Appendix F
Constructing Multiple Paths to Sustainability

The committee constructed the sustainable scenarios in three steps. First, unique spending trajectories for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, and defense and domestic programs were specified for each of the scenarios. Details of the spending trajectories for Social Security and defense and domestic programs are discussed in Appendixes C and D, respectively. The health trajectories, which are by their very nature more speculative, are discussed in the first section below.

Second, a target debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio of 60 percent was uniformly applied across the scenarios so that the target ratio was gradually reached by 2022. Payments of interest on the debt (an amount derived by multiplying the debt level in a year by the projected interest rate on debt in that year) are the same for all scenarios.

Third, revenue levels were adjusted annually to a level that, given the spending amount specified for that year, produced deficits that were arithmetically consistent with the debt-to-GDP ratio specified for that year.

MEDICARE AND MEDICAID TRAJECTORIES

Low Spending Trajectory

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2009) recently laid out a zero percent excess cost growth (ECG) trajectory for Medicare and Medicaid spending in its update of the long-term budget outlook. However, it did so using the assumptions of the “extended-baseline scenario” for Medicare and Medicaid, rather than the “alternative fiscal scenario” (which abandons



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Appendix F Constructing Multiple Paths to Sustainability The committee constructed the sustainable scenarios in three steps. First, unique spending trajectories for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Secu- rity, and defense and domestic programs were specified for each of the sce- narios. Details of the spending trajectories for Social Security and defense and domestic programs are discussed in Appendixes C and D, respectively. The health trajectories, which are by their very nature more speculative, are discussed in the first section below. Second, a target debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio of 60 per- cent was uniformly applied across the scenarios so that the target ratio was gradually reached by 2022. Payments of interest on the debt (an amount derived by multiplying the debt level in a year by the projected interest rate on debt in that year) are the same for all scenarios. Third, revenue levels were adjusted annually to a level that, given the spending amount specified for that year, produced deficits that were arith- metically consistent with the debt-to-GDP ratio specified for that year. MEDICARE AND MEDICAID TRAJECTORIES Low Spending Trajectory The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2009) recently laid out a zero percent excess cost growth (ECG) trajectory for Medicare and Medicaid spending in its update of the long-term budget outlook. However, it did so using the assumptions of the “extended-baseline scenario” for Medicare and Medicaid, rather than the “alternative fiscal scenario” (which abandons 

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00 APPENDIX F TABLE F-1 Basis of the Low Spending Trajectory for Medicare and Medicaid 2008 (Percentage of GDP) 2025 Percentages of GDP Actual CBO CBO: 0% CBO 0% Excess Cost Extended- Excess Cost Alternative Growth: For Use Baseline Growth Fiscal Scenario/ in Committee’s Scenario Study Baseline Scenarios 4.1 7.3 5.9 7.4 (5.9/7.3)*7.4 = 6.0 the assumption that Medicare’s payment rates for physicians will grow with inflation) that is the basis of the committee’s study baseline for Medicare and Medicaid. The committee adopted a simple approach to reconcile CBO’s zero percent ECG trajectory with the study’s baseline assumptions. In 2025, for example, CBO’s path puts Medicare and Medicaid spending at 7.3 percent of GDP and program spending at 5.9 percent of GDP—that is, 19.2 percent below the extended baseline. Although the study baseline puts Medicare and Medicaid at 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025, which is slightly higher than CBO’s extended baseline, the committee still assumed that the zero percent ECG trajectory would put Medicare and Medicaid at 19.2 percent below the study baseline—that is, at 6 percent of GDP; see Table F-1. High Spending Trajectory The high spending path uses CBO data to broadly mimic the long- term cost-growth path of the Medicare Trustees. The formula used in the extrapolation does two things: 1. It causes spending in 2083 to be at the same level as that achieved by the 1 percent ECG path laid out by CBO in its most recent up- date of the long-term budget outlook. The same adjustments the committee made to the zero percent ECG path (as described above) were made to the 1 percent ECG path. 2. It causes the spending curve to flatten out to zero percent ECG by 2083. The formula that accomplishes that is as follows: Zero Percent ECGt MMt = MMt −1 ∗ ∗ (Xt ), Zero Percent ECGt −1

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0 APPENDIX F where MM is Medicare and Medicaid spending, t is any year after 2018, Zero Percent ECG is Medicare and Medicaid spending under a zero percent excess cost growth assumption, and Xt is a functional form that captures the gradual diminishment of excess cost growth, where Xt = 1.00031(2083 − t ) . The spending path that results fluctuates around the study baseline for Medicare and Medicaid until around 2050, sometimes falling slightly below it, sometimes slightly above it. The high spending trajectory, for the sake of conceptual tidiness, is constrained to never exceed the study baseline. As a result, the high spending trajectory follows the study baseline until 2030. Intermediate Trajectories For every year from 2012 to 2083, the intermediate-1 spending trajec- tory is exactly equidistant from the low and intermediate-2 spending tra- jectories, while the intermediate-2 spending trajectory is exactly equidistant from the intermediate-1 and high spending trajectories. The formulas are as follows: (intermediate-)t = lowt + ((hight – lowt)/3), and (intermediate-)t = lowt + (2 ∗ (hight – smallt)/3), where high represents Medicare and Medicaid expenditures under the high spending trajectory, and low represents program expenditures under the low spending trajectory. SETTING THE DEBT-TO-GDP TARGET To set the debt-to-GDP target, assume that g is the growth rate of nomi- nal GDP and that OMF (other means for financing) represents transactions that affect federal borrowing but that are not included in revenues and outlays (and which are generally small relative to the deficit).1 Then: debtt/GDPt = (debtt– + deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = (debtt–/GDPt–) ∗ (1/(1+gt)) + (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt and (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt/GDPt – (debtt–/GDPt–) ∗ (1/(1+gt)).

