National Academies Press: OpenBook

Space Studies Board Annual Report 2008 (2009)

Chapter: 5 Summaries of Major Reports

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Suggested Citation:"5 Summaries of Major Reports." National Research Council. 2009. Space Studies Board Annual Report 2008. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12624.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

5 Summaries of Major Reports This chapter reprints the summaries of reports that were released in 2008 (note that the official publication date may be 2009). Two reports released in 2007 but published in 2008Assessment of the NASA Astrobiology Institute and ­ rading NASA’s Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Reviewthe summaries were reprinted in Space G Studies Board Annual Report2007. 37

38 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 5.1 Ensuring the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft Summary The nation’s next-generation National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was created by the Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)-2 of May 5, 1994, that merged the military and civil meteorological programs into a single program.  Within NPOESS, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible for satellite operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for major acquisitions, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is responsible for the development and infusion of new technologies. In 2000, the NPOESS program anticipated purchasing six satellites for $6.5 billion, with a first launch in 2008. By November 2005, however, it had become apparent that NPOESS would overrun its cost estimates by at least 25 percent, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy review by the DOD. The results of that review were announced in June 2006; among the notable changes in the “certified” NPOESS program were the following: • The planned acquisition of six spacecraft was reduced to four. • The planned use of three Sun-synchronous orbits was reduced to two, with data from the European Meteo- rological Operational (MetOp) satellites provided by the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteoro- logical Satellites (EUMETSAT) providing data for the canceled mid-morning orbit. • The launch of the first spacecraft, NPOESS C1, was delayed until 2013. • Several sensors were canceled (in common parlance, “demanifested”) or degraded (“descoped”) in ­capability as the program was refocused on “core” requirements related to the acquisition of data to support numerical weather prediction. “Secondary” (non-core) sensors that would provide crucial continuity to certain long-term climate records, as well as other sensors that would have provided new measurement capabilities, were not funded in the certified NPOESS program. Since the 1970s, NOAA has operated geostationary satellites that provide images and data on atmospheric, oceanic, and climatic conditions over the continental United States and Hawaii from ~22,000 miles above the equator. NOAA’s next generation of geostationary weather satellites will commence with the launch of GOES-R in 2015. Originally, plans for this series included four satellites—GOES-R through GOES-U. However, in Septem- ber 2006, following significant cost growth and estimates that the total program cost would nearly double, NOAA NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Ensuring the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-9.   Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-Orbiting Operation Environmental Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994, available at http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/NSTC-2.html.   See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Hearing Charter, “The Future of NPOESS: Results of the Nunn-McCurdy Review of NOAA’s Weather Satellite Program,” June 8, 2006, available at http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full06/June%208/charter.pdf.   Following program changes in September 2006, it was announced that launch of the first spacecraft in the GOES-R satellite series would be delayed until December 2014. However, a reduction in funds included in the FY 2008 enacted budget resulted in an additional delay until April 2015. See Chapter 4, “Procurement, Acquisition and Construction,” in NOAA FY 2009 Budget Summary, available at http://www.­ corporateservices.noaa.gov/~nbo/09bluebook_highlights.html.   The cost growth resulted in part from the risk reduction achieved by a deliberate shift from a 50 percent cost probability to the more con- servative 80 percent probability, based on lessons learned from NPOESS.

Summaries of Major Reports 39 reduced the scope of the program, removed a key instrument on the spacecraft, the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES), and revised the procurement process so that only two satellites are guaranteed.  These events prompted a request from NASA and NOAA for two National Research Council (NRC) efforts. The first, a workshop titled “Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft” and held in Washington, D.C., on June 19-21, 2007, gave participants an opportunity to discuss options to recover measurement capabilities, especially those related to climate research, that were lost as a result of the Nunn- McCurdy actions and the cancellation of the HES on GOES-R. Some 100 scientists and engineers from academia, government, and industry attended the workshop, commenting on a draft mitigation plan developed by NASA and NOAA as well as exploring options not included in the NASA-NOAA report. A prepublication version of the workshop report (NRC, 2008) was released in October 2007. The second NRC effort, a study documented in the present report, builds on the information gathered at the June 2007 workshop. In their request for this study (Appendix A), NASA and NOAA asked that a committee of the NRC “prioritize capabilities, especially those related to climate research, that were lost or placed at risk follow­ing recent changes to NPOESS and the GOES-R series of polar and geostationary environmental monitor- ing satellites” [emphasis added]. The Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft understands “climate” to be “the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant measures of the atmosphere-ocean system over periods of time ranging from weeks to thousands or millions of years” (Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, 2003, p. 12). In the present study, the committee primarily considered climate-related physical, chemical, and biological processes that vary on interannual to centennial timescales. It is also important to note that the committee did not a priori assume a longer-duration measurement record would be assigned a higher priority than a shorter-duration measurement record. Instead, the committee considered each measurement’s value to climate science in a more comprehensive sense as described in the section below on prioritization. The committee interprets the information needed for climate research broadly to be that which enables: • Detection of variations in climate (through long-term records), • Climate predictions and projections, and • Improved understanding of the physical, chemical, and biological processes involved in climate variability and change. In performing its prioritization, the committee was cognizant of the scientific importance of maintaining long-term records of climate forcing and improving understanding of the climate system through starting or con- tinuing records of climate responses. It also recognized the challenges of finding an appropriate balance between observations of climate forcing and response on the one hand, and sustained observations and improved “process” understanding on the other. The committee notes that its interpretation of the research agenda for climate-related issues is consistent with the five goals of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (Box S.1).   The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite consisted of two components: an advanced hyperspectral sounder and a coastal waters imager. The hyperspectral sounder was intended to greatly advance current operational geostationary sounding capability; its cancellation will instead end the long-term geostationary sounding record started by GOES-I. The coastal waters imager component was planned primarily to benefit coastal monitoring, management, and remediation applications.   Oversight Hearing on the Government Accountability Office Report on NOAA’s Weather Satellite Program Before the Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, September 29, 2006, available at http://science.house.gov/publications/hearings_markups_details. aspx?NewsID=1194.   Outlined in a presentation titled “Mitigation Approaches to Address Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA Climate Goals,” available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/ NPOESSWorkshop_Cramer_NRC_06_19_07_final.pdf and also reprinted in Appendix C of the June 2007 workshop report. A final version of the NASA-NOAA report has not been released; a widely cited December 11, 2006, draft was posted by Climate Science Watch at http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/file-uploads/NPOESS-OSTPdec-06.pdf.   Prediction (climate) is a probabilistic description or forecast of a future climate outcome based on observations of past and current climato- logical conditions and quantitative models of climate processes (e.g., a prediction of an El Niño event) and projection (climate) is a description of the response of the climate system to an assumed level of future radiative forcing. Changes in radiative forcing may be due to either natural sources (e.g., volcanic emissions) or human-induced causes (e.g., emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, or changes in land use and land cover). Climate “projections” are distinguished from climate “predictions” in order to emphasize that climate projections depend on scenarios of future socioeconomic, technological, and policy developments that may or may not be realized (Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, 2003, p. 12).

40 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 BOX S.1 Goals of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program Goal 1:  Improve knowledge of Earth’s past and present climate and environment, including its natural variability, and improve understanding of the causes of observed variability and change. Goal 2:  Improve quantification of the forces bringing about changes in Earth’s climate and related systems. Goal 3:  Reduce uncertainty in projections of how Earth’s climate and related systems may change in the future. Goal 4:  Understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural and managed ecosys- tems and human systems to climate and related global changes. Goal 5:  Explore the uses and identify the limits of evolving knowledge to manage risks and opportunities related to climate variability and change. SOURCE: The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Factsheet, available at http://www.climatescience.gov/infosheets/ factsheet3/CCSP-3-StratPlanOverview14jan2006.pdf. APPROACH TO AND SCOPE OF PRIORITIZATION Conducted during its December 17-19, 2007, meeting, the committee’s prioritization of capabilities lost in program restructuring was guided by the following overarching principles: • The objective of the committee’s deliberations would be to prioritize for the restoration of climate capa- bilities. For example, although a sensor with the capability to improve resolution of fast climate processes is of interest to both the weather forecasting and the climate research communities, it is the value to the latter that would inform the committee’s ranking. • The particular strategy for recovery and the cost of recovery of a measurement/sensor would not be a factor in the ranking. • Measurements/sensors on NPOESS would not be ranked against measurements/sensors on GOES-R; how- ever, the criteria used in ranking measurements/sensors for either program would be identical. • When it was relevant, the measurement objectives of a particular sensor, and not the sensor itself, would be the basis for consideration. Thus, for example, members of the committee considered the importance of radar altimetry to climate science, rather than the importance of the particular implementation of this capability on NPOESS, that is, the ALT instrument. Prior to the meeting, one or more committee members with the requisite expertise was assigned the task of preparing a detailed review of the issues associated with the descoping or demanifesting of a particular NPOESS or GOES-R measurement capability, guided by questions 1 through 9, below. These questions, which were devel­ oped at the committee’s first meeting, follow from the committee’s interpretation of what constitutes climate sci- ence and the associated requirements for climate observations (see above); they allow a prioritization across the diverse information requirements for climate science, for example, long-term measurements, new measurements, measurements of climate forcings and responses, measurements to improve scientific understanding and reduce key uncertainties, and measurements to improve climate predictions. The questions are also consistent with the   The committee did not have access to the ongoing NASA-NOAA study for OSTP that is examining the cost of various recovery strategies.

Summaries of Major Reports 41 ranking criteria employed by the panels of the NRC Earth Science and Applications from Space decadal survey (NRC, 2007), although in that study societal benefits and cost considerations were included as ranking factors. 10 By design, the questions were open-ended in order to provoke a more nuanced discussion of the value of the measurements. For example, rather than merely listing the duration of the measurement records at risk as a proxy for value, the committee considered the value of a long-term record in a more holistic manner via questions 1 and 5, which in turn prompted an in-depth exploration of the value of the long-term record, the impact of the record on global climate studies, the relative impact/consequences of a gap in the record, the maturity of related data assimilation, and sensor heritage. Such an analysis was considered important in the prioritization process in order to appropriately balance the need to continue very-long-duration measurements with shorter-duration measure- ments. The former would benefit with better scores for measurement/sensor maturity and the value of maintaining the long-term record. The latter measurements, although perhaps less mature, might result in greater consequences associated with a prospective measurement gap (for example, those related to climate forcing/response parameters with larger uncertainties for which longer trend data can greatly constrain future climate predictions). 1. To what extent are the data used both to monitor and to provide a historical record of the global climate? Is there a requirement for data continuity? If so, discuss the consequences of a measurement gap. 2. To what extent is this measurement important in reducing “uncertainty”—for example, in reducing error bars in climate sensitivity forcing and monitoring? In making these judgments, refer also to the priorities of the Climate Change Research Program. 3. Consider the importance of the measurement’s role in climate prediction and projections (forcing/ response/sensitivity). 4. To what extent is the measurement needed for reanalysis? 5. Describe the measurement’s maturity—for example, its readiness to be assimilated into a particular model(s)—and its heritage. If discussing a sensor, discuss its technical maturity and heritage. 6. Are other sensors and ancillary data required to make the measurement useful? Is this measurement unique? Are there complementary international sensors? If so, please list them and assess their capabilities. Discuss any data issues you may be aware of. 7. To what extent are the data used by, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Climate Change Science Program (in developing synthesis and assessment products)? 8. Provide a qualitative assessment of the measurement’s role in contributing to an overall improved under- standing of the climate system and climate processes. 9. To what extent does the measurement contribute to improved understanding in related disciplines? Following each reviewer presentation, committee members actively discussed the measurement objective under consideration in relation to each of the nine questions. The committee’s prioritization was developed on the basis of numerical scoring of the importance of each measurement capability to the needs of the climate research community (questions 1-8) and the importance of the measurement to related disciplines (question 9). Each of the responses to questions 1 through 9 was given equal weight in determining an overall ranking.11 The committee had extensive discussions regarding whether a simple average of committee member rankings of the responses to questions 1 through 9 should be used for an overall ranking, or whether rankings with respect to particular questions should be given more weight. In part because there was no consensus among committee members on how a particular weighting scheme might improve what was already a subjective evaluation (in map- ping the study statement of task to the questions, and in assigning individual numerical rankings for each ques- tion), the committee determined that the use of an unweighted average was advisable. Given that the committee was not provided any information concerning costs, relative or absolute, for any of the proposed mitigations, its prioritization of measurement capabilities was based entirely on climate science value as determined by consid- eration of the nine questions above. Lacking the information by which to determine the financial implications of its recommendations, the committee did not include implementation costs in its rankings. The committee notes, however, that had costs been provided, a more far-reaching set of recommendations might have been developed 10  See Box 2.2 in Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (NRC, 2007), p. 40. 11  The committee was aware of a similar prioritization exercise conducted by NASA and NOAA in late 2006/early 2007. NASA and NOAA reached a somewhat different prioritization, which the present committee attributes in large part to their giving additional weight to the factors noted in question 1, that is, measurement continuity and the importance of avoiding a data gap.

