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In both medicine and intelligence analysis the stakes are often very high. That, combined with time pressure, can generate considerable stress for the person making the forecasts and detections. As the medical examples illustrate, rigorous evaluation of physician judgments and practices using the methods proposed in this chapter have improved medical outcomes substantially. It is reasonable to expect similar benefits if these methods are applied in intelligence analysis.

Without scorecards and assessment of accuracy of the many forecasts an individual or organization makes, judgments of forecaster performance are likely to be based on a few spectacular, newsworthy, atypical events. These events are more likely to be failed rather than successful predictions. For example, public assessments of the IC in this century are largely based on missing the 9/11 terrorist attacks and falsely claiming that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dangers of forecasters being evaluated on the basis of a few events are obvious. The many day-to-day predictions that were correct are ignored, especially true negatives (e.g., no credit is given for not having invaded other countries that did not have these weapons). Also, post-hoc analyses of a few events are plagued by the problems of hindsight bias. Finally and perhaps most importantly, a few isolated events do not provide adequate data for assessing whether new methods (e.g., Intellipedia, A-Space, red cell analysis, having an overarching Office of the Director of National Intelligence) improve performance. Keeping score in the IC is likely to reveal much better day-to-day performance than they are given credit for by policy makers and the public.

Forecasters are not only reluctant to keep score, but also they often avoid making predictions with sufficient precision to allow scorekeeping. An important exception is contemporary weather forecasting that involves, for example, explicit probabilities of precipitation and confidence bands around predicted hurricane tracks. By contrast, many forecasts in other disciplines are too vague to support scorekeeping. In this context, an examination of unclassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) from the past several years provides an interesting case study. Heuer (1999, pp. 152–153) explicitly warns: “Verbal expressions of uncertainty—such as ‘possible,’ ‘probable,’ ‘unlikely,’ ‘may,’ and ‘could’—are a form of subjective probability judgment, but they have long been recognized as sources of ambiguity and misunderstanding…. To express themselves clearly, analysts must learn to routinely communicate uncertainty using the language of numerical probability or odds ratios.” Sherman Kent (1964) had similar concerns and concludes:

Words and expressions like these are far too much a part of us and our habits of communication to be banned by fiat…. If use them we must in NIEs, let us try to use them sparingly and in places where they are least



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