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0 APPENDIX F If the debt-to-GDP ratio is held constant, then: (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt–/GDPt– ∗ (1 – (1/(1+gt)). If the debt-to-GDP ratio needs to be reduced—for example, by 1 percent a year—then: (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt–/GDPt– ∗ (.99 – (1/(1+gt)). Revenue levels can be specified once the target deficit is known: reenuest = outlayst – deficitt. All four scenarios allow the federal debt to grow as a percentage of GDP by 0.9 percent from 2011 to 2012; roughly stabilize it from 2012 to 2014; and then reduce it by 0.3 percent from 2014 to 2015, 0.4 percent from 2015 to 2016, 1 percent from 2016 to 2017, 4.3 percent from 2017 to 2018 (a large decrease made possible by a large projected repayment of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds in 2018, which the scenarios apply toward debt reduction), 0.9 percent from 2018 to 2019, 0.6 percent from 2019 to 2020, 0.3 percent from 2020 to 2021, 0.5 percent from 2021 to 2022, 0.1 percent from 2022 to 2023, and maintains it at a stable level from then on. The transitional decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 2012 to 2023 is designed to produce a low scenario with a near-term revenue trajectory that is as smooth as possible and with revenue levels that are as close to the historical average of 18.5 percent as possible. Table F-2 presents information about projected revenues, outlays, defi- cits, and debt in the study baseline. Table F-3 presents information about projected deficits, debt, and interest payments under the committee’s four scenarios. Table F-4 presents information about the differences in deficits, debt, and interest payments between the committee’s four scenarios and the study baseline. Tables F-5, F-7, F-9, and F-11, respectively, present informa- tion about revenues and outlays in the low, intermediate-1, intermediate-2, and high scenarios. Tables F-6, F-8, F-10, and F-12, respectively, present information about the differences in revenues and outlays between the low, intermediate-1, intermediate-2, and high scenarios and the study baseline. DELAy SCENARIOS General The delay scenarios indicate, as simply as possible, the consequences of delaying changes. The same debt-to-GDP target is applied, and the same

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TABLE F-2 Projected Revenues, Outlays, Deficits, and Debt in the Study Baseline, as Percentages of GDP Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande Interest Deficit Debt 2008f 17.7 21.0 4.1 4.3 10.8 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 3.2 40.8 2009 15.5 27.6 4.8 4.8 16.8 4.8 4.1 7.9 1.2 12.1 55.0 2010 16.0 24.5 5.1 4.8 13.5 5.1 4.4 3.9 1.2 8.5 60.9 2011 17.1 23.7 5.1 4.8 12.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 1.4 6.6 64.8 2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 4.5 3.7 2.5 1.7 4.3 66.5 2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 4.1 3.5 2.5 2.1 4.0 67.6 2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 3.9 3.4 2.3 2.5 4.1 69.0 2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 3.7 3.3 2.2 2.8 4.0 70.4 2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.7 3.3 2.2 3.0 4.3 72.1 2017 18.3 22.7 5.7 5.0 8.9 3.6 3.2 2.1 3.1 4.3 73.8 2018 18.3 22.8 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.5 3.1 2.0 3.4 4.5 73.8 2019 18.3 23.4 6.1 5.2 8.6 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.6 5.1 76.1 2020 18.3 23.8 6.4 5.3 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.6 5.5 78.8 2021 18.4 24.1 6.6 5.4 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.7 5.7 81.7 2022 18.4 24.5 6.8 5.4 8.6 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.7 6.0 84.7 2023 18.4 24.8 7.0 5.5 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.8 6.4 87.8 2024 18.5 25.1 7.2 5.5 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.9 6.6 91.3 2025 18.5 25.6 7.4 5.6 8.6 3.4 3.0 2.1 3.9 7.1 95.0 2030 18.7 28.1 8.7 6.0 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 4.8 9.4 117.6 2035 18.9 30.4 9.9 6.0 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 6.0 11.5 146.5 2040 19.1 32.8 10.9 5.9 8.5 3.4 3.0 2.1 7.4 13.7 180.2 2045 19.3 35.1 11.8 5.8 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 9.1 15.8 218.2 2050 19.6 37.5 12.6 5.7 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 10.8 17.9 259.2 2055 19.9 40.2 13.4 5.8 8.4 3.3 3.0 2.1 12.7 20.4 303.8 2060 20.3 43.1 14.2 5.8 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 14.7 22.9 351.7 2065 20.6 46.3 15.1 5.9 8.4 3.3 3.0 2.1 17.0 25.7 403.4 2070 20.9 49.7 16.0 6.0 8.4 3.3 3.0 2.1 19.4 28.8 460.4 2075 21.2 53.4 17.0 6.1 8.4 3.3 3.0 2.1 21.9 32.2 521.5 2080 21.6 57.4 17.9 6.2 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 24.9 35.9 590.5 2083 21.8 59.7 18.4 6.2 8.4 3.4 3.0 2.1 26.7 38.0 633.8 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. 0 bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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0 APPENDIX F TABLE F-3 Projected Federal Deficits, Debt, and Interest Payments Under the Committee’s Four Scenarios, as Percentages of GDP Selected Years Deficit Debt Interest Payments 2008a 3.2 40.8 1.8 2009 12.1 55.0 1.2 2010 8.5 60.9 1.2 2011 6.5 64.8 1.4 2012 3.2 65.4 1.7 2013 2.9 65.4 2.1 2014 2.6 65.4 2.4 2015 2.2 65.2 2.6 2016 2.1 64.9 2.7 2017 1.7 64.2 2.8 2018 1.4 61.5 2.9 2019 1.8 61.0 2.9 2020 1.9 60.6 2.9 2021 2.0 60.4 2.8 2022 1.9 60.0 2.7 2023 2.2 60.0 2.6 2024 2.2 60.0 2.6 2025 2.2 60.0 2.5 2030 2.2 60.0 2.5 2035 2.3 60.0 2.5 2040 2.3 60.0 2.5 2045 2.2 60.0 2.5 2050 2.3 60.0 2.5 2055 2.3 60.0 2.5 2060 2.2 60.0 2.5 2065 2.3 60.0 2.6 2070 2.3 60.0 2.6 2075 2.3 60.0 2.6 2080 2.2 60.0 2.6 2083 2.3 60.0 2.6 aActual spending. nonbaseline trajectories are used. The difference is that the changes start 5 or 10 years later, that is, in 2017 or 2022. The nonbaseline revenue paths are similarly delayed 5 or 10 years. There are two ways these elements can be combined; for example, for 5-year delays (also see Chapter 9): 1. the reenue path necessary to attain the debt-to-GDP target for a 5-year delay of each spending trajectory, and 2. to stay within a given delayed revenue trajectory and attain the debt-to-GDP target, combinations of delayed spending paths.

