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Committee on Review of the Scientific Approaches Used
During the FBI’s Investigation of the 2001 Bacillus anthracis Mailings
Board on Life Sciences
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Committee on Science, Technology, and Law
Policy and Global Affairs Division
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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing
Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils
of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the
Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were
chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Contract No. A9N0902700 between the National Academy
of Sciences and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Any opinions, findings, conclu-
sions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support
for the project.
International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-18719-0
International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-18719-2
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 2011927648
Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press,
500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202)
334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet: www.nap.edu.
Copyright 2011 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
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The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of
distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the
furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon
the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a
mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical
matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the
National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is
autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the
National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government.
The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at
meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior
achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy
of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences
to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examina -
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responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to
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The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in
1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s
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accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become
the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the
National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public,
and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by
both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Charles M.
Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.
www.national-academies.org
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COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES
USED DURING THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF THE
2001 BACILLUS ANTHRACIS MAILINGS
ALICE P. GAST (Chair), President, Lehigh University
DAVID A. RELMAN (Vice Chair), Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan
Professor, Stanford University School of Medicine, and Chief, Infectious
Disease Section, Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, CA
ARTURO CASADEVALL, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor of
Microbiology and Immunology and Chair, Department of Microbiology
and Immunology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine
NANCY D. CONNELL, Professor of Medicine, University of Medicine
and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ)-New Jersey Medical School and
Director, UMDNJ Center for BioDefense
THOMAS V. INGLESBY, Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Director of
the Center for Biosecurity of University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
Associate Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of
Pittsburgh Schools of Medicine and Public Health
MURRAY V. JOHNSTON, Professor of Chemistry and Biochemistry,
University of Delaware
KAREN KAFADAR, James H. Rudy Professor of Statistics and Physics,
Indiana University
RICHARD E. LENSKI, John A. Hannah Distinguished Professor of
Microbial Ecology, Michigan State University
RICHARD M. LOSICK, Maria Moors Cabot Professor of Biology, Harvard
College Professor and Howard Hughes Medical Institute Professor
ALICE C. MIGNEREY, Professor of Chemistry and Biochemistry,
University of Maryland, College Park
DAVID L. POPHAM, Professor of Microbiology, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University
JED S. RAKOFF, United States District Judge, Southern District of
New York
ROBERT C. SHALER, Director, Forensic Science Program, Professor of
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Pennsylvania State University
ELIZABETH A. THOMPSON, Professor of Statistics, University of
Washington
KASTHURI VENKATESWARAN, Senior Research Scientist, California
Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory
DAVID R. WALT, Robinson Professor of Chemistry and Professor of
Biomedical Engineering, Tufts University and Howard Hughes Medical
Institute Professor
v
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Staff
ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, Study Director
FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Study Co-Director (until 1/11)
ERICKA MCGOWAN, Program Officer, Board on Chemical Sciences and
Technology (until 4/10)
STEVEN KENDALL, Associate Program Officer, Committee on Science,
Technology, and Law
AMANDA P. CLINE, Senior Program Assistant, Board on Life Sciences
(until 5/10)
KATHI E. HANNA, Consultant Writer
CAMERON H. FLETCHER, Editor
vi
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BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
KEITH R. YAMAMOTO (Chair), Executive Vice Dean, School of Medicine,
and Professor, Department of Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology,
University of California, San Francisco
BONNIE L. BASSLER, Investigator, Howard Hughes Medical Institute,
and Professor of Molecular Biology, Department of Molecular Biology,
Princeton University
VICKI L. CHANDLER, Chief Program Officer, Science, Gordon and Betty
Moore Foundation
SEAN EDDY, Group Leader, Howard Hughes Medical Institute Janelia