42 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 in which cost/benefit was taken into consideration. It is also important to recognize that important nonscientific factors were not, by design, part of the committee’s analysis. Before restructuring, each of the lost or degraded measurement capabilities had been considered both prac- ticable and of high importance. In the case of NPOESS, a tri-agency under-secretary-level executive committee provides overall program direction and ensures that both civil and national security requirements are satisfied. 12 GOES-R requirements had been established by NOAA following a formal process that determined and prioritized user requirements; various senior management committees oversaw this process.13 As is evident in the “Highlights of Analysis” sections in Chapter 3, the committee also found great merit in each of the climate-related measure- ment capabilities under consideration. However, given that a wholesale reversal of the programs’ changes is not feasible, it became the committee’s difficult task to provide a prioritized set of recommendations for restoration of climate measurement capabilities. SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES AND MITIGATION OPTIONS The committee prioritized all of the climate-related measurement capabilities that were lost or diminished as a result of NPOESS and GOES-R program restructuring rather than limiting its recommendations to the demanifested sensors as was done in the NASA-NOAA draft report prepared for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).14 The committee’s approach is consistent with input received from the community as part of the NRC’s June 2007 workshop. Specifically, with respect to changes in the NPOESS program, the committee considered: • Aerosol properties and the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), • Earth radiation budget and the Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System/Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (CERES/ERBS), • Hyperspectral diurnal coverage and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), • Microwave radiometry and the Conical Scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS), • Ocean color and the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), • Ozone profiles and the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite-Limb (OMPS-L) sensor, • Radar altimetry and the ALT sensor, and • Total solar irradiance and the Total Solar Irradiance Monitor (TIM)/spectrally resolved irradiance and the Solar Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM). With respect to the changes in the GOES-R program, the committee considered: • Geostationary coastal waters imagery and the HES-CWI sensor, and • Geostationary hyperspectral sounding and the HES sensor. As a result of the prioritization process, the measurements and sensors listed above are divided into four groups, which the committee designates, in descending order of priority, as Tier 1 through Tier 4 (Figure S.1). As noted above, sensors from the NPOESS and GOES-R programs were not prioritized head-to-head. However, it can be roughly stated that considering climate science contributions alone, geostationary hyperspectral sounding compares to the NPOESS capabilities prioritized as Tier 2, and coastal waters imagery falls into Tier 4. After completing the relative prioritization, the committee considered a wide range of options for recovery of the lost capabilities, including the remanifesting of sensors onto NPOESS platforms, accommodation of sensors on free flyers or flights of opportunity, and the use of formation flight to combine multiple, synergistic, measure- ment types without incurring the cost, complexity, and risk of large facility-class observatories. The committee’s recommendations for mitigation recovery of the lost capabilities are detailed in the main text and are summarized in Table S.1. 12  Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, “Convergence of U.S.-Polar-Orbiting Operation Environmental Satellite Systems,” May 5, 1994, available at http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/About/NSTC-2.html. 13  See Jim Gurka, “The Requirement Process in NOAA GOES-R Mission Definition,” April 12, 2007, available at http://osd.goes.noaa. gov/documents/Requirements_Process.pdf. 14  See footnote 7 above.

Summaries of Major Reports 43 FIGURE S.1  Graphical depiction of overall rankings, showing the clustering of scores into what the committee defined as Tiers 1-4, for recovery of both NPOESS (low Earth orbit) and GOES-R (geostationary Earth orbit) lost or degraded climate capabilities. The color coding used in Figure S.1 and Table S.1—green, yellow, blue, and pink shading to indicate Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4 prioritization, respectively—is used as an interpretive aid in Chapter 3. ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM CLIMATE STRATEGY: A WAY FORWARD The committee has developed and recommends a prioritized, short-term strategy for recovery of crucial cli- mate capabilities lost in the NPOESS and GOES-R program descopes. However, mitigation of these recent losses is only the first step in establishing a viable long-term climate strategy—one that builds on the lessons learned from the well-intentioned but poorly executed merger of the nation’s weather and climate observation systems. The key elements of such a long-term strategy are discussed in Chapter 4 and are summarized here. Sustained Climate Observations In developing an effective long-term climate strategy, it is critical to consider the similarities in and differ- ences between research, operational, and sustained measurements in order to take advantage of synergies when

44 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 TABLE S.1  Summary Recommendations for Mitigation of Lost or Degraded Climate Capabilities Lost or Degraded Climate Capability in NPOESS Low Earth Orbit Recommendation Tier 1 Microwave Radiometry •  NASA and NOAA should initiate a study as soon as practicable to address continuity of microwave radiometry and to determine a cost-effective approach to supplement the AMSR-2, carried on the Japanese spacecraft GCOM-W, with another microwave radiometer of similar design. The agencies should also consider the feasibility of manifesting a microwave radiometer on a flight of opportunity or free flyer to cover the microwave radiometry gap anticipated with a delay in accommodation of MIS until NPOESS C2. •  The agencies should provide funding for U.S. participation in an AMSR-2 science team to take full advantage of this upcoming microwave radiometer mission. •  The NPOESS Integrated Program Office should continue with its plans to restore a microwave sounder to NPOESS C2 and subsequent platforms, with an emphasis on SUAG priorities 1 through 3 (core radiometry, sounding channels, and soil moisture/sea surface temperature). •  NASA and NOAA should devise and implement a long-term strategy to provide sea-surface wind vector measurements. The committee finds important limitations in the planned reliance on a polarimetric radiometer for this measurement; instead, the preferred strategy is timely development and launch of the next-generation advanced scatterometer mission, that is, the Extended Ocean Vector Winds Mission (XOVWM) recommended in the 2007 NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space. Radar Altimetry A precision altimetry follow-on mission to OSTM/Jason-2 (i.e., Jason-3) should be developed and launched in a time frame to ensure the necessary mission overlap. The agencies’ long-term plan should include a series of precision altimetry free flyers in non-Sun-synchronous orbit designed to provide for climate-quality measurements of sea level. Earth Radiation Budget To minimize the risk of a potential data gap, the committee reiterates the recommendation of the 2007 Earth Science and Applications from Space decadal survey to manifest the CERES FM-5 on NPP. The agencies should further develop an ERB instrument series and provide for subsequent flights on Sun-synchronous platforms to continue the Earth radiation budget long- term record. Tier 2 Hyperspectral Diurnal Coverage The CrIS/ATMS instrument suite should be restored to the 05:30 NPOESS orbit to provide improved hyperspectral diurnal coverage and support atmospheric moisture and temperature vertical profile key performance parameters. Total Solar Irradiance The agencies should consider use of an appropriate combination of small, low-cost satellites and flights of opportunity to fly TSIS (or at least TIM) as needed to ensure overlap and continuity of measurements of total solar irradiance. Tier 3 Aerosol Properties •  NASA should continue its current plan to fly the APS on Glory. •  NASA and NOAA should continue to mature aerosol remote sensing technology and plan for the development of operational instruments for accommodation on future platforms and/or flights of opportunity. Ocean Color •  The NPOESS Integrated Program Office should consider any practical mechanisms to improve VIIRS performance for NPP and ensure that all specifications are met or exceeded by the launch of NPOESS C1. •  The agencies should ensure that adequate post-launch calibration/validation infrastructure is in place, including oversight by the scientific community, to ensure the production of viable ocean color imagery. •  address reduced sensor coverage, the agencies should work with their international To partners toward flying a fully functioning VIIRS or a dedicated sensor on a mission of opportunity in Sun-synchronous orbit. The agencies should also work with international partners to ensure community access to ocean color and ancillary calibration/validation data from international platforms during the gap likely to be experienced prior to launch of NPOESS C1. Ozone Profiles The committee supports current agency plans to reintegrate OMPS-Limb on NPP. The agencies should consider the relative cost/benefit of reintegration of OMPS-Limb capabilities for NPOESS platforms carrying OMPS-Nadir based on the degree of integration inherent in the instrument’s original design. Lost or Degraded Climate Capability in GOES-R Geostationary Earth Orbit Recommendation Tier 2 Geostationary Hyperspectral Sounding NASA and NOAA should plan an earliest-possible demonstration flight of a geostationary hyperspectral sounder, supporting operational flight in the GOES-T time frame. Tier 4 Geostationary Coastal Waters Imagery Provision for coastal waters imaging should be considered by the agencies based on non‑climate applications.

Summaries of Major Reports 45 appropriate while avoiding incompatible observing system requirements. Sustained measurements needed to detect climate trends can, for example, impose tighter requirements for calibration, characterization, and stability, or impose orbit constraints different from what would otherwise be required for operational applications. A long-term climate strategy must provide for the essential characterization, calibration, stability, continuity, and data systems required to support climate applications. National Policy for Provision of Long-Term Climate Measurements Much of climate science depends on long-term, sustained measurement records. Yet, as has been noted in many previous NRC and agency reports, the nation lacks a clear policy to address these known national and inter- national needs. For example, an ad hoc NRC task group (NRC, 1999b, p. 4) stated as follows: No federal entity is currently the “agent” for climate or longer-term observations and analyses, nor has the ­“virtual agency” envisioned in the [U.S. Global Change Research Program] succeeded in this function. The task group e ­ ndorses NASA’s call for a high-level process to develop a national policy to ensure that the long-term continuity and quality of key data sets required for global change research are not compromised in the process of merging research and operational data sets.15 A coherent, integrated, and viable long-term climate observation strategy should explicitly seek to balance the myriad science and applications objectives basic to serving the variety of climate data stakeholders. The program should, for example, consider the appropriate balance between (1) new sensors for technological inno- vation, (2) new observations for emerging science needs, (3) long-term sustainable science-grade environmental observations, and (4) measurements that improve support for decision makers to enable more effective climate mitigation and adaptation regulations (NRC, 2006). The various agencies have differing levels of expertise associated with each of these programmatic elements, and the long-term strategy should seek to capitalize on inherent organizational strengths where appropriate. Elements of this needed national policy include clear roles and responsibilities for agencies, international coordination, and community involvement in the development of climate data records. Clear Agency Roles and Responsibilities In the NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space, the authors stated, “The committee is concerned that the nation’s civil space institutions (including NASA, NOAA, and USGS) are not adequately pre- pared to meet society’s rapidly evolving Earth information needs. These institutions have responsibilities that are in many cases mismatched with their authorities and resources: institutional mandates are inconsistent with agency charters, budgets are not well matched to emerging needs, and shared responsibilities are supported inconsistently by mechanisms for cooperation. These are issues whose solutions will require action at high levels of the federal government” (NRC, 2007, p. 13). In turn, this prompted one of the report’s most important recommendations: “The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in collaboration with the relevant agencies and in consultation with the scientific community, should develop and implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth observations. This plan should recognize the complexity of differing agency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as well as the lessons from implementation of the Landsat, EOS, and NPOESS programs” (p. 14). The present committee fully endorses the need for clarified agency roles and responsibilities, consistent with inherent agency strengths, and reiterates this important recommendation of the decadal survey. International Coordination The committee recognizes the importance of international cooperation in obtaining climate-quality measure- ments from space; the absence of an internationally agreed upon and ratified strategy for climate observations 15  similar view was expressed in Adequacy of Climate Observing Systems, which stated, “There has been a lack of progress by the federal A agencies responsible for climate observing systems, individually and collectively, toward developing and maintaining a credible integrated climate observing system” (NRC, 1999a, p. 5).

