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Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for Screening Cargo at Ports of Entry INTERIM REPORT (ABBREVIATED VERSION) Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board Division on Earth and Life Studies THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. www.nap.edu

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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract/Grant No. HSHQDC-08-A-00056 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu Copyright 2009 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ii

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The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

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Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals Robert Dynes, CHAIR, University of California, San Diego Richard Blahut, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Robert R. Borchers, Maui High Performance Computing Center, Hawaii Philip E. Coyle, III, Private Consultant and World Security Institute, Sacramento, California Roger L. Hagengruber, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque Carl N. Henry, Private Consultant, Albuquerque, New Mexico John M. Holmes, Port of Los Angeles, California Karen Kafadar, Indiana University, Bloomington C. Michael Lederer, University of California Energy Institute, Berkeley Keith W. Marlow, Private Consultant, Albuquerque, New Mexico John W. Poston, Sr., Texas A&M University, College Station Henry H. Willis, Rand Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania STAFF Micah D. Lowenthal, Study Director Sarah C. Case, Program Officer Kathryn Hughes, Associate Program Officer Toni Greenleaf, Administrative and Financial Associate Mandi Boykin, Senior Program Assistant (April to December 2008) v

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Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board Richard A. Meserve (Chairman), Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C. S. James Adelstein (Vice Chairman), Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts Joonhong Ahn, University of California, Berkeley Joel S. Bedford, Colorado State University, Fort Collins Sue B. Clark, Washington State University, Pullman Allen G. Croff, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Retired), St. Augustine, Florida Patricia J. Culligan, Columbia University, New York, New York Sarah C. Darby, Clinical Trial Service Unit, Oxford, United Kingdom Jay Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Retired) Roger L. Hagengruber, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque David G. Hoel, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston Hedvig Hricak, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York, New York Thomas H. Isaacs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California Paul A. Locke, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland Boris F. Myasoedov; Russian Academy of Sciences John C. Villforth, Food and Drug Law Institute (Retired), Gaithersburg, Maryland Raymond G. Wymer, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Retired), Oak Ridge, Tennessee Paul L. Ziemer, Purdue University (Retired), West Lafayette, Indiana Staff Kevin D. Crowley, Director Micah D. Lowenthal, Program Director John R. Wiley, Senior Program Officer Sarah Case, Program Officer Daniela Stricklin, Program Officer Toni Greenleaf, Administrative and Financial Associate Laura D. Llanos, Administrative and Financial Associate Shaunteé Whetstone, Senior Program Assistant Erin Wingo, Program Assistant James Yates, Jr., Office Assistant vi

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Preface The threat of a nuclear attack on the United States has haunted the U.S. public consciousness and been a central motivation in U.S. national defense since the 1950s. This was vividly demonstrated by the image of American schoolchildren doing “duck and cover” drills at the early heights of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the prospect of a full-scale nuclear exchange between superpowers diminished, but the specter of new and different threats emerged: nuclear terrorism and clandestine nuclear attacks. Countering these new threats is a different kind of challenge and a goal that all reasonable people support. The question however, is where to devote limited funds to achieve the greatest impact against these risks. This report is an interim report of a study on the testing of next generation radiation detectors for screening cargo at ports of entry to the United States, one layer of the defense against such attacks. These new detectors are called advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for screening cargo for nuclear and radiological material at ports of entry. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for development and testing of new detectors and coordinating efforts for this mission. Both CBP and DNDO are in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DNDO issued the contract for this study to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in late April 2008 at the direction of Congress. The study is to advise the Secretary of Homeland Security on testing, analysis, costs, and benefits of the systems. DNDO wanted the NAS to issue a report in just over 4 months, and the NAS was prepared and equipped to deliver a report on that schedule, provided that all of the necessary information was provided by DHS. To carry out the study, the National Research Council (which is the operating arm of the NAS) assembled a committee with expertise in detection and identification of radioactive materials (nuclear materials and devices), cost-benefit analysis, statistical interpretation of data, algorithms for analysis of measurements, radiation shielding, deployment of detection systems, and port-of-entry operations. To gather information for the study, the committee observed operations during visits to ports of entry and test sites, reviewed the test plans and results, and met with experts and program managers. The committee obviously could not observe the prior tests, and so in addition to looking at the test plans and results from those tests, the committee took as valuable input reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Independent Review Team, which was convened at the request of the DHS Secretary. Like the prior tests, those reports were completed before the committee was formed, and indeed led to the request for this study. Given that DNDO acknowledged several of the problems with earlier testing, the committee focused more of its efforts on testing conducted in 2008 and the analysis that followed. The committee met in May, June, July, August, and October 2008 for information gathering, and subgroups of the committee visited ports in Seattle, Los Angeles, and Long Beach; border crossings in Blaine, Washington, and Otay Mesa, California; and met with experts at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque. The committee also heard from ASP program staff, the vendors, and outside experts in meetings in Washington, D.C. The original plan for testing, evaluation, and consultation was a tightly coupled schedule dictated by the Secretary of Homeland Security’s intent to make a decision in September 2008 vii

