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Appendix B Preliminary Letter Report1 1 The report that follows is the exact text of the Preliminary Letter Report provided on a privileged basis to DHS on March 26, 2010. 77

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 78

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APPENDIX B 79 Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas: Preliminary Letter Report Committee on the Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security’s Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas Board on Life Sciences Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources Division on Earth and Life Studies THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C. w ww.nap.edu

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 80 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by Contract No. HSFLBP-10-C-00001 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http://www.nap.edu Copyright 2010 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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APPENDIX B 81 The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 82 .

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APPENDIX B 83 COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF A SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S PLANNED NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY IN MANHATTAN, KANSAS RONALD M. ATLAS (Chair), Professor of Biology and Public Health and Co-director, Center for Health Preparedness, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY THOMAS W. ARMSTRONG, Principal Investigator, TWA8HR Occupational Hygiene Consulting, LLC, Branchburg, NJ MICHAEL S. ASCHER, Visiting Researcher, University of California, Davis MARK T. HERNANDEZ, Professor of Environmental Engineering, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO BARBARA JOHNSON, Consultant for Biosafety and Biosecurity, Johnson & Associates, LLC, Herndon, VA BRENDAN MCCLUSKEY, Executive Director, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Newark, NJ KISHOR C. MEHTA, P.W. Horn Professor of Civil Engineering, Texas Technical University, Lubbock, TX FREDERICK A. MURPHY, Professor of Pathology, University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Galveston, TX PHILIP L. PAARLBERG, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana TIMOTHY C. RELUGA, Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA JAMES A. ROTH, Clarence Hartley Covault Distinguished Professor, Iowa State University, Ames, IA MARK C. THURMOND, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Davis, CA STAFF PEGGY TSAI, Study Director and Program Officer CARL-GUSTAV ANDERSON, Senior Program Assistant FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director, Board on Life Sciences ROBIN A. SCHOEN, Director, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources NORMAN GROSSBLATT, Senior Editor

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 84 BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES KEITH R. YAMAMOTO (Chair), University of California, San Francisco, CA ANN M. ARVIN, Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, CA BONNIE L. BASSLER, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ VICKI L. CHANDLER, Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Palo Alto, CA SEAN EDDY, HHMI Janelia Farm Research Campus, Ashburn, VA MARK D. FITZSIMMONS, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago, IL DAVID R. FRANZ, Midwest Research Institute, Frederick, MD LOUIS J. GROSS, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN JO HANDELSMAN, Yale University, New Haven, CN CATO T. LAURENCIN, University of Connecticut Health Center, Farmington, CN JONATHAN D. MORENO, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA ROBERT M. NEREM, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA CAMILLE PARMESAN, University of Texas, Austin, TX MURIEL E. POSTON, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY ALISON G. POWER, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY BRUCE W. STILLMAN, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY CYNTHIA WOLBERGER, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD MARY WOOLLEY, Research!America, Alexandria, VA STAFF FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director JO L. HUSBANDS, Scholar/Senior Project Director ADAM P. FAGEN, Senior Program Officer ANN H. REID, Senior Program Officer MARILEE K. SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer INDIA HOOK-BARNARD, Program Officer ANNA FARRAR, Financial Associate CARL-GUSTAV ANDERSON, Senior Program Assistant AMANDA P. CLINE, Senior Program Assistant AMANDA MAZZAWI, Program Assistant

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APPENDIX B 85 BOARD ON AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES NORMAN R. SCOTT (Chair), Cornell University, Ithaca, NY PEGGY F. BARLETT, Emory University, Atlanta, GA ROGER N. BEACHY, Donald Danforth Plant Science Center, St. Louis, MO HAROLD L. BERGMAN, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY RICHARD A. DIXON, Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, Ardmore, OK DANIEL M. DOOLEY, University of California, Oakland, CA JOAN H. EISEMANN, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC GARY F. HARTNELL, Monsanto Company, St. Louis, MO GENE HUGOSON, Minnesota Department of Agriculture, St. Paul, MN KIRK C. KLASING, University of California, Davis, CA VICTOR L. LECHTENBERG, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN PHILIP E. NELSON, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN ROBERT PAARLBERG, Wellesley College, Watertown, MA KEITH PITTS, Marrone Bio Innovations, Davis, CA CHARLES W. RICE, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS HAL SALWASSER, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR PEDRO A. SANCHEZ, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, Palisades, NY ROGER A. SEDJO, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC KATHLEEN SEGERSON, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CN MERCEDES VÁZQUEZ-AÑÓN, Novus International, Inc., St. Charles, MO STAFF ROBIN A. SCHOEN, Director KAREN L. IMHOF, Administrative Assistant AUSTIN J. LEWIS, Senior Program Officer EVONNE P.Y. TANG, Senior Program Officer PEGGY TSAI, Program Officer CAMILLA YANDOC ABLES, Associate Program Officer KARA N. LANEY, Associate Program Officer RUTH S. ARIETI, Research Associate JANET M. MULLIGAN, Research Associate KAMWETI MUTU, Research Associate ERIN P. MULCAHY, Senior Program Assistant

