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2
Policy Makers’ Perspectives on
Key Nonproliferation Issues Associated
with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
One of the tasks of this National Academies workshop (see Appen-
dixes A and B) was to solicit input from policy makers. Several policy
makers were invited and asked to comment on two topics: (1) the key
questions involved in U.S. nonproliferation policy; and (2) the potential
for technical assessments of fuel cycle facilities’ proliferation resistance to
inform real-world decision-making.
The workshop’s first day began with three briefings by U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) policy makers. First, in the workshop’s keynote
speech, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman provided
background and insights on the past, present, and potential future of
U.S. nonproliferation policy. Following Mr. Poneman’s briefing, Edward
McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Secretary in DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy,
and Mark Whitney, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation
and International Security in DOE’s National Nuclear Security Adminis -
tration’s (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, provided
briefings on the applicability of and potential role for technical assess -
ments of proliferation resistance as well as potential questions and goals
for the workshop.
Following these briefings, a panel discussion was convened including
panelists from three agencies responsible for formulating and executing
U.S. nonproliferation and nuclear security policy:
• Dunbar Lockwood, Team Leader for International Safeguards
Policy, NNSA Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security;
13
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14 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
• John Harvey, Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Pro-
grams at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD); and
• Richard Stratford, Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety,
and Security (NESS) in the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of State.
This panel discussion was moderated by Sharon Squassoni, director
and senior fellow in the nonproliferation program at the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies and workshop committee member.
This chapter provides summaries of the key points made by each of
these individuals and by participants in the subsequent discussion ses -
sions. These statements reflect the viewpoints of the individual speakers,
not the consensus views of the workshop participants or of the National
Academies.
IS STOPPING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION A HUMAN
PROBLEM, A TECHNICAL PROBLEM, OR SOMETHING ELSE?
Daniel Poneman
U.S. nuclear arms control policy began directly following World War
II with the Baruch Plan. Since that time, the pendulum of U.S. policy has
swung from a highly positive view of civilian nuclear energy worldwide
(in the 1970s) to a more negative view of nuclear energy, discouraging
nuclear fuel cycle facilities abroad and abandoning some projects (e.g.,
breeder and reprocessing projects) domestically due to proliferation con-
cerns. In many ways, the pendulum now appears to be swinging back
again to a greater international interest in nuclear energy.
For a generation, U.S. nuclear energy policy was a product of Presi -
dent Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace speech to the United Nations. 1
In this speech, he encouraged the peaceful uses of atomic energy—as
opposed to the military uses—and proposed the establishment of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by el -
ementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint con -
tributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable ma-
terials to an international atomic energy agency. . . . The more important
responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods
whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peace -
1 Available on the Internet at: http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html
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15
POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
ful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic
energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities.
A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the
power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing Powers would
be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the
fears of mankind. (Eisenhower, 1953)
In 1974, however, India’s test of a “peaceful nuclear explosive” chal -
lenged the previous assumption that civilian nuclear fuel cycle technology
could be safely shared. This view reflected concern that Canadian and
U.S. peaceful nuclear assistance was used in the project to facilitate India’s
development of an explosive device.
Following these tests, both the U.S. executive branch and Congress
changed their approach to nuclear nonproliferation policy. Notably, on
April 7, 1977, the Carter administration banned domestic reprocessing of
civilian used nuclear fuel and sought to persuade other nations to shortly
follow the U.S. example. While the United States abandoned the effort to
close the nuclear fuel cycle, however, other nations, such as France, Japan,
Russia, and the United Kingdom, persisted.
At the same time, the effect of the tests in India—combined with
the political impact of the 1979 partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor at
Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and the 1983 Washington Public Power
System municipal bond system failure2—resulted in a shift in the U.S.
consensus on the value of nuclear energy. This shift lasted for more than
a decade.
By the late 1990s, nuclear energy again began to rise in prominence
in the United States. This rise was due in large part to two factors: first,
recognition of the potential role of nuclear energy in addressing con-
cerns over carbon dioxide emissions and climate change; and second,
significant regulatory improvements that had taken place over the previ -
ous decade. Beginning in the mid-2000s, a relatively robust consensus
emerged that nuclear energy has a place in a low-carbon future. Nuclear
energy continues to enjoy support in the United States today.
Nuclear power is currently expanding around the world. In many
cases, nations that have not previously had nuclear power programs are
considering constructing reactors. It is important that the United States is
engaged globally in ensuring that nuclear power is expanded safely and
securely and that an increase in nuclear power worldwide does not lead
to further nuclear weapons proliferation.
2 In 1983, the Washington Public Power System declared in the late summer of 1983 that
it could not repay $2.25 billion in bonds used to finance partial construction of two now-
abandoned nuclear power plants in Washington State. More information available on the
Internet at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,955183,00.html
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16 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Nuclear security concerns have preoccupied President Obama since
before taking office. As an Illinois senator in 2006, he worked with Sena-
tor Richard Lugar on a bill seeking to secure nuclear weapons,3 and he
traveled to Russia to discuss issues of nuclear security. He believes that it
is in the interest of the United States to pursue a vision of a world free of
nuclear weapons in a vigorous manner.
