transport, or terrorist acts, agents must move with indoor aerosols, wastewater, or solid waste streams before they potentially impact internal occupational receptors and/or progress to the outdoor environment at large. Following media transport paradigms commonly employed by industrial hygienists and environmental engineers, each route—airborne, wastewater, and solids—is isolated and analyzed by the EIS, from a routine, but limited facilities design perspective.
With respect to protecting biological indoor air quality as well as the immediate outdoor air quality, the committee finds the following key design parameters and mechanical heat, ventilation, and air conditioning redundancies in accordance with or exceeding guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the American National Standards Institute and the American Industrial Hygiene Association (ANSI/AIHA 2003), and the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH 1999, 2001) developed expressly for such high-exposure environments, specifically regarding: air exchange rates, vestive flow regimes, differential pressure systems, staged filtration, and protected heat transfer equipment. While special indoor air quality engineering features were presented in this context, the performance, reliability, and security concerning the operations and maintenance of indoor air quality systems were not addressed in the EIS or its associated hazard assessment. Such an analysis would include, but would not be limited to: special contextual confirmation of mixing and flow regimes using widely accepted tracer tests under multi-season heating/cooling scenarios; the confirmation of filter blow-by under both clean and ripe conditions (in addition to smoke testing); and periodic stress challenges of critical pressure-sensitive infrastructure (in addition to Magnehelic calibration).
Unlike the maintenance of indoor air quality, reliable inactivation of the capricious wastewater flows that contain potentially high concentrations of pathogenic agents relies on satellite in-situ laboratory pre-treatment prior to its transport and treatment in the building-centralized systems proposed under the USAMRIID expansion. With respect to treating comingled wastewater flows from the facility (apart from in-situ chemical pre-treatment), the committee finds key containment, transport, and design parameters in accordance with or exceeding the standards of the American Society of Microbiology (ASM 2007), CDC/NIH (2007), the American Public Health Association (APHA), the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the American Water Works Association (AWWA), and the Water Environment Federation (WEF) (APHA/AWWA/ WEF 2005; ASCE/WEF 1992; WEF 1990, 1992, 1997), and guidelines written expressly for handling and treating combined wastewater flows containing discarded culture media and the biological fluids and sanitary sewage generated by USAMRIID’s animal testing. While special engineering features were presented in this context, the performance, reliability, and security concerning the operations and maintenance of USAMRIID’s wastewater treatment and conveyance systems were not addressed in the EIS.
Like its wastewater counterpart, reliable inactivation of pathogenic agents entrained in or on solid materials leaving the USAMRIID laboratories (exclud-