46 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 from space remains an area of grave concern. The research and operational agencies should coordinate their development, operations, standards, and products with international partners. Community Involvement in the Development of Climate Data Records The NRC has produced a number of reports on the subject of climate data records (CDRs), many having been motivated by concerns over the future availability of satellite-based climate-quality data records. The implied demise of climate-focused satellite observations from NPOESS, a consequence of the Nunn-McCurdy certification, adds to the ongoing concern about the lack of organized commitment to CDR development. It has been stressed in many NRC and other reports that generation of CDRs requires considerable scientific insight, including the blend- ing of multiple sources of data; error analysis; and access to raw data. On the basis of its review of previous NRC studies and its own experience, the committee identified a number of particularly important elements for a sus- tained long-term program dedicated to developing credible CDRs. These elements are discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, it is important to note that community concerns about the adequacy of NPOESS for climate research existed even before the 2006 program restructuring. For example, in the 2007 NRC decadal survey Earth Science and Applications from Space (NRC, 2007, p. 263), the report from the Panel on Climate Variability and Change concluded that, “Regardless of the descoping, the NPOESS program lacks essential features of a well-designed climate-observing system.” REFERENCES Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 2003. Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. Available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/final/default.htm. NRC (National Research Council). 1999a. Adequacy of Climate Observing Systems. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 1999b. “Assessment of NASA’s Plans for Post-2002 Earth Observing Missions,” letter report. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., April 8. NRC. 2006. A Review of NASA’s 2006 Draft Science Plan: Letter Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 2007. Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. NRC. 2008. Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: A Workshop Report. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.

Summaries of Major Reports 47 5.2 Launching Science: Science Opportunities Provided by NASA’s Constellation System A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System Summary In 2004 NASA began implementation of the first phases of a new space exploration policy.  This imple- mentation effort included the development of a new human-carrying spacecraft, known as Orion; the Altair lunar lander; and two new launch vehicles, the Ares I and Ares V rockets—collectively called the Constellation System (described in Chapter 5 of this report). The Altair lunar lander, which is in the very preliminary concept stage, is not discussed in detail in this report. In 2007 NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to evaluate the sci- ence opportunities enabled by the Constellation System. To do so, the NRC established the Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System. In general, the committee interpreted “Constellation- enabled” broadly, to include not only mission concepts that required Constellation, but also those that could be significantly enhanced by Constellation. The committee intends this report to be a general overview of the topic of science missions that might be enabled by Constellation, a sort of textbook introduction to the subject. The mission concepts that are reviewed in this report should serve as general examples of kinds of missions, and the committee’s evaluation should not be construed as an endorsement of the specific teams that developed the mission concepts or of their proposals. Additionally, NASA has a well-developed process for establishing scientific priorities by asking the NRC to con- duct a “decadal survey” for a particular discipline. Any scientific mission that eventually uses the Constellation System will have to be properly evaluated by means of this decadal survey process. The committee was impressed with the scientific potential of many of the proposals that it evaluated. However, the committee notes that the Constellation System has been justified by NASA and selected in order to enable human exploration beyond low Earth orbit—not to enable science missions. Virtually all of the science mission concepts that could take advantage of Constellation’s unique capabilities are likely to be prohibitively expensive. Several times in the past NASA has begun ambitious space science missions that ultimately proved too expensive for the agency to pursue. Examples include the Voyager-Mars mission and the Prometheus program and its Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter spacecraft (both examples are discussed in Chapter 1). Finding:  The scientific missions reviewed by the committee as appropriate for launch on an Ares V vehicle fall, with few exceptions, into the “flagship” class of missions. The preliminary cost estimates, based on mis- sion concepts that at this time are not very detailed, indicate that the costs of many of the missions analyzed will be above $5 billion (in current dollars). The Ares V costs are not included in these estimates. All of the costs discussed in this report are presented in current-year (2008) dollars, not accounting for poten- tial inflation that could occur between now and the decade in which these missions might be pursued. In general, preliminary cost estimates for proposed missions are, for many reasons, significantly lower than the final costs. Given the large cost estimates for many of the missions assessed in this report, the potentially large impacts on NASA’s budget by many of these missions are readily apparent. SCIENCE MISSIONS THAT ARE ENABLED OR ENHANCED BY THE CONSTELLATION SYSTEM The committee evaluated a total of 17 mission concepts for future space science missions (11 were “Vision Missions” studied at the initiation of NASA between 2004 and 2006; the remaining 6 were submitted to the committee in response to its request for information). The committee based its initial evaluation of each mis- NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Launching Science: Science Opportunities Provided by NASA’s Constellation System, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009, pp. 1-9; approved for release in 2008.   ee http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html. S   its interim report, the committee selected 7 of the 11 Vision Mission concepts as “worthy of further study as a Constellation mission.” In See National Research Council, Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System: Interim Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008.

48 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 sion concept on two criteria: (1) whether the concept offered the potential for a significant scientific advance and (2) whether or not the concept would benefit from the Constellation System. The committee determined that all of the concepts offered the possibility of a significant scientific advance, but it cautions that such an evaluation ultimately must be made by the NRC’s decadal survey process referred to above. This report’s evaluations should not be considered to be an endorsement of the scientific merit of these proposals, which must of course be evalu- ated relative to other proposals. The committee determined that 12 of the 17 mission concepts would benefit from the Constellation System, whereas 5 would not. See Table S.1 for a summary of the mission concepts, including their cost estimates, techni- cal maturity, and reasons why they might benefit from the Constellation System. The five mission concepts that the committee deemed not worthy of further study as Constellation missions according to its evaluation criteria simply do not require, or do not appear to benefit highly from, use of the Con- stellation System (see Table S.1). In several cases they should easily fit within existing launch vehicles. In one case, that of Super-EUSO (Extreme Universe Space Observatory), the committee questions the cost-effectiveness of a flagship-class space mission as compared with the expansion of existing ground-based facilities. Notably, the committee did not receive any proposals in the Earth sciences. The committee lacked sufficient data to determine why it did not receive any such proposals, although it notes that the Vision Mission effort that spon- sored many of the mission concepts evaluated in this study did not include Earth science, which at the time was separated organizationally within NASA from space science. It is possible that, if invited to consider the matter, the Earth science community may find uses for Constellation that are not readily apparent. TABLE S.1  Summary of Mission Concepts Evaluated by the Committee Cost Worthy Estimatea of Further (billions of Study as a current-year Constellation Mission [2008] $) Technical Maturityb Mission? Notes Advanced Compton ∼1 Medium No This mission does not benefit from the Constellation Telescope (ACT)c System. It can fit in an existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). Advanced >5 Low for mirror Yes The 16-meter folded telescope design can only fit in an Technology technology Ares V payload fairing. Large-Aperture (including mass) Space Telescope Medium for detectors (ATLAST)d and thermal control Dark Ages Lunar >5 Medium for rovers and Yes The large antennas must be landed on the lunar farside. Interferometer interferometrics This requires both the Ares V launch vehicle and the Altair (DALI)d Low for reducing mass lunar lander. and for deploying and operating in a remote location 8-Meter Monolithic 1-5 High for mirror and Yes The 8-meter-diameter telescope can only fit inside an Ares Space Telescoped structure V payload fairing. Low for coronagraphic observation Exploration >5 High for instruments Yes The Orion vehicle is the only U.S. spacecraft envisioned of Near Earth Low for human factors that will be capable of operating beyond low Earth Objects via the such as radiation orbit. The mission also will require substantial payload Crew Exploration capability. This mission fits better within the purview of the Vehicled Exploration Systems Mission Directorate than as a mission of the Science Mission Directorate.

Summaries of Major Reports 49 TABLE S.1  Continued Cost Worthy Estimatea of Further (billions of Study as a current-year Constellation Mission [2008] $) Technical Maturityb Mission? Notes Generation-X >5 Low for mirror Yes One Ares V launch of one 16-meter telescope (Gen-X)c development and is significantly simpler than the early proposed operations configurations. The cost estimates are weak. The additional mass capability could significantly reduce mirror development costs. Interstellar Probec 1-5 High for science, Yes Further study is needed of the benefits of Ares V—in instruments, and particular, of alternative propulsion options. mission concept Kilometer-Baseline >5 Low No This mission should be able to fit on an existing EELV; Far-Infrared/ therefore the need for Constellation is questionable, except Submillimeter for human servicing. Interferometerc Modern Universe >5 High for instruments Yes A large, one-piece central mirror rather than a robotically Space Telescope Low for coronagraph assembled mirror is possible with Ares V. (MUST)c and mirror assembly Neptune Orbiter >5 High for mission Yes Ares V could possibly obviate the need for aerocapture with Probesc concept and and/or nuclear-electric propulsion. instruments Low for propulsion and possibly lander Palmer Questc >5 Low No This mission does not benefit from Constellation. It can fit in an existing EELV. Single Aperture Far >5 Medium for mission No This mission does not benefit from Constellation. It can Infrared (SAFIR) concept fit in an existing EELV. However, it could benefit from Telescopec Low for cooling and human servicing. detectors Solar Polar Imagerc ∼1 High for instruments Yes Propulsion options enabled by Ares V should be Propulsion not studied considered. in sufficient detail Solar Probe 2d 1-5 High for science, Yes Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles could enable spacecraft instruments, and to be placed in an orbit that could bring it close to the Sun, mission concept accomplishing the major science goals. Stellar Imagerc >5 Low for formation Yes Larger mirrors (2 meters versus 1 meter) and a second hub flying could be launched on a single Ares V launch. Super-EUSO 1-5 Low for mirror No This mission does not benefit from Constellation. (Extreme Significant advances in this science can be made using Universe Space ground-based and alternative approaches. Observatory)d Titan Explorerc >5 High for instruments Yes Launch on Ares V may enable propulsive capture rather Medium for blimp than aerocapture and may shorten transit time. NOTE: The mission concepts are listed in alphabetical order. All of the missions listed are robotic missions, with the exception of the proposal for Exploration of Near Earth Objects via the Crew Exploration Vehicle.   aCost estimates are based on data estimates provided to the committee, with modifications based on expertise within the committee.   bTechnical maturity is based on data provided to the committee.   cThis is 1 of 11 Vision Mission studies initiated by NASA between 2004 and 2006.   dThis study proposal was submitted in response to the committee’s request for information.

50 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 Finding:  The committee did not receive any Earth science proposals and found it impossible to assess the potential of the Constellation System to meet the future needs of Earth-oriented missions. The mission concepts reviewed during this study lacked the level of detail necessary for a full evaluation. In particular, the cost estimates were extremely rough. The lack of Earth science concepts also concerned the com- mittee. NASA is still in the early stages of identifying the potential benefits of the Constellation System to the space science program and has not made a dedicated effort to evaluate the potential of the Constellation System for space and Earth science missions. As a result, the committee determined that the agency needs to continue efforts to attract and advance ideas for space and Earth science missions in general, and should develop a method for soliciting potential mission concepts. Recommendation:  NASA should solicit further mission concepts that are most likely to benefit from the capabilities of the Constellation System in each of the space and Earth science disciplines: astronomy and astrophysics, Earth science, heliophysics, and planetary science. The agency should seek mission concepts that are studied in a uniform manner with regard to design, system engineering, and costing. The committee focused on the 12 mission concepts that, as shown in Table S.1, it determined are worthy of further study as Constellation missions. Because the committee was charged with determining which studies are “most deserving” of further study, it divided the list of 12 mission concepts into “more deserving” and “deserv- ing” categories. All 12 of these concepts show great promise, but the committee determined that, as indicated in the recommendations below, several in particular serve as examples of what Constellation could provide to space science. The committee’s criteria for determining if a mission concept is more deserving or simply deserving of further study are as follows: • Criterion 1:  Mission Impact on Science in the Field of Study—The mission concept must present well- articulated science goals that the committee finds compelling and worthy of the investment needed to develop the technology. • Criterion 2:  Technical Maturity—The mission concept must be sufficiently mature in its overall concep- tion and technology. If the technology for accomplishing the mission does not currently exist at a high technology readiness level, the mission must provide a clear path indicating how it will be developed. If a mission concept satisfied both criteria to a moderate or high degree, it was designated more deserving of further study. (These criteria are fully explained in Chapter 2.) As a result of these evaluations, the committee identified five missions that it determined are more deserving of further study. Recommendation:  NASA should conduct further study of the following mission concepts, which have the most potential to demonstrate the scientific opportunities provided by the Constellation System: 8-Meter Monolithic Space Telescope, Interstellar Probe, Neptune Orbiter with Probes, Solar Polar Imager, and Solar Probe 2. Several of the missions named above, particularly the heliophysics missions, are well defined scientifically and do not require significant study of instruments or related issues. Further study should focus primarily on the relationship between the Ares V capabilities and the missions’ propulsion requirements. Because these are narrow requirements, NASA may have the ability to give further study to other possible Ares V science missions that the committee placed in the “deserving” category. The seven missions in the “deserving” category are also promising and offer great potential science return, but greater amounts of effort will be required to bring them to a similar level of maturity. Recommendation:  NASA should consider further study of the following mission concepts: Advanced Technology Large-Aperture Space Telescope, Dark Ages Lunar Interferometer, Exploration of Near Earth Objects via the Crew Exploration Vehicle, Generation-X, Modern Universe Space Telescope, Stellar Imager, and Titan Explorer.