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0 APPENDIX F TABLE F-4 Percentage Point Differences for Deficits, Debt, and Interest Payments Between the Committee’s Four Scenarios and the Study Baseline, as Shares of GDP Selected Years Deficit Debt Interest Payments 2008a 0.0 0.0 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 2012 –1.1 –1.1 0.0 2013 –1.2 –2.2 –0.1 2014 –1.5 –3.6 –0.1 2015 –1.8 –5.3 –0.2 2016 –2.2 –7.2 –0.3 2017 –2.6 –9.5 –0.4 2018 –3.1 –12.3 –0.5 2019 –3.4 –15.2 –0.7 2020 –3.6 –18.2 –0.8 2021 –3.8 –21.3 –0.9 2022 –4.1 –24.6 –1.0 2023 –4.2 –27.9 –1.1 2024 –4.5 –31.3 –1.3 2025 –4.9 –35.0 –1.4 2030 –7.2 –57.6 –2.3 2035 –9.2 –86.5 –3.5 2040 –16.7 –120.2 –4.9 2045 –13.6 –158.2 –6.5 2050 –17.3 –199.3 –8.3 2055 –18.1 –243.8 –10.2 2060 –20.6 –291.7 –12.2 2065 –23.4 –343.4 –14.4 2070 –26.5 –400.5 –16.8 2075 –29.9 –461.5 –19.4 2080 –33.6 –530.5 –22.4 2083 –35.7 –573.9 –24.2 aActual spending. Delayed Medicare and Medicaid Trajectories Low Spending Trajectory For the low spending path, for the 5-year delay, this path follows the study baseline until 2017, after which it grows at the same proportional rate as the zero percent ECG trajectory that is implemented in 2012. For the 10-year delay, this path follows the study baseline until 2022, after which it grows at the same proportional rate as the zero percent ECG spending trajectory.

