Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page R1
THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
TREATY—TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR
THE UNITED STATES
Committee on Reviewing and Updating Technical Issues Related to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Policy and Global Affairs
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
OCR for page R2
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of
the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The
members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences
and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Contract No. DE-DT0000878, TO#31 between the National
Academy of Sciences and the Department of Energy, Contract No.SAQMMA09M1670
between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of State, Grant No. B
8618 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Carnegie Corporation of New
York, and by the National Academy of Sciences. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the
project.
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-14998-3
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-14998-3
Additional copies of this report are available for sale from the National Academies Press, 500
Fifth Street, N.W., Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313;
Internet, http://www.nap.edu/.
Copyright 2012 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
OCR for page R3
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars
engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their
use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has
a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone
is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of
Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the
selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal
government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national
needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M.
Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of
eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the
public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional
charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care,
research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad
community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal
government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become
the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in
providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is
administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest
are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.
www.national-academies.org
OCR for page R4
OCR for page R5
COMMITTEE ON REVIEWING AND UPDATING TECHNICAL ISSUES
RELATED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
ELLEN D. WILLIAMS, Chair, BP
MARVIN L. ADAMS, Texas A&M University
LINTON BROOKS, Independent Consultant
THEODORE W. BOWYER, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
DONALD D. COBB, Los Alamos National Laboratory (retired)
RICHARD L. GARWIN, Thomas J. Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation (emeritus)
RAYMOND JEANLOZ, University of California, Berkeley
RICHARD MIES, Independent Consultant
C. BRUCE TARTER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (emeritus)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEISMOLOGY:
IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON REVIEWING AND UPDATING THE 2002
REPORT: TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR
TEST BAN TREATY
LYNN R. SYKES, Subcommittee Chair, Columbia University
HANS HARTSE, Los Alamos National Laboratory
PAUL G. RICHARDS, Columbia University
GREGORY VAN DER VINK, Terrametrics, LLC
WILLIAM R. WALTER, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
National Research Council Staff
GREG EYRING, Sr. Program Officer (August 2009 to June 2010)
Study Co-Director (from June 2010)
BENJAMIN J. RUSEK, Program Officer (August 2009 to June 2010)
Study Co-Director (from June 2010)
ANNE HARRINGTON, Study Director (August 2009 to June 2010)
MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(from November 2010)
RITA S. GUENTHER, Program Officer
LA’FAYE LEWIS-OLIVER, Administrative Coordinator
v
OCR for page R6
OCR for page R7
PREFACE
The Office of the Vice President and the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy requested this study, which was carried out under contracts with the Department of State
and Department of Energy, with additional support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York
and the National Academy of Sciences. The committee formed by the National Research
Council (NRC) to carry out the study has conducted a review and assessment of changes in
technical issues that have occurred since the NRC’s previous report on this topic, Technical
Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NRC, 2002). In particular the
committee was asked to address the following:
1) The risks in ensuring, over the longer term, a safe and reliable nuclear weapons
stockpile absent underground nuclear-explosion testing, particularly including the
experience of the U.S. stockpile stewardship program. (See Chapter 1)
2) The status of nuclear-explosion detection, taking into account the operating experience
of the international monitoring system and improvements in U.S. national technical
means in the last decade. (See Chapter 2)
3) The commitments required to sustain the U.S. stockpile and effective nuclear explosion
monitoring. (See Chapter 3)
4) The potential technical advances to nuclear-weapon capabilities that might be gained by
other countries from testing that might escape detection compared with those advances
available with a return to full-yield testing in a non-test-ban environment.
(See Chapter 4)
In addition, some further emphasis on certain issues was provided to the committee at
its first meeting by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen
Tauscher, and Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and National Nuclear Security
Administration Administrator, Thomas D’Agostino. They requested that the committee include its
views in the study on (1) research that could improve or address shortfalls in monitoring
capabilities, (2) the 2008 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
Integrated Field Exercise and the utility of on-site inspections as a verification tool, (3) lessons
learned from the 2006 and 2009 DPRK nuclear explosions, and (4) the possible effects of
undetectable cheating. Items 1-3 are discussed in Chapter 2, and item 4 is discussed in Chapter
4.
In the course of this study, the committee has benefited from the invaluable assistance
of many dedicated experts in different aspects of these issues, including representatives of U.S.
government agencies and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. Those who spoke to the
committee at its meetings are listed in Appendix B. The committee was also granted access to
the 2010 CTBT National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and other intelligence reports relevant to
the issues it was asked to address.
