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1 New Approaches to Cooperation F ollowing World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) steadily exerted increasing control over policies and activi- ties in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. First, military control was strongly asserted. In parallel, political domina- tion became widespread. The countries of the region soon were members of the Warsaw Pact, tightly bound to the USSR in many ways. At the same time, Soviet troops took control of a newly created state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which also became a member of the Warsaw Pact. GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE USSR IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY By the 1960s, Soviet economic influence in the region was extensive. This influence had extended well beyond the academies to the science policies and funding priorities of the governments. These policies and priorities were increasingly determined by formal directives and other types of instructions emanating from Moscow. Such directives reinforced and at times supplemented the views of local communist leaders who had strong ties to counterparts throughout the region. Of course, local commu- nist leaders controlled key science and technology appointments within the governments and academies. Of special relevance for this report, party members received preference for international travel to scientific meetings. Usually they, like other travelers, were required to prepare trip
Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 reports that identified their international contacts and key foreign scien- tists whom they encountered abroad. While at home, they also reported on international activities including exchanges of journal articles. Given such inhibitions, researchers in the region were often out-of-date with international scientific achievements; and frequently they had no alter- native to relying on abstracts describing international advances in their fields of interest. Of particular interest for this report was the adoption in most of Eastern Europe (that is, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the GDR) of the Soviet model of an academy of sciences. In this model, the academies assumed responsibility for managing many of the best basic research groups within the countries. The academies were advo- cates of rigid top-down planning and centralized financing of research activities, often carried out pursuant to strong guidance from government agencies. The conflicts between the new role of the academies and the long- standing prerogatives of the universities as guardians for graduate stu- dents and associated research activities quickly became apparent. In gen- eral, universities successfully resisted the erosion of their pedagogical responsibilities, a struggle that continued into the 1990s. The new struc- tures for science continue to direct basic research in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, although the academies are less dominant as central planning mechanisms and less arbitrary in addressing personnel appointments, budget allocations, and program priorities. From univer- sity research laboratories to technology-oriented firms, few scientists of the region were left on their own to explore and apply science according to local needs and personal interests. Indeed, local needs and interests were soon defined by leaders of the Warsaw Pact as the collective needs and interests of the states of the region. More often than not, the Soviet Union was the leading state and often the primary beneficiary of collec- tive actions. An important mechanism for exerting direction of the research and development activities of the Eastern European countries was to be a newly established Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The facilities for CMEAâs headquarters were constructed in the late 1950s and became fully operational during the early 1960s. The offices were located in Moscow, very close to the American Embassy, where they served as a frequent reminder for American diplomats of the reach of the Soviet empire. CMEA was staffed by more than 2,000 people, including many technical specialists from the Soviet Union and small scientific cadres from the other countries. As to the scientific interests of CMEA, an important concept was to take advantage of the special technical strengths of the individual coun-
New Approaches to Cooperation tries and use them for the common good of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A step in this regard was to be the designation of coordination centers for scientific activities throughout the region. These centers were well funded and were to provide technical leadership in selected areas of applied science for the region. According to reports received by the National Research Council (NRC) from specialists in the region, inter- country travel by specialists of the region to the centers was encouraged and readily funded by the governments of the region, although the centers were reported to have served primarily the interests of the host countries and the interests of the USSR. Thus, they seemed to be important compo- nents of the science infrastructures of the host countries but less signifi- cant as regional hubs. Box 1-1 presents a list of most of the centers. At the same time, however, the Soviet government apparently was reluctant to place too much responsibility for controlling economic or BOX 1-1 Research Coordination Centers of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ⢠Improvement of Nutritional Content of Food Products, Sofia ⢠Economic Requirements and Standards for International Highways, Sofia ⢠Industrial Robots Research and Development, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria ⢠Preservation of Ecosystems and Landscapes, Bratislava ⢠Utilization of Raw Materials in Lumbering, Bratislava ⢠Mechanization and Automation in Crop Raising and Livestock Husbandry, Prague ⢠Computer Technology and Mathematical Methods in Transportation, Prague ⢠New Chemical Consumer Goods, Berlin ⢠Defense Against Atmospheric Pollution, Dresden ⢠Biological Problems in Livestock Husbandry, Dummersdorf, GDR ⢠New Types of Mineral Fertilizers, Leipzig ⢠Synthesis of Fuel Supplements, Schwedt, GDR ⢠Utilization of Industrial Wastes, Budapest ⢠Economic Forecasting in Development of Automotive Transport Equipment, Budapest ⢠New Methods of Utilizing Coal, Katowice ⢠New Pesticides and Plant Production Methods, Poznan ⢠Economic, Social, and Legal Aspects of Pollution Control, Warsaw ⢠Crating and Packaging in the Food Industry, Warsaw ⢠Economic Forecasting in Development of Railroad Rolling Stock, Warsaw SOURCE: NRC Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. 1985. Newsletter 7(1):10-11.
