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CHAPTER FIVE
Key Elements of America’s
Climate Choices
A comprehensive and effective response to climate
change requires a diverse portfolio of actions that
evolve with new information and understanding.
A
s discussed in Chapter 4, a balanced risk management strategy for addressing
climate change requires an integrated portfolio of policy options, including
actions aimed at reducing the likelihood of adverse outcomes and actions
aimed at reducing the damages such outcomes could cause. It further requires mak-
ing investments over time to advance the knowledge on which future decisions will
be based, to expand the options available to decision makers in the future, and to
ensure that decision makers at all levels (including the public) have the information
necessary to make decisions that properly reflect new knowledge and new options.
Cutting across all of these elements are needs for international engagement and for
coordinating the different actors and elements of an overall response strategy. This
chapter offers recommendations along each of these dimensions, with an emphasis
on near-term responses that enhance the capacity for, and reduce the costs of, more
substantial responses that may be chosen in the more distant future.
LIMITING THE MAGNITUDE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Limiting the magnitude of climate change requires stabilizing atmospheric green-
house gas (GHG) concentrations, which in turn requires reducing emissions of these
gases so that their emissions are no greater than the rate at which they are naturally
removed from the atmosphere. The basic opportunities available for reducing GHG
emissions include restricting or modifying activities that release GHGs (e.g., burning
of fossil fuels), removing CO2 from the waste stream of large point sources of emis-
sions and sequestering it underground (carbon capture and storage), or augmenting
natural processes that remove GHGs from the atmosphere, for example by managing
agricultural soils or forests to increase the rate at which they sequester carbon (post-
emission GHG management). In addition, GHG emissions could potentially be offset by
enhancing the reflection of solar radiation back to space (solar radiation management),
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A M E R I C A’ S C L I M AT E C H O I C E S
which together with some post-emission GHG management strategies is sometimes
referred to as geoengineering (see Box 5.1). NRC, Advancing the Science and Limiting
the Magnitude review the technologies and practices that are available for pursuing
these various opportunities. Here we provide a very brief overview, starting with the
more general issue of setting goals for limiting the magnitude of climate change.
BOX 5.1
Geoengineering
Geoengineering, applied to climate change, refers to deliberate, large-scale manipulations of the
Earth’s environment intended to offset some of the harmful consequences of GHG emissions, and it
encompasses two very different types of strategies: solar radiation management and post-emission
GHG management.a Many proposed geoengineering approaches are ambitious concepts with global
environmental consequences; as such, they have attracted a great deal of attention. In general, however,
current scientific knowledge of the efficacy and overall risk reduction potential of most geoengineer-
ing approaches is limited.
Solar radiation management (SRM) involves increasing the reflection of incoming solar radiation
back into space. Some SRM approaches can, in theory at least, produce substantial cooling quickly and
thus could potentially be used in the case of “climate emergencies” involving unexpectedly rapid warm-
ing or severe impacts. A much-discussed example is the proposal to continuously inject large quantities
of small reflective particles (aerosols) into the stratosphere. This would mimic some effects of sustained
large volcanic eruptions, which have been observed to cool the earth’s surface measurably for months.
Another SRM strategy sometimes proposed is to increase the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface through
widespread use of “white roofs.”
The potential benefits of many SRM strategies are offset by potential risks. In the case of aerosol
injection strategies, for example, significant regional or global effects on precipitation patterns could
occur,b potentially placing food and water supplies at risk. SRM alone would also do nothing to slow
ocean acidification, since CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere and ocean would continue to rise.
Thus, it is unclear if any of the proposed large-scale SRM strategies could actually reduce the overall
risk associated with human-induced climate change.c
Large-scale proposals for post-emission GHG management generally involve either removing CO2
from the atmosphere by direct air capture technologies or managing ecosystems on land or in the ocean
to increase their natural uptake and storage of carbon. Strategies for enhancing carbon sequestration
in soils and forests (which are often viewed as standard strategies for limiting climate change rather
than geoengineering) are relatively well understood and offer important opportunities for reducing
net GHG emissions in some parts of the world. However, changes in the sequestration rates of these
systems are often difficult to quantify, and the potential effectiveness of these strategies may decline
over time due to saturation effects.d
A more controversial post-emission GHG management strategy which has actually been tested at
small scales is fertilizing the ocean by adding iron to iron-poor waters (or adding other limiting nutrients
or minerals) to increase removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by phytoplankton. Concerns have been
raised both about the efficacy of this approach and about possible risks that it might pose to marine
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
Setting Goals
Concrete, quantitative goals for limiting the magnitude of climate change offer the
benefit of allowing all parties involved to have a common sense of purpose and a
clear metric against which to measure progress. Finding agreement on quantitative
ecosystems.e Other post-emission approaches involve removing CO2 from the air though chemical
processes, but as with conventional carbon capture and storage from point emission sources, direct
air capture schemes require reliable geological repositories for the removed CO2. In general, most CO2
removal approaches seem to pose fewer ancillary risks than SRM approaches, but they appear likely to
be expensive, and because they would have only a gradual effect on atmospheric GHG concentrations,
they would not have the potential to produce substantial cooling quickly.
