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Summaries of Major Reports

This chapter reprints the summaries of reports that were released in 2008 (note that the official publication date may be 2009).

Two reports released in 2007 but published in 2008—Assessment of the NASA Astrobiology Institute and Grading NASA’s Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Review—the summaries were reprinted in Space Studies Board Annual Report2007.



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5 Summaries of Major Reports This chapter reprints the summaries of reports that were released in 2008 (note that the official publication date may be 2009). Two reports released in 2007 but published in 2008Assessment of the NASA Astrobiology Institute and Grading NASA’s Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Reviewthe summaries were reprinted in Space Studies Board Annual Report007. 7

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8 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 5.1 ensuring the Climate record from the NPOess and GOes-r spacecraft: elements of a strategy to recover Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program restructuring A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft summary The nation’s next-generation National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was created by the Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)-2 of May 5, 1994, that merged the military and civil meteorological programs into a single program. 1 Within NPOESS, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for satellite operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for major acquisitions, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is responsible for the development and infusion of new technologies. In 2000, the NPOESS program anticipated purchasing six satellites for $6.5 billion, with a first launch in 2008. By November 2005, however, it had become apparent that NPOESS would overrun its cost estimates by at least 25 percent, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy review by the DOD. The results of that review were announced in June 2006;2 among the notable changes in the “certified” NPOESS program were the following: • The planned acquisition of six spacecraft was reduced to four. • The planned use of three Sun-synchronous orbits was reduced to two, with data from the European Meteo- rological Operational (MetOp) satellites provided by the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteoro- logical Satellites (EUMETSAT) providing data for the canceled mid-morning orbit. • The launch of the first spacecraft, NPOESS C1, was delayed until 2013. • Several sensors were canceled (in common parlance, “demanifested”) or degraded (“descoped”) in capability as the program was refocused on “core” requirements related to the acquisition of data to support numerical weather prediction. “Secondary” (non-core) sensors that would provide crucial continuity to certain long-term climate records, as well as other sensors that would have provided new measurement capabilities, were not funded in the certified NPOESS program. Since the 1970s, NOAA has operated geostationary satellites that provide images and data on atmospheric, oceanic, and climatic conditions over the continental United States and Hawaii from ~22,000 miles above the equator. NOAA’s next generation of geostationary weather satellites will commence with the launch of GOES-R in 2015.3 Originally, plans for this series included four satellites—GOES-R through GOES-U. However, in Septem- ber 2006, following significant cost growth and estimates that the total program cost would nearly double,4 NOAA NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Ensuring the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-9. 1 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-Orbiting Operation Environmental Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994, available at http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/NSTC-2.html. 2 See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Hearing Charter, “The Future of NPOESS: Results of the Nunn-McCurdy Review of NOAA’s Weather Satellite Program,” June 8, 2006, available at http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full06/June%208/charter.pdf. 3 Following program changes in September 2006, it was announced that launch of the first spacecraft in the GOES-R satellite series would be delayed until December 2014. However, a reduction in funds included in the FY 2008 enacted budget resulted in an additional delay until April 2015. See Chapter 4, “Procurement, Acquisition and Construction,” in NOAA FY 00 Budget Summary, available at http://www. corporateservices.noaa.gov/~nbo/09bluebook_highlights.html. 4The cost growth resulted in part from the risk reduction achieved by a deliberate shift from a 50 percent cost probability to the more con- servative 80 percent probability, based on lessons learned from NPOESS.

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 Summaries of Major Reports reduced the scope of the program, removed a key instrument on the spacecraft, the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES),5 and revised the procurement process so that only two satellites are guaranteed. 6 These events prompted a request from NASA and NOAA for two National Research Council (NRC) efforts. The first, a workshop titled “Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft” and held in Washington, D.C., on June 19-21, 2007, gave participants an opportunity to discuss options to recover measurement capabilities, especially those related to climate research, that were lost as a result of the Nunn- McCurdy actions and the cancellation of the HES on GOES-R. Some 100 scientists and engineers from academia, government, and industry attended the workshop, commenting on a draft mitigation plan developed by NASA and NOAA7 as well as exploring options not included in the NASA-NOAA report. A prepublication version of the workshop report (NRC, 2008) was released in October 2007. The second NRC effort, a study documented in the present report, builds on the information gathered at the June 2007 workshop. In their request for this study (Appendix A), NASA and NOAA asked that a committee of the NRC “prioritize capabilities, especially those related to climate research, that were lost or placed at risk following recent changes to NPOESS and the GOES-R series of polar and geostationary environmental monitor- ing satellites” [emphasis added]. The Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft understands “climate” to be “the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant measures of the atmosphere-ocean system over periods of time ranging from weeks to thousands or millions of years” (Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, 2003, p. 12). In the present study, the committee primarily considered climate-related physical, chemical, and biological processes that vary on interannual to centennial timescales. It is also important to note that the committee did not a priori assume a longer-duration measurement record would be assigned a higher priority than a shorter-duration measurement record. Instead, the committee considered each measurement’s value to climate science in a more comprehensive sense as described in the section below on prioritization. The committee interprets the information needed for climate research broadly to be that which enables: • Detection of variations in climate (through long-term records), • Climate predictions and projections,8 and • Improved understanding of the physical, chemical, and biological processes involved in climate variability and change. In performing its prioritization, the committee was cognizant of the scientific importance of maintaining long-term records of climate forcing and improving understanding of the climate system through starting or con- tinuing records of climate responses. It also recognized the challenges of finding an appropriate balance between observations of climate forcing and response on the one hand, and sustained observations and improved “process” understanding on the other. The committee notes that its interpretation of the research agenda for climate-related issues is consistent with the five goals of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (Box S.1). 5The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite consisted of two components: an advanced hyperspectral sounder and a coastal waters imager. The hyperspectral sounder was intended to greatly advance current operational geostationary sounding capability; its cancellation will instead end the long-term geostationary sounding record started by GOES-I. The coastal waters imager component was planned primarily to benefit coastal monitoring, management, and remediation applications. 6 Oversight Hearing on the Government Accountability Office Report on NOAA’s Weather Satellite Program Before the Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, September 29, 2006, available at http://science.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details. aspx?NewsID=1194. 7 Outlined in a presentation titled “Mitigation Approaches to Address Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA Climate Goals,” available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/ NPOESSWorkshop_Cramer_NRC_06_19_07_final.pdf and also reprinted in Appendix C of the June 2007 workshop report. A final version of the NASA-NOAA report has not been released; a widely cited December 11, 2006, draft was posted by Climate Science Watch at http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/file-uploads/NPOESS-OSTPdec-06.pdf. 8 Prediction (climate) is a probabilistic description or forecast of a future climate outcome based on observations of past and current climato- logical conditions and quantitative models of climate processes (e.g., a prediction of an El Niño event) and projection (climate) is a description of the response of the climate system to an assumed level of future radiative forcing. Changes in radiative forcing may be due to either natural sources (e.g., volcanic emissions) or human-induced causes (e.g., emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, or changes in land use and land cover). Climate “projections” are distinguished from climate “predictions” in order to emphasize that climate projections depend on scenarios of future socioeconomic, technological, and policy developments that may or may not be realized (Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, 2003, p. 12).