Summaries of Major Reports 51 Two missions that were placed in the category of “deserving” to be considered for further study did not receive the higher rating (i.e., they were not placed in the “more deserving” category) for reasons largely beyond the control of the proposing teams. Exploration of Near Earth Objects using astronauts is an intriguing and exciting potential future use of the Constellation System. This mission also has significant exploration benefits. Because exploration benefits were not part of the evaluation criteria, the committee could not place this mission in the “more deserving” category despite its strengths. Similarly, the Titan Explorer mission concept evaluated for this report was developed before Cassini reached Saturn, so it reflects an older series of science assumptions and questions; Ares V has great potential for Titan missions. MISSION COSTS The committee accepted the cost estimates provided in the proposals themselves or by the study representa- tives who presented the proposals to the committee, but with some modifications based on the expertise of the committee. Nevertheless, the committee concluded that these cost estimates are preliminary and are likely to be significantly lower than the actual cost of the missions. The committee is concerned that even according to the preliminary estimates, the costs of these missions will be as high as those of flagship-class missions (i.e., several billion dollars each), if not substantially higher than previous flagship-class missions. The committee was asked to consider missions that could be flown during the period 2020 to 2035; very few such large missions could pos- sibly be funded during that period. However, the committee also heard arguments that the larger payload capability of the Ares V could also possibly balance increased costs by simplifying mission design. Many of the mission concepts evaluated in this study do not require the full mass capabilities of the Ares V, and it is therefore possible that mission concepts could make use of these capabilities to reduce mission cost. This subject remains conjectural and therefore requires further study. Recommendation:  NASA should conduct a comprehensive systems-engineering-based analysis to assess the possibility that the relaxation of weight and volume constraints enabled by Ares V for some space science missions might make feasible a significantly different approach to science mission design, development, assembly, integration, and testing, resulting in a relative decrease in the cost of space science missions. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Virtually all of the mission concepts evaluated by the committee are large, complex, and costly. Several are similar to studies currently being undertaken by traditional international partners of the U.S. space program in space science and exploration. As a result, there are opportunities for NASA to undertake joint missions in some of these areas. Finding: International cooperation could provide access to international scientific expertise and technology useful for large, complex, and costly mission concepts and could reduce costs through provision of instru- ments and infrastructure by international partners. TECHNOLOGY ISSUES The committee was charged with identifying the benefits of using the Constellation System’s unique capabili- ties relative to alternative implementation approaches. Such approaches include technologies that may allow a mis- sion to be accomplished without the Constellation System, such as the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles that were used as the baseline for many of the Vision Mission studies that the committee evaluated. Such approaches also include technologies like in-space propulsion that might not be necessary if a launch vehicle such as the Ares V is available. The committee notes that the majority of mission concepts evaluated in this study (the NASA-funded Vision Missions) were originally designed to use launch vehicles—the Atlas and Delta—often in combination with technology options (such as ion propulsion) that were necessary because of the lack of mass or change in velocity provided by those launch vehicles. The Constellation System may offer an alternative to those launch vehicles and technologies.

52 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 During this study, the committee concluded that even the Constellation System alone might be insufficient for some of the missions that it evaluated, and that additional technological developments would be required. NASA currently lacks a technology development strategy for science missions, a gap previously identified by the NRC as a shortcoming, and the committee concluded that some of the missions would be enhanced with the availability of additional technology developments. Finding: Advanced in-space propulsion technology may be required for some science missions considered for using the Constellation System. Virtually all of the missions evaluated in this report would introduce substantial new demands on the Deep Space Network (DSN). The committee was briefed on the current demands and plans for the DSN and became concerned about the future of the DSN, but determined that this subject was beyond the committee’s base of expertise or purview. Nevertheless, future Constellation science missions will have a major impact on the DSN. (Technology issues are further discussed in Chapter 3.) Finding: Science missions enabled by the Constellation System will increase the strain on the capabilities of the Deep Space Network. HUMAN AND ROBOTIC SERVICING Various proposers of observatory mission concepts suggested to the committee that large, expensive obser- vatories might benefit from servicing, which would allow them to operate for decades and to be upgraded with the latest instruments. The Orion spacecraft, unlike the space shuttle, offers the possibility of human servicing of spacecraft beyond low Earth orbit, although it lacks the mass and volume required to conduct such missions alone. However, recent developments in robotic servicing also demonstrate that this technology is now reaching a mature stage and could provide an alternative method of servicing future spacecraft. (Human and robotic servicing issues are discussed in Chapter 4.) Finding:  The Constellation System and advanced robotic servicing technology make possible the servicing and in-space assembly of large spacecraft. Finding:  Designing spacecraft components for accessibility is essential for in-space servicing and is also advantageous for preflight integration and testing. The committee was informed that one of the lessons that NASA has learned from decades of spacecraft servic- ing is that it is far easier to service spacecraft specifically designed for access and easy replacement of equipment. This approach has other benefits as well, such as prelaunch servicing and maintenance that may be required during integration and testing. However, because NASA largely abandoned the concept of the human servicing of space- craft and because robotic servicing was not a developed technology, for many years the agency did not consider designing new spacecraft that could benefit from servicing. The new capabilities provided by the Constellation System and robotic servicing technologies highlight the importance of devoting new attention to this subject. Recommendation:  NASA should study the benefits of designing spacecraft intended to operate around Earth or the Moon, or at the libration points for human and robotic servicing. SPACECRAFT AND LAUNCH VEHICLES The alternative implementation approaches that the committee was charged with evaluating include technolo- gies that allow the use of launch vehicles smaller than Ares V. Although the Ares V offers significant capabilities not available from other vehicles, the Ares I launch vehicle does not offer capabilities significantly different from   National Research Council, Grading NASA’s Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Review, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 11 and 59-61.

Summaries of Major Reports 53 4.44 m [14.6 ft] 7.50 m [24.6 ft] 12.4 m [40.8 ft] 9.70 m [31.8 ft] 8.80 m 8.80 m [28.9 ft] [28.9 ft] Baseline Extended Shroud Shroud FIGURE S.1  Two possible configurations of the Ares V shroud—the current baseline shroud and a proposed extended shroud. Figure 5.15.eps Shown inside the shrouds are two possible Centaur upper-stage configurations: the Titan IV Centaur (left) and the Atlas V C ­ entaur III Dual Engine Configuration (right). Any spacecraft carried atop an upper stage would have severely restricted volume constraints. Neither shroud option takes advantage of the width of the Ares V shroud. SOURCE: Adapted courtesy of NASA. those currently available with the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) family of launch vehicles for science missions. (Launch vehicles are discussed in Chapter 5.) The Ares I is required for launching the Orion spacecraft, and so any science missions that require astronauts will use the Ares I. Finding:  The Ares I will not provide capabilities significantly different from those provided by existing launch vehicles. Although the Orion spacecraft is being designed primarily for transporting astronauts to and from the Interna- tional Space Station and to and from the Moon, it will possess additional capabilities, such as the ability to carry secondary payloads, including deployable satellites. During the Apollo program, the Apollo service module was equipped with a bay for carrying science instruments for use while the spacecraft was in orbit around the Moon. NASA is currently seeking to incorporate a similar capability in the Orion spacecraft and has provided for mass and volume reserves in its current design. Although the Ares V offers the greatest potential value to science, the launch vehicle must be made capable of accommodating science payloads. Science missions are more likely to take advantage of the Ares V if these capabilities are designed into the vehicle rather than their needing to be added later. A potentially serious issue for using Ares V for planetary missions concerns the need for a dedicated upper stage to provide high excess escape velocities for spacecraft (velocity squared per second squared, known as C3).  Neither the current most likely upper stage, the Atlas V Centaur III Dual Engine Configuration, nor the previous Titan IV Centaur would make efficient use of the Ares V payload shroud volume and may present other design problems such as load (weight)-bearing capability (see Figure S.1). Planetary missions could better use an upper stage that is shorter and takes advantage of the full width of the Ares V; however, the development of such a stage could be expensive. In order for Ares V to be attractive for future science missions, vehicle designers will have to consider the requirements of potential science missions.   3 C is km2/s2 the square of the hyperbolic excess velocity—in other words, the amount of velocity that the vehicle can provide to the space- craft beyond that needed to escape Earth’s gravitational field.

54 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 Recommendation: If NASA wishes to use the Constellation System for science missions, it should preserve the capability for Orion to carry small scientific payloads and should ensure that the Ares V development team considers the needs of scientific payloads in system design. The Constellation System offers great potential for space science missions, but the costs of the types of mis- sions evaluated in this report may be unaffordable. Many of these missions have such large costs that they might require that funds be taken from numerous other, smaller science missions, which could create imbalances in the science programs in the individual disciplines. These missions will have to be evaluated carefully within the NRC’s decadal survey process. NASA will have to proceed with caution as it develops these new capabilities.

Summaries of Major Reports 55 5.3 Opening New Frontiers in Space: Choices for the Next New Frontiers Announcement of Opportunity A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on New Opportunities in Solar System Exploration: An Evaluation of the New Frontiers Announcement of Opportunity Summary In 2007 NASA began planning to initiate a new competition for a New Frontiers mission. Because NASA has now selected two of the five missions recommended by the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) decadal survey New Frontiers in the Solar System, and because the decadal survey recommended that the agency ask the NRC for further advice on the New Frontiers Program after several selections had been made, in March 2007 NASA asked the NRC to: [P]rovide criteria and guiding principles to NASA for determining the list of candidate missions. These issues include the following: • Should the next New Frontiers solicitation be completely open relative to any planetary mission, or should it state a candidate list of missions as was done in the previous AO? • If a candidate list of missions is preferred, what is the process by which candidate missions should be deter- mined? Specifically, there is a need to review the mission categories identified in the previous AO and see if the list needs to be revised or augmented in light of developments since the release of the last AO. Should consideration be given to a candidate list of appropriate science themes from the NRC decadal survey on solar system exploration rather than to specific missions? The original statement of task for the Committee on New Opportunities in Solar System Exploration: An Evaluation of the New Frontiers Announcement of Opportunity included the words “excluding Mars” in the first question. In September 2007 NASA amended the statement of task so that Mars could be considered in a discus- sion of the future direction of the New Frontiers Program. NASA’s New Frontiers Program is a series of principal-investigator-led solar system exploration missions with a cost cap of $750 million. These missions are larger than the principal-investigator-led Discovery-class missions (with a cost cap of $425 million) but smaller than “flagship” missions, which are led by a NASA center and are defined as larger than $750 million, but in actuality cost several billion dollars. New Frontiers is operated as a program, similar to the Discovery- and Mars Scout-class missions, meaning that Congress and the White House have agreed to support the existence of a class of missions, and NASA does not have to seek special approval for each individual mission. The New Frontiers Program was created at the recommendation of the NRC’s solar system exploration decadal survey, New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy (hereafter the “decadal survey”). The decadal survey recommended that in order to optimize solar system exploration, NASA’s solar system explo- ration program required a series of principal-investigator-led missions larger than the Discovery-class missions, but not as large as flagship missions. When teams led by a principal investigator compete, their proposed missions are often innovative and unique, producing ingenious solutions to difficult challenges and demonstrating many of the best characteristics of U.S. science. However, unlike Discovery, New Frontiers missions must be firmly grounded in scientific priorities established by the decadal survey without relying on new scientific or technology developments. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Opening New Frontiers in Space: Choices for the Next New Frontiers Announcement of Opportunity, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-5. National Research Council, New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy, The National Academies Press, Wash- ington, D.C., 2003. Colleen N. Hartman, Acting Associate Administrator for Science Mission Directorate, letter to Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, March 21, 2007. National Research Council, New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy, The National Academies Press, Wash- ington, D.C., 2003.

