each country’s S&T innovation environment and especially to predicting its future change. The cultural contexts of Brazil, India, Japan, and Russia have slowed their S&T innovation developments and will continue to do so in the near to mid terms. No single set of common indicators was found by the committee to provide a complete assessment of progress toward goals for all countries.

One of the better indicators of a country’s ability to achieve its S&T innovation goals is its ability to effect the requisite cultural changes. Among the six countries studied, China and Singapore have demonstrated a high capability to make the needed changes in cultural norms, and Russia has demonstrated the least capability, which will most likely delay or block its ability to achieve its S&T innovation goals. Furthermore, the S&T innovation environments of the more successful countries possess both top-down (i.e., led by government) and bottom-up (i.e., led by individuals and organizations) drivers of change. Among the JBRICS countries, China and Singapore also are the furthest along in this direction, and the likelihood of their continued, substantial progress is therefore high.

The national S&T innovation environment that has been a hallmark of the United States since World War II, and the model for other nations, is evolving into a new, 21st-century, global innovation environment in which R&D talent, financial resources, and manufacturing systems are integrated but geographically dispersed. In this context, the S&T strategy of a country has implications for its military capabilities both through wide-ranging, dual-use technology developments and through priorities given to developing those military capabilities for national use and for sale.

JBRICS investment in military modernization, a priority in China, Russia, India, and Singapore, and less so in Brazil and Japan, has varying implications for U.S. national security. China and India credibly integrate their goals for military modernization into broader, overriding goals for economic development, and their military capabilities are increasing. Russia views increased military strength as a counter to its declining economic, political, and diplomatic stature in the world, which is potentially more troubling. Singapore’s and Brazil’s military goals are consistent with transparent national plans and are not a significant natural security concern for the United States.

On the basis of its findings regarding implications of identified national S&T strategies in the JBRICS countries, the committee makes a number of recommendations to the U.S. government and the intelligence community. Its key recommendations are listed below; additional findings and recommendations are presented in Chapters 3 through 10. The recommendations highlight current observations and suggest that, at a minimum, further tracking of the best indicators be undertaken to verify the countries’ middle- and long-term S&T strategies and achievements.


Key Recommendation. Because a successful global S&T innovation environment portends future prosperity and security for all countries, monitoring the transformation from a national to a global S&T innovation environment should be undertaken on a regular basis for the United States and all countries of interest. Because this transformation can take place before a national S&T environment is fully developed, monitoring should be conducted independent of a country’s current achievement. (Recommendation 10-1)


Key Recommendation. The transfer of intellectual property by multinational corporations into domestic companies through S&T activities should be monitored in key countries, particularly India and China. The United States could join with Japan, and possibly the European Union, to establish a united front against such practices. (Recommendation 10-2)


Key Recommendation. The United States should assess its own preparation for, and transformation to, a successful global S&T innovation environment to ensure that it remains in a preeminent S&T position for continued prosperity and national security. Specific areas for assessment should include global exchanges in education and R&D talent, international as well as national recruitment of R&D talent, multinational corporate collaborations, and public policies that facilitate or restrain the leadership of the United States in global S&T innovation. (Recommendation 10-3)


Key Recommendation. For each country of interest, the United States should identify country-specific measures of S&T innovation environments, including nontraditional indicators that are appropriate for targeted technologies



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