Because some forms of geoengineering would have consequences that span national boundar-
ies, international legal frameworks are needed to govern the development and possible deployment
of these options. Such frameworks need to include a clear definition of the “climate emergency” that
would trigger deployment of large-scale SRM, and criteria for whether, when, and how SRM (and some
versions of post-emission GHG management) would be tested —recognizing that even the act of field
testing may create international tensions. More fundamentally, intentional alteration of the Earth’s
environment via geoengineering raises significant ethical issues, including the distribution of risks
among population groups in both present and future generations, as well as challenging questions of
public perceptions and acceptability.f
In conclusion, geoengineering approaches may conceivably have a role to play in future climate
risk management strategies, particularly if efforts to reduce global GHG emissions are unsuccessful or
if the impacts of climate change are unexpectedly severe. At present however, the costs, benefits, and
risks of many geoengineering approaches are not well understood. In the committee’s judgment, it
would therefore be imprudent to use certain geoengineering approaches (in particular, SRM and ocean
fertilization strategies) to manipulate the Earth’s environment in the near future, and it would be unwise
to assume they will be attractive options even in the more distant future. We recommend instead a
program of research to better understand the potential effects of different geoengineering options
and efforts to address the international governance issues raised by many geoengineering proposals.
a See, e.g., Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, RS policy document 10/09 (Lon-
don: The Royal Society, 2009); American Geophysical Union, Geoengineering the Climate System. A Position Statement of the American
Geophysical Union (Adopted by the AGU Council on 13 December 2009); American Meteorological Society, Geoengineering the Climate
System. A Policy Statement of the American Meteorological Society (adopted by the AMS Council on 20 July 2009).
b G. C. Hegerl and S. Solomon,“Risks of climate engineering” (Science 325[5943]:955-956, 2009, doi: 10.1126/science.1178530).
c See NRC, Advancing the Science, Chapter 15 for additional discussion of proposed SRM approaches, including the research
needed to better understand their potential efficacy and risks.
d See NRC, Advancing the Science and Limiting the Magnitude for further discussion and references.
e K. O. Buesseler, S. C. Doney, D. M. Karl, P. W. Boyd, K. Caldeira, F. Chai, K. H. Coale, H. J. W. De Baar, P. G. Falkowski, K. S. Johnson,
R. S. Lampitt, A. F. Michaels, S. W. A. Naqvi, V. Smetacek, S. Takeda, and A. J. Watson, “Environment: Ocean iron fertilization—Moving
forward in a sea of uncertainty” (Science 319[5860]:162, 2008).
f NRC, Advancing the Science.
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A M E R I C A’ S C L I M AT E C H O I C E S
targets is, however, an inevitably contentious process, and a failure to reach consensus
on such targets can become a barrier to moving ahead with meaningful actions. It is
of course possible to proceed with meaningful actions to limit GHG emissions in the
absence of universally-accepted quantitative goals. Nonetheless, it is important to
understand the different types of goals that are being actively debated at national and
international levels.
At the international level, a commonly discussed goal is the tolerable increase in
global average surface temperature relative to pre-industrial times. (The goal of limit-
ing global average temperature rise to 2°C (3.6°F) has been agreed to in a number
of major international platforms,1 although there is ongoing scientific debate about
whether that actually represents a “safe” threshold for limiting climate change.2) For
any given global temperature goal, corresponding goals can then be derived for
atmospheric GHG concentrations that would give a reasonable chance of meeting
the temperature goal, for global GHG emissions limits that would give a reasonable
chance of meeting those GHG concentration goals, and, finally, for national GHG emis-
sion limits that would collectively achieve the needed global emission reductions.
These relationships are complicated, however, by a variety of scientific uncertainties
and value judgments (see Figure 5.1).3
A global mean temperature limit is not a goal that can be directly controlled, but
rather, is an emergent property of the decisions made by countless governments, pri-
vate sector actors, and individuals around the world, and of the earth system processes
that determine how emissions affect the earth’s climate. Operationally, domestic-
level response strategies require metrics that can be directly tracked and controlled
at the national level. For the U.S. national goal, the America’s Climate Choices (ACC)
panel report Limiting the Magnitude of Future Climate Change recommends setting a
“budget” for cumulative domestic GHG emissions over a set period of time—a recom-
mendation the committee supports. The budget concept has also been proposed in
the context of global emissions.4
It is beyond the mandate of this committee to recommend specific global or national
emission budget goals because such goals are based in large part on value judg-
ments about what is an acceptable degree of risk, and what is a fair U.S. share of the
global emissions-reduction burden. Nor do we try to evaluate the risks of adverse
climate impacts associated with different possible U.S. emission goals, because such
risks ultimately depend on global emissions, not U.S. emissions alone. We do suggest,
however, that in the context of iterative risk management, any such goals need to
be periodically revisited and revised over time, in response to new information and
understanding.
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
Goals Key questions for setting each goal:
What is a ‘safe’ amount of climate change?
limiting global mean Depends on the risks associated with given
temperature increase temperature targets, and decisions about willingness
(e.g. 2ºC, 3ºC)
to tolerate these risks
--------------------------
limiting global How does GHG concentration translate into
atmospheric global temperature change and other impacts?
GHG concentrations Depends on climate sensitivity and the strength of
(e.g. 450 ppm, 550 ppm) other forcing factors (e.g., aerosols)
--------------------------
How does a given level of emissions translate
limiting global
into an atmospheric GHG concentration?
GHG emissions
Depends on carbon cycle dynamics and the timing of
(e.g. global emission budget
emission reductions
or percent reduction)
--------------------------
What is a reasonable share of U.S. emission
limiting U.S.
reductions relative to the global targets?