10 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 scientific development into the hands of CMEA. Rather, many bilateral agreements between the USSR and the other countries in the fields of economics, trade, and science signaled that more direct control through bilateral arrangements would be an important approach for extending the reach of Moscow. Also, in some fields with potential military applica- tions such as optics and material science, Moscow was reluctant to have achievements on display and kept them separate from multilateral activi- ties. In the United States, the general view of political experts who focused on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was that bilateral arrangements were more important to the Soviet government than multilateral arrange- ments developed through CMEA, which provided largely window dress- ing when important issues were decided. In parallel with the expansion of CMEA activities into the area of science and technology was an expanded role for the Soviet Academy of Sciences as a de facto coordinator of basic scientific activities throughout the region. The Soviet academy established an array of bilateral agree- ments with academies of the other members of the Warsaw Pact that frequently went beyond basic research into the technical sciences and engineering. These agreements served as the basis for many joint activi- ties that brought scientists throughout the region more directly under the influence of Soviet policies. Because this report covers bilateral scientific activities involving Yugoslavia as well as the six countries noted above, Yugoslaviaâs unique position in the postwar era deserves a few words. Yugoslavia was not behind the Iron Curtain. However, its Communist leadership was often sympathetic to the views of the USSR. Its ties between important elements of the population and professional colleagues and friends in adjacent countries also had long histories. Politically, Yugoslavia was considered a nonaligned nation with regard to important international matters. At times Yugoslavia was a bridge between East and West in sponsoring international exhibitions and meet- ings on many types of developments, including scientific achievements. At other times it aligned itself with the activities and interests of either East or West, depending on the extent of mutual interests. But favoritism toward the East or West did not seem to be a consistent determinant of the scientific activities carried out within the country. Often the interests of international organizations were more important. For example, beginning in the mid-1950s Yugoslavia promoted the nuclear research center at Vinca near Belgrade as a high-visibility activity of interest to scientists from many countries. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became one of the external organizations most interested in Yugoslaviaâs important scientific activities. When a nuclear reactor accident at the center exposed about a dozen Yugoslav scientists
New Approaches to Cooperation 11 to high doses of radiation in 1957, several were rushed to Paris for bone marrow transplants. At the same time, the Yugoslav government was quick to ensure that the IAEA provided an international umbrella for this emergency response. As to technical relations with the United States, during the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the United States supported a substantial for- eign assistance program in Yugoslavia. While not explicitly targeted on enhancing Yugoslaviaâs science capacity, some projects involved introduc- tion of modern technologies into the nationâs industrial base. Dozens of technical experts from the United States visited Yugoslavia each year to advise the government on agricultural and industrial developments, and dozens of Yugoslav engineers and agricultural scientists traveled to the United States for specialized education and training. All the while, a significant diaspora of Yugoslav émigrés who contin- ued their scientific careers in the United States helped ensure that vibrant scientific relations developed between the United States and Yugoslavia during the 1960s and 1970s. REDUCED LEVEL OF SCIENTIFIC ENGAGEMENT FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II Prior to World War II, important scientists from the Eastern European countries in addition to Yugoslavia had emigrated to the United States. Many had maintained professional contacts with their colleagues in their native countries, and they promoted a flow of exchange visits in both directions. Scientific papers written jointly by specialists living in the United States and those living in the region were common in the interna- tional journals. Science-oriented students from the region were enrolled at many leading American universities; and the distinction between U.S. science and Eastern European science in physics, chemistry, and math- ematics was often difficult to distinguish. But with the spread of Soviet influence in the 1950s and 1960s, American scientists had increasing difficulty gaining access to important research centers in the region. Also, many Eastern European technology- oriented companies were under state control. They were not ready to receive American visitors, whose presence could raise security concerns of local authorities. No longer could transplanted Eastern Europeans or other American scientists depend on collaborative efforts being welcomed by the officials of the region. No longer could they easily obtain data that were not pub- lished in international journals. At the same time, scientists of the region gradually lost track of important developments in the United States in their fields of research.
