ondary problems. However, within a constrained timetable BTRP can not only complete important upgrade activities but can also help jump-start additional activities and be a catalyst for action for complementary and sustained activities by others, and particularly by the host countries themselves.
The remainder of this report addresses how enhanced biosecurity capabilities in developing countries can help prevent groups or individuals with hostile intentions from obtaining and dispersing harmful biological agents. It describes conditions in a variety of countries and provides a menu of activities that could be undertaken by BTRP. It also presents lessons learned by several organizations that are engaged in preventing bioterrorism.
The report will show that BTRP is in a good position to help counteract nefarious schemes of individuals who live in or have access to developing countries and who are determined to wreak havoc with infectious diseases, whether for ideological or personal motives. At the same time, BTRP must ensure that its activities do not inadvertently contribute to bioterrorism concerns. Training specialists, collecting pathogens in centralized facilities with uncertain long-term security, and transporting pathogens by insecure means all have the potential to offer new targets for terrorists.