The administration, however, also recognizes the importance of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy to building a low-carbon future. In order
to help countries to benefit from nuclear energy in a safe and secure
manner, President Obama recommended the establishment of a new
framework for international civilian nuclear cooperation in his April 2009
speech in Prague:
…we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, in -
cluding an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful
power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the
right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially devel-
oping countries embarking on peaceful programs.4
One proposal for such cooperation would involve seeking commer-
cial consortia offering to provide fuel cycle services to countries looking
to initiate or expand nuclear energy programs, so that there is no need for
them to develop fuel cycle services domestically.
Many, if not most, nations currently pursuing nuclear power are
genuinely seeking a source of electricity, not a back door to obtain nuclear
weapons. But in order to succeed, the reliability of any offer must be
established to the satisfaction of the reactor operators and their host gov-
ernments. If these nations received an assurance that fresh fuel would be
reliably provided and used fuel reliably managed, reasons for pursuing
fuel cycle facilities—with their concomitant proliferation risks—would be
reduced. This arrangement would allow countries to freely pursue peace-
ful nuclear aspiration without increasing proliferation risks.
One possibility is some form of layered guarantees for fuel assurance.
Commercial entities could provide assurances for execution of contracted
fuel services, which then could be reinforced by national governmen-
tal, and finally multilateral, guarantees. In addition to safeguarding any
facilities involved in the fuel assurances, the IAEA could support this
framework both by hosting fuel banks and other potential fuel assurance
mechanisms and by determining when a member state had violated its
nonproliferation commitments. Of course, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation
3 Available on the Internet at: thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.02566:
4 Available on the Internet at: www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-President-in-Prague
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17
POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
Treaty violator would not be entitled to continue to enjoy the benefits of
the contracted fuel assurances.
In July 2011, DOE held a workshop to consider future directions in
nuclear separations technology.5 This workshop brought together indi-
viduals working in NNSA, the Office of Applied Science, the Office of
Nuclear Energy (NE), and the Office of Science to discuss fuel assurance,
and other approaches for controlling proliferation, particularly modified
fuel cycles and the use of small modular reactors (SMR). Several points
are clear following this workshop: first, none of the participants thought
they knew the answer to preventing proliferation; second, analytical rigor
is important in considering how to prevent proliferation; and third, this
analytic rigor will need to be integrated with the many governmental and
political issues involved in preventing proliferation.
Summary of Question and Answer Session
Working with international partners. Workshop chair C. Paul
Robinson (Director Emeritus of Sandia National Laboratories), asked
Deputy Secretary Poneman to elaborate on the melding of technical solu -
tions to proliferation with political solutions. In response, Deputy Secre -
tary Poneman noted that the budget environment has changed over the
last year, and that less funding is projected to be available at DOE than
in previous years. The effects of reduced funding will need to be consid-
ered in any effort. However, DOE’s nuclear complex has a great deal of
scientific expertise, and effective international partnerships can optimize
the usefulness of this expertise. For example, continuing close interactions
with nations such as France, with its many experts in fuel cycle technolo-
gies, and Russia, with its current work on a test bed for advanced fuel
cycle technologies, are likely to be fruitful. Of course, this kind of collabo -
ration will be easier with countries for which the United States already
has 123 Agreements6 in place, but in other cases, other agreements may
be in place to allow for a convening purpose.
Business opportunities and the back end of the fuel cycle. Workshop
committee member Sharon Squassoni (Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Security) observed that fuel assurances might be easier to manage
on the front end of the fuel cycle than on the back end of the fuel cycle,
5 The workshop agenda can be accessed on the Internet at: http://events.energetics.com/
NuclearSeparationsTechnologyWorkshop/agenda.html
6 “123 Agreements” refer to Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
which establish an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between
the United States and any other nation.
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18 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
particularly given the recent fate of the proposed spent fuel repository at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada. She then asked Deputy Secretary Poneman
to comment on the recent findings on this topic contained in the interim
report of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future (BRC, 2011).
Deputy Secretary Poneman agreed that it is likely to be easier to
cooperate internationally on the front end of the fuel cycle. However,
there are also potential opportunities to be considered on the back end.
For example, he suggested that an entity able to effectively close the back
end of the fuel cycle would have the ability to provide a full package of
fuel cycle services to nations that want to start a nuclear energy program.
However, as noted previously, a reactor operator will need to have
sufficient confidence that the entity managing such fuel cycle services will
continue to function, and that used fuel will not return to the operator
either physically, legally, or financially. This may require governments to
make a backstopping statement that they have some residual responsibil-
ity for the fuel.
Finally, the BRC’s recent findings may provide a useful basis for
people in the business community, non-governmental organizations, and
Congress to tackle this national challenge.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S OFFICE OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY’S PERSPECTIVE ON PROLIFERATION
RISK AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Edward McGinnis
There is a grand challenge facing the world right now: Ensuring that
a global expansion of nuclear power does not increase the proliferation
risk associated with nuclear weapons technology. An expansion of nuclear
power could carry both benefits and risks. Although some fuel cycle
facilities associated with nuclear power have the potential to be misused
for non-peaceful purposes, nuclear power can also provide a low-carbon
energy source as well as significant economic benefit, including jobs.