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TABLE F-5 Federal Spending and Revenues Under the Committee’s Low Scenario, as Percentages of GDP 0 Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 17.7 21.0 4.1 4.3 10.8 4.3 3.7 2.8 2009 15.5 27.6 4.8 4.8 16.8 4.8 4.1 7.9 2010 16.0 24.5 5.1 4.8 13.5 5.1 4.4 3.9 2011 17.1 23.7 5.1 4.8 12.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 2012 18.5 21.8 4.8 4.7 10.5 4.4 3.6 2.5 2013 18.5 21.4 5.0 4.7 9.6 3.9 3.3 2.5 2014 18.5 21.1 5.2 4.7 8.8 3.5 3.1 2.3 2015 18.5 20.7 5.2 4.7 8.2 3.2 2.9 2.1 2016 18.5 20.7 5.4 4.8 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.1 2017 18.5 20.3 5.4 4.8 7.4 2.8 2.5 2.0 2018 18.5 20.0 5.3 4.9 6.9 2.7 2.4 1.9 2019 18.5 20.3 5.5 4.9 6.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 2020 18.5 20.4 5.7 5.0 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2021 18.5 20.5 5.8 5.1 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2022 18.5 20.5 5.8 5.1 6.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 2023 18.4 20.6 6.0 5.1 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2024 18.5 20.7 6.1 5.1 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2025 18.5 20.6 6.0 5.2 6.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 2030 19.1 21.3 6.5 5.5 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2035 19.2 21.5 6.8 5.4 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2040 19.1 21.5 7.0 5.1 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2045 19.1 21.3 7.1 4.9 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2050 18.9 21.1 7.1 4.7 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2055 18.8 21.1 7.2 4.7 6.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 2060 18.8 21.0 7.2 4.6 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2065 18.7 21.0 7.2 4.6 6.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 2070 18.8 21.2 7.3 4.6 6.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 2075 19.0 21.3 7.5 4.6 6.7 2.5 2.2 1.9 2080 19.3 21.5 7.5 4.7 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 2083 19.2 21.5 7.5 4.6 6.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-6 Percentage Point Differences for Revenues and Outlays Between the Committee’s Low Scenario and the Study Baseline, as Percentages of GDP Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays (total) Outlays (noninterest) M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2012 0.7 –0.4 –0.4 –0.1 0.0 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 2013 0.4 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 0.0 –0.6 –0.3 –0.2 0.0 2014 0.4 –1.1 –1.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.8 –0.4 –0.4 –0.1 2015 0.3 –1.5 –1.4 –0.2 –0.1 –1.1 –0.5 –0.5 –0.1 2016 0.3 –1.9 –1.6 –0.2 –0.1 –1.3 –0.6 –0.6 –0.1 2017 0.2 –2.4 –2.0 –0.3 –0.2 –1.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.1 2018 0.2 –2.9 –2.4 –0.4 –0.2 –1.7 –0.8 –0.8 –0.1 2019 0.2 –3.1 –2.5 –0.5 –0.2 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2020 0.2 –3.4 –2.6 –0.6 –0.3 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2021 0.1 –3.6 –2.7 –0.7 –0.3 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2022 0.1 –4.0 –3.0 –0.9 –0.3 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2023 0.0 –4.2 –3.1 –1.0 –0.3 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2024 0.0 –4.5 –3.2 –1.1 –0.4 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2025 0.0 –4.9 –3.5 –1.4 –0.4 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2030 0.4 –6.8 –4.5 –2.3 –0.5 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2035 0.3 –8.9 –5.4 –3.1 –0.6 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2040 0.0 –11.3 –6.4 –3.9 –0.7 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2045 –0.2 –13.8 –7.3 –4.7 –0.9 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2050 –0.7 –16.4 –8.1 –5.5 –1.0 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2055 –1.1 –19.2 –9.0 –6.2 –1.1 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2060 –1.5 –22.1 –10.0 –7.0 –1.2 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2065 –1.8 –25.3 –10.8 –7.9 –1.3 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2070 –2.0 –28.5 –11.7 –8.7 –1.4 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2075 –2.1 –32.0 –12.6 –9.5 –1.4 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2080 –2.2 –35.9 –13.5 –10.3 –1.5 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 2083 –2.5 –38.2 –14.1 –10.8 –1.5 –1.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.1 0 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-7 Federal Spending and Revenues Under the Committee’s Intermediate-1 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP 0 Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 17.7 21.0 4.1 4.3 10.8 4.3 3.7 2.8 2009 15.5 27.6 4.8 4.8 16.8 4.8 4.1 7.9 2010 16.0 24.5 5.1 4.8 13.5 5.1 4.4 3.9 2011 17.1 23.7 5.1 4.8 12.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 2012 19.2 22.5 4.9 4.7 11.1 4.5 4.1 2.5 2013 19.6 22.5 5.0 4.7 10.6 4.1 4.0 2.5 2014 19.9 22.5 5.2 4.8 10.1 3.9 3.9 2.3 2015 20.2 22.4 5.2 4.8 9.8 3.7 3.8 2.2 2016 20.5 22.6 5.5 4.9 9.6 3.7 3.7 2.2 2017 20.7 22.5 5.5 4.9 9.3 3.6 3.7 2.1 2018 21.0 22.4 5.5 5.0 9.0 3.5 3.6 2.0 2019 21.0 22.8 5.7 5.1 9.0 3.4 3.5 2.1 2020 21.0 22.9 5.9 5.2 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2021 21.1 23.1 6.1 5.3 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2022 21.2 23.1 6.1 5.3 9.0 3.4 3.5 2.1 2023 21.1 23.3 6.4 5.4 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2024 21.2 23.4 6.5 5.4 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2025 21.3 23.5 6.5 5.4 9.0 3.4 3.5 2.1 2030 22.2 24.4 7.2 5.7 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2035 22.6 24.9 7.8 5.6 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2040 22.8 25.2 8.3 5.4 8.9 3.4 3.5 2.1 2045 23.0 25.2 8.6 5.2 8.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 2050 23.0 25.3 8.9 5.0 8.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 2055 23.2 25.4 9.1 5.0 8.7 3.3 3.4 2.1 2060 23.3 25.6 9.3 4.9 8.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 2065 23.4 25.7 9.5 4.9 8.7 3.3 3.4 2.1 2070 23.6 25.9 9.8 4.9 8.7 3.3 3.4 2.1 2075 23.9 26.2 10.0 4.9 8.7 3.3 3.4 2.1 2080 24.3 26.5 10.2 4.9 8.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 2083 24.2 26.5 10.2 4.9 8.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-8 Percentage Point Differences for Revenues and Outlays Between the Committee’s Intermediate-1 Scenario and the Study Baseline, as Percentages of GDP Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays (total) Outlays (noninterest) M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2012 1.4 0.3 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 2013 1.5 0.3 0.4 –0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2014 1.8 0.3 0.4 –0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 2015 1.9 0.1 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 2016 2.2 0.0 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2017 2.4 –0.2 0.2 –0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2018 2.7 –0.4 0.1 –0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2019 2.7 –0.7 0.0 –0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2020 2.7 –0.9 –0.1 –0.4 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2021 2.7 –1.1 –0.2 –0.5 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2022 2.8 –1.3 –0.3 –0.6 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2023 2.7 –1.6 –0.4 –0.7 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2024 2.7 –1.8 –0.5 –0.8 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2025 2.8 –2.1 –0.7 –1.0 –0.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2030 3.5 –3.7 –1.4 –1.5 –0.2 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2035 3.7 –5.5 –2.1 –2.1 –0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2040 3.7 –7.6 –2.7 –2.6 –0.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 2045 3.7 –9.9 –3.4 –3.2 –0.6 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2050 3.4 –12.3 –4.0 –3.7 –0.7 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2055 3.3 –14.8 –4.7 –4.3 –0.8 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2060 3.1 –17.6 –5.4 –4.9 –0.9 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2065 2.8 –20.6 –6.2 –5.6 –1.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2070 2.8 –23.7 –6.9 –6.2 –1.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2075 2.7 –27.1 –7.7 –7.0 –1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2080 2.7 –30.9 –8.5 –7.7 –1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 2083 2.5 –33.2 –9.1 –8.2 –1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-9 Federal Spending and Revenues Under the Committee’s Intermediate-2 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP 0 Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 17.7 21.0 4.1 4.3 10.8 4.3 3.7 2.8 2009 15.5 27.6 4.8 4.8 16.8 4.8 4.1 7.9 2010 16.0 24.5 5.1 4.8 13.5 5.1 4.4 3.9 2011 17.1 23.7 5.1 4.8 12.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 2012 18.8 22.0 4.9 4.7 10.7 4.5 3.7 2.5 2013 19.0 21.8 5.0 4.7 10.0 4.0 3.5 2.5 2014 19.1 21.7 5.3 4.8 9.3 3.7 3.3 2.3 2015 19.4 21.6 5.3 4.8 8.9 3.5 3.2 2.1 2016 19.6 21.7 5.5 4.9 8.6 3.4 3.1 2.1 2017 19.8 21.5 5.6 4.9 8.3 3.3 3.0 2.0 2018 20.0 21.4 5.6 5.0 7.9 3.2 2.9 1.9 2019 20.1 21.9 5.9 5.1 7.9 3.1 2.8 2.0 2020 20.2 22.1 6.1 5.2 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2021 20.3 22.2 6.3 5.3 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2022 20.4 22.3 6.4 5.3 7.9 3.1 2.8 2.0 2023 20.3 22.5 6.7 5.4 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2024 20.5 22.7 6.9 5.4 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2025 20.7 22.9 7.0 5.4 7.9 3.1 2.8 2.0 2030 21.9 24.1 7.9 5.8 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2035 22.6 24.9 8.8 5.7 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2040 23.2 25.5 9.6 5.6 7.8 3.1 2.8 2.0 2045 23.7 25.9 10.2 5.5 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 2050 24.1 26.3 10.6 5.4 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 2055 24.5 26.8 11.1 5.5 7.7 3.0 2.7 1.9 2060 25.0 27.2 11.4 5.5 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 2065 25.3 27.6 11.8 5.6 7.7 3.0 2.7 1.9 2070 25.7 28.1 12.2 5.6 7.7 3.0 2.7 1.9 2075 26.2 28.5 12.6 5.6 7.7 3.0 2.7 1.9 2080 26.6 28.8 12.8 5.6 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 2083 26.4 28.7 12.8 5.6 7.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-10 Percentage Point Differences for Revenues and Outlays Between the Committee’s Intermediate-2 Scenario and the Study Baseline, as Percentages of GDP Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays (total) Outlays (noninterest) M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2012 0.9 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 2013 0.8 –0.3 –0.3 0.0 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 2014 1.0 –0.5 –0.4 0.0 0.0 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 2015 1.1 –0.7 –0.5 –0.1 0.0 –0.5 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 2016 1.3 –0.9 –0.6 –0.1 0.0 –0.5 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 2017 1.5 –1.1 –0.8 –0.1 0.0 –0.6 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2018 1.7 –1.4 –0.9 –0.1 0.0 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2019 1.8 –1.6 –0.9 –0.2 0.0 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2020 1.9 –1.7 –1.0 –0.2 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2021 1.9 –1.9 –1.0 –0.2 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2022 2.0 –2.1 –1.1 –0.3 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2023 1.9 –2.3 –1.1 –0.3 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2024 2.0 –2.5 –1.2 –0.4 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2025 2.2 –2.7 –1.3 –0.5 –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2030 3.2 –4.0 –1.7 –0.8 –0.2 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2035 3.7 –5.5 –2.0 –1.1 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2040 4.1 –7.2 –2.3 –1.4 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2045 4.5 –9.2 –2.6 –1.7 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2050 4.5 –11.2 –2.9 –2.0 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2055 4.7 –13.4 –3.3 –2.3 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2060 4.7 –15.9 –3.8 –2.8 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2065 4.8 –18.7 –4.2 –3.3 –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2070 4.9 –21.6 –4.8 –3.8 –0.4 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2075 5.0 –24.9 –5.5 –4.4 –0.4 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2080 5.0 –28.6 –6.3 –5.1 –0.5 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 2083 4.7 –31.0 –6.8 –5.6 –0.6 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1  aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-11 Federal Spending and Revenues Under the Committee’s High Scenario, as Percentages of GDP  Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 17.7 21.0 4.1 4.3 10.8 4.3 3.7 2.8 2009 15.5 27.6 4.8 4.8 16.8 4.8 4.1 7.9 2010 16.0 24.5 5.1 4.8 13.5 5.1 4.4 3.9 2011 17.1 23.7 5.1 4.8 12.4 5.0 4.1 3.2 2012 19.7 22.9 4.9 4.7 11.5 4.9 4.1 2.5 2013 20.4 23.2 5.1 4.7 11.4 4.8 4.0 2.5 2014 20.9 23.5 5.3 4.8 11.0 4.7 4.0 2.3 2015 21.3 23.5 5.4 4.8 10.7 4.6 3.9 2.2 2016 21.6 23.7 5.6 4.9 10.5 4.5 3.9 2.2 2017 21.9 23.7 5.7 5.0 10.3 4.4 3.8 2.1 2018 22.3 23.7 5.7 5.1 10.0 4.3 3.8 2.0 2019 22.4 24.2 6.1 5.2 10.0 4.2 3.7 2.1 2020 22.5 24.4 6.4 5.3 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2021 22.6 24.6 6.6 5.4 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2022 22.9 24.8 6.8 5.4 10.0 4.2 3.7 2.1 2023 22.8 25.0 7.0 5.5 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2024 23.0 25.2 7.2 5.5 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2025 23.4 25.6 7.4 5.6 10.0 4.2 3.7 2.1 2030 24.9 27.1 8.7 6.0 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2035 25.9 28.2 9.9 6.0 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2040 26.8 29.2 10.9 5.9 9.9 4.2 3.7 2.1 2045 27.6 29.8 11.7 5.8 9.8 4.1 3.6 2.1 2050 28.2 30.4 12.4 5.7 9.8 4.1 3.6 2.1 2055 28.8 31.1 13.1 5.8 9.7 4.1 3.6 2.1 2060 29.5 31.7 13.5 5.8 9.8 4.1 3.6 2.1 2065 30.0 32.3 14.1 5.9 9.7 4.1 3.6 2.1 2070 30.6 32.9 14.6 6.0 9.7 4.1 3.6 2.1 2075 31.2 33.5 15.1 6.1 9.7 4.1 3.6 2.1 2080 31.8 34.0 15.4 6.2 9.8 4.1 3.6 2.1 2083 31.7 34.0 15.4 6.2 9.8 4.1 3.6 2.1 aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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TABLE F-12 Percentage Point Differences for Revenues and Outlays Between the Committee’s High Scenario and the Study Baseline, as Percentages of GDP Def and Domc Selected Years Revenues Outlays (total) Outlays (noninterest) M and Ma Soc Secb Total Defense Dom Discd Dom Mande 2008f 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2009 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2010 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2011 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2012 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 2013 2.2 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 2014 2.7 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2015 3.0 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.0 2016 3.3 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.0 2017 3.6 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2018 4.0 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2019 4.1 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 2020 4.2 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2021 4.2 0.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2022 4.5 0.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 2023 4.4 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2024 4.5 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2025 4.9 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 2030 6.2 –1.0 1.3 –0.1 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2035 7.0 –2.2 1.3 –0.1 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2040 7.7 –3.6 1.3 –0.1 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 2045 8.3 –5.3 1.2 –0.1 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0 2050 8.6 –7.1 1.2 –0.2 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0 2055 9.0 –9.1 1.0 –0.3 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 2060 9.2 –11.5 0.7 –0.6 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0 2065 9.4 –14.0 0.4 –1.0 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 2070 9.7 –16.8 0.0 –1.3 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 2075 10.0 –19.9 –0.5 –1.8 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.0 2080 10.2 –23.4 –1.1 –2.4 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0 2083 9.9 –25.7 –1.6 –2.9 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0  aMedicare and Medicaid. cDefense and domestic. eDomestic mandatory. bSocial Security. dDomestic discretionary. fActual spending.