56 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 The decadal survey specified five mission candidates and ranked them according to priority: • Kuiper Belt Pluto Explorer, • South Pole-Aitken Basin Sample Return, • Jupiter Polar Orbiter with Probes, • Venus In Situ Explorer, and • Comet Surface Sample Return. The decadal survey stated that although this list was ranked by scientific priority, NASA should not automati- cally select on the basis of that priority and should first consider the overall viability of the proposed mission. NASA followed this advice. For the 2005 New Frontiers announcement of opportunity, NASA clearly stated that the “‘strawman’ missions are in no order of priority,” and in fact the announcement of opportunity did not list them in the same order as the decadal survey. In addition, for the 2005 competition NASA selected the Jupiter polar mission instead of the scientifically higher-ranked (in the decadal survey) lunar mission. To date two New Frontiers missions have been selected: the New Horizons mission to Pluto and the Kuiper Belt and the Juno mission to orbit Jupiter. New Horizons was launched in 2006, flew past Jupiter in early 2007, and is scheduled to fly past Pluto in 2015. Juno is scheduled for launch in 2011 and to reach Jupiter in 2015. Both missions will address fundamental science goals defined in the decadal survey and will significantly enhance scientific understanding of our solar system. The decadal survey listed five additional missions that were not recommended for reasons of “mission sequencing, technological readiness, or budget.” These missions, listed in the following order in the decadal survey, were not ranked according to scientific priority: • Network Science, • Trojan/Centaur Reconnaissance, • Asteroid Rover/Sample Return, • Io Observer, and • Ganymede Observer. Notably, Mars was not included in the New Frontiers Program. In essence, New Frontiers was created to ensure that a medium-size class of missions for the rest of the solar system (excluding Mars) was funded. The decadal survey treated Mars as a separate program with its own integrated list of scientific priorities and mis- sions, some of which were in the same cost range as the New Frontiers missions. In particular, the decadal survey identified the Mars Long-Lived Lander Network as its second-highest-priority medium-size Mars mission, after the Mars Science Laboratory, which is currently scheduled for launch in 2009. In drafting this report, the committee used the decadal survey as its guide and the decadal survey’s list of other potential medium-size solar system missions as its starting point. The committee solicited information from a broad range of sources, including NASA’s own solar system advisory groups, and heard about other possible missions and science that were not included in the decadal survey’s review of medium-size missions. The committee recognized that it lacked the scope and time of the decadal survey and did not have the exper- tise or authority to substantially question the decadal survey. As a result, the committee deferred to the insight and authority of the decadal survey whenever possible. However, the committee noted that scientific discoveries have been made since the decadal survey was presented to NASA in summer 2002, and new technologies and technological approaches may be available today. During its deliberations, the committee also recognized that including Mars in the New Frontiers Program was outside the scope considered in the development of the decadal survey. The decadal survey treated Mars as a program, and the committee sees no reason why that should change. Furthermore, the committee believes that allowing any medium-size Mars mission to compete in the New Frontiers Program would run the risk of undercutting the overall Mars Exploration Program, and thus be counter to the decadal survey. The committee believes that this action would be bad for both the New Frontiers Program and the Mars Exploration Program. However, the committee ultimately determined that within the context of New Frontiers in the Solar System, p. 197.

Summaries of Major Reports 57 comparative terrestrial planetology (i.e., network seismic and meteorological science) the New Frontiers Program is open to Mars missions. The committee strongly believes that the New Frontiers Program is a valuable and vital part of NASA’s solar system exploration program. The committee’s philosophy was to provide NASA with sufficient options and to provide potential proposers with sufficient flexibility in their proposals to enable NASA to select a mission that can be done within the constraints of the New Frontiers Program, particularly the cost cap. The health of the New Frontiers Program was an overriding priority for the committee. New Frontiers has so far been successful in selecting missions that accomplish science that is not possible under the Discovery Program. These missions will make fundamental contributions to scientific understanding of the formation and evolution of the solar system. In reviewing the decadal survey, and listening to presentations by proposers in the previous New Frontiers competition, the committee was concerned that the mission options presented in the decadal survey were overly specific about the methods of accomplishing the science missionsthe so-called “mission architectures.” For example, the Jupiter Mission with Probes described in the decadal survey essentially required atmospheric probes to return data from Jupiter’s atmosphere rather than specifying the information to be gained and leaving the method of obtaining it to those intending to propose a mission. Ultimately, the mission selected, named Juno, utilizes microwave radiometry only to return data on the water abundance in the atmosphere. The committee was concerned that such constraints could make it impossible for anyone to propose a mission that could be accomplished within the cost cap. The committee heard statements that allowing proposers greater latitude in how to return data not only increases ingenuity, but more importantly, also provides the flexibility required to fit missions within the cost and other constraints. The committee determined that rather than specify- ing mission architectures, NASA should emphasize the science to be returned from such a mission and leave the implementation specifics to the teams competing for the opportunity. Recommendation 1: In drafting the rules for the next New Frontiers announcement of opportunity, NASA should emphasize the science objectives and questions to be addressed, and not specify measurements or techniques for the implementation. The committee determined that the three remaining potential missions in the decadal survey’s listSouth Pole-Aitken Basin Sample Return, Venus In Situ Explorer, and the Comet Surface Sample Returnstill have sub- stantial scientific merit and should remain among the options in the next announcement of opportunity. However, the committee also determined that the list of candidate missions should be expanded to include the five other medium-size mission options identified in the decadal survey: Network Science, Trojan/Centaur Reconnaissance, Asteroid Rover/Sample Return, Io Observer, and Ganymede Observer. The committee also determined that an additional open option should be made available, which is discussed below. The committee notes that compared to the original five New Frontiers missions identified in the decadal survey, the other five medium-size missions were discussed in less detail. Because of this, the committee has sought to devote significant attention to discussing the background and objectives of these missions in this report. In particular, the Io Observer and Ganymede Observer missions were not discussed in great detail in the decadal survey, and so the committee has devoted more attention to them in Chapter 2 of this report in order to explain their inclusion. Expanding the list accomplishes several important goals: it provides NASA with more options for the next mission selection; it provides potential proposers with more options to produce interesting, innovative, and com- petitive missions; it expands the cadre of participants and the science that will be evaluated by potential proposers, enabling the applicant pool to grow for future competitions; and it provides options to be considered by the next decadal survey. As with prior competitive mission opportunities, NASA should select from this set of missions based both on science priority and on overall mission viability. Recommendation 2: NASA should expand the list of potential missions in the next New Frontiers announce- ment of opportunity to include the three remaining candidate missions—South Pole-Aitken Basin Sample Return, Venus In Situ Explorer, and Comet Surface Sample Return—and also the five additional medium- size missions mentioned in the decadal survey: Network Science, Trojan/Centaur Reconnaissance, Asteroid Rover/Sample Return, Io Observer, and Ganymede Observer. There is no recommended priority for these

58 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 missions. NASA should select from this set of missions based both on science priority and on overall mis- sion viability. The committee has not prioritized its list of eight missions. Each of these missions is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. The committee has also provided mission-specific recommendations for the science goals of each. The lists of goals are as comprehensive as possible but should not be interpreted as all-encompassing. In some cases those mission-specific recommendations introduce significant changes into the possible mission, notably in defining the parameters for the Venus In Situ Explorer and the Network Science missions. The committee noted that these science goals may not all be achievable in a single mission but believes that the choice and prioritization of goals are best left to those proposing and evaluating the missions. The committee was also impressed with arguments it heard about the importance of innovation not only in individual missions, but also in the overall New Frontiers Program, and about the risks of being overly specific on how to accomplish the goals of the decadal survey. Thus, in addition to the eight identified missions, the com- mittee believes that NASA should offer an additional option for other missions in the same size class that can acquire compelling information answering high-priority science questions from the decadal survey. The committee believes that this approach not only will provide an opening for innovation but also might enable the applicant pool for future missions to grow. The committee believes that any such mission will have to meet a very high standard of scientific proof. Possible examples of such missions could include—but are not limited to—shallow atmospheric probes for the outer planets. The committee realized that the New Frontiers mission line is a hybrid, incorporating aspects of both the Discovery- and the flagship-class missions. As such, the committee concluded that the mission options for the next announcement of opportunity cannot be drawn strictly from the decadal survey but rather should be interpreted in light of scientific discoveries made since the decadal survey was conducted in 2002. New discoveries made about several of the targets evaluated in this mission class in some cases enhance the importance of these scientific questions, and in other cases may undercut the original rationale for investigating a target. Planetary exploration is an ongoing endeavor advanced by paradigm-shifting scientific discoveries and mission-enabling technological developments. NASA’s New Frontiers Program will have to adapt to include them. New technologies and technological methods may now exist that were not available even 5 years ago. These technologies could include instrumentation (such as new seismic sensors) or mission-enabling equipment (such as radiation-hardened electronics). The committee concluded that it is important to the health of the program that a method exist for including such innovations, while acknowledging that those proposing missions will have a high standard to meet. Recommendation 3: NASA should consider mission options outside the three remaining and five additional medium-size missions described in the decadal survey that are spurred by major scientific and technologi- cal developments made since the decadal survey. As with any New Frontiers mission, these proposals must offer the potential to dramatically advance fundamental scientific goals of the decadal survey and should accomplish scientific investigations well beyond the scope of the smaller Discovery Program. Both mission- enabling technological advances and novel applications of current technology could be considered. However, NASA should limit its choices to the eight specific candidate missions unless a highly compelling argument can be made for an outside proposal. The basis for these overarching recommendations is discussed further in Chapter 1. However, the mission sections in Chapter 2 provide information that will be vital for drafting the next New Frontiers announcement of opportunity, and this report must be read in its entirety in order to understand the committee’s findings and recommendations. The mission-specific recommendations in Chapter 2 are also included in Chapter 3 for ease of reference. Finally, the committee notes that the New Frontiers Program is intended to be both strategic—based on the science goals established in the decadal survey—and adaptable to new discoveries. The committee believes that it is important for NASA to find a method for incorporating new discoveries into the goals of the program for announcements of opportunity made several years after a decadal survey has been produced. Seeking input from the scientific community via the NRC (in the form of reports such as this one) is one method to achieve this, but not necessarily the only method. The committee hopes that in the future NASA will continue to recognize the importance of such a process.

Summaries of Major Reports 59 5.4 Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System: Interim Report A Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System Summary In 2004 NASA initiated studies of advanced science mission concepts known as the Vision Missions and i ­nspired by a series of NASA roadmap activities conducted in 2003. Also in 2004 NASA began implementation of the first phases of a new space exploration policy, the Vision for Space Exploration. This implementation effort included development of a new human-carrying spacecraft, known as Orion, and two new launch vehicles, the Ares I and Ares V rocketscollectively called the Constellation System. NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to evaluate the science opportunities enabled by the Constellation System (see Preface) and to produce an interim report on a short time schedule and a final report by November 2008. The committee notes, however, that the Constellation System and its Orion and Ares vehicles have been justified by NASA and selected in order to enable human exploration beyond low Earth orbit, and not to enable science missions. This interim report of the Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System evaluates the 11 Vision Mission studies presented to it and groups them into two categories: those more deserving of future study, and those less deserving of future study. Although its statement of task also refers to Earth science missions, the committee points out that the Vision Missions effort was focused on future astronomy, heliophysics, and planetary exploration and did not include any Earth science studies because, at the time, the NRC was conduct- ing the first Earth science decadal survey, and funding Earth science studies as part of the Vision Missions effort would have interfered with that process. Consequently, no Earth science missions are evaluated in this interim report. However, the committee will evaluate any Earth science mission proposal submitted in response to its request for information issued in March 2008 (see Appendix A). The committee based its evaluation of the preexisting Vision Missions studies on two criteria: whether the con- cepts offered the potential for a significant scientific advance, and whether or not the concepts would benefit from the Constellation System. The committee determined that all of the concepts offered the possibility of a significant scientific advance, but it cautions that such an evaluation ultimately must be made by the decadal survey process, and it emphasizes that this interim report’s evaluation should not be considered to be an endorsement of the scientific merit of these proposals, which must of course be evaluated relative to other proposals. The committee determined that seven of these concepts would benefit from the Constellation System, whereas four would not, but it stresses that this conclusion does not reflect an evaluation of the scientific merit of the projects, but rather an assessment of whether or not new capabilities provided by the Constellation System could significantly affect them. Some of the mission concepts, such as the Advanced Compton Telescope, already offer a significant scientific advance and fit easily within the mass and volume constraints of existing launch vehicles. Other mission concepts, such as the Palmer Quest proposal to drill through the Mars polar cap, are not constrained by the launch vehicle, but rather by other technology limitations. The committee evaluated the mission concepts as presented to it, aware nevertheless that proposing a far larger and more ambitious mission with the same science goals might be possible given the capabilities of the Ares V launch vehicle. (Such proposals can be submitted in response to the committee’s request for information to be evaluated in its final report.) See Table S.1 for a summary of the Vision Missions, including their cost estimates, technical maturity, and reasons that they might benefit from the Constel- lation System. The committee developed several findings and recommendations. Finding 1. The greatly increased payload capability promised by Ares V could lead to much more costly science payloads. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA’s Constellation System: Interim Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-4.

