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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

However, general principles and approaches used during SMP development are of a universal nature and can be adopted to solve other similar problems.

MAIN GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN: ROLES AND MECHANICS

The Cold War has left some nuclear facilities located in the Russian northwest in the grip of numerous environmental problems. The extent of the threat caused by these problems has created the necessity for international collaboration and multilateral financing. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) responded by establishing a fund to support the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). One of the priorities of the ‘nuclear window’ of NDEP is to develop a controllable set of measures to efficiently reduce nuclear and radiation hazards presented by decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, surface ships with nuclear propulsion, and their support infrastructure facilities located in the Russian northwest.

In partnership with Rosatom, the EBRD and its donor nations decided to develop a Strategic Master Plan in order to implement a comprehensive strategy to resolving the following problems:

  • complex decommissioning of nuclear submarines and other floating sources of nuclear and radiation hazards

  • rehabilitation, in a manner safe for people and the environment, of on-shore hazardous nuclear and radiological facilities

  • strengthening physical protection of nuclear materials

Unlike previously developed plans, the SMP viewed all facilities as a single interconnected entity or system. This ensured a coordinated approach to common problems and made it possible to avoid any unnecessary duplication. The SMP offers both a comprehensive strategy and individual, facility-specific strategies that will be conducive to achieving certain end-states in decommissioning and rehabilitation activities in the Russian northwest. The SMP, and the Complex Decommissioning Program (CDP) it contains, will serve as the basic guiding document for project implementation in order to reach these end states. The SMP should not, however, be viewed as a program for direct action. Rather, it is a framework program, doctrinal in nature and set up to facilitate and guide Rosatom in its development of short- and medium-term action plans. With this in mind, it is assumed that the SMP (CDP) will be a ‘living and breathing’ document that will evolve as additional research takes place and more detailed information becomes available. This will make future avenues of strategic development more informed.

Development of the SMP was split into two stages. The first stage (preparation) [SMP-1] was completed in December 2004. Three leading research organizations participated in the development effort: the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE), the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, and the N.A. Dollezhal Research and Development Institute for Power Engineering. This effort provided the necessary inputs and

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)