Farm Research Campus
MARK D. FITZSIMMONS, Associate Director, MacArthur Fellows
Program, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
DAVID R. FRANZ, Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist, Midwest
Research Institute
DONALD E. GANEM, Director, Global Infectious Disease Research,
Novartis Institute of Biomedical Research
LOUIS J. GROSS, Professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and
Mathematics and Director, Institute for Environmental Modeling,
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville
JO HANDELSMAN, Howard Hughes Medical Institute Professor, Yale
University
CATO T. LAURENCIN, Vice President for Health Affairs and Dean,
University of Connecticut Health Center School of Medicine
BERNARD LO, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Program in
Medical Ethics, University of California, San Francisco
ROBERT M. NEREM, Institute Professor and Parker H. Petit Professor
Emeritus, Institute for Bioengineering and Bioscience, Georgia Institute
of Technology
CAMILLE PARMESAN, Associate Professor of Integrative Biology, Section
of Integrative Biology, University of Texas
MURIEL E. POSTON, Dean of Faculty, Skidmore College
ALISON G. POWER, Professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology and
Dean, The Graduate School, Cornell University
BRUCE W. STILLMAN, President, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
CYNTHIA WOLBERGER, Professor, Department of Biophysics and
Biophysical Chemistry, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine
MARY WOOLLEY, President and CEO, Research!America
vii
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Staff
FRANCES E. SHARPLES, Director
JO L. HUSBANDS, Scholar/Senior Project Director
JAY B. LABOV, Senior Scientist/Program Director for Biology Education
KATHERINE W. BOWMAN, Senior Program Officer
MARILEE K. SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer
INDIA HOOK-BARNARD, Program Officer
ANNA FARRAR, Financial Associate
CARL-GUSTAV ANDERSON, Program Associate
AMANDA MAZZAWI, Senior Program Assistant
AYESHA AHMED, Program Assistant
viii
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW
DAVID KORN (Co-Chair), Vice Provost for Research, Harvard University
RICHARD A. MESERVE (Co-Chair), President, Carnegie Institution for
Science, and Senior Of Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, JR., Partner, McKenna, Long & Aldridge LLP
ARTHUR I. BIENENSTOCK, Special Assistant to the President for Federal
Research Policy and Director, Wallenberg Research Link, Stanford
University
BARBARA E. BIERER, Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School,
and Senior Vice President, Research, Brigham and Women’s Hospital
ELIZABETH H. BLACKBURN, Morris Herzstein Professor of Biology and
Physiology, University of California, San Francisco
JOHN BURRIS, President, Burroughs Wellcome Fund
ARTURO CASADEVALL, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor of
Microbiology and Immunology; Chair, Department of Biology and
Immunology; and Professor of Medicine, Albert Einstein College of
Medicine
JOE S. CECIL, Project Director, Program on Scientific and Technical
Evidence, Division of Research, Federal Judicial Center
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, Pauline Newman Professor of Law
and Director, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, New
York University School of Law
DREW ENDY, Assistant Professor, Bioengineering, Stanford University, and
President, The BioBricks Foundation
PAUL G. FALKOWSKI, Board of Governors Professor in Geological and
Marine Science, Department of Earth and Planetary Science, Rutgers,
The State University of New Jersey
MARCUS FELDMAN, Burnet C. and Mildred Wohlford Professor of
Biological Sciences, Stanford University
ALICE P. GAST, President, Lehigh University
JASON GRUMET, President, Bipartisan Policy Center
GARY W. HART, Wirth Chair in Environmental and Community
Development Policy, University of Colorado, Denver
BENJAMIN W. HEINEMAN, JR., Senior Fellow, Harvard Law School and
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
D. BROCK HORNBY, Judge, U.S. District Court, District of Maine
ALAN B. MORRISON, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest
and Public Service, George Washington University Law School
PRABHU PINGALI, Deputy Director of Agricultural Development, Global
Development Program, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
HARRIET RABB, Vice President and General Counsel, Rockefeller University
BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, Director, The Federal Judicial Center
ix
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JONATHAN M. SAMET, Professor and Flora L. Thornton Chair,
Department of Preventive Medicine, Keck School of Medicine and
Director, Institute for Global Health, University of Southern California
DAVID S.TATEL, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit
SOPHIE VANDEBROEK, Chief Technology Officer and President, Xerox
Innovation Group, Xerox Corporation
Staff
ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, Director
STEVEN KENDALL, Associate Program Officer
x
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Preface
In autumn 2001, the tragic deaths, illnesses, and environmental contamina-
tion caused by the mailing of Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis) spores in letters
sent through the U.S. postal system caused tremendous fear and disruption in a
nation shaken by the events of September 11. Efforts led by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) to characterize the material contained in the letters and
identify the individual or individuals responsible for the mailings would involve
extensive scientific study spanning almost nine years.
It is not unusual to use science to identify and characterize evidence and
to link it to a particular individual in a criminal investigation. Indeed, in the
2001 B. anthracis mailings investigation, physics, chemistry, and biology all
played a role. In this case, the field of bacterial genomics was rapidly evolving
throughout the investigation. Recognizing the challenges inherent in such a
complex scientific investigation, in 2008 the FBI asked the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct an
independent review of the scientific approaches used during its investigation.
In 2009, the committee, formed under the auspices of the National Academies’
Board on Life Sciences and Committee on Science, Technology, and Law, began
this review.