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 86

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APPENDIX B 87 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Corrie Brown, University of Georgia, Athens, GA Philip Hagan, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Peter B. Jahrling, National Institutes of Health, Frederick, MD Jonathan Richmond, Jonathan Richmond & Associates, Southport, NC Daniel L. Rock, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL Gary Smith, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA Akula Venkatram, University of California, Riverside, CA Ronald H. White, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD Alex Winter-Nelson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Roger Kasperson, Clark University, and Harley Moon, Iowa State University. Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 116 infected mosquito or the possibility of RVFV-infected mosquitoes’ escaping from containment. The SSRA will also need to address mitigation steps for a zoonotic disease that can be maintained in animal hosts and mosquitoes and their eggs. One crucial mitigation step would be a public education campaign about RVF so that members of the public will know how to protect themselves and how to recognize signs of disease in humans and animals. Ruminants are amplifying hosts, so an important mitigation strategy would be to have a stockpile of RVF vaccine available for use in ruminants in the event of an outbreak by the time the NBAF opens. Other elements of mitigation to be considered should include vector control, spraying, testing, and surveillance implementation to test for RVFV in potential host populations, including humans. Amendment Question 4: Parametric approach to cost of illness: Data which establish the cost of illness (COI) resulting from the introduction of RVF will be estimated parametrically from related economic impact studies of other zoonotic diseases (e.g., West Nile Virus, H5N1, H1N1). Does the NAS Committee concur with this approach and are there any specific references/studies suggested that may assist the team with this aspect of the analysis? Response to Amendment Question 4: The parametric approach to the cost of illness proposed by the SSRA does not take into account the science and biology of RVF, but it will need to do so. The economic impact studies from H1N1 and H5N1 will not necessarily apply to a vector-borne zoonosis such as RVF, thus the model is not a one-size-fits-all model. The cost of an illness will depend on its severity and treatment for it, so the cost incurred because of RVF should be different from the cost incurred because of H1N1 or H5N1 influenza or West Nile virus (WNV), and the difference will have to be incorporated into the economic assessment. Also, assessing the cost of illness for RVF is complex because the assessment will need to consider impacts on both human and animal populations. Estimates for major economic losses due to livestock and trade restrictions for RVF- infected livestock can be quantifiable. Determination of the cost of infection should consider costs associated with animal morbidity, including abortion. An outbreak of RVF would cause U.S. trading partners to stop importation of at least beef and lamb, and perhaps pork, until there is proof that RVFV has been eliminated. It will be difficult to conduct surveillance to prove that the nation is free of RVFV, given that the virus is capable of surviving in mosquito eggs for extended periods of time (WHO, 2007). However, to address the cost of illness for humans alone, the assessment would need to include the cost of disease, public health response costs, direct healthcare costs, productivity losses, and additional economic costs. As an example, the economic impact from the 329 cases in the 2002 Louisiana WNV epidemic resulted in $20.1 million in human medical, non-medical, and public health response costs (Zohrabian et al., 2004). However, for a pathogen such as RVFV, there is no evidence of RVF outbreaks in urban areas (WHO, 2007) and the likelihood of North American mosquitoes acting as efficient RVFV vectors outside the laboratory setting is still uncertain (Turell et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is uncertain how the economic impacts on human health for RVF in developing countries would translate to potential economic health impacts in the United States where the healthcare system differs. Thus the committee believes it would be difficult to provide a reliable estimate for the cost of illness for RVF by benchmarking it to other zoonoses.