12 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 The degree of isolation varied from country to country. Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary were the most open countries of the region for Western scientific colleagues. Bulgaria, Romania, the GDR, and Czecho- slovakia were isolated in many ways, particularly with regard to travel to the West by their scientists. Also, some fields of science became more insular than others. Achievements in engineering and the social sciences, in particular, became increasingly opaque in Eastern Europe. Several U.S. government programs supported limited exchanges involving researchers from the region. However, participation often required special permission from the governments of the region, and approvals were frequently problematic. In particular, the Fulbright Pro- gram provided opportunities for a limited number of American scientists to obtain travel support for activities involving several countries of the region, and in return Fulbright participants from the region were wel- comed in the United States. The National Science Foundation (NSF) had a variety of small programs over many years for supporting travel in both directions. The National Institutes of Health at times provided financial support for research in the region of considerable priority to the United States and also awarded fellowships to work in the United States for visi- tors from the region. Other U.S. departments and agencies occasionally provided funding for cooperative ventures. Overall, when international funds were available on a competitive basis, Eastern European scientists fared well in the competition. But these activities did not add up to a level of activity commensurate with the sci- entific capabilities of countries with a combined population that exceeded 100 million. In previous decades, the region had made many important scientific contributions to economic progress, argued the American advo- cates of greater engagement during a period of political disengagement. There was both vocal and latent interest in the scientific communities on both sides of the ocean in expanding cooperation. At the time, the U.S. government viewed expansion of such coop- eration as a potentially important form of bridge-building that could contribute to the political objectives of weaning the countries away from the USSR. From the scientific viewpoint, NSF was particularly interested in supporting expanded ties. It correctly believed that the long legacy of important scientific achievements in the region continued to permeate local research institutions that could make significant contributions in advancing international science INITIATIVE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Beginning in 1965, several successive foreign secretaries of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) decided to try to bring the Eastern European
New Approaches to Cooperation 13 BOX 1-2 Cooperation as a Scientific and Cultural Experience âI remain convinced of the value of cooperation, not only in a narrow scientific sense but as a broad cultural experience as well. At a time when so many chan- nels of cooperation and communication with Soviet and East European colleagues have shrunk, the interacademy programs assume greater significance than their modest size would suggest. They offer Americans rare opportunities for access and for joint work with scientific colleagues and opportunities for scientists from those countries to visit the United States. But they will command wholehearted participa- tion only if scientists are respected and treated equitably so they can participate in an unfettered manner in cooperation.â Walter Rosenblith, foreign secretary, NAS, 1983. SOURCE: National Research Council (NRC) Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. 1983. Newsletter 5(1). scientific communities closer to the mainstream of international research and particularly research in the United States. They and other influential leaders of the NAS had repeatedly met leading Eastern European coun- terparts at international meetingsânational and regional scientific confer- ences, sessions of the societies of the International Council of Scientific Unions, and meetings of other professional societies, for example. They received many invitations to visit the region, and they became convinced that strengthening contacts with Eastern European colleagues through a formalized interacademy program would benefit the United States in a variety of ways (see, for example, Box 1-2). NSF agreed, and funds were provided to the NAS for scientific engagement. The natural counterparts for the NAS were the academies of sciences in the countries of the region. As previously noted, with the exceptions of Romania and Yugoslavia, each of the countries adopted the Soviet model for the structure and role of its academy of sciences. They were scientifically strong and well-funded organizations, tightly linked to the governments, particularly with regard to the selection of academy offi- cers. By the mid-1960s, most academies had already established robust scientific exchange programs among themselves and, of course, with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. They also were in the process of broadening their international activities to include cooperation with other academies in more distant lands. In the late 1960s, the political situation in Czechoslovakia, and to some
