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Suggested Citation:"Appendix J: Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group." National Research Council. 2009. Countering Biological Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Program Beyond the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12596.
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Page 177
Suggested Citation:"Appendix J: Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group." National Research Council. 2009. Countering Biological Threats: Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Program Beyond the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12596.
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Page 178

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix J Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group The International Bio-Engagement Working Group coordinates U.S. gov- ernment international efforts in the biological sciences, public health, and security to meet U.S. global biodefense and public health priorities. The activi- ties of the working group include developing engagement strategies for priority countries and regions, reviewing specific program activities and implementation mechanisms, and establishing metrics for program evaluation. Members of the Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group National Security Council Homeland Security Council Office of the Vice President Department of State B  ureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Regional bureau staff members and desk officers U.S. Agency for International Development Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Health Affairs Joint Chiefs of Staff Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Centers 1 Information provided by the Department of State, November 2008. 177

178 APPENDIX J Department of Health and Human Services Office of Global Health Affairs Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institutes of Health (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Service Foreign Agricultural Service Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Food Safety and Inspection Service Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis Office of Health Affairs Science and Technology Directorate Environmental Protection Agency International Office Federal Bureau of Investigation National Counterterrorism Center National Counterproliferation Center Central Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Agency Office of Science and Technology Policy

Next: Appendix K: Relevant Studies »
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In response to a request from the U.S. Congress, this book examines how the unique experience and extensive capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) can be extended to reduce the threat of bioterrorism within developing countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU). During the past 12 years, DOD has invested $800 million in reducing the risk from bioterrorism with roots in the states of the FSU. The program's accomplishments are many fold. The risk of bioterrorism in other countries is too great for DOD not to be among the leaders in addressing threats beyond the FSU.

Taking into account possible sensitivities about a U.S. military presence, DOD should engage interested governments in about ten developing countries outside the FSU in biological threat reduction programs during the next five years. Whenever possible, DOD should partner with other organizations that have well established humanitarian reputations in the countries of interest. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization should be considered as potential partners.

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