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0 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 BOX S.1 Goals of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program Goal 1: Improve knowledge of Earth’s past and present climate and environment, including its natural variability, and improve understanding of the causes of observed variability and change. Goal 2: Improve quantification of the forces bringing about changes in Earth’s climate and related systems. Goal 3: Reduce uncertainty in projections of how Earth’s climate and related systems may change in the future. Goal 4: Understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural and managed ecosys- tems and human systems to climate and related global changes. Goal 5: Explore the uses and identify the limits of evolving knowledge to manage risks and opportunities related to climate variability and change. SOURCE: The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Factsheet, available at http://www.climatescience.gov/infosheets/ factsheet3/CCSP-3-StratPlanOverview14jan2006.pdf. aPPrOaCh TO aND sCOPe OF PriOriTiZaTiON Conducted during its December 17-19, 2007, meeting, the committee’s prioritization of capabilities lost in program restructuring was guided by the following overarching principles: • The objective of the committee’s deliberations would be to prioritize for the restoration of climate capa- bilities. For example, although a sensor with the capability to improve resolution of fast climate processes is of interest to both the weather forecasting and the climate research communities, it is the value to the latter that would inform the committee’s ranking. • The particular strategy for recovery and the cost of recovery of a measurement/sensor would not be a factor in the ranking.9 • Measurements/sensors on NPOESS would not be ranked against measurements/sensors on GOES-R; how- ever, the criteria used in ranking measurements/sensors for either program would be identical. • When it was relevant, the measurement objectives of a particular sensor, and not the sensor itself, would be the basis for consideration. Thus, for example, members of the committee considered the importance of radar altimetry to climate science, rather than the importance of the particular implementation of this capability on NPOESS, that is, the ALT instrument. Prior to the meeting, one or more committee members with the requisite expertise was assigned the task of preparing a detailed review of the issues associated with the descoping or demanifesting of a particular NPOESS or GOES-R measurement capability, guided by questions 1 through 9, below. These questions, which were devel- oped at the committee’s first meeting, follow from the committee’s interpretation of what constitutes climate sci- ence and the associated requirements for climate observations (see above); they allow a prioritization across the diverse information requirements for climate science, for example, long-term measurements, new measurements, measurements of climate forcings and responses, measurements to improve scientific understanding and reduce key uncertainties, and measurements to improve climate predictions. The questions are also consistent with the 9The committee did not have access to the ongoing NASA-NOAA study for OSTP that is examining the cost of various recovery strategies.

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 Summaries of Major Reports ranking criteria employed by the panels of the NRC Earth Science and Applications from Space decadal survey (NRC, 2007), although in that study societal benefits and cost considerations were included as ranking factors. 10 By design, the questions were open-ended in order to provoke a more nuanced discussion of the value of the measurements. For example, rather than merely listing the duration of the measurement records at risk as a proxy for value, the committee considered the value of a long-term record in a more holistic manner via questions 1 and 5, which in turn prompted an in-depth exploration of the value of the long-term record, the impact of the record on global climate studies, the relative impact/consequences of a gap in the record, the maturity of related data assimilation, and sensor heritage. Such an analysis was considered important in the prioritization process in order to appropriately balance the need to continue very-long-duration measurements with shorter-duration measure- ments. The former would benefit with better scores for measurement/sensor maturity and the value of maintaining the long-term record. The latter measurements, although perhaps less mature, might result in greater consequences associated with a prospective measurement gap (for example, those related to climate forcing/response parameters with larger uncertainties for which longer trend data can greatly constrain future climate predictions). 1. To what extent are the data used both to monitor and to provide a historical record of the global climate? Is there a requirement for data continuity? If so, discuss the consequences of a measurement gap. 2. To what extent is this measurement important in reducing “uncertainty”—for example, in reducing error bars in climate sensitivity forcing and monitoring? In making these judgments, refer also to the priorities of the Climate Change Research Program. 3. Consider the importance of the measurement’s role in climate prediction and projections (forcing/ response/sensitivity). 4. To what extent is the measurement needed for reanalysis? 5. Describe the measurement’s maturity—for example, its readiness to be assimilated into a particular model(s)—and its heritage. If discussing a sensor, discuss its technical maturity and heritage. 6. Are other sensors and ancillary data required to make the measurement useful? Is this measurement unique? Are there complementary international sensors? If so, please list them and assess their capabilities. Discuss any data issues you may be aware of. 7. To what extent are the data used by, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Climate Change Science Program (in developing synthesis and assessment products)? 8. Provide a qualitative assessment of the measurement’s role in contributing to an overall improved under- standing of the climate system and climate processes. 9. To what extent does the measurement contribute to improved understanding in related disciplines? Following each reviewer presentation, committee members actively discussed the measurement objective under consideration in relation to each of the nine questions. The committee’s prioritization was developed on the basis of numerical scoring of the importance of each measurement capability to the needs of the climate research community (questions -8) and the importance of the measurement to related disciplines (question ). Each of the responses to questions  through  was given equal weight in determining an overall ranking.11 The committee had extensive discussions regarding whether a simple average of committee member rankings of the responses to questions 1 through 9 should be used for an overall ranking, or whether rankings with respect to particular questions should be given more weight. In part because there was no consensus among committee members on how a particular weighting scheme might improve what was already a subjective evaluation (in map- ping the study statement of task to the questions, and in assigning individual numerical rankings for each ques- tion), the committee determined that the use of an unweighted average was advisable. Given that the committee was not provided any information concerning costs, relative or absolute, for any of the proposed mitigations, its prioritization of measurement capabilities was based entirely on climate science value as determined by consid- eration of the nine questions above. Lacking the information by which to determine the financial implications of its recommendations, the committee did not include implementation costs in its rankings. The committee notes, however, that had costs been provided, a more far-reaching set of recommendations might have been developed 10 SeeBox 2.2 in Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (NRC, 2007), p. 40. 11The committee was aware of a similar prioritization exercise conducted by NASA and NOAA in late 2006/early 2007. NASA and NOAA reached a somewhat different prioritization, which the present committee attributes in large part to their giving additional weight to the factors noted in question 1, that is, measurement continuity and the importance of avoiding a data gap.

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 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 in which cost/benefit was taken into consideration. It is also important to recognize that important nonscientific factors were not, by design, part of the committee’s analysis. Before restructuring, each of the lost or degraded measurement capabilities had been considered both prac- ticable and of high importance. In the case of NPOESS, a tri-agency under-secretary-level executive committee provides overall program direction and ensures that both civil and national security requirements are satisfied. 12 GOES-R requirements had been established by NOAA following a formal process that determined and prioritized user requirements; various senior management committees oversaw this process.13 As is evident in the “Highlights of Analysis” sections in Chapter 3, the committee also found great merit in each of the climate-related measure- ment capabilities under consideration. However, given that a wholesale reversal of the programs’ changes is not feasible, it became the committee’s difficult task to provide a prioritized set of recommendations for restoration of climate measurement capabilities. sUMMarY OF PriOriTies aND MiTiGaTiON OPTiONs The committee prioritized all of the climate-related measurement capabilities that were lost or diminished as a result of NPOESS and GOES-R program restructuring rather than limiting its recommendations to the demanifested sensors as was done in the NASA-NOAA draft report prepared for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).14 The committee’s approach is consistent with input received from the community as part of the NRC’s June 2007 workshop. Specifically, with respect to changes in the NPOESS program, the committee considered: • Aerosol properties and the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), • Earth radiation budget and the Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System/Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (CERES/ERBS), • Hyperspectral diurnal coverage and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), • Microwave radiometry and the Conical Scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS), • Ocean color and the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), • Ozone profiles and the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite-Limb (OMPS-L) sensor, • Radar altimetry and the ALT sensor, and • Total solar irradiance and the Total Solar Irradiance Monitor (TIM)/spectrally resolved irradiance and the Solar Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM). With respect to the changes in the GOES-R program, the committee considered: • Geostationary coastal waters imagery and the HES-CWI sensor, and • Geostationary hyperspectral sounding and the HES sensor. As a result of the prioritization process, the measurements and sensors listed above are divided into four groups, which the committee designates, in descending order of priority, as Tier 1 through Tier 4 (Figure S.1). As noted above, sensors from the NPOESS and GOES-R programs were not prioritized head-to-head. However, it can be roughly stated that considering climate science contributions alone, geostationary hyperspectral sounding compares to the NPOESS capabilities prioritized as Tier 2, and coastal waters imagery falls into Tier 4. After completing the relative prioritization, the committee considered a wide range of options for recovery of the lost capabilities, including the remanifesting of sensors onto NPOESS platforms, accommodation of sensors on free flyers or flights of opportunity, and the use of formation flight to combine multiple, synergistic, measure- ment types without incurring the cost, complexity, and risk of large facility-class observatories. The committee’s recommendations for mitigation recovery of the lost capabilities are detailed in the main text and are summarized in Table S.1. 12 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-Orbiting Operation Environmental Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994, available at http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/NSTC-2.html. 13 See Jim Gurka, “The Requirement Process in NOAA GOES-R Mission Definition,” April 12, 2007, available at http://osd.goes.noaa. gov/documents/Requirements_Process.pdf. 14 See footnote 7 above.