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APPENDIX B 117 REFERENCES Alexandersen, S., and A.I. Donaldson. 2002. Further studies to quantify the does of natural aerosols of foot-and-mouth disease virus for pigs. Epidemiol Infec 128:313-323. Alexandersen, S., M.B. Oleksiewicz, and A.I. Donaldson. 2001. The earl pathogenesis of foot- and-mouth disease in pigs infected by contact: a quantitative time-course study using TaqMan RT-PCR. J Gen Virol 82:747-755. Alexandersen, S., I. Brotherhood, and A.I. Donaldson. 2002. Natural aerosol transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus to pigs: minimal infectious dose for strain O1 Lausanne. Epidemiol Infec 128:301-312. Alexandersen, S., M. Quan, C. Murphy, J. Knight, and Z. Zhang. 2003a. Studies of quantitative parameters of virus excretion and transmission in pigs and cattle experimentally infected with foot-and-mouth disease virus. J Comp Pathol 129(4):268-282. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, A.I. Donaldson, and A.J. Garland. 2003b. The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. J Comp Pathol 129(1):1-36. Barlow, D.F. 1972. The aerosol stability of a strain of foot-and-mouth virus and the effects on stability of precipitation with Ammonium sulfate, methanol, or polyethylene glycol. J. Gen virol 15:17-24. Bates, T.W., M.C. Thurmond, and T.E. Carpenter. 2003a. Description of an epidemic simulation model for use in evaluating strategies to control an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Am J Vet Res 64(2):194-204. Bates, T.W., M.C. Thurmond, and T.E. Carpenter. 2003b. Results of epidemic simulation modeling to evaluate strategies to control an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Am J Vet Res 64(2):205-210. Brown, C.J. 1997. BSE and Britain’s CJD outbreak: Definitive link established. Journal of the Canadian Medical Association 157:1194-1194. BuaNews (Government of South Africa). 2010. Livestock deaths prompt RVF warning. 15 March. Government Communication and Information System, South Africa. Available online at http://www.buanews.gov.za/news/10/10031516251001 [accessed March 19, 2010]. CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 2002. Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication. Available online at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cerc/pdf/CERC-SEPT02.pdf [accessed March 18, 2010]. Chrisafis, A. 2001. How the brigadier has mopped up chaos and won farmers’ support. The Guardian, UK. March 30. Available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/mar/30/footandmouth.angeliquechrisafis [accessed March 5, 2010]. Covello, V.T., R.G. Peters, J.G. Wojtecki, and R.C. Hyde. 2001. Risk communication, the West Nile virus epidemic, and bioterrorism: responding to the communication challenges posed by the intentional or unintentional release of a pathogen in an urban setting. J Urban Health 78(2):382-391. Devadoss, S., D.W. Holland, L. Stodick, and J. Ghosh. 2006. A general equilibrium analysis of foreign and domestic demand shocks arising from mad cow disease in the United States. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 31(2):441-453.