GHG emissions
Depends on political, economic, and ethical judgments
(e.g. national emission budget
or percent reduction)
FIGURE 5.1 A schematic illustration of the steps involved in setting goals for limiting the magnitude of
future climate change, and some key questions and uncertainties that need to be considered in each of
these steps.
Reducing Global Emissions
The United States currently accounts for roughly 20 percent of global CO2 emissions,
despite having less than 5 percent of the world’s population. The U.S. percentage of to-
5-1, editable
tal global emissions is projected to decline over the coming decades, however, mainly
because emissions from rapidly developing nations such as China and India will
continue to grow (see Figure 3.1). International engagement challenges are discussed
later in this chapter, but it is worth emphasizing here the central point that poorer
nations usually find requests by the United States to limit their emissions unjustified
for several reasons: because current per-capita emissions and standard of living in the
United States and other developed nations are far above theirs, because the United
States is responsible for the largest share of the historical increase in atmospheric GHG
concentrations, and because the United States has not yet been willing to enact its
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own national policies to limit emissions. As a result of such dynamics, the international
community has not yet forged an agreement in which both developed countries
and all large, rapidly developing countries commit to binding GHG emission reduc-
tions. Forging a comprehensive international agreement will be difficult and possibly
infeasible without credible U.S. leadership, demonstrated through strong domestic
actions.5
In addition to this need for demonstrating leadership through strong domestic ac-
tions, America’s climate change response strategies need to include cooperative
international efforts aimed at helping developing countries advance their economies
along less carbon-intensive pathways than were followed by today’s industrialized
nations. This is primarily because reducing global GHG emissions requires limiting the
growth in emissions from developing countries. Additional motivation comes from
the fact that it is generally less expensive to reduce emissions in developing nations
than in developed ones (although the evidence can vary considerably depending on
the specific context),6 and because developing nations often present more significant
opportunities for ancillary benefits such as reducing local air pollution.
Emission Offsets
Offsets can be used at either the domestic or international level to help lower the
cost of reducing emissions. In most cases, an offset system allows actions that remove
or prevent GHG emissions in one place to cancel (or offset) an equivalent amount of
emissions elsewhere. Offsets can include investments in agriculture and land manage-
ment, reforestation, energy efficiency, capture or destruction of industrial gases and
methane, or low carbon energy generation such as renewables. International offset
programs such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), that allow GHG emitters
in the United States or other developed countries to pay for emission reductions in de-
veloping countries, can also be a potentially important mechanism for engaging those
countries in emission-reduction efforts. Although the United States does not partici-
pate in the CDM, it has been involved in discussion of other international mechanisms
similar to offsets, particularly proposals to reduce emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (often referred to as REDD).
The use of offsets can be complex and fraught with pitfalls, however. Some offsets,
such as capturing methane from livestock waste, are relatively straightforward to
quantify and implement. Others, such as sequestering carbon in soils and forests,
or those where investments are made in small scale technologies such as improved
wood stoves, present many challenges. Quantifying the size of the offset requires
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
not only knowing how much carbon is being sequestered by the system (which in
turn requires accurate baselines and monitoring) but also knowing what would have
happened in the absence of the offset program—i.e., offsets only contribute to reduc-
ing emissions if they are clearly additional to programs that would have been imple-
mented anyway. In contrast, a cap-and-trade or carbon tax system (that does not allow
use of offsets) considers only what actually is emitted; it does not require estimates,
often controversial, of what would have been emitted absent the policy or action
considered.
Offsets also raise concerns about emissions leakage: for example, if the demand for
timber is unchanged (and there are no global emission caps), saving one forest that
would have been cut could simply increase the pressure to cut other forests that
would otherwise have been spared. A similar problem occurs with the so-called
rebound effect, when savings from energy efficiency actions are invested in other ac-
tivities that produce GHGs. Another complication arises from the fact that the amount
of sequestered carbon can change over time. For instance, if a forest grown to offset
carbon emissions from elsewhere burns down 10 years later, the emissions reductions
provided by the offset will be lost.
Finally, the ancillary ecological and social impacts of offset programs can be either
positive or negative, depending on whether they are guided by sound sustainable
development or land management principles and practices, including respect for local
property rights.7 For these reasons, the inclusion of offsets as a major component of
U.S. climate policy will require rigorous rules, standards, and accounting procedures to
ensure claimed emissions reductions are real and sustained.
Reducing U.S. Emissions
The nation’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions depend to a large degree on private
sector investments (in areas such as technology development, physical assets, manu-
facturing operations, and marketing and delivery of goods and services) and on the
behavioral and consumer choices of individual households. But federal, state, and local
governments have a large role to play in influencing these key stakeholders through
effective policies and incentives. In general, there are four major tool chests from
which to select policies for driving GHG emission reductions:
• pricing of emissions by means of a tax or cap-and-trade system;
• mandates or regulations, which includes full-scale programs of controls on
emitters (for example through the Clean Air Act) and more narrowly targeted
mandates such as automobile fuel economy standards, appliance efficiency
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standards, labeling requirements, building codes, and renewable or low-
carbon portfolio standards for electric generation;8
• public subsidies through the tax code, appropriations, or loan guarantees; and
• providing information and education and promoting voluntary measures.9
A comprehensive national program would likely use tools from all four of these areas.
