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1
IntroductIon
t he Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) was
created by Congress to determine whether recommendations for base
closure and realignment developed by the Department of Defense (DoD)
“provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realign-
ment of military installations inside the United States” (Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Act of 2000). The independent commission,
made up of appointees of the administration who are approved by the
Senate, makes recommendations to Congress, which it can approve or
reject, but it makes either choice without changing the recommendations.
BRAC 2005 was the fifth round of decisions designed to stream-
line the nation’s defense infrastructure. Unlike past BRAC rounds, which
generally focused on reducing excess physical infrastructure, this round
presents military growth challenges for DoD, states, and local govern-
ments. Its implementation will increase the number of on-base personnel,
military families, and defense-related contractors at or near 18 military
bases, several of which are located in major metropolitan areas. Further-
more, because the BRAC realignments must, by law, be completed by
September 15, 2011, these community changes will be rapid, as person-
nel will arrive quickly once the bases are readied. There are 18 bases
where BRAC growth will affect neighboring communities, as shown in
Figure 1. Other military growth communities exist, but their growth is
not a result of BRAC.
While BRAC 2005 is taking place, other major initiatives will
increase growth at or near some BRAC-affected bases. These areas
include two major military reorganizations. First, the Global Defense
Posture Realignment initiative will move about 70,000 military and
civilian personnel from overseas to U.S. bases by 2011 to help support
current strategies and address emerging threats. Second, the Army’s force
modularity effort will restructure the Army from a division-based force to
a more readily deployable modular, brigade-based force. Some of these
brigade units will relocate to existing bases. A third initiative, Grow the
Force, is not a reorganization but will increase the permanent strength of
the military to enhance overall U.S. forces. This initiative will add about
74,000 soldiers and about 27,000 marines. Finally, troop drawdowns
from Iraq could increase personnel at some BRAC-affected bases. These
other military initiatives will be implemented over a longer time frame
than BRAC decisions, which must happen by September 2011.
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Wash.
Army
Ft. Lewis
Army
Aberdeen
Army
Proving Ground
Ft. Meade
Army
Ft. Carson Navy
Army Va.
Kans. National Naval
Ft. Knox Army
Army
Colo. Medical Center
Ft. Lee
Ky.
Ft. Riley
Army N.C. Army
Redstone Army Ft. Belvoir
Army
Arsenal Ft. Bragg
Ft. Sill
Okla. Marine Corps
Army Quantico
Army Fort Benning
Ft. Bliss Marine Corps
Tex. Ga.
Ala.
Camp Lejeune/
Army Air Station Cherry Point/
Ft. Sam Air Station New River
Air Force
Houston
Eglin AFB
Fla.
Installation identified transportation as a major challenge
Installation did not identify transportation as a major challenge
FIGurE 1 Military bases affected by BrAc growth (GAo 2009).
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IntroductIon
These BRAC movements are occurring at a difficult time. The
nation is fighting two wars during the severest economic downturn
since the Great Depression. Traditional sources of funding for trans-
portation are under severe strain because of the economic downturn;
the federal-aid transportation program has not been reauthorized, in
part because of inadequate revenue to fund needed improvements.
The forces driving growth at military bases and the surrounding com-
munities are more complex than they would be if they were the result
of BRAC decisions alone. During fiscal years 2006 through 2012, the
populations of the communities in the vicinity of the 18 BRAC bases
are expected to increase by an estimated 181,800 military and civilian
personnel plus an estimated 173,200 dependents, for a total increase
of about 355,000 persons (Table 1).1 The total military and civilian
workers at these locations in 2005 was about 422,000 (DoD 2009),
indicating an increase of 84%.