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 APPENDIX F High Spending Trajectory Since the high spending path that is implemented in 2012 does not deviate from the study baseline until 2030, 5- and 10-year delays leave it unaffected. Intermediate Spending Paths For both 5- and 10-year delays, the delayed intermediate-1 spending trajectories are exactly equidistant from the delayed low and delayed inter- mediate-2 spending trajectories. Similarly, the delayed intermediate-2 spend- ing trajectories are exactly equidistant from the delayed intermediate-1 and high spending trajectories. Delayed Social Security Trajectories A different approach is taken for the delayed Social Security trajecto- ries, consistent with the committee’s analysis of this program (see Chapter 6 and Appendix C). In these trajectories, the execution of each of the specific, detailed policies is delayed 5 or 10 years, and the fiscal consequences are then estimated. For example, in the 5-year delay of Option 2 (two-third benefit-growth reductions; one-third payroll tax increases; see Table 6-1), the first increase of the payroll tax would be delayed 5 years to 2017, in- stead of occurring in 2012. Each of the Social Security options that is implemented in 2012 achieves solvency for the program. However, as discussed in Chapter 9 (see also Tables F-17 and F-18 below), none of the delayed scenarios achieves sol- vency for the Social Security program.2 Delayed Defense and Other Domestic Spending Trajectories With a 5-year delay, for all four scenarios, defense and other domestic spending follows the baseline until 2017. Mimicking the 7-year phase-in (from 2012 to 2019) for the scenarios implemented in 2012, policy changes take effect in 2017, and by 2024 spending levels are where they would have been with 2012 implementation. In other words, the delayed defense and other domestic spending paths look different from the 2012 ones until 2024, but are the same thereafter. With a 10-year delay, for all four scenarios, defense and other domestic spending follows the baseline until 2022. Mimicking the 7-year phase-in (from 2012 to 2019) for the scenarios with 2012 implementation, policy changes take effect in 2022, and by 2029 spending levels are where they would have been with 2012 implementation. In other words, the delayed