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 Summaries of Major Reports FIGURE S.1 Graphical depiction of overall rankings, showing the clustering of scores into what the committee defined as Tiers 1-4, for recovery of both NPOESS (low Earth orbit) and GOES-R (geostationary Earth orbit) lost or degraded climate capabilities. The color coding used in Figure S.1 and Table S.1—green, yellow, blue, and pink shading to indicate Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4 prioritization, respectively—is used as an interpretive aid in Chapter 3. eLeMeNTs OF a LONG-TerM CLiMaTe sTraTeGY: a WaY FOrWarD The committee has developed and recommends a prioritized, short-term strategy for recovery of crucial cli- mate capabilities lost in the NPOESS and GOES-R program descopes. However, mitigation of these recent losses is only the first step in establishing a viable long-term climate strategy—one that builds on the lessons learned from the well-intentioned but poorly executed merger of the nation’s weather and climate observation systems. The key elements of such a long-term strategy are discussed in Chapter 4 and are summarized here. sustained Climate Observations In developing an effective long-term climate strategy, it is critical to consider the similarities in and differ- ences between research, operational, and sustained measurements in order to take advantage of synergies when

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 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 TABLE S.1 Summary Recommendations for Mitigation of Lost or Degraded Climate Capabilities Lost or Degraded Climate Capability in NPOess Low earth Orbit recommendation Tier 1 Microwave Radiometry • NASA and NOAA should initiate a study as soon as practicable to address continuity of microwave radiometry and to determine a cost-effective approach to supplement the AMSR-2, carried on the Japanese spacecraft GCOM-W, with another microwave radiometer of similar design. The agencies should also consider the feasibility of manifesting a microwave radiometer on a flight of opportunity or free flyer to cover the microwave radiometry gap anticipated with a delay in accommodation of MIS until NPOESS C2. • The agencies should provide funding for U.S. participation in an AMSR-2 science team to take full advantage of this upcoming microwave radiometer mission. • The NPOESS Integrated Program Office should continue with its plans to restore a microwave sounder to NPOESS C2 and subsequent platforms, with an emphasis on SUAG priorities 1 through 3 (core radiometry, sounding channels, and soil moisture/sea surface temperature). • NASA and NOAA should devise and implement a long-term strategy to provide sea-surface wind vector measurements. The committee finds important limitations in the planned reliance on a polarimetric radiometer for this measurement; instead, the preferred strategy is timely development and launch of the next-generation advanced scatterometer mission, that is, the Extended Ocean Vector Winds Mission (XOVWM) recommended in the 2007 NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space. Radar Altimetry A precision altimetry follow-on mission to OSTM/Jason-2 (i.e., Jason-3) should be developed and launched in a time frame to ensure the necessary mission overlap. The agencies’ long-term plan should include a series of precision altimetry free flyers in non-Sun-synchronous orbit designed to provide for climate-quality measurements of sea level. Earth Radiation Budget To minimize the risk of a potential data gap, the committee reiterates the recommendation of the 2007 Earth Science and Applications from Space decadal survey to manifest the CERES FM-5 on NPP. The agencies should further develop an ERB instrument series and provide for subsequent flights on Sun-synchronous platforms to continue the Earth radiation budget long- term record. Tier 2 Hyperspectral Diurnal Coverage The CrIS/ATMS instrument suite should be restored to the 05:30 NPOESS orbit to provide improved hyperspectral diurnal coverage and support atmospheric moisture and temperature vertical profile key performance parameters. Total Solar Irradiance The agencies should consider use of an appropriate combination of small, low-cost satellites and flights of opportunity to fly TSIS (or at least TIM) as needed to ensure overlap and continuity of measurements of total solar irradiance. Tier 3 Aerosol Properties • NASA should continue its current plan to fly the APS on Glory. • NASA and NOAA should continue to mature aerosol remote sensing technology and plan for the development of operational instruments for accommodation on future platforms and/or flights of opportunity. Ocean Color • The NPOESS Integrated Program Office should consider any practical mechanisms to improve VIIRS performance for NPP and ensure that all specifications are met or exceeded by the launch of NPOESS C1. • The agencies should ensure that adequate post-launch calibration/validation infrastructure is in place, including oversight by the scientific community, to ensure the production of viable ocean color imagery. • To address reduced sensor coverage, the agencies should work with their international partners toward flying a fully functioning VIIRS or a dedicated sensor on a mission of opportunity in Sun-synchronous orbit. The agencies should also work with international partners to ensure community access to ocean color and ancillary calibration/validation data from international platforms during the gap likely to be experienced prior to launch of NPOESS C1. Ozone Profiles The committee supports current agency plans to reintegrate OMPS-Limb on NPP. The agencies should consider the relative cost/benefit of reintegration of OMPS-Limb capabilities for NPOESS platforms carrying OMPS-Nadir based on the degree of integration inherent in the instrument’s original design. Lost or Degraded Climate Capability in GOes-r Geostationary earth Orbit recommendation Tier 2 Geostationary Hyperspectral Sounding NASA and NOAA should plan an earliest-possible demonstration flight of a geostationary hyperspectral sounder, supporting operational flight in the GOES-T time frame. Tier 4 Geostationary Coastal Waters Imagery Provision for coastal waters imaging should be considered by the agencies based on non-climate applications.