About 28% of the total population increase, roughly 98,000
people, will occur at bases in metropolitan areas, several of which have
transportation facilities serving the bases that are barely able to serve
current demand during peak periods. Except in the case of congestion
caused by a doubling of traffic, however, DoD views the responsibility
for addressing increasing traffic attributable to military expansion to be
that of state and local authorities (DoD 2008). The problems for state
and local jurisdictions in BRAC cases are attributable to the rapid pace
of traffic growth on heavily used facilities, particularly those in urban-
ized areas that have limited options for expansion; the lengthy process
for projects to be evaluated for environmental impact and included in
state and regional transportation plans; the intense competition among
state and local projects for available federal and state aid for capacity
enhancements; and the general shortage of available state and local
funds. Moreover, the normal process for developing highway and transit
projects, from required planning and environmental processes all the way
through construction is, at best, 9 years and usually takes 15 to 20 years
(GAO 2003).
Addressing congestion problems around bases in metropolitan
areas will require major improvements in the transportation system,
including both increased capacity and improved operations. At issue is
where the additional funds will come from and who will be responsible
for carrying out the improvements.
With limited exceptions, the committee did not have information about secondary, or spin-off,
1
employment growth associated with the increases at military bases.
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TABLE 1 Estimated Growth from All DoD Sources at and near BRAC-Affected Military Bases,
Fiscal Years 2006–2012, as of March 2008 (GAo 2009)
Total Change in Total Change in Population Total Current Total
Military and Civilian of Military and Civilian Population Regional
Base DoD Population DoD Dependents Increase Population
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. 3,400 2,200 5,600 2,512,000
National Naval Medical Center, Md.a 2,500 Not available 2,500 4,331,000
Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, 13,400 18,700 32,100 108,000
and New River, N.C.
Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. 3,600 5,900 9,500 190,000
Fort Belvoir, Va. 24,100 12,700 36,800 4,331,000
Fort Benning, Ga. 12,700 6,100 18,800 247,000
Fort Bliss, Tex. 28,000 41,700 69,700 722,000
Fort Bragg, N.C. 18,900 17,100 36,000 301,000
Fort Carson, Colo. 10,400 14,400 24,800 514,000
Fort Knox, Ky. (2,900) 4,500 1,600 117,000
Fort Lee, Va. 10,200 4,600 14,800 138,000
Fort Lewis, Wash. 13,500 17,400 30,900 3,422,000
Fort Meade, Md. 7,000 4,200 11,200 2,512,000
Fort Sam Houston, Tex. 10,900 6,100 17,000 1,416,000
Fort Sill, Okla. 3,700 (400) 3,300 81,000
Fort Riley, Kans. 10,900 15,000 25,900 109,000
Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Va. 3,600 1,000 4,600 202,000
Redstone Arsenal, Ala. 7,900 2,000 9,900 291,000
Total 181,800 173,200 355,000
a
Traffic impacts will be compounded by patients and visitors to the hospital, who are not included in this population number.
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IntroductIon
orGAnIzAtIon oF thE rEport
In Chapter 2, the committee describes case studies of BRAC-related per-
sonnel increases in Virginia, Maryland, Washington, Texas, and Florida
and the efforts of these communities to cope with traffic increases in the
surrounding transportation system. In Chapter 3, the normal processes
followed in military base planning and metropolitan area transporta-
tion planning are described, while noting the apparent disconnects
between these two processes and opportunities to better integrate them.
In Chapter 4, the committee reviews the available options for funding
off-base transportation improvements and travel demand management
efforts through both DoD and non-DoD sources and offers a rationale for
assigning cost responsibility for the improvements. Chapter 5 presents
the committee’s findings and recommendations. Information about com-
mittee members is presented in the Study Committee Biographical Infor-
mation. A background paper prepared for the committee on the subject
of impact fees is contained in Appendix A.
rEFErEncEs
U.S. Department of Defense. 2008. Defense Access Road Criteria. DoD, Washing-
ton, D.C. October.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2009. Defense Community Profiles, Partnering for
Success, Installation Mission Growth, Base Realignment and Closure. Office of
Economic Adjustment, DoD, Washington, D.C.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 2003. Highway Infrastructure—Perceptions of
Stakeholders on Approaches to Reduce Highway Project Completion Time. Report
to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Environment and Public
Works, U.S. Senate. GAO-03-398. April.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. Military Base Realignments and
Closures—Transportation Impact of Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but
Long-Term Costs Are Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. Report
to Congressional Committees. GAO-09-750. GAO, Washington, D.C.
September.
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