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PREFACE whether to certify that the ASPs would provide “a significant increase in operational effectiveness”. This wording was in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, and certification was required by Congress before DHS obligates funds for full-scale procurement of ASPs. This requirement was repeated in fiscal year 2008. In late July of 2008, DHS issued a signed memorandum defining what is a significant increase in operational effectiveness, in the context of ASP testing. At the same time, it became clear that the equipment vendors, DNDO, and CBP could not meet their September target date because testing would not be completed until much later. Also, DNDO had not finalized some of the methods for analyzing results, and particularly for assessing costs and benefits. In the fall, as testing and evaluation continued to take longer than DHS hoped, the NAS proposed to DHS that the committee issue an interim report that would help DNDO and CBP complete their testing and evaluation more effectively. DHS accepted this proposal. At the time that this report entered peer review, the committee had only seen preliminary results and analyses from the performance testing and an incomplete version of the DNDO cost- benefit analysis, both in briefing form. Because of the preliminary nature of the results the committee has seen and the incomplete state of the cost-benefit analysis methodology, this interim report focuses more on methodology than on results. During the peer review, DNDO provided a draft final report on performance testing. Unfortunately, the DNDO report was received too late to be considered in this Academy review. DNDO and DHS still have analysis and decisions ahead of them, even after the analysis of performance testing is finalized, and this interim report should help with that work. The final report will address the balance of the committee’s statement of task. The committee wrote this interim report to assist DHS in its procurement efforts, to provide the Secretary with initial advice, and to begin to fulfill Congress’ request. It is the committee’s hope that DNDO, CBP, and DHS will consider the report in the spirit it is intended. This report is an abbreviated version of the classified report provided to DNDO, DHS, and Congress. Some sensitive details have been removed, but the findings and recommendations remain unchanged from the full report. Robert Dynes, Chairman Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals viii

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REVIEWERS This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The content of the review comments and draft manuscript remains confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report: Vicki Bier, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Jay C. Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (retired), Robin Dillon-Merrill, Georgetown University, Glenn Knoll, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (retired), Richard Meserve, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Dennis Slaughter, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired), George Thompson, Homeland Security Institute, and Alyson Wilson, Iowa State University. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Dr. John Ahearne, Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Research Council. ix

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study began as a fast-track effort, and the committee had to obtain and learn a large amount of information from different sources over a short period of time. The committee was able to accomplish this with the assistance of program staff in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as well as from several other people and organizations. The committee gratefully acknowledges the following people and organizations that provided information to the committee: Vayl Oxford, Walt Dickey, Julian Hill, Ernie Muenchau, Mark Mullen, John Roland, Jason Shergur, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; George Ryan, Department of Homeland Security; Ben Nicholson, House Committee on Appropriations, Homeland Security Subcommittee staff; Gene Aloise, Ned Woodward, Joe Cook, Kevin Tarmin, Government Accountability Office; George Thompson, Homeland Security Institute; Thomas Cochran and Matthew McKinzie, Natural Resources Defense Council; John O’Sullivan, Raytheon Corporation; Mark Ramlo, Thermo-Fisher Corporation; Steve Mettler, Canberra Corporation; Mark Abhold, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sonya Bowyer, J. Mark Henderson, Asim Khawaja, John Schweppe, Eric Smith, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; RAND Corporation; the Port of Los Angeles; Maersk Shipping; the Port of Long Beach; Mel Chicazola and colleagues, Otay Mesa Border Crossing; Patrick Simmons, Todd Hoffman, Javier Larios, and CBP officers at the Port of Los Angeles, the Port of Long Beach, the Port of Seattle, and the Otay Mesa and Blaine border crossings, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the Nevada Test Site; and Dean Mitchell, Sandia National Laboratory. The committee particularly acknowledges the assistance it received from its liaison from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, LTC Chad Russell. The committee appreciates the assistance received from the following organizations in facilitating the committee’s work: RAND Corporation; U.S. Coast Guard, Long Beach; and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The committee is also grateful for the assistance provided by the National Research Council staff in preparing this report. Mandi Boykin and Toni Greenleaf provided the committee with administrative and logistical support through a series of many meetings arranged on short notice at a variety of locations. Sarah Case, Kathryn Hughes, and Micah Lowenthal provided professional support to the committee, without which the report would not have been completed. Robert Dynes, Chairman Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals xi

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Contents Executive Summary 1 Summary 3 1. Introduction 8 2. Background on Radiation Detection 14 3. Testing and Analyses of the ASP and PVT/RIID Systems 25 4. Cost-Benefit Analysis 44 References 54 Appendix A The Joint Explanatory Statement and the Statement of Task 57 Appendix B Performance Metrics for ASPs and PVTs. 58 Appendix C The Value of Factorial Experiments 69 Appendix D Brief Biographies of Committee Members 72 xiii

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