As we undertook this review, the committee kept in mind the context of
the time, immediately following September 11, 2001, when there were multiple
high-profile FBI investigations under way. We recognized that the grave conse -
quences of these events for public health and national security and the uncer-
tainty about possible additional attacks necessarily influenced the initial design
and execution of the FBI’s scientific investigation. Throughout its investigation,
the FBI embraced and energetically pursued the use of new and emerging
science through an unusual degree of involvement of outside scientists. In
many ways, this case established and emphasized the potential importance of
microbial forensics in the investigation of future acts of bioterrorism.
A scientific study is much more than a series of well-executed experiments.
The planning and decision making used during a study are essential compo -
xi
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xii PREFACE
nents of the science and can determine its outcome. As we learned from our
review of this case, it is especially important in emergency situations to have
a clearly defined approach for undertaking a complex scientific investigation
involving many experts and collaborators. In any such case, the goal is to inte -
grate a broad range of experimental methods and exploratory work with a more
thorough and deeper study of selected methods, along with clear guidance for
the investigation. Investigators must maintain a healthy degree of skepticism
and a willingness to challenge their own assumptions. Achieving these goals
requires considerable thought and planning before a crisis occurs. It is also
important to recognize that when science meets law enforcement there are
several tensions that need to be balanced: openness and secrecy, collaboration
and independence, and deliberateness and expediency.
We also learned from this investigation that there is an immediate and ongo-
ing need from the outset of an investigation to obtain expert advice and have
available a group of advisors who can provide conceptual insight and relevant
expertise to scientific plans, approaches, and scenarios.
An unavoidable observation from the 2001 B. anthracis mailings is that the
best subject matter experts in a given area also might be viewed as suspects.
Working with potential suspects during a sensitive investigation is a challenge
that the law enforcement community must continually address through its vet -
ting processes.
Throughout our review, we focused on the scientific aspects of the investi -
gation and did not evaluate non-science-based investigative material. We have
evaluated the science to the best of our ability, given the materials made avail -
able to us. While there may be additional relevant material to which we were
not provided access, we believe that our review of the available material has
resulted in many useful findings and conclusions. Nonetheless, other aspects
of, and documents from, the FBI investigation may deserve future study and
review.
In following our charge, we evaluated the specific conclusions drawn by
the FBI based on its scientific analyses. The FBI never provided the committee
with those conclusions in written form, although FBI conclusions were offered
in oral presentations to the committee. We repeatedly sought written statements
of conclusions until the case was closed by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
on February 19, 2010. In our report, we address the conclusions offered in
verbal reports, as well as the main scientific conclusions as written in the DOJ
Amerithrax Investigative Summary.1
In November 2010, after our final report had been submitted to the FBI
for a security review, the FBI informed the National Academies that there were
additional materials relevant to the committee’s work that had not previously
1 United States Department of Justice. Amerithrax Investigative Summary. February 19, 2010.
Available at: www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-summary.pdf.
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xiii
PREFACE
been shared with the committee. The Bureau offered to provide our committee
with these materials and an additional briefing. After serious discussions with
the National Academies’ leadership, we agreed to receive and review these
materials and reconvene the committee for one final meeting in January 2011.
The documents and briefing provided us with additional information and led
to meaningful changes in this report regarding the organization of the scientific
investigation, sample collection, and analytical tests undertaken by the FBI
and its contracting laboratories. This information resulted in the addition of
a new section in the report (3.4.3) and the addition of a new finding (3.4) and
recommendation (3.1). A benefit of the extension of the project and the delay
in issuance of the report is that important additional materials, now available to
the public, provide more information about the scientific investigation.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
While much of our effort was focused on a review of the science performed
in support of the investigation of the 2001 B. anthracis mailings, an equally
important aim has been to help ensure that future scientific investigations of
biological attacks are conducted in the most relevant, rigorous, and thoughtful
manner possible. Although the events of 2001 were tragic, they could have been
more catastrophic. In the future, among many other requirements, it will be
important to ensure more timely results, more efficient environmental analysis,
access to globally representative strain collections, and a robust capability
for characterizing less well studied or less easily cultivated biological agents.
Officials also may need to manage expectations among the general public,
policymakers, and the scientific community about the conclusions that can
realistically be expected from the use of microbial forensics.
We have been fortunate to work with extremely talented, intelligent, and
dedicated individuals in the undertaking of this multifaceted study. Commit -
tee members evaluated large numbers of documents under constrained cir-
cumstances that required exceptional dedication and patience. They listened
intently to speakers, asked probing and insightful questions, and vigorously
discussed what was learned, what we could research, and how to word our
findings. We are indebted to them for all the time and energy they gave to this
effort. We are also most grateful to the staff—Amanda Cline, Cameron Fletcher,
Steven Kendall, Ericka McGowan, Anne-Marie Mazza, and Fran Sharples—
and to the consultant writer, Kathi Hanna.