The Subcommittee on Seismology (see the biographies of members in Appendix A) was
separately constituted for the purpose of providing input to the parent committee. At the
direction of the committee, the subcommittee produced written input on seismology issues
identified by the committee and interacted with the committee as needed. The subcommittee
also raised issues to the committee that in its view had a material bearing on the committee’s
work. In cooperation with subcommittee members, the committee integrated the subcommittee’s
material into the committee’s report and worked with the subcommittee to produce technical
appendices to further explain certain issues related to the report. We would especially like to
vii
OCR for page R8
thank subcommittee member William Walter of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for his
extraordinary work to see the study to completion.
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse
perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National
Academies’ Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide
candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as
sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity,
evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript
remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process.
We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: John Ahearne,
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society; Mona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; John Foster, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems; Ward Hawkins, Los Alamos
National Laboratory; Stephen LaMont, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Cherry Murray, Harvard
University; C. Paul Robinson, Sandia National Laboratories; Lawrence Welch, Institute for
Defense Analyses; and Jay Zucca, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and
suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they
see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by
Richard Meserve and Russell Hemley, both from the Carnegie Institution for Science. Appointed
by the National Academies, they were responsible for making certain that an independent
examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that
all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report
rests entirely with the authoring committee and the Academy.
In the following chapters, we review the technical changes related to the U.S. nuclear
stockpile and to nuclear-explosion test monitoring that have occurred in the past ten years and
place these in the context of their significance for national security. The discussion covers
maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile; maintaining and expanding the ability
to place clandestine testers at risk of detection via an effective monitoring capability; sustaining
the U.S. human and physical infrastructure of these capabilities; and assessing the risks of
undetected clandestine testing in contrast to the risks of full-yield nuclear-explosion testing
unhindered by international agreements. To the extent that weapons laboratory management
and contracting issues impinge on the quality of the nuclear weapons workforce and the
sustainability of critical technical capabilities, the committee has commented on these issues.
The committee prepared both a classified and an unclassified version of this report. The
National Research Council completed its peer review of the reports in March 2011 and then
turned over the reports to the sponsoring agencies for security review. The committee updated
data in the reports during the security review, but some text and figures reflect the March 2011
date the reports were sent to the agencies. The findings and recommendations are identical in
the two versions, except for a few cases in which classified passages are paraphrased in the
unclassified report.
For the benefit of the reader, a glossary of specialized terms from the 2010 CTBT NIE is
provided as Appendix K.
Ellen D. Williams
Chair
viii
OCR for page R9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
Summary 3
15
Chapter 1 – Safety, Security, and Reliability of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile
16
Overview and 2002 Report Findings
16
Changes Since the 2002 Report
30
Test Readiness
33
Interface with DOD
35
Chapter 2 – Technical Monitoring Capabilities and Challenges
35
Overview and 2002 Report Findings
38
U.S. National Technical Means
39
The CTBTO International Monitoring System
43
Other Capabilities
43
Monitoring Technologies
67
Operational Capabilities of the CTBTO
75
Monitoring and the North Korea Nuclear-Explosion Tests
77
Chapter 3 – Sustaining U.S. Technical Capabilities under the CTBT
77
Overview and 2002 Report Findings
78
Changes Since the 2002 Report
78
Sustaining U.S. Nuclear Weapon Programs
84
Sustaining U.S. Monitoring Capabilities
89
Sustainability of the International Monitoring Regime, Including On-
site Inspection
91
CTBT Safeguards
95
Chapter 4 – Potential Technical Advances from Nuclear-Explosion
Testing
95
Overview and 2002 Report Findings
96
Changes Since the 2002 Report
96
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) Programs under a Test Moratorium
100
Test-Ban Compliance Issues
104
Probability of Detection vs. Probability of Evasion
113
Technical Significance of Different Levels of Testing
Chapter 5 – Complete List of Findings and Recommendations 119
129
Appendix A – CTBT Committee and Seismology Subcommittee
Biographies
135
Appendix B – List of CTBT Committee and Seismology Subcommittee
Meetings
ix
OCR for page R10
137
Appendix C –The U.S. National Capability to Monitor for Nuclear
Explosions
Appendix D – Monitoring Areas of High Interest 139
Appendix E – Dealing with Evasive Underground Nuclear Testing 161
Appendix F – Issues Related to Containment of Radioactivity 181
183
Appendix G – U.S. Satellite Nuclear Detonation Detection Capability:
Options and Impacts
Appendix H – Satellite-Based Challenges and Solutions 185
Appendix I – References 187
Appendix J – List of Acronyms 199
Appendix K – Glossary of Key Terms from the 2010 CTBT NIE 203
x