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 APPENDIX F TABLE F-13 Revenues and Outlays Under a 5-Year Delay of the Intermediate-2 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP Selected Soc Def and M and Ma Secb Domc Years Revenues Outlays Interest Deficit Debt 2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4 2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6 2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0 2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4 2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1 2017 20.1 22.6 5.6 5.0 8.9 3.1 2.5 72.0 2018 20.4 22.7 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.2 2.3 69.8 2019 21.1 23.0 6.0 5.2 8.6 3.3 1.9 69.1 2020 21.5 23.1 6.2 5.3 8.4 3.2 1.6 68.1 2021 21.7 23.1 6.4 5.4 8.3 3.1 1.4 67.1 2022 21.8 22.9 6.5 5.3 8.1 3.0 1.1 65.7 2023 22.0 23.0 6.8 5.4 8.0 2.8 1.0 64.2 2024 21.9 23.0 6.9 5.4 7.8 2.8 1.1 63.0 2025 21.9 23.1 7.0 5.5 7.9 2.6 1.2 61.9 2026 21.9 23.3 7.3 5.6 7.8 2.6 1.5 61.0 2027 22.3 23.5 7.5 5.6 7.9 2.5 1.2 60.0 2028 21.6 23.8 7.7 5.7 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2029 21.8 24.0 8.0 5.7 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2030 22.0 24.2 8.0 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2031 22.2 24.4 8.3 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2032 22.3 24.6 8.4 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2033 22.4 24.7 8.5 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2034 22.8 25.0 8.8 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2035 22.7 25.1 8.9 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. bSocialSecurity. cDefense and domestic, total. defense and other domestic spending paths look different from the 2012 ones until 2029, but are the same thereafter. Tables F-13 through F-18 present details of the delay scenarios. Whole- budget estimates appear in Tables F-13 to F-16, while financial estimates pertaining to the Social Security trust fund appear in Tables F-17 and F-18.