60 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 TABLE S.1  Summary of Vision Missions (in Alphabetical Order) Evaluated by the Committee Worthy of Cost Further Study as Estimatea a Constellation Vision Mission (billions) Technical Maturityb Mission? Notes Advanced Compton $1 Medium No This mission does not benefit from Telescope (ACT) Constellation. Generation-X >$5 Low Yes One Ares V launch of one 16-meter telescope (Gen-X) is significantly simpler than the early proposed configurations. Cost estimates are weak. The additional mass capability could significantly reduce mirror development costs. Interstellar Probe $1-$5 Highconcept, Yes Further study is needed of the benefits of instruments additional launch mass enabled by Ares V, in Lowpropulsion particular alternative propulsion options. Kilometer-Baseline >$5 Low No The need for Constellation is questionable, Far-Infrared/ except for human servicing. Submillimeter Interferometer Modern Universe >$5 Highmission concept, Yes Large one-piece, central mirror is possible with Space Telescope instruments Ares V rather than a robotically assembled (MUST) Lowassembly mirror. Neptune Orbiter >$5 Highmission concept, Yes Ares V could possibly obviate the need for with Probes instruments aerocapture and/or nuclear-electric propulsion. Lowpropulsion and possibly lander Palmer Quest >$5 Low No This mission does not benefit from Constellation. Single Aperture Far >$5 Mediummission No This mission does not benefit from Infrared Mission concept Constellation. (SAFIR) Lowcooling, detectors Solar Polar Imager $1-$5 Highmission concept, Yes Consider propulsion options enabled by Ares V. instruments Lowpropulsion Stellar Imager $5 Low Yes Could launch larger mirrors (2 meters vs. 1 meter) and a second hub on a single Ares V launch. Titan Explorer >$5 Lowrequires Yes Launch on Ares V may enable propulsive aerocapture capture rather than aerocapture and shorten transit time. aCost estimates based on data provided to the committee. bTechnical maturity based on data provided to the committee.

Summaries of Major Reports 61 Finding 2. The committee determined that the Ares I capabilities are not sufficiently distinct from those of Atlas V and Delta IV to enable different types or a higher quality of space science missions. Finding 3. The following Vision Mission studies might benefit from the opportunities enabled by the Constel- lation System and are therefore considered more deserving of future study: Generation-X, Modern Universe Space Telescope, Stellar Imager, Interstellar Probe, Solar Polar Imager, Neptune Orbiter with Probes, and Titan Explorer. The committee did not assess the relative scientific priority of the missions within this group. In the final report, these mission concepts will be compared to additional mission concepts (collected in response to the committee’s request for information) that the committee determines to be more deserving of future study, and the committee will produce a consolidated list. According to the committee’s evaluation criteria, the four mission concepts that it deemed less deserving of future study simply do not appear to benefit highly from use of the Constellation System. The committee concluded that the seven more-deserving mission concepts require greater study of their scientific benefits and the technical benefits enabled by the Constellation System. Recommendation 1. NASA should conduct further studies of the scientific benefits as well as the technical benefits to mission execution, such as reduction of mission complexity and risk, enabled by the Constella- tion System for the following missions: Generation-X, Modern Universe Space Telescope, Stellar Imager, Interstellar Probe, Solar Polar Imager, Neptune Orbiter with Probes, and Titan Explorer. The committee accepted the cost estimates provided by the Vision Mission studies themselves or by the study representatives who presented them to the committee. Nevertheless, the committee concluded that these cost e ­ stimates are preliminary. The committee is concerned that the costs of these missions will be high, at least for the flagship-class missions, if not substantially higher. Given the fact that NASA has insufficient funding to support more than one flagship-class mission per decade in two science areas (essentially one for astronomy and astro- physics and one for solar system exploration, with the situation for Earth science and heliophysics being slightly more complicated), each of these missions would place substantial strain on the science budget, and the commit- tee therefore emphasizes that close attention to cost issues is required. Since the committee was asked to consider missions that could be flown during the period 2020-2035, very few such large missions could possibly be funded during that period. Finding 4. There are uncertainties in the cost estimates associated with the Vision Missions listed above when flown on the Ares V vehicle. Although NASA has not yet produced cost estimates for many of the elements of the Constellation System, such as the Ares V launch vehicle, the committee recognized that utilization of the Constellation System, particularly the Ares V, could have a potentially dramatic effect on the costs of these missions. Incorporating the use of an expensive launch vehicle could increase costs. But it could also possibly balance increased costs by simplifying mission design (for instance, by eliminating the requirement for on-orbit assembly or complex deployment mechanisms). Recommendation 2. NASA should perform cost analysis for the missions that the committee determined could benefit from the Ares V capability (Generation-X, Modern Universe Space Telescope, Stellar Imager, Interstellar Probe, Solar Polar Imager, Neptune Orbiter with Probes, and Titan Explorer). This analysis should use the Ares V technical capabilities together with appropriate upper stages as a baseline. Virtually all of the mission concepts evaluated by the committee are large, complex, and costly. Several are similar to studies currently being undertaken by traditional international partners in space exploration. Finding 5. International cooperation could provide access to international scientific expertise and tech- nology useful for these missions, and could reduce costs through provision of foreign instruments and infrastructure.

62 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 The committee was charged with identifying the “benefits of using the Constellation System’s unique capabili- ties relative to alternative implementation approaches.” Alternative implementation approaches include technologies that allow the use of smaller launch vehicles (such as in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle class that served as the baseline for the Vision Mission studies). The committee notes that several technology issues are shared by two or more missions. There are benefits to having multiple technology solutions available to achieve objectives, and the committee is concerned that it is risky to rely on only one solution that may never emerge. NASA currently lacks a technology development strategy, a gap identified by the NRC as a shortcoming. The impact of technology on these missions and how it may require, or alleviate the need for, the use of the Constellation System requires further study and will be evaluated by the committee in its final report. Finding 6. The committee identified the following technology issues as meriting further attention. Some of these technologies are of a basic, mission-enabling nature; others provide options that can be traded for alternative mission architectures. • Basic enabling technologies Free-flying constellations Tethered flight Next-generation Deep Space Network Space nuclear reactors • Technologies enabling alternatives to Ares V Aerocapture Solar sails Solar-electric propulsion Nuclear-electric propulsion Robotic assembly and servicing • Technologies enhancing Constellation capabilities Human assembly and servicing See,for example, National Research Council, Grading NASA’s Solar System Exploration Program: A Midterm Review, The National Acad- emies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 11 and 59-61.

Summaries of Major Reports 63 5.5 Severe Space Weather Events Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts: Workshop Report A Report of the Ad Hoc Planning Committee for the Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events Workshop Summary SOCIETAL CONTEXT Modern society depends heavily on a variety of technologies that are susceptible to the extremes of space weather—severe disturbances of the upper atmosphere and of the near-Earth space environment that are driven by the magnetic activity of the Sun. Strong auroral currents can disrupt and damage modern electric power grids and may contribute to the corrosion of oil and gas pipelines. Magnetic storm-driven ionospheric density distur- bances interfere with high-frequency (HF) radio communications and navigation signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, while polar cap absorption (PCA) events can degrade—and, during severe events, com- pletely black out—HF communications along transpolar aviation routes, requiring aircraft flying these routes to be diverted to lower latitudes. Exposure of spacecraft to energetic particles during solar energetic particle events and radiation belt enhancements can cause temporary operational anomalies, damage critical electronics, degrade solar arrays, and blind optical systems such as imagers and star trackers. The effects of space weather on modern technological systems are well documented in both the technical lit- erature and popular accounts. Most often cited perhaps is the collapse within 90 seconds of northeastern Canada’s Hydro-Quebec power grid during the great geomagnetic storm of March 1989, which left millions of people without electricity for up to 9 hours. This event exemplifies the dramatic impact that extreme space weather can have on a technology upon which modern society in all of its manifold and interconnected activities and functions critically depends. Nearly two decades have passed since the March 1989 event. During that time, awareness of the risks of extreme space weather has increased among the affected industries, mitigation strategies have been developed, new sources of data have become available (e.g., the upstream solar wind measurements from the Advanced Composi- tion Explorer), new models of the space environment have been created, and a national space weather infrastructure has evolved to provide data, alerts, and forecasts to an increasing number of users. Now, 20 years later and approaching a new interval of increased solar activity, how well equipped are we to manage the effects of space weather? Have recent technological developments made our critical technologies more or less vulnerable? How well do we understand the broader societal and economic impacts of extreme space weather events? Are our institutions prepared to cope with the effects of a “space weather Katrina,” a rare, but according to the historical record, not inconceivable eventuality? On May 22 and 23, 2008, a workshop held in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the National Research Council brought together representatives of industry, the federal government, and the social science community to explore these and related questions. This report was prepared by members of the ad hoc committee that organized the workshop, and it summarizes the key themes, ideas, and insights that emerged during the 1½ days of presentations and discussions. THE IMPACT OF SPACE WEATHER Modern technological society is characterized by a complex interweave of dependencies and inter­dependencies among its critical infrastructures. A complete picture of the socioeconomic impact of severe space weather must include both direct, industry-specific effects (such as power outages and spacecraft anomalies) and the ­collateral effects of space-weather-driven technology failures on dependent infrastructures and services. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Severe Space Weather EventsUnderstanding Societal and Economic Impacts: Workshop Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-5.

64 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 Industry-Specific Space Weather Impacts The main industries whose operations can be adversely affected by extreme space weather are the electric power, spacecraft, aviation, and GPS-based positioning industries. The March 1989 blackout in Quebec and the forced outages of electric power equipment in the northeastern United States remain the classic example of the impact of a severe space weather event on the electric power industry. Several examples of the impact of space weather on the other industries are cited in the report: • The outage in January 1994 of two Canadian telecommunications satellites during a period of enhanced energetic electron fluxes at geosynchronous orbit, disrupting communications services nationwide. The first satellite recovered in a few hours; recovery of the second satellite took 6 months and cost $50 million to $70 million. • The diversion of 26 United Airlines flights to non-polar or less-than-optimum polar routes during several days of disturbed space weather in January 2005. The flights were diverted to avoid the risk of HF radio blackouts during PCA events. The increased flight time and extra landings and takeoffs required by such route changes increase fuel consumption and raise cost, while the delays disrupt connections to other flights. • Disabling of the Federal Aviation Administration’s recently implemented GPS-based Wide Area Augmenta- tion System (WAAS) for 30 hours during the severe space weather events of October-November 2003. With increasing awareness and understanding of space weather effects on their technologies, industries have responded to the threat of extreme space weather through improved operational procedures and technologies. As just noted, airlines re-route flights scheduled for polar routes during intense solar energetic particle events in order to preserve reliable communications. Alerted to an impending geomagnetic storm by NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) and monitoring ground currents in real-time, power grid operators take defensive mea- sures to protect the grid against geomagnetically induced currents (GICs). Similarly, under adverse space weather conditions, launch personnel may delay a launch, and satellite operators may postpone certain operations (e.g., thruster firings). For the spacecraft industry, however, the primary approach to mitigating the effects of space weather is to design satellites to operate under extreme environmental conditions to the maximum extent possible within cost and resource constraints. GPS modernization through the addition of two new navigation signals and new codes is expected to help mitigate space weather effects (e.g., ranging errors, fading caused by ionospheric scintillation), although to what degree is not known. These technologies will come on line incrementally over the next 15 years as new GPS satellites become operational. In the meantime, the Federal Aviation Administration will maintain “legacy” non-GPS-based navigation systems as a backup, while other GPS users (e.g., offshore drill- ing companies) can postpone operations for which precision position knowledge is required until the ionospheric disturbance is over. The Collateral Impacts of Space Weather Because of the interconnectedness of critical infrastructures in modern society, the impacts of severe space weather events can go beyond disruption of existing technical systems and lead to short-term as well as to long-term collateral socioeconomic disruptions. Electric power is modern society’s cornerstone technology, the technology on which virtually all other infrastructures and services depend. Although the probability of a wide- area electric power blackout resulting from an extreme space weather event is low, the consequences of such an event could be very high, as its effects would cascade through other, dependent systems. Collateral effects of a longer-term outage would likely include, for example, disruption of the transportation, communication, banking, and finance systems, and government services; the breakdown of the distribution of potable water owing to pump failure; and the loss of perishable foods and medications because of lack of refrigeration. The resulting loss of services for a significant period of time in even one region of the country could affect the entire nation and have international impacts as well. Extreme space weather events are low-frequency/high-consequence (LF/HC) events and as such present—in terms of their potential broader, collateral impacts—a unique set of problems for public (and private) institutions and governance, different from the problems raised by conventional, expected, and frequently experienced events.