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 Summaries of Major Reports appropriate while avoiding incompatible observing system requirements. Sustained measurements needed to detect climate trends can, for example, impose tighter requirements for calibration, characterization, and stability, or impose orbit constraints different from what would otherwise be required for operational applications. A long-term climate strategy must provide for the essential characterization, calibration, stability, continuity, and data systems required to support climate applications. National Policy for Provision of Long-Term Climate Measurements Much of climate science depends on long-term, sustained measurement records. Yet, as has been noted in many previous NRC and agency reports, the nation lacks a clear policy to address these known national and inter- national needs. For example, an ad hoc NRC task group (NRC, 1999b, p. 4) stated as follows: No federal entity is currently the “agent” for climate or longer-term observations and analyses, nor has the “virtual agency” envisioned in the [U.S. Global Change Research Program] succeeded in this function. The task group endorses NASA’s call for a high-level process to develop a national policy to ensure that the long-term continuity and quality of key data sets required for global change research are not compromised in the process of merging research and operational data sets.15 A coherent, integrated, and viable long-term climate observation strategy should explicitly seek to balance the myriad science and applications objectives basic to serving the variety of climate data stakeholders. The program should, for example, consider the appropriate balance between (1) new sensors for technological inno- vation, (2) new observations for emerging science needs, (3) long-term sustainable science-grade environmental observations, and (4) measurements that improve support for decision makers to enable more effective climate mitigation and adaptation regulations (NRC, 2006). The various agencies have differing levels of expertise associated with each of these programmatic elements, and the long-term strategy should seek to capitalize on inherent organizational strengths where appropriate. Elements of this needed national policy include clear roles and responsibilities for agencies, international coordination, and community involvement in the development of climate data records. Clear agency roles and responsibilities In the NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space, the authors stated, “The committee is concerned that the nation’s civil space institutions (including NASA, NOAA, and USGS) are not adequately pre- pared to meet society’s rapidly evolving Earth information needs. These institutions have responsibilities that are in many cases mismatched with their authorities and resources: institutional mandates are inconsistent with agency charters, budgets are not well matched to emerging needs, and shared responsibilities are supported inconsistently by mechanisms for cooperation. These are issues whose solutions will require action at high levels of the federal government” (NRC, 2007, p. 13). In turn, this prompted one of the report’s most important recommendations: “The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in collaboration with the relevant agencies and in consultation with the scientific community, should develop and implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth observations. This plan should recognize the complexity of differing agency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as well as the lessons from implementation of the Landsat, EOS, and NPOESS programs” (p. 14). The present committee fully endorses the need for clarified agency roles and responsibilities, consistent with inherent agency strengths, and reiterates this important recommendation of the decadal survey. international Coordination The committee recognizes the importance of international cooperation in obtaining climate-quality measure- ments from space; the absence of an internationally agreed upon and ratified strategy for climate observations 15A similar view was expressed in Adequacy of Climate Observing Systems, which stated, “There has been a lack of progress by the federal agencies responsible for climate observing systems, individually and collectively, toward developing and maintaining a credible integrated climate observing system” (NRC, 1999a, p. 5).

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 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 from space remains an area of grave concern. The research and operational agencies should coordinate their development, operations, standards, and products with international partners. Community involvement in the Development of Climate Data records The NRC has produced a number of reports on the subject of climate data records (CDRs), many having been motivated by concerns over the future availability of satellite-based climate-quality data records. The implied demise of climate-focused satellite observations from NPOESS, a consequence of the Nunn-McCurdy certification, adds to the ongoing concern about the lack of organized commitment to CDR development. It has been stressed in many NRC and other reports that generation of CDRs requires considerable scientific insight, including the blend- ing of multiple sources of data; error analysis; and access to raw data. On the basis of its review of previous NRC studies and its own experience, the committee identified a number of particularly important elements for a sus- tained long-term program dedicated to developing credible CDRs. These elements are discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, it is important to note that community concerns about the adequacy of NPOESS for climate research existed even before the 2006 program restructuring. For example, in the 2007 NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space (NRC, 2007, p. 263), the report from the Panel on Climate Variability and Change concluded that, “Regardless of the descoping, the NPOESS program lacks essential features of a well-designed climate-observing system.” reFereNCes Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 2003. Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. Available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/final/default.htm. NRC (National Research Council). 1999a. Adequacy of Climate Observing Systems. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1999b. “Assessment of NASA’s Plans for Post-2002 Earth Observing Missions,” letter report. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., April 8. NRC. 2006. A Review of NASA’s 2006 Draft Science Plan: Letter Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 2007. Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 2008. Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: A Workshop Report. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.

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7 Summaries of Major Reports 5.2 Launching science: science Opportunities Provided by Nasa’s Constellation system A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System summary In 2004 NASA began implementation of the first phases of a new space exploration policy. 1 This imple- mentation effort included the development of a new human-carrying spacecraft, known as Orion; the Altair lunar lander; and two new launch vehicles, the Ares I and Ares V rockets—collectively called the Constellation System (described in Chapter 5 of this report). The Altair lunar lander, which is in the very preliminary concept stage, is not discussed in detail in this report. In 2007 NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to evaluate the sci- ence opportunities enabled by the Constellation System. To do so, the NRC established the Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System. In general, the committee interpreted “Constellation- enabled” broadly, to include not only mission concepts that required Constellation, but also those that could be significantly enhanced by Constellation. The committee intends this report to be a general overview of the topic of science missions that might be enabled by Constellation, a sort of textbook introduction to the subject. The mission concepts that are reviewed in this report should serve as general examples of kinds of missions, and the committee’s evaluation should not be construed as an endorsement of the specific teams that developed the mission concepts or of their proposals. Additionally, NASA has a well-developed process for establishing scientific priorities by asking the NRC to con- duct a “decadal survey” for a particular discipline. Any scientific mission that eventually uses the Constellation System will have to be properly evaluated by means of this decadal survey process. The committee was impressed with the scientific potential of many of the proposals that it evaluated. However, the committee notes that the Constellation System has been justified by NASA and selected in order to enable human exploration beyond low Earth orbit—not to enable science missions. Virtually all of the science mission concepts that could take advantage of Constellation’s unique capabilities are likely to be prohibitively expensive. Several times in the past NASA has begun ambitious space science missions that ultimately proved too expensive for the agency to pursue. Examples include the Voyager-Mars mission and the Prometheus program and its Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter spacecraft (both examples are discussed in Chapter 1). Finding: The scientific missions reviewed by the committee as appropriate for launch on an ares V vehicle fall, with few exceptions, into the “flagship” class of missions. The preliminary cost estimates, based on mis- sion concepts that at this time are not very detailed, indicate that the costs of many of the missions analyzed will be above $5 billion (in current dollars). The ares V costs are not included in these estimates. All of the costs discussed in this report are presented in current-year (2008) dollars, not accounting for poten- tial inflation that could occur between now and the decade in which these missions might be pursued. In general, preliminary cost estimates for proposed missions are, for many reasons, significantly lower than the final costs. Given the large cost estimates for many of the missions assessed in this report, the potentially large impacts on NASA’s budget by many of these missions are readily apparent. sCieNCe MissiONs ThaT are eNaBLeD Or eNhaNCeD BY The CONsTeLLaTiON sYsTeM The committee evaluated a total of 17 mission concepts for future space science missions (11 were “Vision Missions” studied at the initiation of NASA between 2004 and 2006; the remaining 6 were submitted to the committee in response to its request for information).2 The committee based its initial evaluation of each mis- NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Launching Science: Science Opportunities Provided by NASA’s Constellation System, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, pp. 1-9; approved for release in 2008. 1 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html. 2 In its interim report, the committee selected 7 of the 11 Vision Mission concepts as “worthy of further study as a Constellation mission.” See National Research Council, Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System: Interim Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008.