Most economists and policy analysts have concluded, however, that putting a price on
CO2 emissions (that is, implementing a “carbon price”) that rises over time is the least
costly path to significantly reduce emissions and the most efficient means to provide
continuous incentives for innovation and for the long-term investments necessary to
develop and deploy new low-carbon technologies and infrastructure.10 A carbon price
designed to minimize costs could be imposed either as a comprehensive carbon tax
with no loopholes or as a comprehensive cap-and-trade system that covers all major
emissions sources. (Pricing systems that are not comprehensive can also produce
substantial reductions, though at higher per-ton costs.) Both of these could be ef-
fective tools; however, cap-and-trade policy offers the advantage of specifying emis-
sions goals. Moreover, if several nations have cap-and-trade systems and international
trading is permitted, firms in rich nations can reduce their costs—and total global
costs—by paying for less expensive emissions reductions in other nations, rather than
by making expensive reductions themselves.11
Meeting stringent national emission-reduction goals also requires the carbon price to
rise to levels that are high enough to ensure the necessary investments are made in
energy-efficient buildings and equipment, low-carbon energy production technolo-
gies, and other key areas, especially over the long run as stocks of equipment and
infrastructure turn over. Estimating possible future carbon prices, which depends on
many unpredictable factors, such as the pace of technology development, is beyond
the scope of this study; but NRC, Limiting the Magnitude does contain a detailed dis-
cussion of future carbon price projections made in the recent multi-model studies of
the Energy Modeling Forum.12
In addition to a price on carbon, there is a need for complementary policy measures
that help to overcome market failures not fully addressed by a carbon price.13 Comple-
mentary policies may also be needed to overcome institutional barriers that inhibit
responses to carbon prices and/or slow the penetration of new low-carbon technolo-
gies.14 Examples of such barriers include outdated building codes and regulatory sys-
tems15 and the information-related problems that reduce incentives for builders and
home owners to invest in energy-efficient homes and appliances.16 Complementary
policies must be chosen strategically, however—an optimal policy reduces emissions
where it is cheapest to do so, not taking all possible measures, nor requiring all sectors
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
of the economy to participate equally. Limiting the Magnitude examines the types of
complementary policies that are most useful for ensuring rapid progress in key areas
such as household-level energy efficiency, development and use of renewable energy
technologies, and retiring/retrofitting existing emissions-intensive equipment and
infrastructure.
As a matter of political reality, a comprehensive carbon-pricing strategy of the sort
described above may not be feasible in the near term. A strategy relying solely on
other types of policies would involve higher costs but would still encourage near-term
emission reductions and thus reduce the need to make costly reductions later. These
policies range from relatively simple measures such as supporting R&D on low-carbon
technologies and reducing behavioral and institutional barriers to energy efficiency,
to more ambitious steps such as a nationwide renewable portfolio standard or a
cap-and-trade system covering only electric power plants.17 To minimize the long-run
costs of reducing emissions, however, it is important to avoid policies that may make
it more difficult later (either economically or politically) to adopt a comprehensive
carbon-pricing policy. This includes, for instance, policies that would implicitly or
explicitly exempt some sources from a subsequent carbon tax or a broader emissions
cap. It may also be necessary to avoid certain policies that have unacceptable equity
and competitiveness impacts (see Box 5.2).
At the time of writing this report, the EPA is in the process of promulgating new rules
to constrain CO2 emissions using the current authorities of the Clean Air Act. These
rules, if adopted, 18 will likely achieve emission reductions and may also stimulate
innovation, but the regulatory strategy is not as likely as a well-crafted pricing strat-
egy to provide continuous incentives to find the cheapest path to significant GHG
reductions.19
RECOMMENDATION 1: In order to minimize the risks of climate change and its ad-
verse impacts, the nation should reduce greenhouse gas emissions substantially
over the coming decades. The exact magnitude and speed of emissions reduction
depends on societal judgments about how much risk is acceptable. However,
given the inertia of the energy system and long lifetime associated with most
infrastructure for energy production and use, it is the committee’s judgment
that the most effective strategy is to begin ramping down emissions as soon as
possible.
Emission reductions can be achieved in part through expanding current local, state,
and regional level efforts, but analyses suggest that the best way to amplify and ac-
celerate such efforts, and to minimize overall costs (for any given national emissions
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A M E R I C A’ S C L I M AT E C H O I C E S
BOX 5.2
Equity and Competitiveness Issues
Significantly reducing U.S. GHG emissions, however it is accomplished, will produce “winners” and
“losers” along several dimensions. Increasing the price of carbon-intensive energy, for instance, will have
a disproportionate impact on those who need to drive long distances to work and residents of some
coal-mining communities. Basic notions of fairness require that adverse energy price impacts on those
least able to bear them be identified and addressed. Carbon-related revenues, obtained from carbon
taxes or auctioning of emissions allowances in a cap-and-trade system, would provide resources that
could be used for this purpose. Alternative or additional policy measures that make incentive-based
climate change policies more accessible to low-income households (e.g., graduated subsidies or tax
credits for home insulation improvements) may also be appropriate. Directly engaging economically
disadvantaged and other vulnerable communities in the policy planning process helps allow the le-
gitimate interests of those communities to be addressed, while nonetheless allowing broadly desirable
investments to be made.