Summaries of Major Reports 65 As a consequence, dealing with the collateral impacts of LF/HC events requires different types of budgeting and management capabilities and consequently challenges the basis for conventional policies and risk management strategies, which assume a universe of constant or reliable conditions. Moreover, because systems can quickly become dependent on new technologies in ways that are unknown and unexpected to both developers and users, vulnerabilities in one part of the broader system have a tendency to spread to other parts of the system. Thus, it is difficult to understand, much less to predict, the consequences of future LF/HC events. Sustaining preparedness and planning for such events in future years is equally difficult. Future Vulnerabilities Our knowledge and understanding of the vulnerabilities of modern technological infrastructure to severe space weather and the measures developed to mitigate those vulnerabilities are based largely on experience and knowledge gained during the past 20 or 30 years, during such episodes of severe space weather as the geomagnetic superstorms of March 1989 and October-November 2003. As severe as some of these recent events have been, the historical record reveals that space weather of even greater severity has occurred in the past—e.g., the Carrington event of 18591 and the great geomagnetic storm of May 1921—and suggests that such extreme events, though rare, are likely to occur again some time in the future. While the socioeconomic impacts of a future Carrington event are difficult to predict, it is not unreasonable to assume that an event of such magnitude would lead to much deeper and more widespread socioeconomic disruptions than occurred in 1859, when modern electricity-based technology was still in its infancy. A more quantitative estimate of the potential impact of an unusually large space weather event has been obtained by examining the effects of a storm of the magnitude of the May 1921 superstorm on today’s electric power infrastructure. Despite the lessons learned since 1989 and their successful application during the October- November 2003 storms, the nation’s electric power grids remain vulnerable to disruption and damage by severe space weather and have become even more so, in terms of both widespread blackouts and permanent equipment damage requiring long restoration times. According to a study by the Metatech Corporation, the occurrence today of an event like the 1921 storm would result in large-scale blackouts affecting more than 130 million people and would expose more than 350 transformers to the risk of permanent damage. SPACE WEATHER INFRASTRUCTURE Space weather services in the United States are provided primarily by NOAA’s SWPC and the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF’s) Weather Agency (AFWA), which work closely together to address the needs of their civilian and military user communities, respectively. The SWPC draws on a variety of data sources, both space- and ground-based, to provide forecasts, watches, warnings, alerts, and summaries as well as operational space weather products to civilian and commercial users. Its primary sources of information about solar activity, upstream solar wind conditions, and the geospace environment are NASA’s Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), NOAA’s GOES and POES satellites, magnetometers, and the USAF’s solar observing networks. Secondary sources include SOHO and ­STEREO as well as a number of ground-based facilities. Despite a small and unstable budget (roughly $6 million to $7 million U.S. dollars annually) that limits capabilities, the SWPC has experienced a steady growth in customer base, even during the solar minimum years, when disturbance activity is lower. The focus of the USAF’s space weather effort is on providing situational knowledge of the real-time space weather environment and assessments of the impacts of space weather on different Department of Defense missions. The Air Force uses NOAA data combined with data from its own assets such as the Defense Meteorological Satellites Program satellites, the ­ Communications/Navigation Outage Forecasting System, the Solar Electro-Optical Network, the Digital ­Ionospheric Sounding System, and the GPS network. NASA is the third major element in the nation’s space weather infrastructure. Although NASA’s role is scientific rather than operational, NASA science missions such as ACE provide critical space weather informa- tion, and NASA’s Living with a Star program targets research and technologies that are relevant to operations. NASA-developed products that are candidates for eventual transfer from research to operations include sensor technology and physics-based space weather models that can be transitioned into operational tools for forecasting and situational awareness.

66 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 Other key elements of the nation’s space weather infrastructure are the solar and space physics research com- munity and the emerging commercial space weather businesses. Of particular importance are the efforts of these sectors in the area of model development. Space Weather Forecasting: Capabilities and Limitations One of the important functions of a nation’s space weather infrastructure is to provide reliable long-term fore- casts, although the importance of forecasts varies according to industry.2 With long-term (1- to 3-day) forecasts and minimal false alarms,3 the various user communities can take actions to mitigate the effects of impending solar disturbances and to minimize their economic impact. Currently, NOAA’s SWPC can make probability forecasts of space weather events with varying degrees of success. For example, the SWPC can, with moderate confidence, predict the occurrence probability of a geomagnetic storm or an X-class flare 1 to 3 days in advance, whereas its capability to provide even short-term (less than 1 day) or long-term forecasts of ionospheric disturbances—infor- mation important for GPS users—is poor. The SWPC has identified a number of critical steps needed to improve its forecasting capability, enabling it, for example, to provide high-confidence long- and short-term forecasts of geomagnetic storms and ionospheric disturbances. These steps include securing an operational solar wind monitor at L1; transitioning research models (e.g., of coronal mass ejection propagation, the geospace radiation environ- ment, and the coupled magnetosphere/ionosphere/atmosphere system) into operations, and developing precision GPS forecast and correction tools. The requirement for a solar wind monitor at L1 is particularly important because ACE, the SWPC’s sole source of real-time upstream solar wind and interplanetary magnetic field data, is well beyond its planned operational life, and provisions to replace it have not been made. UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SEVERE SPACE WEATHER The title of the workshop on which this report is based, “The Societal and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather,” perhaps promised more than this subsequent report can fully deliver. What emerged from the presenta- tions and discussions at the workshop is that the invited experts understand well the effects of at least moderately severe space weather on specific technologies, and in many cases know what is required to mitigate them, whether enhanced forecasting and monitoring capabilities, new technologies (new GPS signals and codes, new-generation radiation-hardened electronics), or improved operational procedures. Limited information was also provided—and captured in this report—on the costs of space weather-induced outages (e.g., $50 million to $70 million to restore the $290 million Anik E2 to operational status) as well as of non-space-weather-related events that can serve as proxies for disruptions caused by severe space storms (e.g., $4 billion to $10 billion for the power blackout of August 2003), and an estimate of $1 trillion to $2 trillion during the first year alone was given for the societal and economic costs of a “severe geomagnetic storm scenario” with recovery times of 4 to 10 years. Such cost information is interesting and useful—but as the outcome of the workshop and this report make clear, it is at best only a starting point for the challenge of answering the question implicit in the title: What are the societal and economic impacts of severe space weather? To answer this question quantitatively, multiple variables must be taken into account, including the magnitude, duration, and timing of the event; the nature, severity, and extent of the collateral effects cascading through a society characterized by strong dependencies and interdepen- dencies; the robustness and resilience of the affected infrastructures; the risk management strategies and policies that the public and private sectors have in place; and the capability of the responsible federal, state, and local government agencies to respond to the effects of an extreme space weather event. While this workshop, along with its report, has gathered in one place much of what is currently known or suspected about societal and economic impacts, it has perhaps been most successful in illuminating the scope of the myriad issues involved, and the gaps in knowledge that remain to be explored in greater depth than can be accomplished in a workshop. A quantita- tive and comprehensive assessment of the societal and economic impacts of severe space weather will be a truly daunting task, and will involve questions that go well beyond the scope of the present report. NOTES 1. The Carrington event is by several measures the most severe space weather event on record. It produced several days of spectacular auroral displays, even at unusually low latitudes, and significantly disrupted telegraph services around the

Summaries of Major Reports 67 world. It is named after the British astronomer Richard Carrington, who observed the intense white-light flare associated with the subsequent geomagnetic storm. 2. For the spacecraft industry, for example, space weather predictions are less important than knowledge of climatology and especially of the extremes within a climate record. 3. False alarms are disruptive and expensive. Accurate forecasts of a severe magnetic storm would allow power com- panies to mitigate risk by canceling planned maintenance work, providing additional personnel to deal with adverse effects, and reducing the amount of power transfers between adjacent systems in the grid. However, as was pointed out during the workshop, if the warning proved to be a false alarm and planned maintenance was canceled, the cost of large cranes, huge equipment, and a great deal of material and manpower sitting idle would be very high.

68 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 5.6 Space Science and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Summary of a Workshop Margaret G. Finarelli, Rapporteur, and Joseph K. Alexander, Rapporteur Summary The United States seeks to protect its security and foreign-policy interests, in part, by actively controlling the export of goods, technologies, and services that are or may be useful for military development in other nations. “Export” is defined not simply as the sending abroad of hardware but also as the communication of related technology and know-how to foreigners in the United States and overseas. The U.S. government mechanism for controlling dual-use items—items in commerce that have potential military use—is the Export Administra- tion Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of Commerce; items defined in law as defense articles fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of State and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of the potential military implications of the export of defense articles, the ITAR regime imposes much greater burdens (on both the applicant and the government) than does the EAR regime during the process of applying for, and implementing the provisions of, licenses and technical-assistance agreements. Until the early 1990s export control activity related to all space satellites (commercial and scientific) was handled under ITAR. Between 1992 and 1996 the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations transferred jurisdiction over the licensing of civilian communications satellites to the Commerce Department under EAR. In 1999, however, in response to broad concerns about Chinese attempts to acquire U.S. high technology, the U.S. House of Representatives convened the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Committee. One of the many consequences of the Cox Committee’s report was Congress’s mandate that jurisdiction over export and licensing of satellites and related equipment and services, irrespective of military utility, be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the State Department and that such equipment and services be covered as defense articles under ITAR. Scientific satellites were explicitly included despite their use for decades in peaceful internationally conducted cooperative scientific research. It is widely recognized that the shift in regulatory regime from EAR to ITAR has had major deleterious effects on international scientific research activities that depend on satellites, spaceflight hardware, and other items that are now controlled by ITAR. Furthermore, contravening U.S. interests in attracting foreign students to U.S. universities, the capture of space technology by ITAR has caused serious problems in the teaching of university space science and engineering classes, virtually all of which include non-U.S. students. This report is a summary of a September 2007 workshop in which participants from the space research com- munities and the export-control administration and policy communities came together to discuss problems, effects, and potential solutions regarding the application of ITAR to space science. The principal themes and ideas that emerged from the discussions are summarized below. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A NET CAST TOO BROADLY The space science community acknowledges the sensitivity of much hardware and technology related to space activity, but they also argue that controlling “everything that flies in space” casts too broad a net. The current admin- istration has actually recognized the mismatch between the ITAR control regime and the low levels of risk inherent in the bulk of international space science activity. A variety of White House policy statements have been made and regulatory adjustments tried over the years, but the unfortunate net result of such changes has been the introduction of ambiguity and uncertainty. As a result, and because the criminal sanctions for failure to comply with ITAR are personal and great, university officials and researchers tend to err on the side of conservatism in seeking licenses and thus impose on themselves financial, administrative, and time-delay burdens that might not even be necessary. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from Space Science and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Summary of a Workshop, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-3. U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1999.