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 118 DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 2008. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility: Final environmental impact statement. Available online at http://www.dhs.gov/files/labs/gc_1187734676776.shtm [accessed March 3, 2010]. Donaldson, A.I. 1972. The Influence of Relative Humidity on the Aerosol Stability of Different Strains of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus Suspended in Saliva. J Gen Virol 15:25-33. Donaldson, A.I., and N.P. Ferris. 1975. The survival of foot-and-mouth disease virus in open air conditions. J Hyg (London) 74(3):409-416. Donaldson, A.I., R.F. Sellers, and J. Lacey. 1983. Quantitative data on airborne foot-and-mouth disease virus: its production, carriage and deposition [and Discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 302(1111): 529-534. Dube, C., M.A. Stevenson, M.G. Garner, R.L. Sanson, B.A. Corso, N. Harvey, J. Griffin, J.W. Wilesmith, and C. Estrada. 2007. A comparison of prediction made b three simulation models of foot-and-mouth disease. New Zealand Vet J 55(6):280-288. Ekboir, J.M. 1999. Potential impact of foot-and-mouth disease in California: The role and contribution of animal health surveillance and monitoring services. University of California. Available online at http://aic.ucdavis.edu/publications/oldanrpubs/fandm.pdf [accessed March 4, 2010]. Federal Register. 2009. Record of Decision for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement: Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 74(11):3065-3080. Available online at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9- 914.pdf [accessed March 4, 2010]. GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office). 2008. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: DHS lacks evidence to conclude that foot-and-mouth disease research can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. Washington, DC: GAO. Available online at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-821T [accessed March 4, 2010]. GAO. 2009. Observations on DHS’s Analyses Concerning Whether FMD Research Can Be Done as Safely on the Mainland as on Plum Island. Washington, DC: GAO. Available online at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-747 [accessed March 5, 2010]. Garner, M.G, G.D. Hess, and X. Yang. 2006. An integrated modelling approach to assess the risk of wind-borne spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus from infected premises. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 11(3):195-207. Garner, M.G., C. Dubé, M.A. Stevenson, R.L. Sanson, C. Estrada, and J. Griffin. 2007. Evaluating alternative approaches to managing animal disease outbreaks - the role of modelling in policy formulation. Veterinaria Italiana 43:285-298. Gloster, J., and S. Alexandersen. 2004. New directions: Airborne transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus Atmospheric Environment 38(3):503-505. Gloster, J, H.J. Champion, L.M. Mansley, P. Romero, T. Brough, and A. Ramirez. 2005a. The 2001 epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom: epidemiological and meteorological case studies. Veterinary Record 156:793-803. Gloster, J., A. Freshwater, R.F. Sellers, and S. Alexandersen. 2005b. Re-assessing the likelihood of airborne spread of foot-and-mouth disease at the start of the 1967–1968 UK foot-and- mouth disease epidemic. Epidemiol Infect 133(5):767–783.

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 120 NRC. 2007. Technical input on the National Institutes of Health’s Draft Supplemental Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University: A Letter Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2008. Technical input on any additional studies to assess risk associated with operation of the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University: A Letter Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2009. Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. NRC. 2010. Evaluation of the Health and Safety Risks of the New USAMRIID Facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Nuanualsuwan, S., P. Thongtha, S. Kamolsiripichaiporn, and S. Subharat. 2008. UV inactivation and model of UV inactivation of foot-and-mouth disease viruses in suspension. International Journal of Food Microbiology 127(1-2):84-90. OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health). 2009. Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Article 8.5.8). Available online at www.oie.org [accessed October 20, 2009]. Paarlberg, P.L., J.G. Lee, and A.H. Seitzinger. 2002. Potential revenue impacts of a foot-and- mouth disease outbreak in the United States. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 220(7):988-992. Paarlberg, P.L., A. Hillberg Seitzinger, and J.G. Lee. 2007. Economic impacts of regionalization of a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in the United States, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 39(2): 325-333. Paarlberg, P.L., A. Hillberg Seitzinger, J.G. Lee, and K.H. Mathews, Jr. 2008. Economic Impacts of Foreign Animal Disease. Economic Research Report Number 57. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture: Washington, DC. Appendix table 15. Paarlberg, P.L., A. Hillberg Seitzinger, J.G. Lee, K.H. Mathews, Jr. 2009. Supply reductions, export restrictions, and expectations for hog returns in a potential classical swine fever outbreak in the United States. Journal of Swine Health and Production 17(3):155-162. Pendell, D.L., J. Leatherman, T.C. Schroeder, and G.S. Alward. 2007. The economic impacts of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak: A regional analysis. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 39:13-33. Peters, R.G., V.T. Covello, and D.B. McCallum. 1997. The determinants of trust and credibility in environmental risk communication: an empirical study. Risk Anal 17(1):43-54. Reed, L.J., and H. Muench. 1938. A simple method of estimating fifty percent endpoints. The American Journal of Hygiene 27:493–497. Reynolds, B. 2008. Some threats to laboratory research require an unusual antidote. Applied Biosafety 13(3):138-141. Sandman, P.M. 1990. Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities in “Readings in Risk", T.S. Glockman, M. Gough Eds,. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future pp. 233-245. Schley, D., L. Burgin, and J. Gloster. 2009. Predicting infection risk of airborne foot-and-mouth disease. J. R. Soc. Interface 6(34):455-462. Schoenbaum, M.A., and W.T. Disney. 2003. Modeling alternative mitigation strategies for a hypothetical outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 58:25-52.