Because of this dual nature of nuclear power, effective nuclear security is
important, as is effective nuclear safety.
To maximize the contribution of nuclear power to the world’s future
energy mix, it will be important to use and expand nuclear technology
in the safest and most secure way possible. However, proven and well-
known designs are sometimes preferred by new entrant countries over
next generation designs that may offer enhanced safety and perhaps
security features. This is because the technical, cost, and schedule risks
are perceived to be reduced when a proven nuclear power plant design
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19
POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
is deployed. Therefore, the nuclear authorities in an emerging market
country may simply believe they cannot afford the risks associated with
building a first-of-a-kind plant.
However, another risk associated with successfully deploying a
nuclear plant in many nations relates to limited national electric grids.
As a general technical rule, any single power source should not exceed
approximately 10 percent of the national electric grid. Thus, a country
seeking to deploy a 1,000 megawatt (MW) reactor should have a grid sup-
porting at minimum 10 gigawatts (GW) of electric generation. However,
a number of emerging market countries have smaller grids. A proven
small modular reactor design could serve an important role in meeting
electricity needs in these countries, because the vast majority of proven
and commonly-deployed nuclear power plant designs are 1,000 MW
plants or larger. The potential cost, safety, and proliferation resistance
improvements that SMRs could offer could be beneficial in an expanding
global market.
The present workshop was convened to consider options for assess -
ing and minimizing the risks of nuclear proliferation associated with the
nuclear fuel cycle. Along with other organizations, DOE-NE is grappling
with these issues. DOE-NE is particularly interested in innovative ideas
related to implementing effective risk assessment and risk management
approaches in a world where access to nuclear energy is expanding.
Understanding and minimizing the risk of proliferation is an integral part
of DOE-NE’s research and development (R&D) roadmap (DOE, 2010).
DOE-NE’s R&D roadmap focuses on four key research objectives
aimed at the safe and secure use of nuclear energy, including minimizing
proliferation: (1) innovative technologies and intrinsic design features;
(2) next-generation materials protection and accounting control systems;
(3) international frameworks and institutions; and (4) proliferation risk
assessment and risk management. Although all of these areas are inter-
related, the focus of this briefing is on the fourth topic.
Risk assessment as a discipline is not new; however, applications to
proliferation resistance of fuel cycle facilities remain immature. Probabi-
listic risk assessment (PRA) has been used in the context of nuclear safety
for decades, beginning with the seminal 1975 WASH-1400 reactor safety
study (USNRC, 1975). However, WASH-1400 did not address prolifera-
tion or terrorism. While substantial work has been done since WASH-1400
to advance the state-of-the art for applications of PRA to proliferation and
terrorism, significant difficulties remain, and further research remains
to be done. These difficulties include understanding and analyzing an
intelligent, adaptive, and determined adversary using a structured meth -
odology such as PRA, as noted in two recent National Research Council
reports (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2011).
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20 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Experts are still debating how best to analyze and understand the
proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles, including the
appropriate role of quantification. The appropriate balance of quantita-
tive and qualitative assessments will need to be well-understood to avoid
misunderstanding and misinterpretation. There is an important role for
the quantification of certain aspects of risk, but quantification must be
performed in combination with other qualitative and related factors and
not used as the only approach.
There are both strengths and limitations associated with using the
output of proliferation risk (or resistance) assessments to inform policy
decisions, whether using PRA or another method. At its best, such an
assessment has the potential to:
• Encourage a disciplined approach and a clear display of impor-
tant information, including uncertainties;
• Present information in an understandable form so that interested
people can scrutinize and challenge the data and assumptions;
• Provide qualitative insights about the structure and performance
of complex systems;
• Enable a deeper understanding of dependencies and interactions
among different subsystems and components of the fuel cycle
system; and
• Give fresh, comparative perspectives on the relative advantages
and disadvantages of various opportunities to reduce and control
risks.
On the other hand, such assessments have limitations, including:
• The involvement of complex phenomena, including an intelli-
gent, adaptive, and determined adversary;
• Sparse data;
• Limited models;
• Large uncertainties;
• Challenges associated with effective risk communication; and
• Dangers associated with misinterpretation or misuse of results.
DOE-NE is considering many potential future research directions for
proliferation risk assessment, such as:
• Leveraging university-based innovative research in the field of
risk assessment, through Nuclear Energy University Programs
(NEUP);
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21
POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
• Utilizing cross-disciplinary teams (e.g., political scientists, social
scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and communications spe -
cialists in laboratories, industry, and academia);
• Focusing on a cross-section of key topics and approaches;
• Establishing standardized “benchmark problems” for consistent
comparisons of different methods;
• Performing prototypic evaluation studies of proliferation risks,
focusing on a range of nuclear energy systems of interest to DOE;
and
• Providing guidance on metrics that can be used by systems ana-
lysts to evaluate a multitude of fuel cycle options (along with other
parameters such as economics, safety, and waste management).
High-quality proliferation risk information is important to DOE-NE’s
mission, whether it is quantitative, qualitative, or a mix of both. In per-
forming analyses relevant to proliferation risk, it is important to distin -
guish clearly between risk assessment, which seeks to understand and
identify the risks, and risk management, which seeks to minimize risks sub-
ject to a range of factors, and is typically the domain of policy decisions.