Alice P. Gast and David A. Relman
Chair and Vice Chair
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Acknowledgments
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their
diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures
approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The
purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments
that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as pos-
sible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity,
evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and
draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process. We
thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
R. John Collier, Harvard Medical School
Rita R. Colwell, University of Maryland
M. Bonner Denton, University of Arizona
Ashlee M. Earl, Broad Institute of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and Harvard University
Philip C. Hanna, University of Michigan Medical School
Stephen A. Johnston, Arizona State University
David H. Kaye, Arizona State University
Cato T. Laurencin, University of Connecticut Health Center
M. S. Meselson, Harvard University
Randall S. Murch, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Pauline Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Stanley A. Plotkin, University of Pennsylvania (emeritus)
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, University of the Pacific
R. Paul Schaudies, GenArraytion, Inc.
James M. Tiedje, Michigan State University
Bruce Weir, University of Washington
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments
and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recom -
xv
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xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
mendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release.
The review of this report was overseen by Stephen Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon
University, and Floyd Bloom, The Scripps Research Institute. Appointed by
the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that
an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with
institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully consid -
ered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the
authoring committee and the institution.
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Contents
SUMMARY 1
1 INTRODUCTION 25
1.1 Background, 25
1.2 Chronology of Events of Fall 2001, 26
1.3 Brief Summary of the FBI’s Scientific Investigation, 31
1.4 Summary of FBI and DOJ Scientific Conclusions, 32
1.5 Committee Process, 33
1.6 Issues for Consideration in Reading This Report, 35
1.7 Organization of the Report, 36
2 BIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF BACILLUS ANTHRACIS 37
2.1 Introduction, 37
2.2 The Biology of B. anthracis, 37
2.3 Clinical Aspects of Anthrax, 38
2.4 B. anthracis as a Biological Weapon, 40
2.5 Phylogeny of B. anthracis, 41
2.6 The Early History of the Ames Strain of B.anthracis, 44
2.7 Summary, 44
3 SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT
CASE AND DESCRIPTION AND TIMELINE OF THE
FBI SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 47
3.1 Introduction, 47
3.2 Science and Scientific Investigation as Part of a Law
Enforcement Investigation, 47
3.3 The Federal Coordinated Response and Assignment of
Laboratory Work, 55
xvii
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xviii CONTENTS
3.4 Collection and Analysis of Clinical and Environmental
Samples and Cross Contamination, 60
3.4.1 Clinical and Epidemiological Samples, 60
3.4.2 Crime Scene Environmental Samples, 64
3.4.3 Samples from an Overseas Site Identified by Intelligence, 66
3.4.4 Letter Material and Cross Contamination, 67
3.5 Committee Findings and Recommendations, 70
4 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL ANALYSES 75
4.1 Introduction, 75
4.2 Spore Preparation and Purification, 75
4.3 Surrogate Preparation and Purification, 78
4.4 Size and Granularity of the Material in the Letters, 79
4.5 Presence of Silicon and Other Elements in the Letter
Material, 80
4.5.1 Elemental Analysis, 81
4.5.2 Spatially Resolved Elemental Analysis, 83
4.5.3 Silicon in the Spore Coat, 84
4.5.4 Summary of the Silicon Analysis, 87
4.6 Features of Bacterial Growth Conditions and Processing
Methods: Detection of Meglumine and Diatrizoate, 87
4.7 Media Component Analysis, 89
4.8 Volatile Organic Compounds, 89
4.9 Determining When the Material Was Produced:
Radiocarbon Dating of B. anthracis Samples, 90