In an economy with substantial unemployment, expansion of labor-intensive activities like
retrofitting buildings for increased energy efficiency can be an attractive option for increasing job
opportunities.a A transition to a low-carbon economy would inevitably produce gains in some sectors
and occupations and losses in others, and some studies suggest that such a transition will probably
have only a small net impact on the overall level of U.S. employment.b For those sectors and regions
that are at greatest risk of job losses, this transition could be smoothed through targeted support for
education and training programs.
reduction target), is with a comprehensive, nationally uniform, increasing price on CO2
emissions, with a price trajectory sufficient to drive major investments in energy ef-
ficiency and low-carbon technologies. In addition, strategically-targeted complemen-
tary policies are needed to ensure progress in key areas of opportunity where market
failures and institutional barriers can limit the effectiveness of a carbon pricing system.
If a pricing strategy proves to be politically infeasible, second-best approaches may
include the expansion of regional, state, and local initiatives already under way, along
with the adoption of national-level mandates or performance standards, some of
which could potentially be implemented through the Clean Air Act. The committee
suggests that new mandates and standards leave as much flexibility as possible for
the private sector to choose the means necessary (i.e., the technological options) for
meeting stated emission-reduction goals and leave room for later adoption of a pric-
ing strategy.
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
Finally, de-carbonizing the U.S. energy system—or failing to do so—could have a significant im-
pact on the competitiveness of some U.S. industries. The European Union (EU) has already increased
its reliance on renewable energy and put a price on CO2 emissions from major sources, without detect-
able adverse economic effects.c China has now placed low carbon and clean energy industries at the
heart of the country’s strategy for industrial growth, and is making large‐scale public investments (for
instance, in “smart grid” energy transmission systems) to support this growth.d If others continue to
press in this direction but the United States does not, firms operating in the United States could find
themselves increasingly out of step with the rest of the world, and without the robust domestic markets
for climate-friendly products that their competitors in the EU and elsewhere would enjoy. Moreover, U.S.
firms in energy-intensive sectors could be disadvantaged relative to their more energy-efficient foreign
competitors if energy prices rise in coming decades (as many observers expect) regardless of whether
global actions are taken to reduce GHG emissions. Firms operating in the United States might also face
tariffs on their exports to countries that have emissions caps in place and are seeking to protect their
industries from the competition posed by countries without such caps.
a R. Pollin, H. Garrett-Peltier, J. Heintz, and H. Scharber, Green Recovery: A Program to Create Good Jobs and Start Building a
Low-Carbon Economy ( Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2008)
b NRC, Limiting the Magnitude; CBO, The Economic Effects of Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions ( Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Budget Office, 2009); H. Huntington, Creating Jobs with Green Power Sources, Energy Modeling Forum OP64, (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University, 2009).
c A. D. Ellerman, F. J. Convery, and C. de Perthuis, Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
d http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/42628.shtml (accessed Feb.20, 2011).
Finally, as with all elements of an iterative risk management strategy, actions taken to
reduce GHG emissions need to be carefully monitored. Decisions made today (e.g.,
regarding emission targets, price schedules, sectors chosen for special attention)
will require periodic reevaluation in light of new developments in climate science,
in technological capabilities, in costs, and in understanding the impacts of response
policies themselves (for instance, understanding how a carbon pricing system imple-
mented in a less than comprehensive form will actually influence investments). In this
regard, long-term emissions goals that stretch out for decades are useful and probably
necessary but would likely need to be revisited over time. This need for the capacity to
adjust polices in response to new information and understanding must be balanced
against the need for policies to be sufficiently durable and consistent to attract sub-
stantial investment and encourage long-term changes in behavior. There is a natural
tension between these goals and designing mechanisms to provide both durability
and flexibility poses a key challenge for climate change governance.
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A M E R I C A’ S C L I M AT E C H O I C E S
product labeling) can help encourage consumer purchasing and behavioral
changes.
• Public communication must rest on high quality information that clearly
conveys climate science and climate choices and that is seen as coming from
trusted sources.
• Because many climate-related choices are occurring in an international context
(e.g., in the case of global agricultural and trade systems)—it is essential for the
United States to support international information systems and assessments.
In a policy area as complex and rapidly changing as climate change, sound iterative
risk management requires institutions with the ability and responsibility to monitor
new learning and to make it available in understandable, relevant form to decision
makers in the public and private sectors. There is much to be gained by sharing infor-
mation about what works and does not work, both within the United States and inter-
nationally. Existing institutions perform some of these functions, but none provides
an ideal model for performing the range of tasks described above, and few effectively
engage nonfederal actors.
There are a variety of mechanisms that could be developed for carrying the sort of
periodic reporting effort described above. NRC, Limiting the Magnitude suggests, as
one example, a process in which the President periodically reports to Congress on key
developments affecting our nation’s response to climate change. This process can be
seen as analogous to the Economic Report of the President, prepared annually by the
Council of Economic Advisers. It could build upon existing mechanisms for periodic re-
porting on climate change information (e.g., the annual GHG emissions inventory car-
ried out by the EPA, the U.S. Climate Action report organized by the State Department
as input to the UNFCCC, the Our Changing Planet report compiled by the USGCRP), and
it may include updates on factors such as:
• national and global emissions trends, and their relationship to developments
in our understanding of climate change science (including reporting on
whether the United States is making sufficient progress toward meeting its
GHG budget);
• energy market developments and trajectories;
• the implementation status, costs, and effectiveness of GHG emission-reduction
policies;
• the status of the development and deployment of key technologies for reduc-
ing GHG emissions;
• the distributional consequences of emission-reduction policies across income
groups and regions of the country;
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Key Elements of America’s Climate Choices
• developments in understanding of climate change impacts and vulnerability
to those impacts; and
• updates of adaptation plans and actions underway at federal, state, and local
levels.