Quantitative measures have the potential to be valuable in risk assess-
ment but must be used judiciously in risk management. Finally, strong
coordination and dialogue among stakeholders will prove to be vital,
whatever methods are used for risk assessment and risk management.
Summary of Question and Answer Session
Management vs. reduction of proliferation risk. Workshop com-
mittee member William Charlton (Texas A&M University) noted that if
nuclear power increases worldwide, it is possible that proliferation risk
would increase. He asked Mr. McGinnis for his opinion regarding (1)
whether it is possible to increase nuclear power worldwide while decreas-
ing proliferation risk; and (2) if proliferation risk is likely to increase,
then whether nuclear energy’s other benefits (e.g., climate change and
economic benefits) are significant enough to justify managing these risks.
In response, Mr. McGinnis stated that he thinks it is possible that inno -
vative concepts and ideas might reduce the incentive to proliferate. For
example, if used fuel removal becomes commercially available, many
nations would likely avail themselves of this service, particularly those
with only a few reactors. They would be likely to see a used fuel-removal
service as a far superior economic and business opportunity compared
with building their own long-term storage and repository sites, particu -
larly given politically burdensome siting and public acceptance processes.
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22 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
As Deputy Secretary Poneman also observed, this could reduce the incen-
tive to construct domestic fuel cycle facilities.
The potential role of government in fuel management services.
William Charlton also asked Mr. McGinnis for a summary of DOE-NE’s
position on whether a government entity might provide a fuel manage-
ment service, as the amount of risk involved is substantial for a commer-
cial entity. In response, Mr. McGinnis stated that there is no assumption
that such an entity should be entirely government operated or entirely
commercially operated; however, he stated that some roles by government
are necessary and inevitable, whether it involves third-country transfer
approvals for nuclear materials or regulatory oversight. He further noted
that in 20 years, he had never seen a better opportunity for alignment
between commercial success involving commercial used fuel removal
and long-term disposal and nonproliferation success related to support -
ing expanded access while minimizing proliferation risks. However, how
such a fuel management service might work will need to be developed on
a case-by-case basis for specific customer needs and supplier capabilities,
so it is hard to predict what the specific details of the final arrangement
might be.
U.S. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY’S PERSPECTIVE ON PROLIFERATION
RISK AND NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Mark Whitney
DOE-NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security
(NIS) focuses primarily on host state proliferation, as does the current
National Academies’ project and workshop. This is important because
there are significant differences between the risk—and risk mitigation
measures—associated with assessing and managing host state prolifera-
tion compared to a sub-national threat. Host states are typically capable
of a larger and more sustained technical proliferation effort than sub-
national groups (such as terrorists). Moreover, the ultimate proliferation
goals of host states and sub-national groups are often very different.
The most obvious example of a host-state proliferation concern is the
diversion of nuclear materials. However, NNSA’s concerns are broader
than this; they are also concerned with the use of a particular nuclear fuel
cycle technology in the context of a breakout scenario. Examples include
misusing declared facilities and using existing or newly developed techni-
cal capabilities to support clandestine facilities.
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POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
The decision to proliferate requires both technical skill and political
will. For this reason, managing proliferation requires both technical and
political understanding. More often than not, decisions about whether or
not to proliferate are based on specific and often dynamic political situa-
tions. While there is value in examining nuclear fuel cycle technologies for
characteristics that could make proliferation more difficult for a host state,
work to date has shown that there is no technology that can completely
eliminate the risk of proliferation by host states, although many tech -
nologies may have a significant impact against sub-national threats. As a
result, nuclear supplier guidelines and other institutional arrangements
are the pillars of the current nonproliferation regime and will continue to
be for the foreseeable future.
Several methodological questions were proposed as important con -
siderations for discussing proliferation resistance and risk, both for the
current workshop and for the follow-on consensus study. These questions
include the following:
• Is it possible to evaluate proliferation risk effectively, and is it
valuable to do so?
• Does the value of performing such an assessment outweigh the
risks of performing it, particularly for a quantitative assessment?
• If there is no silver bullet to eliminate proliferation concerns from
nuclear facilities, how can technology best be used to minimize
proliferation concerns?
• If the time frames of concern for proliferation are measured
in decades, what is the present-day utility of probabilistic risk
assessment?
• Is it possible to determine the risk of proliferation based on tech-
nological considerations alone, and, if so, how can the conclusion
be trusted when so many of the key factors involved in prolifera-
tion are non-technical in nature?
• How do we best understand the national and regional dynamics
that might affect the misuse of technology?
• Can analytical results be produced that are actionable?
These questions relate to many currently pressing issues for NNSA.
NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to
develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure
necessary to sustain the international safeguards system over the coming
decades. NGSI is a very complicated undertaking, and NNSA hopes that
the workshop and the follow-on National Academies study will articulate
a serious set of questions for NNSA to consider in this project. Such a list
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28 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
• What is “acceptable” risk? How is it defined? By whom? How is
it expressed?
• If technology is not considered to be the primary driver of prolif-
eration risks, how far can you go in making technology choices
based on risk studies?
