program evaluators and those weaned in the days of program-planning-budgeting.
Addressing this analytical diffuseness, this paper assesses the promises and limitations of performance measures as means of measuring economic and other returns of the Federal government’s investments in basic and applied research. Referring to promises and limitations in the same sentence implies differences in perspectives and assessments about the relevance, reliability, validity, transparency, and suitability of performance measures to guide decision making. These differences exist. A stylized dichotomization is as follows:
The tensions created by these differences are best captured by the observation of Grover Cleveland, 22d and 24th President of the United States: “It’s a condition we confront—not a theory.” The condition is the set of Congressional and Executive requirements upon Federal agencies to specify performance goals and to provide evidence, preferably in quantitative form, that advances towards these goals have been made. The set includes by now familiar legislation such as the Government Performance and Results (GPRA) Act of 1993, the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010, and requirements of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s (ARRA) that Federal agencies provide evidence that their expenditures under the Act have stimulated job creation. It also includes comparable Executive branch directives. These include the Bush II Administration’s articulation in 2002 of R and D Investment Criteria , subsequent implementation of these criteria by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) via its Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) procedures, and the Obama Administration’s 2009 OMB memorandum on Science and Technology Priorities for the FY 2011 Budget, that states that “Agencies should develop outcome-oriented goals for their science