A wide array of actors in state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations,
and the private sector are already playing important roles and should continue to be
involved, in the enterprise of collecting and sharing climate-related information (see
NRC, Informing Effective Decisions for details). But there are a number of areas where
federal-level leadership is of particular importance. This includes, for instance, the issu-
ance of federal guidelines for gathering and reporting of key climate-related informa-
tion, to help ensure the legitimacy and comparability of information being collected
by different parties. It also includes monitoring relevant developments internationally
and ensuring information access for especially vulnerable populations. Current ex-
amples of federal leadership include NOAA and NASA’s roles in collecting basic obser-
vations of atmospheric, oceanic, and land-surface changes (with regional and private
sector actors adding local detail and value-added products); and the EPA’s role in
collecting and evaluating emission inventory data. Such efforts are clearly valuable in
national debates about whether climate change is happening, and whether responses
are effective.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The federal government should lead in developing, sup-
porting, and coordinating the information systems needed to inform and evalu-
ate America’s climate choices, to ensure legitimacy and access to climate services,
greenhouse gas accounting systems, and educational information. To help garner
public trust, the design and implementation of any such information systems should
be transparent and subject to periodic independent review.
Engaging the Broader Community
As discussed in Chapter 4, establishing processes that bring together scientific /
technical experts and government officials with key stakeholders in the private sector
and the general public is essential for the success of an iterative risk management
approach to addressing climate change. This is because these other stakeholders
make important contributions to mitigation and adaptation efforts through their
daily choices; because they are an important source of information and perspectives
in assessing policies options and in setting priorities for research and development;
and because they determine the direction and viability of most governmental policies
over the long term.
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Processes for engaging stakeholders in learning and deliberation take many forms
(for example, Box 4.2 discusses the value of analytic deliberative processes). A sub-
stantial research literature, summarized in a number of NRC reports, identifies design
principles and tools for implementing such engagement processes. These principles
include, for instance, the need to be collaborative and broad based, to combine delib-
eration with analysis, to ensure transparency of information and analysis, to attend to
both facts and values, to explicitly address assumptions and uncertainties, to provide
a means of inquiring into official analyses, and to allow iterative reassessment of prior
conclusions based on new information.26 Federal agencies and other organizations
that can provide scientific analyses for informing climate choices could do so through
direct engagement with the regions, sectors, and constituencies they serve. There are
many examples already under way, ranging from national networks such as NOAA’s
Regional Integrated Science and Assessment Centers to ad hoc community-level
dialogues.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The nation’s climate change response efforts should in-
clude broad-based deliberative processes for assuring public and private-sector
engagement with scientific analyses, and with the development, implementa-
tion, and periodic review of public policies. Such processes can be initiated by
federal agencies, state or local governments, the private sector, or non-profit organi-
zations—linking the organizations that can provide relevant scientific analyses with
the constituencies they are best suited to serve, and engaging those who are most
affected by a given decision.
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The United States has a strong national interest in ensuring an effective global re-
sponse to climate change, because if domestic GHG emissions reductions are to be
effective in actually limiting climate change, they must be accompanied by significant
emission reductions from all major emitting countries. Also, the United States can be
deeply affected by climate change impacts occurring elsewhere, given the degree to
which different nations are linked by shared natural resources (e.g., fisheries, cross-
border river systems), migration of species, diseases vectors, and human populations,
and linked economic and trade systems. The United States can magnify the returns on
its climate-related investments by a thoughtful strategy of international engagement
that encompasses all the various activities discussed in earlier sections of this chapter.
In the committee’s judgment, serious U.S. emission-reduction efforts and effective par-
ticipation in international negotiations are necessary conditions for stimulating sub-
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stantial global emission reductions. The difficult and unwieldy nature of the UNFCCC
process underlies the need for U.S. diplomatic efforts to be enhanced by continued
involvement in the Major Emitters Forum and other bilateral and multilateral settings.
As discussed earlier, the use of international offsets, in which a U.S. firm pays for and
receives credit for relatively inexpensive emissions reductions (relative to some base-
line) in another country, may play a constructive role in engaging developing nations;
but only experience will tell if these approaches will be sufficient to induce substantial
global emissions reductions.
International agreements to limit GHG emissions (and to enhance GHG sinks through
land-use practices) will require rigorous methods to accurately estimate these emis-
sions, monitor their changes over time, and verify them with independent data. To
help assure that such efforts are carried out with transparency, consistency, and proper
quality assurance in all countries, there is a need for active U.S. participation in inter-
national cooperative efforts, including financial and technical assistance for develop-
ing countries that lack the needed resources and expertise. In 2010, the NRC assessed
existing capabilities for estimating and verifying GHG emissions and identified ways to
improve these capabilities through strategic near-term investments.27
The United States also has much to gain from actively participating in international
adaptation efforts, particularly those involving developing nations. It is in the nation’s
interest to limit the potentially destabilizing impacts of climate change in the devel-
oping world, and it can be argued that our large contribution to current and historic
global GHG emissions gives us some responsibility to assist those whose vulner-
abilities exceed their resources. Moreover, active U.S. participation in international
adaptation programs could enable us to learn from the effective programs of others.