A U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Perspective on the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Related Proliferation Risks
John Harvey
As noted in several of the previous discussions, the goal of strengthen-
ing nonproliferation is at the top of the President’s agenda, as is prevent -
ing terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Through
the efforts of the U.S. government, warheads have been dismantled in the
United States and in Russia, fissile material has been secured around the
world, and nuclear security has been bolstered. In addition, peaceful uses
of nuclear energy have been supported and have increased.
Limiting proliferation and preventing WMD terrorism are complex
problems, and multiple U.S. government agencies are involved in efforts
to address them. DOE leads U.S. government efforts to reduce the prolif -
eration risk associated with nuclear facilities, but the contributions from
DoD, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others are essential.
The DoD is not as deeply involved in nonproliferation policy as DOE
or the State Department. DoD’s work in nuclear security focuses more
on weapons of mass destruction and threat reduction, particularly the
retrieval of special nuclear material that is no longer under (national or
international) regulatory or military control. DoD is primarily involved
in situations that would occur after safeguards have failed and with situ-
ations that involve protecting U.S. military interests. However, DoD does
have several interests related to safeguards, proliferation, and civilian
nuclear energy.
First, IAEA safeguards and inspections have implications for DoD.8
The IAEA Additional Protocol9 allows access by inspection to all aspects
of the fuel cycle: mining, fuel fabrication, waste storage, and other
8 Although participation in IAEA safeguards are voluntary for the United States, it
participates to bolster the IAEA’s goal of preventing proliferation in non-weapons states.
9 The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection
authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable
the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared
activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information
and sites. (http://www.iaea.org)
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29
POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
facilities where nuclear material is present. It is essential to balance the
transparency required by IAEA safeguards with the costs of real secu-
rity challenges: Specifically, to ensure sufficient transparency and access
to sensitive facilities while (1) protecting against loss of economic and
proprietary information that could undermine U.S. competitiveness; (2)
protecting sensitive information; and (3) controlling the overall costs of
transparency and access.
Although DoD recognizes that safeguards are important, it is impor-
tant to understand how safeguards impact DoD equities. The U.S. national
security exclusion to the Additional Protocol (Article 1b) states:
The United States shall apply, and permit the [International Atomic
Energy] Agency to apply, this Protocol, excluding only instances where
its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with
direct national security significance to the United States or to locations
or information associated with such activities.
Thus, the IAEA is not permitted to hold safeguards inspections at DoD
facilities. However, there are other facilities that may also need protection,
and it is important to vet the list of facilities subject to IAEA inspection
prior to the annual submission of this list to Congress.10 This is in part
because other, non-nuclear technology or information may be sampled
when an inspection team is present in a sensitive facility, which could be
of concern.
Second, recently DoD has been interested in understanding the fea-
sibility of using nuclear power at U.S. military installations. Small reac -
tors could easily support a brigade and would need refueling yearly or
even less often, which could provide numerous benefits. For example,
using small reactors in remote and hostile locations could reduce secu-
rity requirements by limiting supply runs and the need to divert forces
to guard fossil fuel convoys. Building nuclear power plants at military
installations also has the potential to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Previous government experience
and knowledge of next generation nuclear plant designs will be helpful in
developing a nuclear plant that could meet these needs and, in particular,
could enable the development of a compact and safe design with good
security and reliability characteristics.
10 This list is required to be submitted to Congress under 22 USC Sec 8172, which states
that: Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any revisions to the United States
declaration submitted under the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress
a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the President
intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a report thereon. (See Additional
Protocol Implementation: http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/22C88.txt)
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30 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Proliferation risk analysis will play an important role in bringing
these power plants overseas—for example, nuclear power plants installed
in hostile areas will require the best in safeguards, security, and prolifera -
tion resistance. Instead of trying to retrofit the plants, these safeguards
and security elements can be incorporated during the design phase. In
addition, it is possible that better understanding of proliferation risk can
help to better address the unique challenges associated with placing small
reactors in a military situation prior to fielding.
In the future, the United States will need an unencumbered source of
low-enriched uranium to use in the Tennessee Valley Authority’s nuclear
reactors to make tritium for nuclear warheads.11 In addition, although
it is not immediate, the United States will eventually run out of highly
enriched uranium (HEU). At this time, the United States will need to
have modern domestic enrichment processes ready for use to fuel naval
reactors.
As a final comment on the overall topics of the workshop, quantitative
risk assessment has barriers to overcome before it can be constructively
applied to physical security and terrorism, as noted by two recent NRC
reports (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2011). It is likely that many of the same short-
comings—including an intelligent adversary and human unpredictability
in protecting facilities—will also apply to the application of quantitative
risk assessment to proliferation problems. However, the critiques are typi -
cally not whether to use risk assessment, but how best to use the results
of risk assessment as part of the policy process. A comparative study of
different options might be the best use of quantitative risk assessment in
proliferation and security.
Insights from the U.S. Department of State
Richard Stratford
For the State Department, the technical aspects of proliferation resis -
tance are not the key issue, but rather, the bottom line involves questions
of international politics. The State Department—and the Office of Nuclear
Energy, Safety, and Security in the Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation in particular—works to determine how to keep pro -
liferation risk as low as possible while still doing what is necessary to
sustain the nuclear fuel cycle.
