Consideration of these principles led the committee to nine recommendations that it believes are essential for keeping BSAT research secure from both internal and external threats.
Recommendation 1 assigns responsibility for fostering a culture of trust and responsibility to a partnership of laboratory leaders and the Select Agent Program:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Laboratory leadership and the Select Agent Program should encourage and support the implementation of programs and practices aimed at fostering a culture of trust and responsibility within BSAT entities. These programs and practices should be designed to minimize potential security and safety risks by identifying and responding to potential personnel issues. These programs should have a number of common elements, tailored to reflect the diversity of facilities conducting BSAT research:
Consideration should be given to including discussion of personnel monitoring during (1) the initial training required for all personnel prior to gaining access to BSAT materials and annual refresher updates and (2) safety inspections to obtain a more complete assessment of the laboratory’s ability to provide a safe and secure research environment.
More broadly, personnel with access to select agents and toxins should receive training in scientific ethics and dual-use research. Training should be designed to foster community responsibility and raise awareness of all personnel of available institutional support and medical resources.
Federal agencies overseeing and sponsoring BSAT research and professional societies should provide educational and training resources to accomplish these goals.
Recommendation 2 engages the research community in oversight of the Select Agent Program through formation of an advisory committee:
RECOMMENDATION 2: To provide continued engagement of stakeholders in oversight of the Select Agent Program, a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC) should be established. The members, who should be drawn from academic/research institutions and the private sector, should include microbiologists and other infec-