Some efforts could be collaborative, such as research on drought-resistant agriculture
for tropical regions. Some efforts might be carried out through existing treaties and
development assistance programs, for instance, various UN and World Bank programs,
as well as existing UNFCCC adaptation funding programs. Additional mechanisms may
be needed, however, for multilateral exploration of techniques and technologies that
support adaptation, as well as for communication and trust-building. Durable institu-
tional arrangements will be necessary for long-term success.
The United States also has much to gain from international engagement in scientific
research and technology development. Understanding and responding to the risks of
climate change requires ongoing efforts to collect and evaluate a vast array of infor-
mation from around the world. In addition to observations of the climate itself, this
includes data on relevant socioeconomic indicators, on emissions monitoring and
verification activities, and on best practices in climate change limiting and adaptation
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efforts. Some relevant information can be gathered by top-down physical observa-
tions (e.g., satellite remote sensing), but some will require the bottom-up collection
and synthesis of detailed local-scale monitoring. Almost all such efforts are beyond the
means of any single country and can only be effectively advanced through interna-
tional cooperation, in which U.S. leadership could well prove critical.
Carefully targeted and coordinated R&D efforts can help enable developing nations
to achieve both the economic growth necessary to alleviate poverty and the GHG
emissions reductions necessary to limit future climate change. If today’s poor nations
rely only on currently available technologies in their drive to approach the living stan-
dards of today’s rich nations, dramatic increases in global CO2 emissions are inevitable.
To reduce global emissions, developing nations must travel a less carbon-intensive
development path; and it is in U.S. interest to help facilitate their efforts to follow these
alternative paths. In addition, U.S. firms could gain valuable technology and market ac-
cess from participation in international efforts to develop low-carbon technologies.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The United States should actively engage in international-
level climate change response efforts: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
through cooperative technology development and sharing of expertise, to en-
hance adaptive capabilities (particularly among developing nations that lack the
needed resources), and to advance the research and observations necessary to
better understand the causes and effects of climate change.
TOWARD AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL RESPONSE
The different types of actions presented in this chapter as part of America’s climate
choices are not separate and distinct. Rather, actions in one category can directly af-
fect actions in others—for better or for worse. For example, the more successful efforts
are to reduce GHG emissions, the less climate change there will be to adapt to, and the
more time will be available to adjust. The more we advance basic understanding of the
climate system, the more effective our responses will be. Table 5.1 illustrates these and
other linkages among the different elements of a comprehensive response strategy. A
comprehensive national response strategy that effectively integrates these different
elements, however, presents significant challenges of coordinating across different
levels of government, across different types of organizations (within and outside gov-
ernment), and across different types of response functions. Each of these challenges is
discussed below.
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TABLE 5.1 Matrix of Interdependencies Among the Different Elements of a National
Response to Climate Change
Will strengthen this element because…
Advancing Science
Limiting Adapting & Technology Informing
Limiting There may be There may be The decision
less stringent, less pressure to environment
disruptive develop risky may be less
requirements (and and/or expensive contentious if the
thus lower costs) technologies for severity of climate
for adapting to coping with change can be
climate change impacts. limited.
impacts.
Adapting Any given degree There may be The decision
of climate change less pressure to environment
may be associated develop risky may be less
with less severe and/or expensive contentious if
Advancing this element…..
impacts and technologies for communities and
disruptions of limiting climate key sectors are
human and change (e.g., prepared to deal
natural systems. some forms of with impacts.
geoengineering).
Advancing R&D could help R&D could help The knowledge
Science & identify more and provide more base for informing
Technology better options for adaptation decisions
limiting climate options and more may be more
change. knowledge about complete, and
their implications. the knowledge
base about how
to most effectively
inform may allow
better information
flow.
Informing Effective options Effective options Science may be
for limiting climate for adapting to more attuned to
change may be climate change decision needs,
more widely may be more and public support
deployed and widely deployed for advances in
used. and used. science is likely to
increase.
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Coordination Across Levels of Government
Efforts to limit and adapt to climate change present different types of coordination
challenges. Adaptation choices will be made largely by state and local governments
and the private sector. The federal government can play an important leadership
role by providing widely useful knowledge and information, but an effective national
adaptation strategy will be based not on top-down federal directives. Rather, it will
be based on coordination and information sharing across levels of government and
between public and private sectors.
The federal role is more obviously and critically important in limiting GHG emissions.
The relevant domestic costs and benefits can be fully aggregated only at the national
level, and strong federal action will be necessary to achieve large U.S. emission reduc-
tions and to sustain an effective, balanced R&D program. Nevertheless, many states
and localities have taken significant early steps to limit emissions, and some important
limiting options, such as revising building codes, changing land-use patterns, and re-
configuring transportation systems, are within the traditional authority and expertise
of state and local governments.
Effective coordination requires carefully balancing federal with state and local au-
thority and promoting regulatory flexibility across jurisdictional boundaries where it
is sensible to do. This includes, for instance, allowing states the option of regulating
GHG emissions more stringently than federal law (in which case, the state is shifting
more of the burden of meeting national goals onto its own residents). There is gener-
ally little to be gained by preempting such state regulations, as long as one can avoid
standard-setting that fragments the national market among numerous states with
differing regulations. Perhaps most importantly, efforts of state and local governments
to reduce GHG emissions or adapt to climate change provide valuable policy experi-
ments from which decision makers at other levels can draw useful lessons.
