nostic facilities, a variety of training programs, and efforts to enhance laboratory and field investigation capabilities in order to improve surveillance capabilities. These activities will probably continue to command most of the available funds for the foreseeable future. CBR funds have supported both researchers in the FSU and U.S. collaborators. The funds have also been used to purchase equipment when needed by FSU participants for specific research projects and to upgrade laboratories in the FSU.

Until FY 2008, funds were also devoted to activities in a previously existing category of dismantlement and conversion of facilities. These efforts had included redirection of three facilities in the FSU that produced pathogens and other materials that could be used for biological warfare activities. BTRP has completed its activities in this category.

The future of BTRP within the FSU was considered in the October 2007 report.1 This report draws on the October 2007 report in discussing future BTRP activities while recognizing the many differences between operating in the FSU and in other regions.

THE NEED FOR A SUSTAINED COMMITMENT TO NONPROLIFERATION

As discussed in Chapter 1, the likelihood of bioterrorism attacks in developing countries outside the FSU is growing in unpredictable directions. Countering bioterrorism is highly complicated, requiring a wide-ranging defensive infrastructure. Many scenarios could be carried out exploiting the vulnerabilities found in almost every developing country.

As emphasized in Chapter 1, tens of millions of dollars will be required for BTRP to have a significant impact on limiting proliferation of dangerous biological assets within, into, or out of even a handful of developing countries beyond the FSU. The problem is widespread, and activities to reduce some of the most important vulnerabilities are expensive. Few developing countries have major resources of their own to devote to countering the potential of bioterrorism.

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, substantial international development assistance resources are being devoted to strengthening the capabilities of developing countries to control health and agriculture diseases. Of course, such activities will help in the prevention of and response to threats of bioterrorism. But in the FSU, BTRP—together with programs of several other U.S.

1

National Research Council Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons. 2007. The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Available online at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12005. In the current report this report is referred to as the “October 2007 report.”



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