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FIGURE 5-12 Notional coverage against depressed threats (notional 4.5 km/sec interceptor at the Polish site).

terceptor into Poland in a later phase of the adaptive deployment would avoid the cost of yet another interceptor development, it would clearly exacerbate political tensions in the region: It would be able to intercept Russian ICBMs deployed in the southwesternmost Russian bases heading toward targets in the eastern United States. The added shot opportunities provided by introducing a Poland-based GMD-E interceptor are shown later in this chapter. A 4.5-km/sec interceptor cannot threaten any Russian strategic deterrent. While a 6-km/sec interceptor in Europe would provide additional shot opportunities for CONUS defense, the committee does not advocate introducing an interceptor with fly-out velocity greater than about 4.5 km/sec into Europe.

Coverage of GMD Evolution Against Threats from North Korea

In a format similar to that of the figures showing the threat from Iran, Figures 5-13, 5-14, and 5-15 compare nominal single-shot and SLS coverage for minimum energy, lofted, and depressed trajectories from North Korea for the committee’s recommended architecture. These threats are seen before burnout by the Shariki FBX, then by the SBX at Adak, Alaska, and finally, in some cases, by the GBX at Clear, Alaska.

Figure 5-12 shows the notional single-shot footprint in blue against minimum-energy threats from North Korea. In these cases, threats are first tracked by the



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