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APPENDIX B 121 Sellers, R.F., A.I. Donaldson, and K.A.J. Herniman. 1970. Inhalation, persistence, and dispersal of foot-and-mouth disease virus by man. J Hyg (Lond) 68(4):565-573. Sellers, R.F., K.A. Herniman, and J.A. Mann. 1971. Transfer of foot-and-mouth disease virus in the nose of man from infected to non-infected animals. Vet Rec 89(16):447-449. Sellers, R.F., and J. Gloster. 2007. Foot-and-mouth disease: a review of intranasal infection of cattle, sheep and pigs. Vet J 177(2):159-168. Sørensen, J.H., D.K. Mackay, C.O. Jensen, and A.I. Donaldson. 2000. An integrated model to predict the atmospheric spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus. Epidemiol Infect 124(3):577-590. Sørensen, J.H., C.O. Jensen, T. Mikkelsen, D.K.J. Mackay, and A.I. Donaldson. 2001. Modelling the atmospheric dispersion of foot-and-mouth disease virus for emergency preparedness. Phys Chem Earth 26:93–97. Sørensen, J.H. 2003. Modelling the Atmospheric Spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Danish Meteorological Institute, Scientific Report: 03-17. Available online at http://www.dmi.dk/dmi/sr03-17.pdf [accessed March 17, 2010]. Tildesley, M., and M. Keeling. 2008. Modelling foot-and-mouth disease: A comparison between the UK and Denmark. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 85:107–124. Tildesley, M.J. T.A. House, M.C. Bruhn, R.J. Curry, M. O’Neil, J.L.E. Allpress, G. Smith, and M.J. Keeling. 2010. Impact of spatial clustering on disease transmission and optimal control. PNAS 107(3):1041-1046. Tinline, R. 1970. Lee wave hypothesis for the initial pattern of spread during the 1967-68 foot- and-mouth epizootic. Nature 227(5260):860-862. Tseng, C.-C., and C.-S. Li. 2005. Inactivation of virus-containing aerosols by ultraviolet germicidal irradiation. Aerosol Sci and Technol 39(12):1136-1142. Turell, M.J., D.J. Dohm , C.N. Mores, L. Terracina, D.L. Wallette Jr., L.J. Hribar, J.E. Pecor, and J.A. Blow. 2008. Potential for North American mosquitoes to transmit Rift Valley fever virus. J Am Mosq Control Assoc 24(4):502-507. UK-MAFF (United Kingdom, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). 2002. “Foot & Mouth Disease Daily Situation Report.” Available online at www.maff.gov.uk. accessed weekly from March 29, 2001-January 14, 2002. USDA-FAS (United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service). 1997. Taiwan Livestock and Products Annual,TW7029, July 21,1997. Available online at www.fas.usda.gov [accessed November 4, 2009]. USDA-FAS. 1998. Taiwan Livestock and Products Annual, TW8021, July 16, 1998. Available online at www.fas.usda.gov [accessed November 4, 2009]. USDA-FAS. 2000. Taiwan Livestock and Products Semi-Annual, GAIN Report TW0006, February 2, 2000. Available online at www.fas.usda.gov [accessed November 4, 2009]. USDA-FAS. 2001. “United Kingdom Livestock and Products , UK Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease Confirmed 2001.” Gain Report #UK1007, February 21, 2001. Available online at www.fas.usda.gov [accessed March 2, 2010]. USDA-NASS (U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service). 2009. “Quick Stats -- Statistics by State, Livestock Inventory January 2009Agricultural Statistical Annual.” Available online at nass.usda.gov/statistics by state [accessed October 20 2009]. USITC (United States International Trade Commission). 2009. Trade data web. (2008 Quarter 1- 2009 Quarter 2 data) Available online at www.usitc.gov [accessed October 20.2009].

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 122 WHO (World Health Organization). 2003. Biosafety and SARS incident in Singapore September 2003: Report of the Review Panel on New SARS Case and Biosafety. Geneva: World Health Organization. Available online at http://www.biosafety.be/CU/PDF/Report_SARS_Singapore.pdf [accessed March 4, 2010]. WHO. 2007. Rift Valley fever: Fact sheet no. 207. Available online at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs207/en/ [accessed March 4, 2010]. Zhao, Z., T.I Wahl, and T.L. Marsh. 2006. Invasive species management: Foot-and-mouth disease in the U.S. Beef Industry. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 35(1):98-115. Zohrabian, A., M.I. Meltzer , R. Ratard, K. Billah, N.A. Molinari , K. Roy, R.D. Scott 2nd, and L.R. Petersen . 2004. West Nile virus economic impact, Louisiana, 2002. Emerg Infect Dis 10(10):1736-1744.