The essential message of U.S. nonproliferation policy is that it is
important to prevent the unnecessary spread of sensitive nuclear tech-
nologies. This does not mean that sensitive technologies should not be
11 Because tritium has a half-life of 12 years, new supplies must be continuously generated.
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POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
used—many would argue that some use of sensitive nuclear technologies
by those who have a need for them is acceptable. For example, enrichment
has a use unless all nations choose to use CANDU reactors in the future.
In this briefing, a sequence of examples are provided, both outlining the
history of U.S. nonproliferation policy related to the nuclear fuel cycle
and illustrating the types of day-to-day issues that policy makers face in
this area.
The history of U.S. nonproliferation policy associated with the nuclear
fuel cycle has not been straightforward. Some believe that the history of
U.S. nonproliferation policy began with President Carter’s decision to
place a moratorium on reprocessing in the United States. However, prior
to Carter’s decision, President Ford stated that the United States would
need to decide whether it was going to reprocess used fuel. Carter stated
that replacements for reprocessing would need to be found.
At the time, a reprocessing facility was under construction in Barn-
well, South Carolina, that was about to be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC). The USNRC was told that the presi-
dential policy was to avoid reprocessing, so the licensing process was
stopped. Subsequently, the USNRC was sued for this decision, but the
courts upheld the USNRC decision not to take the application.
The Carter administration, along with its position toward domestic
reprocessing, began to impose roadblocks related to Japanese and Euro-
pean fuel cycle facilities. Upon taking office, the Reagan administration
devised an alternative solution to preserve the United States’ Japanese
and European relations on this topic. At the time, Congress was insisting
that the administration renegotiate all its international agreements related
to peaceful nuclear cooperation to include a long list of requirements. The
Reagan administration worked out new agreements for these countries,
including all the Congressional controls and giving the U.S. consent rights
over reprocessing of U.S. origin fuel. In return, the United States agreed
to give consent to nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium storage for
the life of the agreements. For new facilities that could not be foreseen at
the time, an automatic process was agreed on. In addition, these agree-
ments were written in a way that assured foreign governments that the
agreement could not shift completely when U.S. policy changed. This way
of handling the difficult diplomatic issue worked both for Japan and for
Europe.
More recently, President George W. Bush recommended that the
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) ban the transfer of reprocessing and
enrichment technologies to all countries without currently operating facil-
ities. However, the NSG was unwilling to accommodate such a ban. As
a result, a criteria-based approach was developed. For export of nuclear
fuel cycle technology to a country, a number of criteria regarding safety
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32 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
and security had to be met. Beyond this, three additional criteria apply:
(1) the supplier can consider other criteria beyond those specified; (2) the
supplier must reacquire an IAEA Additional Protocol complementing the
safeguards agreements;12 and (3) for enrichment, the technology must
operate as a “black box.”
The next big issue to emerge was the Indian nuclear cooperation
agreement. India has three reprocessing facilities and wanted consent
from the United States regarding these facilities. The Bush Administration
agreed to give consent with two conditions:
1. India was asked to build an all-new state-of-the-art reprocessing
facility permanently dedicated to safeguarded reprocessing; and
2. India was not to reprocess until a second agreement was put in
place setting out terms and procedures relevant to reprocessing.
The negotiations with India began not long after conclusion of the agree -
ment, and the final draft was sent to Congress as a subsequent agreement.
However, it was challenging to determine how to set terms and conditions
for the agreement.
NESS solved this difficulty by asking DOE and the U.S. National
Laboratories to provide a page-long document describing state-of-the-art
safeguards. This description was crafted into an agreement for India.
These negotiations not only involved technical expertise, but also
common sense. For example, India asked for consent on two reprocessing
facilities, rather than the one that was in the original agreement. The State
Department recommended this request be accommodated, because the
first facility was located far north on the subcontinent, while the second
facility was located in the south. Having two facilities would prevent
India from needing to move used fuel across the entire subcontinent,
reducing the possibility that a shipment of fresh or used fuel would be
diverted.
Once the India negotiations were complete, the next challenge was
negotiation of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). The Obama Administration determined that, in order
to approve a nuclear cooperation agreement with the UAE, there would
need to be a legally binding commitment to not have enrichment or
reprocessing plants on UAE soil even if the plant in question did not use
12 An Additional Protocol is “a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards
agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in a State” (IAEA, 2011). See http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html
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POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
technology exported from the United States, and thus was not subject to
U.S. consent. The UAE voiced concerns about their options for managing
spent fuel in that situation. The United States responded that the spent
fuel could be sent to the U.K. or to France for reprocessing; however,
no MOX fuel or plutonium would be returned to the UAE. The UAE
accepted this agreement.
However, following the UAE agreement, some in Congress decided
that this same solution should be applied to any new nation that negoti -
ates a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. However,
each agreement needs to be managed on a case-by-case basis, and a
blanket requirement could create difficulties in successful negotiations. It
should be recognized that other suppliers of nuclear technologies will not
make the same concessions, and it is certain that if the United States is not
willing to engage with a particular nation, others will be.
