4

Summary Discussions

The workshop’s discussions were summarized in three ways. First, the workshop participants were divided into three breakout groups of about 20-25 participants each to discuss the workshop briefings; the highlights of the breakout sessions were reviewed in front of the full workshop. Second, following the breakout session discussions, a panel of experts was convened and charged with summing up the workshop’s major messages. Finally, the floor was opened for free discussion by the participants.

In this chapter, the major issues presented from the breakout group discussions, each of the panelists’ briefings, and the key points made during the free discussion period following the panel briefings are summarized. These statements in this chapter reflect the viewpoints of the individual speakers, not the consensus views of the workshop participants or of the National Academies.

BREAKOUT GROUP SESSIONS SUMMARY

As noted above, during the workshop, the participants were divided into three breakout groups. Each of these breakout groups was charged with:

•   Identifying the key nonproliferation policy questions that are important to decision makers, drawing on the briefings and discussions;



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4 Summary Discussions The workshop’s discussions were summarized in three ways. First, the workshop participants were divided into three breakout groups of about 20-25 participants each to discuss the workshop briefings; the highlights of the breakout sessions were reviewed in front of the full workshop. Second, following the breakout session discussions, a panel of experts was convened and charged with summing up the workshop’s major messages. Finally, the floor was opened for free discussion by the participants. In this chapter, the major issues presented from the breakout group discussions, each of the panelists’ briefings, and the key points made during the free discussion period following the panel briefings are sum - marized. These statements in this chapter reflect the viewpoints of the individual speakers, not the consensus views of the workshop partici - pants or of the National Academies. BREAKOUT GROUP SESSIONS SUMMARY As noted above, during the workshop, the participants were divided into three breakout groups. Each of these breakout groups was charged with: • Identifying the key nonproliferation policy questions that are important to decision makers, drawing on the briefings and discussions; 59

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60 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES • Discussing the overlap between these questions and the issues that proliferation resistance and risk assessment methods can address; and • Discussing ways to increase this overlap. Following the breakout group discussions, the workshop participants reconvened to review and discuss the major issues brought up during the breakout group sessions. The breakout group chairs, workshop committee members Sharon Squassoni (Center for Strategic and International Secu - rity), William Charlton (Texas A&M University), and Charles Forsberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) gave short presentations sum - marizing the key points made during each of the breakout sessions. These presentations and discussions are summarized in this section. Minimizing the proliferation risk associated with maintaining nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world involves using both technical and nontechnical approaches. Due to this technical/non-technical dichotomy, two cultures have developed in the nonproliferation community: • A highly technical culture, focused on maximizing proliferation resistance by considering the design and operation of facilities; and • A non-technical public policy/political science culture, focused on discouraging and slowing proliferation attempts using domes- tic and international policy measures. While policy makers—such as those at NNSA or the State Depart- ment—do not typically use highly technical quantitative analyses to inform their policymaking decisions, such input would be possible and would not be unique. In other endeavors, such as Treasury Department activities, technical analysis is used to help formulate and drive policy. However, multiple workshop participants, particularly those working in policy, stated that such analyses would be more useful if the technical ana- lysts working on nonproliferation problem were aware of and considering the types of questions that are important to policy makers. Participants in one breakout group suggested that helpful questions for the technical community to consider would include: (1) who the policy makers are; (2) what questions they are asking; (3) which of those questions are amenable to technical analysis; and (4) how policy makers are putting technical information to use. A good assessment also needs to account for a broad range of ways in which information could be acquired. It was noted several times in the course of the discussions that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are currently lagging behind many other commercial technologies. This means that