Summaries of Major Reports 69 No one in the policy or political community contends that observed deleterious effects on U.S. leadership in scientific research and on U.S. academic excellence in science and engineering were intended by the use of ITAR as the regulatory regime for scientific-satellite exports. Nonetheless, the unintended consequences continue to plague the space community. EFFECTS ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH Science, perhaps more than most fields of endeavor, depends on a full and open discussion and exchange of ideas among researchers who are addressing a given problem. If researchers are constrained by security classifica- tion or proprietary interests, communication is necessarily limited. Because most of the results of space science research are placed in the public domain, most space research activity qualifies as “fundamental research,” which is excluded from ITAR controls as long as the research is conducted by “accredited institutions of higher learning.” However, the bulk of government-sponsored fundamental space research at universities is conducted by consortia, including government research laboratories and private companies, and ITAR requires licensing when persons from other countries are involved—and they usually are. Since the dawn of the space age, other nations have invested in developing their own capabilities and have thereby made themselves desirable partners of the United States. Furthermore, many space-based scientific efforts focus on the science of Earth, and so international collaboration is necessary if global perspectives are to be drawn. The costs and delays imposed by ITAR processing requirements, coupled with other nations’ reluctance to be made subject to restrictions derived from U.S. law and regulations, are making the United States less and less desirable as a partner to its foreign collaborators. The implications for continued international collaboration are grave. EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC OPERATIONS Ambiguities about what constitutes fundamental research that can thus be excluded from ITAR controls, about what information can be placed in the public domain, and about what specific kinds of involvement with non-U.S. persons require licensing have led to great uncertainties in the university community about the participation of foreign students and researchers in projects involving potentially controlled hardware or technology. Universities must choose between either going through the burdensome licensing or technical-assistance agreement process to involve their students and researchers from other countries or consciously excluding any non-U.S. nationals from space-related research. The latter approach is injurious to the quality of research and to the educational value inherent in diversity. It is especially damaging when the non-U.S. participants could contribute critical and unique knowledge and skills to a project, as is often the case. According to workshop participants, the same uncertainties are leading some professors to “dumb down” course content rather than risk ITAR violations by discussing their research in the classroom setting. Although they believe that the vitality of education in the U.S. university system depends on its links to state-of-the-art research, many cite fears of breaking the law inadvertently. THE OUTLOOK In the short term, fundamental changes to the law or regulations are unlikely, especially in a political envi- ronment in which almost any provisions related to national security are taken as givens and attempts to modify them are viewed as being politically risky, regardless of the potential practical impacts. Over the next year or so, the State Department is committed to incremental improvements in efficiency and to better communication with the space community to clarify and harmonize key definitions and concepts where confusion exists. Similarly, members of the university community are committed to participating actively in that communication to make their actions more effective and to document their problems with ITAR to facilitate favorable change. Over the long term, however, many believe that a clean-slate approach is needed to fix the fundamental dis- connect between ITAR as it is being applied to space science research and the needs of the U.S. space science community as it endeavors to maintain world leadership. The United States has many space-related policy priorities in addition to national security, including space leadership, university excellence, and international partnerships. As emphasized at the workshop, all these national goals need to be considered jointly in the development of a system for controlling the export of space-related hardware and technology that is effective at protecting national security, but that does not inadvertently harm the other policy priorities.

70 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 5.7 United States Civil Space Policy: Summary of a Workshop Molly K. Macauley, Rapporteur, and Joseph K. Alexander, Rapporteur Summary What are the principal purposes, goals, and priorities of the U.S. civil space program? This question was the focus of the workshop on civil space policy held November 29-30, 2007, by the Space Studies Board (SSB) and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC). In addressing this question, invited speakers and panelists and the general discussion from this public workshop explored a series of topics, including the following: • Key changes and developments in the U.S. civil space program since the new national Vision for Space Exploration (the Vision) was articulated by the executive branch in 2004; • The fit of space exploration within a broader national and international context; • Affordability, public interest, and political will to sustain the civil space program; • Definitions, metrics, and decision criteria for the mix and balance of activities within the program portfolio; • Roles of government in Earth observations from space; and • Gaps in capabilities and infrastructure to support the program. The workshop organizers acknowledged the long-standing problem of reconciling expectations of civil space program accomplishments during the coming decades with the limited public resources available to support these activities. The goal of the workshop was neither to develop definitive solutions nor to reach consensus. Rather, the purpose was to air a range of views and perspectives that would serve to inform broader discussion of such ­questions by policy makers and the public. This document summarizes the opinions expressed by individual workshop partici- pants and does not necessarily reflect the consensus views of these participants, the SSB, or the workshop planning committee. By way of background, the SSB and the ASEB had convened a similar workshop in 2003 in the wake of the space shuttle Columbia tragedy and the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Since the issuance of the report on the 2003 workshop, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy, additional developments have taken place to redirect many elements of the civil space program. The Vision for Space Exploration set forth by the executive branch in 2004, the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2005, and the national space policy presidential directive issued in 2006 have all served to redirect the program. The Vision sets forth a long-term robotic and human exploration program; the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 endorses the Vision and directs the program in several areas with respect to policy, management, and accountability and oversight; and the 2006 presidential directive establishes goals related to U.S. space leadership and the governance of space operations in and through space. NOTE: “Summary” reprinted from United States Civil Space Policy: Summary of a Workshop, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, pp. 1-5. Participants at the 2003 workshop considered civil space to include all of NASA’s human and robotic space programs; NOAA’s meteorologi- cal and environmental satellite programs; the activities of commercial entities in support of the space programs of NASA, NOAA, and other civilian agencies; and commercial space activities. Military and national security reconnaissance space programs were not included under the rubric of civil space. Participants in the 2007 workshop took the same approach and also considered emerging entrepreneurial efforts such as space tourism to be part of civil commercial space. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration, NP-2004-01-334-HQ, NASA, Washington, D.C., 2004. National Research Council, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Public Law 109-155, 109th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2005.

Summaries of Major Reports 71 ROBUSTNESS OF THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM The workshop summarized here thus builds on discussion from the 2003 workshop in light of these develop- ments. A natural starting point was an assessment of the new directions for the U.S. civil space program: How robust or resilient are these new directions to changes in resources available to support the program? How relevant is the program in what many workshop participants see as a rapidly changing international context? Is there public appeal in terms of willingness to embrace the program? Many participants expressed the view that the Vision had not pro- gressed as originally outlined nor as many had expected, due in large part to the failure of the administration and the Congress to seek the required resources. A prominent concern among participants was that although the Vision was to be “pay as you go,” shortfalls in the NASA budget had led the agency to reallocate resources toward pursuit of the Vision and away from other activities such as space and Earth science. Speakers argued that continued operational costs of the International Space Station, delayed phaseout of the space shuttle, costs of near-term development of the next-generation space transportation system, and unbudgeted operational costs will all make the Vision increasingly unaffordable. Other participants acknowledged that some of the problems with robustness and program balance are of the space community’s own making, in that in many activities, project cost estimates had been unrealistic and subject to significant cost growth. Participants from within and outside the scientific community voiced agreement that the community will need to demonstrate leadership and share responsibility with NASA in controlling science program costs. Speakers expressed concern that NASA’s program suffers from a lack of resources, budget realism, and budget stability, thereby making the Vision unaffordable and unsustainable. The recent report that focused on the space and Earth science issues at this workshop summarized the mood at the workshop as follows: Overall, as noted by the participants themselves, the tone of the workshop was surprisingly sober, with frequent expressions of discouragement, disappointment, and apprehension about the future of the U.S. civil space program. During the one and one-half days of discussion, an oft-repeated statement by workshop participants was that the goals of the U.S. civil space program are completely mismatched with the resources provided to accomplish them. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT In contrast with the 2003 workshop at which international developments were mentioned but did not play a pivotal role in discussion, international collaboration and competition were prominent topics at the 2007 workshop. Speakers summarized their understanding of the capabilities and ambitions of new national space programs in China and India, cited the forming of multinational alliances that exclude the United States or Europe, and pointed out some consequences of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as examples of new challenges in balancing cooperation and competition in the U.S. civil space program. For example, speakers questioned whether a goal of cooperation conflicts with the objective in the Vision to support international participation “to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.” Some participants suggested that international cooperation could provide a means to share costs, thereby augmenting resources available for the space program, but others noted that collaboration does not always result in reduced costs, particularly if partner roles and responsibilities are unclear. Participants also discussed at length the emergence of China as a major player in space and whether China presents a threat, in which case cooperation may be difficult or even out of the question, or an opportunity for engagement and cooperation, in which case space could gain a new strategic purpose as a vehicle for such cooperation. In any case, discussion highlighted that a decision about how to engage China will not be based solely on space policy, but will depend on much larger geopolitical considerations. PUBLIC INTEREST AND SUPPORT In assessing contemporary public interest in and support for space activities, some participants commented that programs such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the Mars rovers are popular and have a “wow factor”; other National Research Council, Workshop Series on Issues in Space Science and Technology: Summary of Space and Earth Science Issues from the Workshop on U.S. Civil Space Policy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space Exploration, NP-2004-01-334-HQ, NASA, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. iii.

72 Space Studies Board Annual Report—2008 speakers suggested that as long as the NASA budget is not too large, a “wow factor” in space accomplishments ­ ecomes less important. Others noted some survey-based evidence that the greatest degree of enthusiasm for ­human b space exploration rests with the Apollo generation (the 45- to 64-year-old age group), with much less support from the generation of youngest votersthe 18- to 24-year-old age group. SUSTAINABILITY, RESOURCES, LEADERSHIP, RELEVANCE, AND BALANCE Subsequent discussion turned to identifying problems in more detail, specifically to addressing a lack of r ­ esources, leadership challenges, the relevance and value of the space program, and balance among activities within the program. Speakers cited both internal and external factors that can affect resource requirements. Internal fac- tors include project delays, inadequate contingency funds, pressures for “full employment” at NASA centers, and defensive behavior by program managers and others when resources are scarce. External influences include com- petition from China and India, the emergence of climate and energy as major global issues, and likely continued federal budget deficits. Another concern was potential congressional opposition to U.S. reliance on Russia during an extended launch hiatus after the retirement of the space shuttle. The question of leadership figured prominently in workshop discussions. Some participants argued that strong leadership at senior levels of NASA and the government is essential for the success of the space program. In this context, some speakers viewed with considerable urgency the desirability of senior leaders facing up to what was repeatedly described as a program that cannot be executed within the allotted budget. Speakers also reiterated the responsibility of the space community to establish sound cost estimates and to execute programs within realistic budgets. Why should I care?suggested by a participant as an appropriate question to be posed by candidates for major national officeserved to focus in-depth discussion about a rationale for the civil space program. There were con- siderable differences in opinion, ranging from historically offered reasons (science, national security, commercial activities, a sense of human destiny and exploration, and national prestige and geopolitics) to a focus on the geo­ political contributions of the space program as perhaps one of the most compelling current-day rationales. But there was less than full agreement as to whether geopolitics meant cooperation or competition as a motivation for space activities. Discussion also addressed but did not reach agreement on whether, and if so to what extent, the civil space program needs to demonstrate practical benefits and value, a “wow” factor, or some mix of both. Balancing the pursuit of science, human space exploration, aeronautics, and other dimensions of space activities was also a concern among participants. Some speakers cautioned against characterizing the problem as “humans versus robots”; others urged that the focus should be on identifying and exploiting synergies among different parts of NASA, among NASA and other agencies and countries, and between NASA and the private sector. Participants also suggested that assessing balance requires recognition that different constituencies have different objectivesfor example, the scientific community measures much of its success in terms of progress toward goals such as those articulated in decadal surveys, whereas the aeronautics community measures progress in terms of responding to commercial and military air transport requirements. EARTH OBSERVING PROGRAMS Workshop discussion also addressed the role of Earth observations. Speakers emphasized that Earth observa- tions necessarily assume even greater importance given evidence of possibly significant changes in climate. But they remained troubled by problems stemming from reorganization of responsibility for and funding of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and the reduced capability of NPOESS in facilitating necessary climate-related measurements. Discussion also addressed the persistent difficulty between NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the “handoff” from use for research purposes to operational use of Earth science infrastructure and information. Speakers argued that differences in these agenciesranging from culture to objectivesbecome even sharper when their budgets are declining. M.L. Dittmar, Engaging the 18-25 Generation: Educational Outreach, Interactive Technologies, and Space, Dittmar Associates, Inc., avail- able at http://www.dittmar-associates.com/Publications/Engaging%20the%2018-25%20Generation%20Update~web.pdf.

Summaries of Major Reports 73 CAPABILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE Additional workshop discussion included optimistic comments about future capabilities and infrastructure to support the civil space program if national priorities can be well articulated and sufficient resources made available. For example, both traditional and new companies in aerospace can bring creativity and talent to problem solving when requirements are made clear. Speakers described experiences with bright university students interested in aerospace careers provided students sense that they can have an impact. Speakers further urged that NASA and universities build more effective partnerships to encourage talent and that ITAR restrictions limiting access to good students be remedied. Some participants mentioned institutions where turnover rates among aerospace profession- als are very low, even at the present time. Discussion also addressed the attraction of many young people to space activities using contemporary media that create a virtual presence. CONCLUDING THEMES The workshop concluded with the consolidation of discussion topics, which fell into three broad categories: communicating about space exploration; international competition, cooperation, and leadership; and ensuring robust­ ness through new approaches and attitudes. One idea for avoiding the impending programmatic “train wreck” to which many participants referred during the workshop was to “slow down the train” by deferring the first human mission to the Moon; extending the use of the International Space Station in support of research and development for later human exploration; establishing a telepresence on the Moon; creating an environment of institutional sta- bility in NASA’s program elements; building globally inclusive working groups on direct missions to Mars, global change, and space science; and defining real, meaningful jobs for humans in space.

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