. "Electromagnetic Terrorism: Threat to the Security of the State Infrastructure--Vladimir Ye. Fortov and Yury V. Parfyonov." Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four Workshops. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.
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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops
makes this unit unique is its compactness. We direct your attention to the maximum size of the generator, which is only about 30 centimeters. Further reductions in the size of the generator are possible, and a flat antenna may also be used.
Existing small high-voltage pulse generators make it possible to inject into data transmission chains or even into buildings’ electricity supply and grounding networks pulses that are harmful to the equipment located in such buildings. They form short pulses with amplitude of 80 kilovolts, periodically repeating at a frequency of 1,000 gigahertz. Such a generator could be manufactured with a volume on the order of 500-800 cubic centimeters.
There are two possible scenarios for how acts of electromagnetic terrorism could be carried out using powerful electromagnetic sources. Option 1 would be by aiming a powerful electromagnetic field at a facility, and option 2 would be by injecting high-voltage pulses into the data transmission lines and into the electricity supply and grounding network in buildings. To assess the degree of danger presented by these scenarios, a large number of facilities were studied to determine their resistance to the impact of powerful super-broadband electromagnetic radiation and high-voltage pulse disruptions. The results of the experiments show that the intentional use of powerful pulse disruptions could lead to dangerous wide-scale consequences, such as communications breakdowns, power failures, alarm systems blockages, and so forth.
At the same time, it must be said that the designers of the most critical facilities recognize this danger and apply all possible measures to protect electronic systems from various types of electromagnetic disruptions. However, there is an enormous quantity of civilian-use electronic equipment for which there are no requirements for protection against powerful electromagnetic disruptions. Of course, if a few individual pieces of such equipment crash, there will be no serious consequences. Meanwhile, if such equipment fails on a massive scale, chaos will ensue. Therefore, systematic studies have been initiated regarding the stability of civilian-use technical systems against intentionally directed electromagnetic impacts. As an example, presented below are the results of tests on an electronic electricity-use meter and electric power line isolators.
The typical electricity meter is a complex device that includes a special integrated system, a microcontroller, power-independent memory, flow sensors, a pulse power source, an optical port, a liquid crystal indicator, a quartz generator, and a light diode. Experiments have indicated that if the meter is irradiated from a distance of 10 meters, operational failures occur. Furthermore, the personnel responsible for the electricity-use monitoring and accounting system are, as a rule, not capable of establishing the causes of the equipment failure in a timely manner or taking effective measures to eliminate them. Thus, the vulnerability of electronic electricity meters has been established experimentally. The tests have also demonstrated the fundamental possibility of intentionally disrupting their operating capacity for criminal purposes, for example, for unauthorized selection