compression. Its proposed WAPI standard was rejected internationally in March 2006. China’s strategy on standards so far has had disappointing results. Still, many Chinese believe that the country has not only a world class capacity for technological innovation but also enormous market power for influencing technical standards and that the two should be developed and exploited hand in hand. The current long-term plan (2006-2020) calls for moving the economy from “Made in China” to “Created in China.” In the meantime, against an international background of institutional fluidity, China has pushed for open standards and open source development.
Chinese standards have generally not been successful in first-tier markets, but may fare better in the relatively near term in second- and third-tier markets. In Suttmeier’s view, the United States and other advanced countries should engage with China and anticipate a broader “regime insurgency” against the role of the World Trade Organization and other multilateral bodies in setting the rules.
Shamnad Basheer, visiting George Washington University law professor, spoke on the evolution of the Indian patent system, which has been driven by the pharmaceutical industry, the dominant patent filing sector (Figure 9). As recently as the 1970 Patent Act, India departed from international norms advocated by the United States in replacing product patents with process patents for pharmaceuticals. When firms understood they could then legally make existing products simply by changing the production process, huge growth followed for the Indian generic manufacturers. Ranbaxy’s production of Cefaclor, an antibiotic, is an example of a commercially successful Indian product based on that strategy.
By accepting the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) as part of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, India was obliged to reintroduce pharmaceutical product patents, over huge resistance, and finally did so in the Patent Act of 2005. How does the