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61 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS commercial technologies developed for other purposes have the potential to influence proliferation risk associated with fuel cycle facilities. One example cited by participants is carbon fiber technology for airplanes and sporting goods. The widespread knowledge of carbon fiber design and fabrication technology could enable nations to build centrifuges with reasonable output that may be simpler to design and debug than the technologies already made available by A.Q. Khan. A second example mentioned is laser technology, where advances in lasers could make laser enrichment more viable for more countries. With this in mind, the following summary of the key points articu - lated by the workshop’s breakout groups is presented in two sections: first, key nonproliferation policy concerns and opportunities for technical methodologies to assist in decision-making; and second, the utility of cur- rent technological assessments and potential paths for improvement. No attempt has been made to identify which breakout group or individual is responsible for specific statements in the following summary. It has also been noted where significant disagreement occurred during the discus- sion over specific points. POLICY CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TECHNICAL METHODOLOGIES One breakout group listed four overarching policy issues for nonpro- liferation that emerged from its breakout group discussions: 1. Managing risk when making international policy decisions; 2. Determining the relative proliferation risk of two fuel cycles; 3. Deciding where to provide money for further research and devel- opment (R&D); and 4. Deciding which countries to cooperate with and how. In many cases, these policy issues involve technology; however, some participants noted that the full range of nonproliferation-related concerns is much broader than purely technical. For example, some key consider- ations regarding cooperation with a new nuclear power program might include understanding the potential motivations of the technology sup- plier (e.g., Russia, France, or China); the full set of conditions and arrange - ments for the sale; the recipient national government’s level of corruption; and the recipient national government’s stability. Beyond this, some participants noted that policy decisions regard- ing nuclear fuel cycle technologies—whether domestic or overseas—may not be solely motivated by proliferation, making proliferation resistance and risk measures inadequate as sole discriminators for policy decisions.

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62 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES Other factors, including national goals, economics, and nuclear waste management, are likely to factor into decision making. A participant in one breakout group expressed his view of the central issue for policy makers very clearly: fundamentally, what policy mak- ers want to know is how many ways they can get into trouble, even if the chances of trouble are remote. For example, from a policymaker’s perspective, if a policy goal is to encourage nuclear energy, where might trouble appear (e.g., what materials, facilities, or locations could create problems)? In many cases, probabilistic or highly technical answers to these types of problems are not desired. Top-level decision makers simply want to know if other nations are likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, there is no tool available that will answer this question, but there may be a range of tools that can answer other important ques- tions. A common understanding of what policy makers’ key questions are could be useful in determining the right tools. In other words, a simpler and clearer question to consider is: What information needs to be obtained to improve policy efforts to minimize proliferation? As a starting point, one breakout group listed a number of spe- cific questions that a policymaker might productively ask of a technical assessment: • If the United States is entering into a nuclear cooperation agree- ment with another country, what technologies would be appro- priate to share with that country? • If a technology is transferred, how could it be used to proliferate in a specific country, and what latent capability would then exist in the country? • Which fuel cycle technology should the United States devote resources to developing, assuming that this technology may be eventually exported by a commercial entity to another country? • What characteristics of a country affect its desire to use a nuclear fuel cycle technology to proliferate? • Does the design and operation of a specific nuclear energy system provide information or develop skills that are likely to result in a breakout scenario? • How can the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) apply its limited inspection resources to better block particular paths to proliferation in countries of concern? Applicability and Usefulness of Technical Assessments Several workshop participants observed that technical and quantifi- able assessments of proliferation resistance might not be the ideal tool to

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63 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS use to advise policy makers on many of their highest-priority concerns. Two major reasons were provided for this observation. First, there exists a mismatch between the concrete day-to-day issues described by policy makers (see Chapter 2) and the more abstracted, technical issues described by the panel of technical experts in proliferation resistance analysis (see Chapter 3). Second, some concerns that are of greatest interest to policy makers—for example, a nation’s motivation to proliferate—cannot easily be addressed with a purely technical analysis. However, others observed that technical assessments have the poten - tial to be very useful if directed toward addressing certain appropriate questions and concerns. Specifically, one participant noted that there are no purely technical solutions to purely political problems, but there are often technical solutions that can assist in managing some part of a politi - cal problem. One example is the use of technical methods to assess the safeguardability of fuel cycle facilities, thereby improving the implemen - tation of a political solution (such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty). One breakout group provided four suggestions that could serve as a starting point for a subset of issues that policy makers would be interested in and that are amenable—at least in part—to technical analysis: • Preventing or providing proof of proliferation, in concert with the IAEA safeguards regime; • Identifying particular nuclear materials, facilities, locations, or portions of the fuel cycles as of particular concern; • Helping to determine policy decisions on technology choices (from the nonproliferation point of view); and • Helping develop or adjust strategies for negotiating agreements, for example, on technology transfer of specific technologies. Both benefits and drawbacks associated with the use of prolifera - tion resistance assessments in policy decision-making were discussed. Some participants suggested that careful and disciplined assessments of a facility’s proliferation resistance could be useful to sharpen the debate on the role of civilian nuclear fuel cycles in proliferation and clarify the underpinnings of decisions taken as a result. On the other hand, others noted that there is a danger of misuse of a comparative risk assessment by foreign nations with an interest in proliferation, as it would allow them to identify the most productive fuel cycle with which to begin their proliferation efforts.1 1 The use and protection of sensitive or classified information is often involved in analysis efforts, and capabilities are often needed to manage and control this information. For exam - ple, in Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection assessments of Generation IV nuclear energy systems, some detailed pathway descriptions may include sensitive information.