14 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 extent in Hungary and Poland, became more liberal, enabling scientists to communicate and travel internationally more freely. More researchers, regardless of political affiliations, began to enjoy the benefits of formal and informal international research arrangements. Thus, there was consider- able interest in the scientific communities in the newly evolving interacad- emy arrangements. This period of liberalization was temporary, ending in the 1970s. But by that time, the interacademy and other arrangements were in place. As for Yugoslavia, academies of sciences were located in each of the six republics of the countryâSlovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedoniaâand also in two regions of SerbiaâVojvodina and Kosovo. The individual academies did not adopt the Soviet model and were not managers of the major research facilities of the countries. They were primarily membership organizations that recognized leading scientists. They were linked through a council of academies with a secretariat that moved every 2 or 3 years among the cities of the country, depending on the residences of the presidents of the council. The council served as a mechanism for considering issues that affected the entire country and provided a focal point for coordinating international cooperation. For about a decade beginning in the late 1960s, the NAS foreign secre- taries traveled to the capital cities of seven countries of the region. There they signed agreements on scientific cooperation between the NAS and the counterpart academies of sciences of the individual countries. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Council of Academies was the signatory. Box 1-3 indicates the dates when the initial agreements were signed. Typically, these agreements were for 3 or 5 years, and they were regularly renewed as necessary by subsequent exchanges of letters until the early 1990s. BOX 1-3 Dates of Initial Interacademy Scientific Cooperation Agreements ⢠Romania: 1965 ⢠Poland: 1966 ⢠Yugoslavia: 1966 ⢠Czechoslovakia: 1966 ⢠Hungary: 1970 ⢠Bulgaria: 1970 ⢠GDR: 1978 SOURCE: Agreements in the Archives of the National Academies.
New Approaches to Cooperation 15 The purpose of the agreements was succinctly stated by the NRC as follows: âThe purpose of these programs is to enable U.S. and foreign scientists to visit each othersâ countries for lecturing, familiarization, and research.â At the same time, the interested organizations and individu- als in the United States and the region recognized that in addition to scientific benefits the agreements had political importance in overcoming the divide in East-West relations while providing greater visibility to the scientific capabilities of the region. Because similar arrangements for scientific exchanges had been adopted by the NAS and the Soviet Academy of Sciences beginning in 1959, there was only limited concern in Washington that national secu- rity interests would be jeopardized through access by adversaries to U.S. scientific achievements. With regard to Eastern Europe, the U.S. govern- ment seemed to believe that the possibility of misuse of exchanges for espionage targeted toward U.S. technologies was outweighed by potential technical benefits to the United States. At the same time, however, the intelligence services in both the United States and the partner countries maintained a careful watch over interacademy activities, primarily in reviewing the visa applications of participants in the programs. The agreements provided for both long-term scientific visits in each directionâusually up to 1 yearâand for short-term visitsâusually for 1 month. An annual quota for visits specified in months was prescribed. For example, Box 1-4 sets forth the quotas in 1978, although the quotas changed frequently, depending on availability of funds and on application pressures in the United States and in partner countries. Because the programs were supported by NSF, the topics that could be covered were limited to the following: physical, biological, or engi- neering sciences; social or behavioral sciences, with an emphasis on empirical and quantitative analysis of individual and group behavior; and biomedical sciences. Clinical studies and agricultural research were generally excluded. The disciplines that were specified were subjected to minor modifications over the years. However, the consistent concept was clearâto have the disciplines for the program the same as the dis- ciplines that were eligible for funding from domestic-oriented programs of NSF. Additional provisions were usually included in the interacademy agreements that addressed the organization of workshops, facilitation of cooperative arrangements to be implemented outside the framework of NRC Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. 1977. Newsletter 1(1). Of special interest is National Security Decision Directive 189, issued in 1985 by the Na- tional Security Council, which reaffirmed earlier directives that the results of basic research should be considered as unclassified information. NRC Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. 1985. Newsletter (Winter 1985), p. 1.