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 Summaries of Major Reports 5.5 severe space Weather events Understanding societal and economic impacts: Workshop report A Report of the Ad Hoc Planning Committee for the Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events Workshop summary sOCieTaL CONTeXT Modern society depends heavily on a variety of technologies that are susceptible to the extremes of space weather—severe disturbances of the upper atmosphere and of the near-Earth space environment that are driven by the magnetic activity of the Sun. Strong auroral currents can disrupt and damage modern electric power grids and may contribute to the corrosion of oil and gas pipelines. Magnetic storm-driven ionospheric density distur- bances interfere with high-frequency (HF) radio communications and navigation signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, while polar cap absorption (PCA) events can degrade—and, during severe events, com- pletely black out—HF communications along transpolar aviation routes, requiring aircraft flying these routes to be diverted to lower latitudes. Exposure of spacecraft to energetic particles during solar energetic particle events and radiation belt enhancements can cause temporary operational anomalies, damage critical electronics, degrade solar arrays, and blind optical systems such as imagers and star trackers. The effects of space weather on modern technological systems are well documented in both the technical lit- erature and popular accounts. Most often cited perhaps is the collapse within 90 seconds of northeastern Canada’s Hydro-Quebec power grid during the great geomagnetic storm of March 1989, which left millions of people without electricity for up to 9 hours. This event exemplifies the dramatic impact that extreme space weather can have on a technology upon which modern society in all of its manifold and interconnected activities and functions critically depends. Nearly two decades have passed since the March 1989 event. During that time, awareness of the risks of extreme space weather has increased among the affected industries, mitigation strategies have been developed, new sources of data have become available (e.g., the upstream solar wind measurements from the Advanced Composi- tion Explorer), new models of the space environment have been created, and a national space weather infrastructure has evolved to provide data, alerts, and forecasts to an increasing number of users. Now, 20 years later and approaching a new interval of increased solar activity, how well equipped are we to manage the effects of space weather? Have recent technological developments made our critical technologies more or less vulnerable? How well do we understand the broader societal and economic impacts of extreme space weather events? Are our institutions prepared to cope with the effects of a “space weather Katrina,” a rare, but according to the historical record, not inconceivable eventuality? On May 22 and 23, 2008, a workshop held in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the National Research Council brought together representatives of industry, the federal government, and the social science community to explore these and related questions. This report was prepared by members of the ad hoc committee that organized the workshop, and it summarizes the key themes, ideas, and insights that emerged during the 1½ days of presentations and discussions. The iMPaCT OF sPaCe WeaTher Modern technological society is characterized by a complex interweave of dependencies and interdependencies among its critical infrastructures. A complete picture of the socioeconomic impact of severe space weather must include both direct, industry-specific effects (such as power outages and spacecraft anomalies) and the collateral effects of space-weather-driven technology failures on dependent infrastructures and services. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Severe Space Weather EventsUnderstanding Societal and Economic Impacts: Workshop Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-5.

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 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 industry-specific space Weather impacts The main industries whose operations can be adversely affected by extreme space weather are the electric power, spacecraft, aviation, and GPS-based positioning industries. The March 1989 blackout in Quebec and the forced outages of electric power equipment in the northeastern United States remain the classic example of the impact of a severe space weather event on the electric power industry. Several examples of the impact of space weather on the other industries are cited in the report: • The outage in January 1994 of two Canadian telecommunications satellites during a period of enhanced energetic electron fluxes at geosynchronous orbit, disrupting communications services nationwide. The first satellite recovered in a few hours; recovery of the second satellite took 6 months and cost $50 million to $70 million. • The diversion of 26 United Airlines flights to non-polar or less-than-optimum polar routes during several days of disturbed space weather in January 2005. The flights were diverted to avoid the risk of HF radio blackouts during PCA events. The increased flight time and extra landings and takeoffs required by such route changes increase fuel consumption and raise cost, while the delays disrupt connections to other flights. • Disabling of the Federal Aviation Administration’s recently implemented GPS-based Wide Area Augmenta- tion System (WAAS) for 30 hours during the severe space weather events of October-November 2003. With increasing awareness and understanding of space weather effects on their technologies, industries have responded to the threat of extreme space weather through improved operational procedures and technologies. As just noted, airlines re-route flights scheduled for polar routes during intense solar energetic particle events in order to preserve reliable communications. Alerted to an impending geomagnetic storm by NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) and monitoring ground currents in real-time, power grid operators take defensive mea- sures to protect the grid against geomagnetically induced currents (GICs). Similarly, under adverse space weather conditions, launch personnel may delay a launch, and satellite operators may postpone certain operations (e.g., thruster firings). For the spacecraft industry, however, the primary approach to mitigating the effects of space weather is to design satellites to operate under extreme environmental conditions to the maximum extent possible within cost and resource constraints. GPS modernization through the addition of two new navigation signals and new codes is expected to help mitigate space weather effects (e.g., ranging errors, fading caused by ionospheric scintillation), although to what degree is not known. These technologies will come on line incrementally over the next 15 years as new GPS satellites become operational. In the meantime, the Federal Aviation Administration will maintain “legacy” non-GPS-based navigation systems as a backup, while other GPS users (e.g., offshore drill- ing companies) can postpone operations for which precision position knowledge is required until the ionospheric disturbance is over. The Collateral impacts of space Weather Because of the interconnectedness of critical infrastructures in modern society, the impacts of severe space weather events can go beyond disruption of existing technical systems and lead to short-term as well as to long-term collateral socioeconomic disruptions. Electric power is modern society’s cornerstone technology, the technology on which virtually all other infrastructures and services depend. Although the probability of a wide- area electric power blackout resulting from an extreme space weather event is low, the consequences of such an event could be very high, as its effects would cascade through other, dependent systems. Collateral effects of a longer-term outage would likely include, for example, disruption of the transportation, communication, banking, and finance systems, and government services; the breakdown of the distribution of potable water owing to pump failure; and the loss of perishable foods and medications because of lack of refrigeration. The resulting loss of services for a significant period of time in even one region of the country could affect the entire nation and have international impacts as well. Extreme space weather events are low-frequency/high-consequence (LF/HC) events and as such present—in terms of their potential broader, collateral impacts—a unique set of problems for public (and private) institutions and governance, different from the problems raised by conventional, expected, and frequently experienced events.

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 Summaries of Major Reports As a consequence, dealing with the collateral impacts of LF/HC events requires different types of budgeting and management capabilities and consequently challenges the basis for conventional policies and risk management strategies, which assume a universe of constant or reliable conditions. Moreover, because systems can quickly become dependent on new technologies in ways that are unknown and unexpected to both developers and users, vulnerabilities in one part of the broader system have a tendency to spread to other parts of the system. Thus, it is difficult to understand, much less to predict, the consequences of future LF/HC events. Sustaining preparedness and planning for such events in future years is equally difficult. Future Vulnerabilities Our knowledge and understanding of the vulnerabilities of modern technological infrastructure to severe space weather and the measures developed to mitigate those vulnerabilities are based largely on experience and knowledge gained during the past 20 or 30 years, during such episodes of severe space weather as the geomagnetic superstorms of March 1989 and October-November 2003. As severe as some of these recent events have been, the historical record reveals that space weather of even greater severity has occurred in the past—e.g., the Carrington event of 18591 and the great geomagnetic storm of May 1921—and suggests that such extreme events, though rare, are likely to occur again some time in the future. While the socioeconomic impacts of a future Carrington event are difficult to predict, it is not unreasonable to assume that an event of such magnitude would lead to much deeper and more widespread socioeconomic disruptions than occurred in 1859, when modern electricity-based technology was still in its infancy. A more quantitative estimate of the potential impact of an unusually large space weather event has been obtained by examining the effects of a storm of the magnitude of the May 1921 superstorm on today’s electric power infrastructure. Despite the lessons learned since 1989 and their successful application during the October- November 2003 storms, the nation’s electric power grids remain vulnerable to disruption and damage by severe space weather and have become even more so, in terms of both widespread blackouts and permanent equipment damage requiring long restoration times. According to a study by the Metatech Corporation, the occurrence today of an event like the 1921 storm would result in large-scale blackouts affecting more than 130 million people and would expose more than 350 transformers to the risk of permanent damage. sPaCe WeaTher iNFrasTrUCTUre Space weather services in the United States are provided primarily by NOAA’s SWPC and the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF’s) Weather Agency (AFWA), which work closely together to address the needs of their civilian and military user communities, respectively. The SWPC draws on a variety of data sources, both space- and ground-based, to provide forecasts, watches, warnings, alerts, and summaries as well as operational space weather products to civilian and commercial users. Its primary sources of information about solar activity, upstream solar wind conditions, and the geospace environment are NASA’s Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), NOAA’s GOES and POES satellites, magnetometers, and the USAF’s solar observing networks. Secondary sources include SOHO and STEREO as well as a number of ground-based facilities. Despite a small and unstable budget (roughly $6 million to $7 million U.S. dollars annually) that limits capabilities, the SWPC has experienced a steady growth in customer base, even during the solar minimum years, when disturbance activity is lower. The focus of the USAF’s space weather effort is on providing situational knowledge of the real-time space weather environment and assessments of the impacts of space weather on different Department of Defense missions. The Air Force uses NOAA data combined with data from its own assets such as the Defense Meteorological Satellites Program satellites, the Communications/Navigation Outage Forecasting System, the Solar Electro-Optical Network, the Digital Ionospheric Sounding System, and the GPS network. NASA is the third major element in the nation’s space weather infrastructure. Although NASA’s role is scientific rather than operational, NASA science missions such as ACE provide critical space weather informa- tion, and NASA’s Living with a Star program targets research and technologies that are relevant to operations. NASA-developed products that are candidates for eventual transfer from research to operations include sensor technology and physics-based space weather models that can be transitioned into operational tools for forecasting and situational awareness.

