting priorities during project funding justification for the selection of directions and particular locations for international cooperation both for the Russian Federation and foreign partners encouragement for donor countries in carrying out feasibility studies related to the implementation of decommissioning projects, including the improvement of nuclear, radiation and environmental safety, and physical protection The SMP shall be regularly updated to take into account the real, on-the-ground situation regarding implementation and the possibilities for funding new programs. Only if this condition is met can the SMP prove its effectiveness as a forceful strategic planning tool. The Program Management Information System shall maintain SMP adaptation to the CDP practical implementation. The experience of other countries worldwide shows that large-scale programs can not be implemented effectively without using modern automatic management information systems. Main PMIS tasks include: obtaining reliable information on the implementation status of all projects within the program in the optimal mode identifying problems, deviations, and trends in project funding, supply, and implementation schedules in a timely manner determining critical points and their possible influence on other projects in the implementation of particular projects selecting optimal variants of management actions in compliance with established conditions updating the implementation plan in a timely and optimal manner to achieve the most effective results The initial simplified PMIS version developed under the SMP project provides the first step in this direction. Over the course of trial operation, it will be improved and adapted to the existing management system. The SMP has been highly appreciated by the Head of the State Corporation on Atomic Energy (Rosatom), Sergei V. Kirienko; the President of the EBRD, Jean Lemierre; the Chairman of the EBRD Expert Advisory Group, Laurence Williams; the Chairman of the NDEP Nuclear Operating Committee, Sophie Galley Leruste; the Chairman of International Atomic Energy Agency Contact Expert Group, Alan Mathiot; and a number of other officials and specialists. By the Order of the Head of the State Corporation on Atomic Energy (Rosatom), Sergei V. Kirienko, No. 686 dated December 26, 2007, the SMP was put in force as a guiding document.
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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop KEY FINDINGS The approaches used in the course of the SMP development are reflective of the scale, complexity, and scope of the problems that have to be resolved. A virtually all-encompassing approach to decommissioning and environmental rehabilitation – regardless of the origin of facilities and the agency responsible for their custody – coupled with due regard for diverse process chains and transportation links, and informed by a systemic multi-variable analysis, has produced a solid justification for the strategic decisions that have been made. Decommissioning of a nuclear fleet is the first experience in the context of large-scale decommissioning of nuclear facilities. This experience and, more specifically, the methodology that was put in practice can be used in the future to support decommissioning of nuclear power plants or nuclear fuel cycle facilities. A comprehensive, systemic approach used to develop the SMP may also be useful in helping the international community resolve a whole host of other complex global problems. Without question, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one such problem. To be fair, the non-proliferation problem is admittedly more complex, and the approaches described earlier in this paper will hardly be applicable to resolve this problem in its entirety. Having said this, individual elements of this problem will not only welcome this experience but will, in fact, benefit from it. Advanced nuclear technologies highly resistant to proliferation of sensitive and potentially hazardous nuclear materials is a good example of the utilization of this experience.