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G
Dissenting Opinion
In multiple ways and places, Chapter 3 claims or implies that a utility-based
decision making technique that we will call DA has, after numerous failures,
largely been replaced by more modern methods. This appendix is a rebuttal. The
subject is important because DA is one of the techniques that the Marines might
better take advantage of.
In their seminal 1944 book, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
(VNM) proved that rational decision makers will make decisions as if they were
maximizing the expected value of some scalar quantity that VNM refer to as “util-
ity.” Theirs is a mathematical theorem, so the word “rational” has the meaning
implied by their assumptions. For example, VNM assume that a rational decision
maker who prefers A to B, as well as B to C, will also prefer A to C. The idea
of making decisions that maximize some scalar quantity (especially “profit”)
considerably predates VNM; their contribution is to demonstrate that doing so is
inevitable for rational decision makers. VNM do not assume that rational decision
makers necessarily approach problems mathematically. You are probably acting
rationally when you tie your shoes in the morning, even though mathematics is the
furthest thing from your mind. A determined scientist could probably demonstrate
that you are maximizing the time available for more productive pursuits (utility)
by minimizing the time spent on shoe tying.
VNM make no claim about how actual humans make decisions, but we
assert that human decisions are typically rational, and that a significant fraction
of those decisions is currently guided by calculations that amount to maximiz -
ing utility. For lack of a better term, call this formal, utility-based approach to
decision making Decision Analysis (DA). Chapter 3 uses several terms for the
idea—SEU, normative analysis, etc.—but one will do here. DA has been greatly
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115
APPENDIX G
aided by the advent of modern computers, to the extent that making decisions
that maximize utility is now widespread. The electric grid is managed this way,
inventories are maintained this way, vehicle routes are determined this way, and
people are routed around traffic jams this way. Missile defenses are planned this
way, and crisis management teams (fire departments, police stations, emergency
vehicles) are located this way. The idea pervades and improves modern life, even
when it lies in the background. Microsoft Excel™ is distributed with an engine
(Solver) the primary purpose of which is to maximize some scalar quantity. There
are several journals that are at least partially devoted to DA, one of which is the
eponymous Decision Analysis. There are large (thousands of attendees) meetings
held regularly all over the world where much of the agenda is devoted to recount -
ing the successes of DA and to enabling further application.
Now, it is true that some human decision making is not rational in the sense of
VNM. People sometimes have circularities in their preferences, especially when
the alternatives are almost equally attractive. Humans also have a limited innate
capacity for processing information, and even that capacity can be degraded by
prolonged stress of the type that Marines sometimes endure. Not all attempts to
apply DA succeed, and some should not even be attempted. All of these facts are
undisputed, and ought to be considered by anyone tempted to apply DA to prob -
lems of the type that Marine small unit leaders face. However, Chapter 3 makes far
too much of these caveats and difficulties. Occasional failures should be expected
in a technique as widely applied as DA, and lessons have been learned from them.
Rationality ought to remain the default assumption, even in the midst of battle.
There is no good reason for Marines to systematically adopt some other decision
making paradigm where the irrationality of humans is a central tenet.
The USMC regularly sends young officers to the Naval Postgraduate School
and other universities for advanced education in Operations Research. A sig-
nificant part of that education is devoted to rational decision making in varied
circumstances, including circumstances that involve a sentient enemy. The fact
that DA is alive and well is thus hardly news to the USMC. It is unfortunate that
Chapter 3 states the contrary.
Alan R. Washburn
Steven Kornguth
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