Priority–Recommendation 2-1: BTRP should continue to emphasize to partner governments the importance of their strengthening on a broad basis the infrastructures necessary to address human, animal, and plant diseases and the underlying scientific capabilities of the countries as essential foundations for addressing threats of bioterrorism (page 50).
Recommendation 2-2: BTRP should give special attention to strengthening the human resource base to address biosecurity challenges (page 53).
Recommendation 2-3: From the outset of engagement with a specific country, BTRP should give attention to encouraging the country to improve its policy framework that affects upgrading of biosecurity capabilities and related activities (page 55).
Recommendation 2-4: BTRP should draw on its extensive experience in providing and upgrading facilities and equipment in the FSU to improve the functioning of important facilities in developing countries, including both scientific and security aspects (page 55).
Recommendation 2-5: An early step in BTRP’s engagement efforts with specific countries should be to jointly identify and characterize pathogen collections—both collections established under the auspices of the government and informal collections established under the purview of individuals or groups of scientists. The security aspects of these collections, and particularly the capacity of the government to ensure compliance with internationally acceptable biosafety regulations on a long-term basis, should be given high priority (page 56).
Priority–Recommendation 3-1: As BTRP moves beyond the FSU, the theme of partnerships with counterpart organizations in host countries should be a guiding principle (page 67).
Priority–Recommendation 3-2: BTRP should develop in cooperation with each partner government a Strategic Plan that describes the security situation and particularly vulnerabilities relevant to biological assets in the country, disease burdens and trends, local capabilities to detect and respond to outbreaks, and plans for cooperative threat reduction activities within the context of national plans and capabilities of both countries (page 69).
Recommendation 3-3: As BTRP considers engagement in developing countries outside the FSU with little or no history of biological warfare or bioterrorism activities, BTRP should continue to expand its list of pathogens of interest to include pathogens of high-priority local interest (page 72).
Recommendation 3-4: Projects requiring renovation or construction activi-