4.10 Stable Isotope Analysis, 90
4.10.1 B. anthracis, 90
4.10.2 Water Samples, 92
4.10.3 The Envelope Measurements, 92
4.11 Committee Findings, 93
5 MICROBIOLOGICAL AND GENETIC ANALYSES OF
MATERIAL IN THE LETTERS 97
5.1 Introduction, 97
5.2 Identification of the B. anthracis Strain, 97
5.3 Was the B. anthracis in the Letters Genetically Engineered?, 100
5.4 B. subtilis Contamination of the New York Samples, 104
5.5 Identification and Characterization of Colony Morphological
Variants in the Evidentiary Material, 106
5.5.1 Why Was the FBI Interested in Colony Morphotypes?, 106
5.5.2 Background Information on Morphotypes, 107
5.5.3 Detection and Characterization of Morphotypes in the
Anthrax Letters Samples, 109
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xix
CONTENTS
5.5.4 Selection Criteria for Genetic Variations Used in
Screening, 113
5.5.5 Whole Genome Sequencing of Morphotype Isolates, 114
5.5.6 Development and Application of Assays for the
Genotypes, 119
Genotypes A1 and A3, 119
Genotypes B and D, 119
Genotype E, 120
5.6 Committee Findings, 121
6 COMPARISON OF THE MATERIAL IN THE LETTERS
WITH SAMPLES IN THE FBI REPOSITORY 125
6.1 Introduction, 125
6.2 Creation of the FBI Repository (FBIR), 126
6.3 Use of the Genetic Assays to Test for the Four Genotypes, 130
6.4 Derivation of RMR-1029 Spores, 130
6.5 Analyses of the Repository Samples and Statistical
Interpretation of the Evidence, 132
6.5.1 The FBI’s Statistical Analysis Report, 135
6.5.2 Committee Assessment of the Statistical Analysis Report, 136
6.6 Analyses Based on Resampling RMR-1029 and Interpretation
of the Results, 140
6.7 Committee Findings, 144
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 161
APPENDIXES
A Radiocarbon Dating 181
B The Forensics Potential of Stable Isotope Analysis 183
C Committee Evaluation of Statistical Analysis Report 185
D Biographical Information of Committee and Staff 193
INDEX 205
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Tables, Boxes, Figures
TABLES
S-1 FBI and DOJ Conclusions and Committee Comments, 11
1-1 Timeline of Key Events in the Anthrax Mailings Case, 28
3-1 Timeline of Scientific Events in the Anthrax Mailings Investigation, 48
3-2 Analytical Techniques Used on the Evidentiary Material, 58
4-1 Estimated Ranges of Total Number of Spores, 76
4-2 Estimates of Media Volume Required for Spore Preparation, 77
4-3 Methods for Chemical Analysis Referred to in Chapter 4, 81
4-4 Summary of Silicon Measurements in Evidentiary and Surrogate
Samples, 82
5-1 Phenotypic Characteristics of the Morphotypes, 113
5-2 B. anthracis Isolates Analyzed by the Institute for Genomic Research
(TIGR), 115
5-3 Further Genetic Characterization of the Morphotype Isolates, 116
5-4 Distribution Among the Anthrax Letters of the Genotypes Selected
for Repository Screening, 118
6-1 General Results of the Screening of 1,059 Viable FBIR Samples for
the Presence of the Mutation Genotypes, as Summarized by the
Statistical Consultant to the FBI, 133
6-2 General Results of the Screening of the 947 Samples that Provided
Definitive Results for All Four Genotypes, 134
6-3 Distribution Results for the Four Genotype Assays for Genotypes A1,
A3, MRI-D, and E in the 947 Samples, 134
xxi
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xxii TABLES, BOXES, FIGURES
6-4 Observed and Expected (Under Independence) Distribution of
Positive Signatures of Four Genotypes, 138
6-5 Genotype Assays on Three Replicates from Two Samples at 10 Dilution
Levels: Entry Denotes Number of Positive Assays on Three Replicates at
Each Dilution Level, 139
6-6 Results Obtained by Resampling from Flask RMR-1029, 143
C-1 Samples with Positive and “Inconclusive” or “Variant” Assays, 187
C-2 Probabilities of k 4-mutation Samples in Institution F, 191
BOXES
S-1 Charge to the Committee, 2
1-1 Charge to the Committee, 27
2-1 The Sverdlovsk Outbreak, 41
3-1 Bioterrorism Investigations, 54
5-1 Genome Sequencing, 101
5-2 The Polymerase Chain Reaction Technique, 102
5-3 The TaqMan Technique, 106
6-1 Subpoena Protocol for Collection and Submission of Ames Strain
Samples, 127
FIGURES
2-1 Worldwide Distribution and Lineages of B. anthracis, 43
3-1 Trajectory and Outcomes of Anthrax Mailings, 62
3-2 New York Post Letter Powder, 63
3-3 Leahy Letter Powder, 63
4-1 SEM of Leahy and New York Post Powders, 85
4-2 Stable Isotope Results 18O and 2H, 91
5-1 B. anthracis Colony Morphotype “A”, 110
5-2 B. anthracis Colony Morphotype “B”, 111
5-3 B. anthracis Colony Morphotype “E”, 112
A-1 Atmospheric CO2 (Northern Hemisphere),182