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 APPENDIX F TABLE F-14 Revenues and Outlays Under a 10-Year Delay of the Intermediate-2 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP Selected Soc Def and M and Ma Secb Domc Years Revenues Outlays Interest Deficit Debt 2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4 2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6 2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0 2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4 2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1 2017 18.3 22.7 5.7 5.0 8.9 3.1 4.3 73.8 2018 18.3 22.8 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.4 4.5 73.8 2019 18.3 23.4 6.1 5.2 8.6 3.6 5.1 76.1 2020 18.3 23.8 6.4 5.3 8.5 3.6 5.5 78.8 2021 18.4 24.1 6.6 5.4 8.5 3.7 5.7 81.7 2022 20.9 24.1 6.7 5.4 8.4 3.6 3.2 81.8 2023 22.9 24.2 7.0 5.5 8.3 3.5 1.3 79.9 2024 23.4 24.2 7.1 5.5 8.2 3.4 0.8 77.8 2025 23.6 24.1 7.2 5.6 8.1 3.2 0.4 75.4 2026 23.8 24.2 7.5 5.7 8.0 3.1 0.5 73.0 2027 23.9 24.2 7.7 5.6 7.9 3.0 0.3 70.7 2028 23.8 24.4 7.9 5.7 7.8 2.9 0.6 68.7 2029 24.1 24.6 8.2 5.8 7.8 2.8 0.4 66.5 2030 24.2 24.7 8.2 5.9 7.8 2.8 0.5 64.6 2031 24.8 24.8 8.5 5.9 7.8 2.7 0.1 62.3 2032 24.9 24.9 8.6 5.9 7.8 2.6 0.0 60.0 2033 22.7 25.0 8.7 5.9 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2034 23.1 25.3 9.0 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2035 23.0 25.3 9.1 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. bSocialSecurity. cDefense and domestic, total.

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 APPENDIX F TABLE F-15 Budget Totals Resulting from 5-Year Delays of the Intermediate-1 (for Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security) and Low (for Defense and Other Domestic Spending) Scenarios, as Percentages of GDP Selected Soc Def and M and Ma Secb Domc Years Revenues Outlays Interest Deficit Debt 2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4 2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6 2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0 2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4 2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1 2017 19.9 22.4 5.6 5.0 8.8 3.1 2.5 72.0 2018 20.1 22.4 5.6 5.1 8.5 3.2 2.3 69.8 2019 20.6 22.5 5.9 5.2 8.2 3.3 1.9 69.1 2020 20.8 22.4 6.1 5.3 7.9 3.2 1.6 68.1 2021 20.9 22.3 6.2 5.3 7.6 3.1 1.4 67.1 2022 20.8 21.9 6.3 5.3 7.3 3.0 1.1 65.7 2023 20.8 21.8 6.5 5.4 7.1 2.8 1.0 64.2 2024 20.5 21.6 6.6 5.4 6.8 2.8 1.1 63.0 2025 20.5 21.7 6.6 5.5 6.9 2.6 1.2 61.9 2026 20.4 21.9 6.9 5.6 6.8 2.6 1.5 61.0 2027 20.8 22.0 7.0 5.6 6.9 2.5 1.2 60.0 2028 20.0 22.2 7.2 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2029 20.1 22.4 7.4 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2030 20.3 22.5 7.4 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2031 20.5 22.7 7.6 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2032 20.5 22.8 7.7 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2033 20.6 22.8 7.7 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2034 20.8 23.0 8.0 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2035 20.7 23.1 8.0 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. bSocialSecurity. cDefense and domestic, total.