Coordination can also take the form of providing federal incentives (or removing disin-
centives) for action by states and localities. This includes, for instance: ensuring that
states and localities have sufficient resources to implement and enforce significant
new regulatory burdens placed on them by federal policy makers (e.g., national build-
ing standards); ensuring that new federal directives do not disadvantage states and
localities that have taken early action to reduce emissions; and providing incentives
for adaptation planning across jurisdictions and sectors.
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Coordination Across Organizations
Dozens of federal agencies and other organizations are carrying out research, making
decisions, and taking action on climate change through a host of existing programs
and authorities. These include, for example, adaptation on federal lands (Departments
of Agriculture, Interior, and Defense); research on climate change and related impacts
(many agencies); research and development for technologies to respond to climate
change (Department of Energy); information provision (Energy Information Adminis-
tration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Environmental Protection
Agency); and regulation of automobile efficiency and GHG emissions (Department
of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency). Many additional organizations
will likely engage as national strategies for limiting and adapting to climate change
emerge.
Although the various activities carried out through these different programs are
inextricably linked, they are managed largely as separate, isolated activities across the
federal government. For example, many departments and agencies that are or will be
engaged in climate response (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency, Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Energy) have not been part
of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and lack sufficient communica-
tion with the federal agencies that are developing knowledge they need. The USGCRP
and the Climate Change Adaptation Task Force have largely been confined to conven-
ing representatives of relevant agencies and programs for dialogue, without mecha-
nisms for making or enforcing important decisions and priorities. Moreover, even
the USGCRP and the Climate Change Technology Program together do not appear
sufficient for effectively coordinating the full portfolio of research needed to support
climate change response efforts.
One can look to other major policy arenas (e.g., public health, national security) and
to other countries for examples of different coordinating mechanisms that have been
employed with varying degrees of success. Some common models include:
• Giving one federal agency full responsibility and authority to lead and co-
ordinate activities across the federal government (e.g., as has occurred with
climate change in the United Kingdom and Australia);
• Creating a White House staff position tasked with directly advising the Presi-
dent on policy decisions and leading coordination efforts (e.g., a climate
“czar”);
• Establishing a new executive branch organization, staffed by senior-level
officials from other relevant government bodies, responsible for coordinating
policy and advising the President (e.g., the National Security Council model).
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A detailed evaluation of the pros and cons associated with each of these different or-
ganizational models is beyond the scope of this report, but the next section discusses
the general capabilities and responsibilities that would be most important for any
such coordinating entity.
Coordination Across Functions
Many previous NRC studies have offered guidance on how to ensure that decision
makers are informed by the best relevant scientific and technical analysis;28 but in the
context of climate change, efforts to actually do so are in their infancy. Traditionally,
climate change research efforts have been organized predominantly around priori-
ties defined by advancing scientific understanding, which do not necessarily match
the needs of affected decision makers. Meeting the coordination challenge of linking
knowledge to action will require sustained efforts from decision makers at all levels,
but there is a particularly strong need for federal leadership. Federal agencies can cre-
ate organizations to perform coordination functions for particular regions or sectors,
as NOAA has done with its Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments Program,
and DOI is planning to do with its Landscape Conservation Councils and Climate
Science Centers. They can also support networks that link decision makers within
a region or sector to each other and to decision-relevant knowledge, can facilitate
processes to collect and analyze data on climate response efforts around the country,
and can communicate the lessons from objective assessments of these efforts, thus
enabling decision makers to learn from each other’s experiences.
In summary, the following are some essential coordination challenges that a national
climate change response effort will need to address:
• Ensuring that federal actions facilitate (or at a minimum, do not impede) effec-
tive nonfederal actions for mitigation and adaptation;
• Developing a clear division of labor among federal agencies and a process to
monitor how well this division of labor is functioning over time;
• Ensuring decision support for constituencies that do not have a particular
government agency or program responsible for providing such information;
and
• Linking science, decision support, and resource management functions within
the federal response to climate change.
To address such wide-ranging challenges, any institution with major responsibility
for coordinating our nation’s climate change response efforts will need to have sev-
eral key features, including: authority to set priorities and to turn these priorities into
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resource allocation decisions; sufficient budgetary resources to actually implement
allocation decisions; personnel who both understand climate science and understand
the needs of climate-affected decision makers; mechanisms for monitoring the organi-
zation’s performance, in order to improve over time; and processes to ensure account-
ability to the parties that use information developed or shared by the institution.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The federal government should facilitate coordination
of the many interrelated components of America’s response to climate change
with a process that identifies the most critical coordination issues and recom-
mends concrete steps for how to address these issues. Coordination and possible
reorganization among federal agencies will require attention from the highest levels
of the executive branch and from Congress. In areas of mixed federal and non-federal
responsibility, the federal government’s leadership role should emphasize support and
facilitation of decentralized responses at lower levels of government and in the private
sector.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Responding to the risks of climate change is one of the most important challenges
facing the United States today. Unfortunately, there is no “magic bullet” for dealing
with this issue; no single solution or set of actions that can eliminate the risks we face.
America’s climate choices will involve political and value judgments by decision mak-
ers at all levels. These choices, however, must be informed by sound scientific analyses.
This report recommends a diversified portfolio of actions, combined with a concerted
effort to learn from experience as those actions proceed, to lay the foundation for
sound decision-making today and expand the options available to decision makers in
the future. Doing so will require political will and resolve, innovation and perseverance,
and collaboration across a wide range of actors.
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