16 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 BOX 1-4 Exchange Quotas in 1978 ⢠Bulgaria: 25 person-months in each direction ⢠Czechoslovakia: 55 months ⢠Hungary: 35 months ⢠Poland: 35 months ⢠Romania: 25 months ⢠Yugoslavia: 30 months ⢠GDR: 20 months SOURCE: NRC Office of Soviet and East European Affairs. 1978. Newsletter 1(2):1 and 2(1):1. the agreements, and other suggestions for expanding bilateral scientific exchanges. An important parallel development was the establishment by the U.S. government of research programs in Yugoslavia and Poland during the 1970s. These programs were funded with local currency generated as payments for agricultural products sent to the countries by the U.S. government (often referred to as P.L. 480 funds). The programs lasted until the early 1990s and involved support of dozens of scientists in the two countries. The level of financial support provided to local scientists to cover some research costs and to scientists in the United States as well as in the region to cover international travel costs varied from year to year but generally was in the range of local currency equivalent to $500,000 to $1 million per year per country. While at the time there were other collaborative programs supported by various U.S. government agencies through other funds, P.L. 480 research programs were important examples of how relatively stable scientific cooperation at the time could serve the interests of the U.S. government and its partner governments. Another set of programs that provided an important context for inter- academy activities during the early 1990s were country-specific inter- governmental scientific programs funded through the Department of State and carried out by a variety of U.S. government agencies. These programs, which were targeted on Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, were designed to expand contacts between institutions in the countries of the region and the United States following the opening of the region after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Although the programs only provided support for travel and directly related expenses in both direc- tions, they were considered to be of great importance by the governments
New Approaches to Cooperation 17 of the countries of the region. They continued for 3 to 4 years with an overall annual funding level of several million dollars. As the programs terminated, there was a constant stream of appeals from the governments of the region to revive them. However, the argument that the region was rapidly becoming an integral component of Europe (whole and free) and therefore should look to European funding sources for cooperative activi- ties was an important factor in the program termination decisions by the U.S. government. Also of importance during this period were exchange programs of several U.S. nongovernmental organizations and foundations. The Inter- national Research and Exchanges Board, with considerable financial sup- port from the U.S. government, supported a broad range of social science cooperative programs. The Ford Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund supported American social science scholars interested in the region and also pioneered many environment- oriented activities. Finally, the Open Society Initiative (George Sorosâs organization) launched one of its first international efforts in Hungary in the mid-1980s, and this program was soon replicated in other Eastern European countries as well. Collectively, these activities, along with the programs of the National Academies, had a significant impact in opening many doors to outsiders with common interests. Finally, Eastern European scientists were quick to learn how to suc- cessfully compete for international research grants offered in Europe and the United States. This experience was a strong factor in encouraging the establishment of grant programs in the region as the Iron Curtain was lifted. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC CHANGES WITH THE LIFTING OF THE IRON CURTAIN By 1991 the countries of Eastern Europe were desperately trying to establish market economies to revive their slumping standards of liv- ing. The salaries of researchers fell dramatically, and many limited their scientific efforts in order to take second and third jobs outside science. The GDR soon became an integral component of the Federal Republic of Germany; but the integration process was not easy, and hundreds of scientists who could not compete internationally were dismissed. The Hungarians continued to struggle with economic transition, which began many years earlier but moved slowly. The Poles took bold steps towards opening their economy by relaxing price controls, reducing subsidies, and adopting realistic foreign exchange rates. In Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, political support for abandoning central command and control spread rapidly; and free market concepts moved beyond the plan-