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 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 Other key elements of the nation’s space weather infrastructure are the solar and space physics research com- munity and the emerging commercial space weather businesses. Of particular importance are the efforts of these sectors in the area of model development. space Weather Forecasting: Capabilities and Limitations One of the important functions of a nation’s space weather infrastructure is to provide reliable long-term fore- casts, although the importance of forecasts varies according to industry.2 With long-term (1- to 3-day) forecasts and minimal false alarms,3 the various user communities can take actions to mitigate the effects of impending solar disturbances and to minimize their economic impact. Currently, NOAA’s SWPC can make probability forecasts of space weather events with varying degrees of success. For example, the SWPC can, with moderate confidence, predict the occurrence probability of a geomagnetic storm or an X-class flare 1 to 3 days in advance, whereas its capability to provide even short-term (less than 1 day) or long-term forecasts of ionospheric disturbances—infor- mation important for GPS users—is poor. The SWPC has identified a number of critical steps needed to improve its forecasting capability, enabling it, for example, to provide high-confidence long- and short-term forecasts of geomagnetic storms and ionospheric disturbances. These steps include securing an operational solar wind monitor at L1; transitioning research models (e.g., of coronal mass ejection propagation, the geospace radiation environ- ment, and the coupled magnetosphere/ionosphere/atmosphere system) into operations, and developing precision GPS forecast and correction tools. The requirement for a solar wind monitor at L1 is particularly important because ACE, the SWPC’s sole source of real-time upstream solar wind and interplanetary magnetic field data, is well beyond its planned operational life, and provisions to replace it have not been made. UNDersTaNDiNG The sOCieTaL aND eCONOMiC iMPaCTs OF seVere sPaCe WeaTher The title of the workshop on which this report is based, “The Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather,” perhaps promised more than this subsequent report can fully deliver. What emerged from the presenta- tions and discussions at the workshop is that the invited experts understand well the effects of at least moderately severe space weather on specific technologies, and in many cases know what is required to mitigate them, whether enhanced forecasting and monitoring capabilities, new technologies (new GPS signals and codes, new-generation radiation-hardened electronics), or improved operational procedures. Limited information was also provided—and captured in this report—on the costs of space weather-induced outages (e.g., $50 million to $70 million to restore the $290 million Anik E2 to operational status) as well as of non-space-weather-related events that can serve as proxies for disruptions caused by severe space storms (e.g., $4 billion to $10 billion for the power blackout of August 2003), and an estimate of $1 trillion to $2 trillion during the first year alone was given for the societal and economic costs of a “severe geomagnetic storm scenario” with recovery times of 4 to 10 years. Such cost information is interesting and useful—but as the outcome of the workshop and this report make clear, it is at best only a starting point for the challenge of answering the question implicit in the title: What are the societal and economic impacts of severe space weather? To answer this question quantitatively, multiple variables must be taken into account, including the magnitude, duration, and timing of the event; the nature, severity, and extent of the collateral effects cascading through a society characterized by strong dependencies and interdepen- dencies; the robustness and resilience of the affected infrastructures; the risk management strategies and policies that the public and private sectors have in place; and the capability of the responsible federal, state, and local government agencies to respond to the effects of an extreme space weather event. While this workshop, along with its report, has gathered in one place much of what is currently known or suspected about societal and economic impacts, it has perhaps been most successful in illuminating the scope of the myriad issues involved, and the gaps in knowledge that remain to be explored in greater depth than can be accomplished in a workshop. A quantita- tive and comprehensive assessment of the societal and economic impacts of severe space weather will be a truly daunting task, and will involve questions that go well beyond the scope of the present report. NOTes 1. The Carrington event is by several measures the most severe space weather event on record. It produced several days of spectacular auroral displays, even at unusually low latitudes, and significantly disrupted telegraph services around the

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7 Summaries of Major Reports world. It is named after the British astronomer Richard Carrington, who observed the intense white-light flare associated with the subsequent geomagnetic storm. 2. For the spacecraft industry, for example, space weather predictions are less important than knowledge of climatology and especially of the extremes within a climate record. 3. False alarms are disruptive and expensive. Accurate forecasts of a severe magnetic storm would allow power com- panies to mitigate risk by canceling planned maintenance work, providing additional personnel to deal with adverse effects, and reducing the amount of power transfers between adjacent systems in the grid. However, as was pointed out during the workshop, if the warning proved to be a false alarm and planned maintenance was canceled, the cost of large cranes, huge equipment, and a great deal of material and manpower sitting idle would be very high.

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8 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 5.6 space science and the international Traffic in arms regulations: summary of a Workshop Margaret G. Finarelli, Rapporteur, and Joseph K. Alexander, Rapporteur summary The United States seeks to protect its security and foreign-policy interests, in part, by actively controlling the export of goods, technologies, and services that are or may be useful for military development in other nations. “Export” is defined not simply as the sending abroad of hardware but also as the communication of related technology and know-how to foreigners in the United States and overseas. The U.S. government mechanism for controlling dual-use items—items in commerce that have potential military use—is the Export Administra- tion Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of Commerce; items defined in law as defense articles fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of State and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of the potential military implications of the export of defense articles, the ITAR regime imposes much greater burdens (on both the applicant and the government) than does the EAR regime during the process of applying for, and implementing the provisions of, licenses and technical-assistance agreements. Until the early 1990s export control activity related to all space satellites (commercial and scientific) was handled under ITAR. Between 1992 and 1996 the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations transferred jurisdiction over the licensing of civilian communications satellites to the Commerce Department under EAR. In 1999, however, in response to broad concerns about Chinese attempts to acquire U.S. high technology, the U.S. House of Representatives convened the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Committee. One of the many consequences of the Cox Committee’s report1 was Congress’s mandate that jurisdiction over export and licensing of satellites and related equipment and services, irrespective of military utility, be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the State Department and that such equipment and services be covered as defense articles under ITAR. Scientific satellites were explicitly included despite their use for decades in peaceful internationally conducted cooperative scientific research. It is widely recognized that the shift in regulatory regime from EAR to ITAR has had major deleterious effects on international scientific research activities that depend on satellites, spaceflight hardware, and other items that are now controlled by ITAR. Furthermore, contravening U.S. interests in attracting foreign students to U.S. universities, the capture of space technology by ITAR has caused serious problems in the teaching of university space science and engineering classes, virtually all of which include non-U.S. students. This report is a summary of a September 2007 workshop in which participants from the space research com- munities and the export-control administration and policy communities came together to discuss problems, effects, and potential solutions regarding the application of ITAR to space science. The principal themes and ideas that emerged from the discussions are summarized below. UNiNTeNDeD CONseQUeNCes OF a NeT CasT TOO BrOaDLY The space science community acknowledges the sensitivity of much hardware and technology related to space activity, but they also argue that controlling “everything that flies in space” casts too broad a net. The current admin- istration has actually recognized the mismatch between the ITAR control regime and the low levels of risk inherent in the bulk of international space science activity. A variety of White House policy statements have been made and regulatory adjustments tried over the years, but the unfortunate net result of such changes has been the introduction of ambiguity and uncertainty. As a result, and because the criminal sanctions for failure to comply with ITAR are personal and great, university officials and researchers tend to err on the side of conservatism in seeking licenses and thus impose on themselves financial, administrative, and time-delay burdens that might not even be necessary. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Space Science and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Summary of a Workshop, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-3. 1U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1999.