Currently, several new technologies are posing challenges, particu-
larly pyroprocessing and uranium enrichment using lasers to separate
the isotopes (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation, also known as
SILEX). Initially, pyroprocessing was thought to provide good opportuni-
ties for reprocessing without easy access to weapons-usable material, but
that no longer appears to be the case. SILEX appears to have the capacity
to make enriching uranium much cheaper, which could be good for the
U.S. economy, but it may also pose proliferation risks. There are a number
of potentially dangerous technologies, both nuclear and non-nuclear (e.g.,
nanotech, biotech). However, the solution for non-nuclear technologies is
not typically to stop using the technology; this is not a reasonable solution
for nuclear technology, either.
Summary of Question and Answer Session
The briefings from the policy panelists were followed by a lively
Q&A session. In the section to follow, some key comments, questions,
and responses that were brought up during this session are summarized.
Policy questions for DOE-NE. Warren (Pete) Miller (Texas A&M
University) noted that DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy is the lead pro -
gram on the back end of the fuel cycle and is charged with developing
the right back-end technology for the United States to deploy domesti -
cally. The attributes that will be used to make these decisions include:
uranium availability, cost, technical maturity, physical security impacts,
environmental impacts, repository availability, and also, proliferation risk
impacts. He stated that it is important to be cautious regarding the pro-
liferation risk impacts of domestically-deployed technologies for two key
reasons. First, if such a technology is deployed, this could have an impact
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34 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
as to whether other nations choose to deploy it. Second, whoever deploys
the technology is likely to want to export it commercially. These factors
are both a part of DOE-NE’s R&D decision-making. It would be useful if
the overall National Academies project on proliferation risk (not simply
the workshop) is able to help DOE-NE to determine how to use prolifera -
tion risk to inform its decisions on technology choices. There is significant
disagreement about the proliferation resistance of different technologies,
and some additional clarity would be valuable.
The essential role of safeguards. Corey Hinderstein (Nuclear Threat
Initiative) noted that there was a great deal of conversation about safe-
guards in the preceding briefings. However, safeguards do not prevent
proliferation, with the potential exception of deterrence, but instead allow
the international community to know about proliferation activities. Both
Mr. Lockwood and Dr. Harvey agreed with the observation. Mr. Lockwood
noted that the stated objective of safeguards was not to prevent prolifera-
tion, but rather to “detect” diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear
material in a timely manner and to deter such diversion by increasing the
risk of early detection. Both Mr. Lockwood and Dr. Harvey underlined
the importance of safeguards as one part of a greater strategy to intercept
and prevent the diversion of nuclear materials. Mr. Lockwood empha -
sized the importance of considering the safeguardability of new designs
to complicate a proliferator’s task, promote early detection, and provide
time for other measures to intervene. Similarly, Dr. Harvey emphasized
the importance of safeguards as an early-warning system: “If something
bad is about to happen, we need to know… if safeguards tell you you’ve
lost ten kilograms of HEU weeks later, that is much less manageable than
days or hours later.”
The value of standardization. Jon Phillips (Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory) observed that much of the discussion during the
panel was about quantification, but that in his view, it would be more
valuable to—in whatever way necessary—standardize the approach to
assessing proliferation risk among different agencies and among different
problems. It would be useful to agree upon certain factors as requirements
for the assessment, and agree on a scope (e.g., a state-specific analysis is
required). Mr. Lockwood replied that although at first this seems reason-
able, in his view, standardization is in fact very difficult to handle in prac -
tice. The world situation is dynamic, a lot of different and often unique
factors need to be taken into account, and state behavior can often change
dramatically in a short period of time.
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POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
U.S. leadership in the fuel cycle. Steven Skutnik (North Carolina
State University) asked how the United States would be able to take on
a leadership role in integrated fuel cycle services in the absence of a U.S.
plan for the back end of its fuel cycle. In response, Mr. Stratford com -
mented that spent fuel management is difficult due to politics. There are
some areas in which the United States cannot lead, and others where it
may. An example of the latter is future fuel cycles involving reprocessing;
however, without a clear end state for the nuclear waste, reprocessing
could also eventually encounter difficulties. Mr. Lockwood added that
in the coming decades, we may find some transformational science and
technology that will solve the problem, but the back end of the fuel cycle
is a very vexing challenge right now.
Plutonium and current reactors. Emory Collins (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory) asked why the United States and the international commu -
nity are not concerned with the production of plutonium in their efforts
to safeguard nuclear technology, in a situation where nuclear reactors
themselves—not just the fuel cycle facilities—are producing plutonium
all around the world. Mr. Stratford responded that this is a very differ-
ent problem, and that to his knowledge, no plutonium from commercial
light water reactors has ever gone into explosive use. Nations that have
pursued weapons programs have done so with indigenous or illegally
acquired materials. In addition, beyond concerns about nonproliferation,
there are other concerns that must be balanced. For example, it must be
considered whether it would be better to have a nation with significant
energy needs—such as India or China—build 50 new nuclear plants, or
instead, 50 new coal plants with their attendant greenhouse gases.