18 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 ning stage with attendant economic problems. In summary, even though the roads to capitalism were uncertain at best, they were slowly adopted. At the same time, the introduction of free markets led to unemployment with limited social safety nets available. Economic issues led to many disappointments among the scientific communities. Most laboratories languished in retarded states of devel- opment. The emerging young talent of the region increasingly turned to business endeavors rather than accepting lower pay and loss of prestige of academic science. Funds became scarcer for equipment, foreign journals, and travel. Thus, local scientists reached out as never before for help from the West. Nevertheless, some research centers continued high-quality research that produced impressive achievements and had become focal points for cooperation. They included, for example, chemical catalysis investiga- tions in Krakow, Poland; water ecology studies in Budapest; entomol- ogy experiments in Äeské BudÄjovice, Czechoslovakia; fruit research in PiteÅti, Romania; and coastal morphology investigations on the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria. Government leaders in all of the countries advo- cated strong support for sizable scientific complexes despite the economic difficulties, although adequate funding seldom followed such political pronouncements. High on the priority lists of these countries were the future configu- rations, policies, and leaderships of the academies of sciences. During the 1990s, strong political attacks were launched against the Soviet-style academies by critics within the region and in the West. However, the academies defended their interests and successfully resisted radical reor- ganization, except in Prague. In other capitals, the conservative nature of the large networks of basic research institutions remained largely intact. Of course, the officers of the academies changed significantly, fairness in elections of academy members was greatly improved, and government control over the functioning of the academies was generally lessened. But most of the new governments in the region considered that preservation and modification of the academy systems were preferable to dismantle- ment. The GDR was a special case, and its academy disappeared. Mean- while, the academies of Yugoslavia became aligned within the new states that succeeded Yugoslavia. Most academies retained their historical roles of electing members in recognition of personal scientific achievements, although the electoral Schweitzer, Glenn E. 1991. The Future of Scientific Research in Eastern Europe. Technol- ogy in Society 13(1-2):39-51. Ibid. Ibid.
New Approaches to Cooperation 19 process was of great concern in each country. In general, scientific achieve- ments gained a rightful place in the process, with political favoritism as an election criterion playing a less dominant role. The academies continued to serve as advisory bodies for governments, just as they had throughout the days of Soviet domination. However, the mechanisms for developing consensus reports for consideration by the government involved more active participation by scientists throughout the academy systems rather than reliance on a very limited number of officials. Finally, most acad- emies continued to have responsibility for managing substantial numbers of research institutions. Greater efforts were frequently exerted to link these academy institutions to the universities and to the users of research results, such as government ministries and the industrial sector. Turning to Czechoslovakia, the old academy underwent a major trans- formation. Its members were dismissed, and an independent Learned Society was established to recognize the achievements of scientists and other leading intellectuals, with a membership of about 140 fellows. The academyâs staff was downsized, with the new âHead Officeâ of the acad- emy providing budgetary support for the institutes, the Academy Council and its Presidium, and targeted programs and projects. The institutes continued to emphasize basic research with only a loose affiliation to the academy through the budgetary process. The government decided that restarting the entire system was the only practical means of ridding the system of scientists with questionable credentials and motives. With the establishment of new institutional arrangements, there was considerable overlap among the leaders of the academy, the directors of its institutes, the managers of the government research council system, and the Learned Society; but their separate responsibilities were generally clear. As to the GDR, the Leopoldina Academy in Halle, the worldâs oldest academy involved in the natural sciences, had long been of special interest to the U.S. scientific community (see Box 1-5). Despite the establishment of a new Soviet-style academy in East Berlin in the 1950s, the Leopoldina Academy managed to maintain a program of international interactions of scientists from many countries. After the collapse of the GDR, it became an even more important academy representing the interests of scientists throughout the Federal Republic of Germany. As an indicator of its impor- tance to U.S. science, more than 90 members of the academy now live in the United States. As to the international cooperation activities of the academies, many cooperative programs and supporting staffs at the academy level remained See www.learned.cz/main.php?id=02.01.01.00; www.kav.cos.sz/gen.php?gage=about_us&lng=en; and www.cax.sz/en/. Accessed July 22, 2009. Hans Frauenfelder, Los Alamos National Laboratory. April 2009.