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 Summaries of Major Reports No one in the policy or political community contends that observed deleterious effects on U.S. leadership in scientific research and on U.S. academic excellence in science and engineering were intended by the use of ITAR as the regulatory regime for scientific-satellite exports. Nonetheless, the unintended consequences continue to plague the space community. eFFeCTs ON sCieNTiFiC researCh Science, perhaps more than most fields of endeavor, depends on a full and open discussion and exchange of ideas among researchers who are addressing a given problem. If researchers are constrained by security classifica- tion or proprietary interests, communication is necessarily limited. Because most of the results of space science research are placed in the public domain, most space research activity qualifies as “fundamental research,” which is excluded from ITAR controls as long as the research is conducted by “accredited institutions of higher learning.” However, the bulk of government-sponsored fundamental space research at universities is conducted by consortia, including government research laboratories and private companies, and ITAR requires licensing when persons from other countries are involved—and they usually are. Since the dawn of the space age, other nations have invested in developing their own capabilities and have thereby made themselves desirable partners of the United States. Furthermore, many space-based scientific efforts focus on the science of Earth, and so international collaboration is necessary if global perspectives are to be drawn. The costs and delays imposed by ITAR processing requirements, coupled with other nations’ reluctance to be made subject to restrictions derived from U.S. law and regulations, are making the United States less and less desirable as a partner to its foreign collaborators. The implications for continued international collaboration are grave. eFFeCTs ON aCaDeMiC OPeraTiONs Ambiguities about what constitutes fundamental research that can thus be excluded from ITAR controls, about what information can be placed in the public domain, and about what specific kinds of involvement with non-U.S. persons require licensing have led to great uncertainties in the university community about the participation of foreign students and researchers in projects involving potentially controlled hardware or technology. Universities must choose between either going through the burdensome licensing or technical-assistance agreement process to involve their students and researchers from other countries or consciously excluding any non-U.S. nationals from space-related research. The latter approach is injurious to the quality of research and to the educational value inherent in diversity. It is especially damaging when the non-U.S. participants could contribute critical and unique knowledge and skills to a project, as is often the case. According to workshop participants, the same uncertainties are leading some professors to “dumb down” course content rather than risk ITAR violations by discussing their research in the classroom setting. Although they believe that the vitality of education in the U.S. university system depends on its links to state-of-the-art research, many cite fears of breaking the law inadvertently. The OUTLOOK In the short term, fundamental changes to the law or regulations are unlikely, especially in a political envi- ronment in which almost any provisions related to national security are taken as givens and attempts to modify them are viewed as being politically risky, regardless of the potential practical impacts. Over the next year or so, the State Department is committed to incremental improvements in efficiency and to better communication with the space community to clarify and harmonize key definitions and concepts where confusion exists. Similarly, members of the university community are committed to participating actively in that communication to make their actions more effective and to document their problems with ITAR to facilitate favorable change. Over the long term, however, many believe that a clean-slate approach is needed to fix the fundamental dis- connect between ITAR as it is being applied to space science research and the needs of the U.S. space science community as it endeavors to maintain world leadership. The United States has many space-related policy priorities in addition to national security, including space leadership, university excellence, and international partnerships. As emphasized at the workshop, all these national goals need to be considered jointly in the development of a system for controlling the export of space-related hardware and technology that is effective at protecting national security, but that does not inadvertently harm the other policy priorities.

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70 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 5.7 United states Civil space Policy: summary of a Workshop Molly K. Macauley, Rapporteur, and Joseph K. Alexander, Rapporteur summary What are the principal purposes, goals, and priorities of the U.S. civil space program?1 This question was the focus of the workshop on civil space policy held November 29-30, 2007, by the Space Studies Board (SSB) and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC). In addressing this question, invited speakers and panelists and the general discussion from this public workshop explored a series of topics, including the following: • Key changes and developments in the U.S. civil space program since the new national Vision for Space Exploration2 (the Vision) was articulated by the executive branch in 2004; • The fit of space exploration within a broader national and international context; • Affordability, public interest, and political will to sustain the civil space program; • Definitions, metrics, and decision criteria for the mix and balance of activities within the program portfolio; • Roles of government in Earth observations from space; and • Gaps in capabilities and infrastructure to support the program. The workshop organizers acknowledged the long-standing problem of reconciling expectations of civil space program accomplishments during the coming decades with the limited public resources available to support these activities. The goal of the workshop was neither to develop definitive solutions nor to reach consensus. Rather, the purpose was to air a range of views and perspectives that would serve to inform broader discussion of such questions by policy makers and the public. This document summarizes the opinions expressed by individual workshop partici- pants and does not necessarily reflect the consensus views of these participants, the SSB, or the workshop planning committee. By way of background, the SSB and the ASEB had convened a similar workshop in 2003 in the wake of the space shuttle Columbia tragedy and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Since the issuance of the report on the 2003 workshop, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy,3 additional developments have taken place to redirect many elements of the civil space program. The Vision for Space Exploration set forth by the executive branch in 2004, the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2005,4 and the national space policy presidential directive issued in 2006 have all served to redirect the program. The Vision sets forth a long-term robotic and human exploration program; the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 endorses the Vision and directs the program in several areas with respect to policy, management, and accountability and oversight; and the 2006 presidential directive establishes goals related to U.S. space leadership and the governance of space operations in and through space. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from United States Civil Space Policy: Summary of a Workshop, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-5. 1Participants at the 2003 workshop considered civil space to include all of NASA’s human and robotic space programs; NOAA’s meteorologi- cal and environmental satellite programs; the activities of commercial entities in support of the space programs of NASA, NOAA, and other civilian agencies; and commercial space activities. Military and national security reconnaissance space programs were not included under the rubric of civil space. Participants in the 2007 workshop took the same approach and also considered emerging entrepreneurial efforts such as space tourism to be part of civil commercial space. 2National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration, NP-2004-01-334-HQ, NASA, Washington, D.C., 2004. 3National Research Council, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004. 4The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Public Law 109-155, 109th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2005.