Innovative approaches for proliferation risk assessment. Mark
Mullen (Los Alamos National Laboratory), referring to Dr. Harvey’s
briefing, commented that the Department of Defense performs extensive
assessments as part of its planning and evaluation processes. Because
of the nature of DoD’s mission, these assessments must take account of
the challenge of understanding and analyzing intelligent, adaptive, and
determined adversaries. Since that type of adversary must also be ana -
lyzed in proliferation risk assessments, Mr. Mullen asked Dr. Harvey if
there are novel or innovative methods that the DoD uses that might be
transferred or adapted to proliferation risk assessments.
Dr. Harvey noted that a recent National Academies report address-
ing security in the DOE nuclear weapons complex (NRC, 2011) included
extensive discussion of the challenges posed by intelligent, adaptive,
and determined adversaries, and he suggested that some of the methods
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36 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
described in that report, such as red team/blue team analysis,13 might be
applicable to proliferation risk assessments. Dr. Harvey responded that he
is uncertain if such approaches are currently in use, but that the dynamic
part of the risk assessment process is important. When proliferation risk
or resistance is discussed, one must consider the likelihood that a terrorist
team or a host state actor might go down a particular proliferation route
as opposed to other routes. The value of quantitative analysis is that it is
structured, and the assumptions can be transparent. If this type of analysis
is combined with a red team analysis, this could be very helpful.
Mr. Mullen agreed that red team/blue team analysis is indeed a good
approach. He said he was familiar with DoD applications where it had
been used to good effect, and he suggested that it be applied more widely
in proliferation risk assessments, as one part of a more comprehensive,
multifaceted analysis.
13 A red team activity involves an unannounced assessment of security and readiness by
an unfamiliar team of operators with no awareness or support from the assessed target. The
goal of a red team is to try to think like the adversary and use information, incentives, and
capabilities that he or she would have to the maximum extent possible.
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POLICY MAKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON KEY NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES
Box
The Genie is out of the Bottle: Low-
Cost Centrifuge Enrichment
Olli Heinonen, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
For nuclear weapons proliferation, a mastery of technology beyond that re-
quired to build nuclear power plants is necessary. This can take the form of either
back-end fuel cycle technology (reprocessing) or front-end fuel cycle technology
(enrichment). However, this discussion will focus on the front end of the nuclear
fuel cycle, more specifically, on low-cost uranium centrifuge enrichment.
There are four questions to be asked with respect to the proliferation threat from
low-cost centrifuge enrichment:
• What information is out there?
• Who has the information?
• What can someone do with it?
• What can be done about this?
First, it is known that a complete set of information on type P-1 and P-21 cen-
trifuges is available on the black market, as well as information on at least three
nuclear weapon designs and the conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas
(UF6, the typical output of centrifuge enrichment) to metal components, all thanks
to A.Q. Khan. Other players connected to the A.Q. Khan network have made avail-
able additional centrifuge designs from the 1980s using composite rotor materials
and magnetic bearings as well as information on UF6 production processes, feed,
and withdrawal systems. Second, it is known that Libya, Iran, and North Korea
have received some part of this information, and that the information was offered
to Iraq, Syria, and potentially others.
With this information, it is possible for a state to build centrifuges, enrich UF6
gas to HEU, convert the UF6 to uranium metal, and ultimately, construct a nuclear
weapon. A scenario for producing HEU using this technology is as follows. A
state might use as the original feed 2,400 kg of UF6 gas enriched to 4 percent
uranium-235, a typical enrichment for nuclear power plant fuel. Then it would be
possible to proceed stepwise using the centrifuge designs supplied by A.Q. Khan,
enriching from 4 percent to 20 percent, then 20 percent to 60 percent, then 60
percent to 90 percent, until weapons-grade HEU is produced. The UF6 could then
be converted to metal using the information from A.Q. Khan.
1 Pakistan developed the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs based on the Soviet Zippe-type
design.
2 The IR-2M is an Iranian centrifuge design that was reportedly installed at Iran’s Natanz
enrichment facility in July 2011. See http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-reportedly-
installing-advanced-centrifuges/.
continued
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38 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
Box Continued
This entire process could take under a year. Using 2095 type IR-2m centri-
fuges,2 step 1 (4 to 20 percent enrichment) would require 10 cascades of 131
centrifuges each and approximately 2 months. Step 2 (20 to 60 percent enrich-
ment) would require 3 cascades of 179 centrifuges each and about 0.9 months.
Step 3 (60 to 90 percent enrichment) would require 2 cascades of 124 centrifuges
and only 0.4 months. Preparing the metal components would only require one ad-
ditional month. In total, the time from completion of the centrifuges to availability of
uranium metal components would be about 4.3 months for the first batch. A second
batch could be produced 2 months following the first batch, and a third batch 2
months following the second batch, culminating in the production of 69.5 kgs of 90
percent enriched uranium metal components in only 9 months total.
The final question, then, is what can be done about this situation? Detecting
such a program requires an all-source information analysis coupled with substan-
tial international cooperation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will
need to use all of its authorities to meet its objectives and maintain a highly robust
verification scheme. The international community will need to use all means to
enforce the IAEA and United Nations Security Council efforts. Finally, it is possible
that embarking on nuclear cooperation could change the narrative of future nuclear
discourse.