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Appendix B-1 Committee’s Revisions to Draft Final Report Outline The committee’s suggested revisions to the draft final report outline are noted in bolded underline for additions and strikethrough for deletions. I. Executive Summary a. Overview i. NBAF Purpose and Benefits ii. Site-Specific Risk Assessment Objectives b. Results i. Best Practices Overview for Manhattan Design and Operations 1. Design 2. Operations 3. Mitigation ii. Reasonable Maximum Credible Risk Worst-Case Scenario Outcomes 1. Assumptions a. Baseline Best Practices b. Site-Specific Considerations 2. Outcomes and Impact a. Extent of Pathogen Dispersion b. Potential Spread of Associated Disease c. Economic Impact c. Site-Specific Risk Assessment Conclusions and Recommendations II. Purpose and Objectives a. Define Best Practices i. Design and Construction ii. Operations iii. Personnel reliability (consider this to be handled by DHS and not specific to the SSRA) iv. Emergency and Contingency Planning b. Identify Potential Release Scenarios i. Accidental ii. Intentional c. Model Outcomes i. Fate and Transport Plume Modeling (through 4 categories of pathways) 1. air 2. solid waste 123

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 124 3. liquid waste 4. in/on fomites or hosts ii. Epidemiological Modeling iii. Economic Consequence Assessments d. Develop Strategies for Prevention and Mitigation of Reasonable Maximum Credible Risk Worst-Case Scenarios III. Technical Approach a. Expertise i. Subject Matter Experts ii. Key Personnel b. Risk Management c. Technical Tasks i. Emergency and Contingency Planning Requirements Review and Baseline Mitigation Strategy Development (Task 01) 1. Review of Best Practices, Mitigation Strategies, Risk Communication, and Emergency Response Plans at Domestic and International Sites 2. Review of Findings with US Government Team and Discussion of NBAF Response Plans with national, regional, state, and local responders 3. Development of a Baseline Mitigation Strategy for the NBAF including Local/State/Federal strategies. ii. Scenario Review (Task 02) 1. Scenario Database Development and Boundary Conditions 2. SME Panel Scenario Review iii. Data Collection (Task 08) 1. Animal 2. Transportation 3. Human Population and Health 4. Insect Vector 5. Building iv. Plume Modeling (Task 04) 1. Model and Source Term Development 2. Meteorological Data Preparation 3. Modeling Plan Development and Review 4. Model Setup 5. Modeling Simulations 6. Post-process Model Results Evaluation 7. Plume-Model Report Development and Review v. Epidemiological Study (Task 05) 1. Data Collection 2. Existing Epidemiological Model Assessment 3. FMDv and RVFV Model Development 4. Parametric Assessment of FMDv and RVFV Release vi. Economic Study (Task 06) 1. Pre-release Market Conditions Assessment 2. Post-release Market Conditions Assessment 3. Animal Commodity Flow

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APPENDIX B-1 125 4. Containment and Animal Stop Zones 5. Critical Economic Infrastructure and Key Resources 6. Trade Impacts 7. Economic Study Report Development and Review d. Process and Data Flow e. Reports and Deliverables (Task 07, plus portions of Tasks 2,4,5,6,& 8) IV. Results a. Best Practices b. Data Collection c. Scenario Database d. Plume Modeling e. Epidemiological Studies f. Economic Studies g. Risks V. Conclusions and Recommendations a. Reasonable Maximum Credible Risk Worst-Case Scenario Outcomes b. Reasonable Maximum Credible Risk Worst-Case Scenario Mitigation Strategy c. Recommendations VI. Bibliography VII. Supporting Data (Order subject to change dependant on order in which they are referenced in the Final Report) a. Appendix A: Collected Data Sets b. Appendix B: Best Practices: Response Strategies c. Appendix C: Best Practices: Mitigation Strategies d. Appendix D: Scenario Database e. Appendix E: Plume Models (Modeling Plans and Final Report) f. Appendix F: Epidemiological Models g. Appendix G: Economic Consequence Models

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EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 126