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7 Summaries of Major Reports rOBUsTNess OF The CiViL sPaCe PrOGraM The workshop summarized here thus builds on discussion from the 2003 workshop in light of these develop- ments. A natural starting point was an assessment of the new directions for the U.S. civil space program: How robust or resilient are these new directions to changes in resources available to support the program? How relevant is the program in what many workshop participants see as a rapidly changing international context? Is there public appeal in terms of willingness to embrace the program? Many participants expressed the view that the Vision had not pro- gressed as originally outlined nor as many had expected, due in large part to the failure of the administration and the Congress to seek the required resources. A prominent concern among participants was that although the Vision was to be “pay as you go,” shortfalls in the NASA budget had led the agency to reallocate resources toward pursuit of the Vision and away from other activities such as space and Earth science. Speakers argued that continued operational costs of the International Space Station, delayed phaseout of the space shuttle, costs of near-term development of the next-generation space transportation system, and unbudgeted operational costs will all make the Vision increasingly unaffordable. Other participants acknowledged that some of the problems with robustness and program balance are of the space community’s own making, in that in many activities, project cost estimates had been unrealistic and subject to significant cost growth. Participants from within and outside the scientific community voiced agreement that the community will need to demonstrate leadership and share responsibility with NASA in controlling science program costs. Speakers expressed concern that NASA’s program suffers from a lack of resources, budget realism, and budget stability, thereby making the Vision unaffordable and unsustainable. The recent report that focused on the space and Earth science issues at this workshop summarized the mood at the workshop as follows:5 Overall, as noted by the participants themselves, the tone of the workshop was surprisingly sober, with frequent expressions of discouragement, disappointment, and apprehension about the future of the U.S. civil space program. During the one and one-half days of discussion, an oft-repeated statement by workshop participants was that the goals of the U.S. civil space program are completely mismatched with the resources provided to accomplish them. iNTerNaTiONaL CONTeXT In contrast with the 2003 workshop at which international developments were mentioned but did not play a pivotal role in discussion, international collaboration and competition were prominent topics at the 2007 workshop. Speakers summarized their understanding of the capabilities and ambitions of new national space programs in China and India, cited the forming of multinational alliances that exclude the United States or Europe, and pointed out some consequences of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as examples of new challenges in balancing cooperation and competition in the U.S. civil space program. For example, speakers questioned whether a goal of cooperation conflicts with the objective in the Vision to support international participation “to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.”6 Some participants suggested that international cooperation could provide a means to share costs, thereby augmenting resources available for the space program, but others noted that collaboration does not always result in reduced costs, particularly if partner roles and responsibilities are unclear. Participants also discussed at length the emergence of China as a major player in space and whether China presents a threat, in which case cooperation may be difficult or even out of the question, or an opportunity for engagement and cooperation, in which case space could gain a new strategic purpose as a vehicle for such cooperation. In any case, discussion highlighted that a decision about how to engage China will not be based solely on space policy, but will depend on much larger geopolitical considerations. PUBLiC iNTeresT aND sUPPOrT In assessing contemporary public interest in and support for space activities, some participants commented that programs such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the Mars rovers are popular and have a “wow factor”; other 5National Research Council, Workshop Series on Issues in Space Science and Technology: Summary of Space and Earth Science Issues from the Workshop on U.S. Civil Space Policy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 2. 6National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration, NP-2004-01-334-HQ, NASA, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. iii.

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7 Space Studies Board Annual Report—008 speakers suggested that as long as the NASA budget is not too large, a “wow factor” in space accomplishments becomes less important. Others noted some survey-based evidence7 that the greatest degree of enthusiasm for human space exploration rests with the Apollo generation (the 45- to 64-year-old age group), with much less support from the generation of youngest votersthe 18- to 24-year-old age group. sUsTaiNaBiLiTY, resOUrCes, LeaDershiP, reLeVaNCe, aND BaLaNCe Subsequent discussion turned to identifying problems in more detail, specifically to addressing a lack of resources, leadership challenges, the relevance and value of the space program, and balance among activities within the program. Speakers cited both internal and external factors that can affect resource requirements. Internal fac- tors include project delays, inadequate contingency funds, pressures for “full employment” at NASA centers, and defensive behavior by program managers and others when resources are scarce. External influences include com- petition from China and India, the emergence of climate and energy as major global issues, and likely continued federal budget deficits. Another concern was potential congressional opposition to U.S. reliance on Russia during an extended launch hiatus after the retirement of the space shuttle. The question of leadership figured prominently in workshop discussions. Some participants argued that strong leadership at senior levels of NASA and the government is essential for the success of the space program. In this context, some speakers viewed with considerable urgency the desirability of senior leaders facing up to what was repeatedly described as a program that cannot be executed within the allotted budget. Speakers also reiterated the responsibility of the space community to establish sound cost estimates and to execute programs within realistic budgets. Why should I care?suggested by a participant as an appropriate question to be posed by candidates for major national officeserved to focus in-depth discussion about a rationale for the civil space program. There were con- siderable differences in opinion, ranging from historically offered reasons (science, national security, commercial activities, a sense of human destiny and exploration, and national prestige and geopolitics) to a focus on the geo- political contributions of the space program as perhaps one of the most compelling current-day rationales. But there was less than full agreement as to whether geopolitics meant cooperation or competition as a motivation for space activities. Discussion also addressed but did not reach agreement on whether, and if so to what extent, the civil space program needs to demonstrate practical benefits and value, a “wow” factor, or some mix of both. Balancing the pursuit of science, human space exploration, aeronautics, and other dimensions of space activities was also a concern among participants. Some speakers cautioned against characterizing the problem as “humans versus robots”; others urged that the focus should be on identifying and exploiting synergies among different parts of NASA, among NASA and other agencies and countries, and between NASA and the private sector. Participants also suggested that assessing balance requires recognition that different constituencies have different objectivesfor example, the scientific community measures much of its success in terms of progress toward goals such as those articulated in decadal surveys, whereas the aeronautics community measures progress in terms of responding to commercial and military air transport requirements. earTh OBserViNG PrOGraMs Workshop discussion also addressed the role of Earth observations. Speakers emphasized that Earth observa- tions necessarily assume even greater importance given evidence of possibly significant changes in climate. But they remained troubled by problems stemming from reorganization of responsibility for and funding of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and the reduced capability of NPOESS in facilitating necessary climate-related measurements. Discussion also addressed the persistent difficulty between NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the “handoff” from use for research purposes to operational use of Earth science infrastructure and information. Speakers argued that differences in these agenciesranging from culture to objectivesbecome even sharper when their budgets are declining. 7M.L. Dittmar, Engaging the 8- Generation: Educational Outreach, Interactive Technologies, and Space, Dittmar Associates, Inc., avail- able at http://www.dittmar-associates.com/Publications/Engaging%20the%2018-25%20Generation%20Update~web.pdf.

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7 Summaries of Major Reports CaPaBiLiTies aND iNFrasTrUCTUre Additional workshop discussion included optimistic comments about future capabilities and infrastructure to support the civil space program if national priorities can be well articulated and sufficient resources made available. For example, both traditional and new companies in aerospace can bring creativity and talent to problem solving when requirements are made clear. Speakers described experiences with bright university students interested in aerospace careers provided students sense that they can have an impact. Speakers further urged that NASA and universities build more effective partnerships to encourage talent and that ITAR restrictions limiting access to good students be remedied. Some participants mentioned institutions where turnover rates among aerospace profession- als are very low, even at the present time. Discussion also addressed the attraction of many young people to space activities using contemporary media that create a virtual presence. CONCLUDiNG TheMes The workshop concluded with the consolidation of discussion topics, which fell into three broad categories: communicating about space exploration; international competition, cooperation, and leadership; and ensuring robust- ness through new approaches and attitudes. One idea for avoiding the impending programmatic “train wreck” to which many participants referred during the workshop was to “slow down the train” by deferring the first human mission to the Moon; extending the use of the International Space Station in support of research and development for later human exploration; establishing a telepresence on the Moon; creating an environment of institutional sta- bility in NASA’s program elements; building globally inclusive working groups on direct missions to Mars, global change, and space science; and defining real, meaningful jobs for humans in space.