20 Interacademy Programs Between the United States and Eastern Europe 1967-2009 BOX 1-5 Leopoldina Academy âDuring the dark days of the GDR, the Leopoldina Academy kept essential free contact with the outside world.â Hans Frauenfelder, Los Alamos National Laboratory. April 2009. in place during the transition. Even in Czechoslovakia, familiar person- alities remained and well-established approaches continued. Over the years, the annual reports of the individual academies as well as reports of the Central and Eastern European Network of Academies of Sciences published by the European Commissionâs Joint Research Center often discussed the changes in the academies. In 1986 several intellectual leaders associated with the Serbian Acad- emy of Sciences and Arts prepared a memorandum entitled âTopical Social Questions in Our Country.â The memorandum blamed Croatia and Slovenia for the disintegration of Yugoslavian unity. It decried the fact that Serbia had been denied the right to create its own state, a clear refer- ence to Serbian minorities living in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This memorandum became known in the West as the manifesto that pro- vided the intellectual underpinning for Serbian aggression in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1989 NRC staff members met in Belgrade with a vice president of the Serbian Academy 2 days after a broadcast on Belgrade television reporting on the availability of the memorandum, which was immediately criticized in the West. The vice president assured the visitors that the memorandum did not reflect the policy of the Serbian Academy but only the views of several of its members. He urged the visitors not to take the document too seriously. However, the manifesto set off a firestorm in the West. The leadership of the NAS, in consultation with members who were well acquainted with Yugoslav colleagues, decided that the Serbian Academy was not a responsible organization and therefore that the NAS should terminate all communication and cooperation with the Serbian Academy. This boycott continued for more than a decade. Despite informal reconciliation discus- See Posa, Cristina. 1998. Engineering Hatred: The Roots of Contemporary Serbian Na- tionalism. Balkanistica 11:69-77. Available online at home.olemiss.edu/mldyer/balk/article1.html. Accessed March 5, 2009.
New Approaches to Cooperation 21 sions involving representatives of the academies at international meet- ings, a formal bilateral meeting involving the Serbian Academy has not been held in recent years. There simply has not been funding to support a cooperative project that would call for such a meeting. SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES Against this background, this report addresses some of the activities that followed the signing of the interacademy agreements. Also, other types of activities that were supported by the NAS and then the National Academies as the political landscape in the region and interests of fund- ing sources changed are considered. Chapter 2 discusses exchanges of individual scientists, initially within the framework of the agreements and then beginning in the early 1990s through other means that built on the experience of the exchange agreements. Chapter 3 is devoted to a dis- cussion of the many bilateral interacademy workshops that were carried out beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present time. Chapter 4 describes a variety of other activities beyond individual exchanges and workshops that expanded the program with counterparts in the region. Recommendations concerning future activities are then presented in Chapter 5.