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64 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES The value of a “single number” quantification of proliferation risk (a figure of merit) was also debated by the workshop participants. Some were concerned about the potential for misuse by those with vested inter- ests (i.e., foreign nations interested in proliferation or politicians with specific agendas) who choose to neglect the underlying uncertainties and assumptions. Others suggested that such a number would have value for communicating with policy makers about the results of technical assess- ments, because of its simplicity and clarity. The time horizon (i.e., the length of time) that an analysis needs to be applicable to is likely to vary depending on the policy question under con- sideration. There was some disagreement among workshop participants about whether different tools would be needed to acquire answers over time horizons of decades, years, or weeks. Some participants judged that different tools would be needed in each case, whereas others judged that it should be possible to converge on a single tool that would be usable for either short- or long-term decision-making. Several key issues related to proliferation risk and resistance assess - ments were mentioned over the course of the discussion that were loosely connected to one another and to the previous discussion. These issues included the following: • Some participants stated that simple judgments, such as one fuel cycle is “good” while another is “bad,” are unlikely to be found, and suggested that policy makers and others should avoid seek - ing to identify winners and losers among fuel cycle technologies. Rather than asking “Does this technical change result in a more or less proliferation-resistant fuel cycle?” one might ask, “In the context of this situation, what changes would improve or degrade the proliferation risk?” • The response to the idea of quantifying proliferation resistance was mixed. Some participants suggested that technical assess - ments might better inform policy makers’ management of prolif - eration risk by focusing on tradeoffs and scenarios more rather than quantification, and they underlined the importance of clari - fying and communicating the uncertainties in the methodologies. Another workshop participant stated that a mix of quantifiable and non-quantifiable assessment is valuable, noting the impor- tance of both technical rigor and well-thought-out opinions. • Some participants stated that good assessments of proliferation resistance should be situation-specific, but they noted that imple- menting such specificity can be difficult. All national situations are not identical, and a method that treats all country contexts as identical is not necessarily helpful in making policy decisions.

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65 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS However, it is very difficult to validate a model that looks at a specific state. One suggested solution was to look at related problems where analyses were performed with no ability to vali- date the models, for example, stockpile stewardship. Another suggested solution was to carry out analyses with different tools and compare the answers; the final conclusion communicated to a policymaker might be based on either multiple answers or the worst-case estimate. Multiple participants thought that such a situation-specific assessment would be useful. • Some participants thought that it could be useful to analyze why a country might pursue a particular path toward proliferation. Such an analysis might take different economic environments in different countries into account. In addition, the analysis might also consider the problem of mimicking: Does U.S. selection of a fuel cycle technology encourage other countries to develop the same technology, and what is the probability that another state will follow U.S. action, for good or bad? • Some workshop participants suggested using history to gain insight on proliferation models. For example, proliferation risk models could be evaluated by comparing their output against the actual historical outcome. However, concerns were raised with such an approach. Specifically, the answers provided by all current models are likely to be similar because the models are very similar. In addition, one is unlikely to ever have complete knowledge, even for historical cases; instances of proliferation are rare, and the few individuals with first-hand knowledge are now retiring. • To date there has been very little consolidation or standardization of models. Some work has been done to combine INPRO2 and Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP), but as of now, there has been no work to combine or standardize other methodologies. • Finally, some participants noted that most thinking about nuclear fuel cycles is tactical rather than strategic, and suggested that it could be valuable to take a strategic look at the nonproliferation impacts of large-scale fuel cycle changes, such as eliminating, combining, or co-locating facilities. 2 International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles.