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 APPENDIX F TABLE F-16 Revenues and Outlays Under a 10-Year Delay of the Low Scenario, as Percentages of GDP Selected Soc Def and M and Ma Secb Domc Years Revenues Outlays Interest Deficit Debt 2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4 2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6 2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0 2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4 2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1 2017 18.3 22.7 5.7 5.0 8.9 3.1 4.3 73.8 2018 18.3 22.8 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.4 4.5 73.8 2019 18.3 23.4 6.1 5.2 8.6 3.6 5.1 76.1 2020 18.3 23.8 6.4 5.3 8.5 3.6 5.5 78.8 2021 18.4 24.1 6.6 5.4 8.5 3.7 5.7 81.7 2022 20.7 23.8 6.6 5.4 8.3 3.6 3.2 81.8 2023 22.4 23.7 6.8 5.5 8.0 3.5 1.3 79.9 2024 22.7 23.5 6.9 5.4 7.8 3.4 0.8 77.8 2025 22.6 23.0 6.8 5.5 7.6 3.2 0.4 75.4 2026 22.5 22.9 7.0 5.5 7.3 3.1 0.5 73.0 2027 22.4 22.7 7.1 5.5 7.1 3.0 0.3 70.7 2028 22.0 22.6 7.2 5.5 6.9 2.9 0.6 68.7 2029 22.1 22.5 7.4 5.6 6.8 2.8 0.4 66.5 2030 22.0 22.5 7.3 5.6 6.8 2.8 0.5 64.6 2031 22.4 22.5 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.7 0.1 62.3 2032 22.4 22.5 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.6 0.0 60.0 2033 20.2 22.4 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 2034 20.4 22.6 7.7 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0 2035 20.2 22.6 7.7 5.5 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0 aMedicare and Medicaid. bSocialSecurity. cDefense and domestic, total.

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 APPENDIX F TABLE F-17 Projected Social Security Cash Flow as Percentages of GDP: Current Law Compared with Four Committee Scenarios Current Law and Four Scenarios 2020 2035 2050 2084 Current Law –0.5 –1.4 –1.2 –1.5 Low (Option 1) –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 –0.1 Delayed 5 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.3 –0.1 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –1.0 –0.5 –0.1 Intermediate-1 (Option 2) –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 0.0 Delayed 5 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.1 –0.1 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –1.0 –0.3 –0.1 Intermediate-2 (Option 3) –0.2 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 Delayed 5 yrs –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.1 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.3 –0.2 High (Option 4) –0.2 –0.8 –0.3 –0.1 Delayed 5 yrs –0.3 –0.8 –0.4 –0.2 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.4 –0.2 NOTE: A year’s “cash flow” is its Social Security revenues minus its expenditures. When the cash flow is positive, the balance in the trust fund increases (see next table). When negative, the trust fund balance decreases. TABLE F-18 Projected Social Security Trust Fund Ratios: Current Law Compared with Four Committee Scenarios Current Law and Four Scenarios 2020 2035 2050 2084 Current Law 315 50 0 0 Low (Option 1) 351 202 100 114 Delayed 5 yrs 322 136 0 0 Delayed 10 yrs 315 107 0 0 Intermediate-1 (Option 2) 334 178 113 157 Delayed 5 yrs 320 126 0 0 Delayed 10 yrs 315 91 0 0 Intermediate-2 (Option 3) 353 227 151 135 Delayed 5 yrs 327 164 47 0 Delayed 10 yrs 315 118 0 0 High (Option 4) 359 229 131 100 Delayed 5 yrs 329 172 42 0 Delayed 10 yrs 315 121 0 0

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0 APPENDIX F NOTES 1. As an accounting concept, OMF provides the exact relationship between the annual deficit and change in the end-of-year debt. It is unusually large and positive in 2008- 2009, thus increasing the change in the debt above the deficit. The 2008-2009 OMF figures are largely swelled by financing for repayable advances to financial institutions, made to help stabilize financial markets, such as in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). As TARP payments are repaid, they appear in the OMF accounting as negative entries, thus reducing federal borrowing needs, as well as reducing increases in the debt. CBO projects that many TARP advances will be repaid in 2010-2013 and all of them by 2018, especially in the single years 2011, 2013, and 2018. In 2019, CBO projects OMF to be $18 billion, roughly the same order of magnitude as has occurred for most recent years. 2. Appendix C explains the indicators of program solvency. Because Tables F-17 and F- 18 are to be compared with Tables C-1 and C-2 for the “on-time” scenarios, the same conventions and assumptions apply. Specifically, all four tables rely on assumptions of the 2009 Social Security Trustees’ Report, rather than the CBO-based study assumptions that are applied in the report other than Chapter 6 and Appendix C. REFERENCE Congressional Budget Office. (2009). The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.