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66 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT: PANEL DISCUSSION Following the overview of the breakout session discussions, a third and final panel was convened involving the following experts: • William Tobey, Senior Fellow at Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; • John Ahearne, Executive Director Emeritus of Sigma Xi; and • Joseph Pilat, Program Manager in the National Security Office of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. This session was moderated by C. Paul Robinson (Director Emeritus of Sandia National Laboratory) and chair of the workshop committee. The panel members were asked to briefly discuss their views on: • The potential role of technical assessments of proliferation resis- tance in informing real-world decision-making; and • Potential ways to make the assessments more useful, including R&D directions and suggestions. Their briefings are summarized in the following sections. William Tobey Technical assessments are of course important to policy makers, but they can be improved if those who develop the assessments have a solid understanding of the context in which policy decisions are made. However, in many cases policy makers have misconceptions about nonproliferation. There are five issues in particular where conventional policy wisdom is at variance with reality: 1. Multinational arrangements are inherently proliferation resis- tant. While such arrangements can be useful, the greatest pro- liferation disaster originated in a multinational arrangement (URENCO).3 2. Nuclear energy programs lead to nuclear weapons programs. In fact, the case is more often the reverse. Weapons programs can 3A.Q. Khan was an employee of the uranium enrichment company URENCO when he obtained access to the centrifuge designs that he later supplied to the Pakistani government and others.

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67 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS often lead to nuclear energy programs, which may be used as a cover for the weapons programs. 3. Safeguards are insufficient, but the failings are not technical. There has been no known case where safeguarded material has been used to build a weapon; the real failings with respect to safeguards have been political. 4. The greatest proliferation threat comes from nation-states. A.Q. Khan and nuclear terrorists are also nuclear proliferators. The threat from states is acute, but it is limited. 5. Technology can be kept secret. It is unrealistic to expect that technology can be kept secret indefinitely. The primary purpose of keeping technology secret is to create a delay so that prolifera - tion concerns can be addressed by other means. With these comments in mind, here are three observations regarding how the United States should be thinking about technology and prolifera- tion. First, it is important to use previous experience to inform decisions. When thinking about increasing proliferation resistance, it can be helpful to examine previous failings. For example, in all but one of eighteen cases where nuclear material has gone beyond the control of a state, it has been in bulk form. Second, nonproliferation standards for states are no longer sufficient. Much of the current nonproliferation edifice is based on the assumption that states are the primary concern with respect to proliferation. However, this is no longer true, and non-state actors often have very different goals than state actors. Finally, there are no lasting victories. Those working to stop prolif - eration are up against adversaries who can and will continue to work to proliferate, so those working to prevent proliferation must be equally determined to stop them. John Ahearne In Deputy Secretary Poneman’s briefing to the workshop (see Chapter 2), he stated that forming a consortium of entities that offer reliable fuel services could be effective in limiting proliferation, with government and international arrangements as an overlay. Of course, the underlying problem is to determine what services could be offered that would be attractive to states, and enticing them to take advantage of these fuel services. It is often suggested that fuel take-back would be a good approach, as it would be quite attractive to many nations. A recent National Acad- emy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Sciences joint study committee on

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68 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle (NRC, 2009) met with a number of representatives from countries that are interested in expanding nuclear programs around the world. The committee asked them what would make the choice of not constructing fuel cycle facilities useful or interest- ing. A program for used fuel take-back was stated to be the main attrac - tion. Thus, if a country decides to build a reactor, a proliferation resistance analysis is unlikely to affect that decision; however, an incentive might be offered, such as fuel take-back, to prevent that country from building other fuel cycle facilities. The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) published its interim report very shortly before the work - shop. The report’s summary states: As more nations consider pursuing nuclear energy or expanding their nuclear programs, U.S. leadership is urgently needed on issues of safety, non-proliferation, and security/counter-terrorism. Many countries, espe- cially those just embarking on commercial nuclear power development, have relatively small programs and may lack the regulatory and over- sight resources available to countries with more established programs. International assistance may be required to ensure they do not create dis- proportionate safety, physical security, and proliferation risks. In many cases, mitigating these risks will depend less on technological interven - tions than on the ability to strengthen international institutions and safeguards while promoting multilateral cooperation and coordination. From the U.S. perspective, two further points are particularly important: First, with so many players in the international nuclear technology and policy arena, the United States will increasingly have to lead by engage - ment and by example. Second, the United States cannot exercise effective leadership on issues related to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle so long as its own program is in disarray; effective domestic policies are needed to support America’s international agenda. (BRC, 2011) As the United States addresses how to better understand prolifer- ation, it should also work to understand why countries want nuclear weapons. In his briefing, Dr. Way described an analysis that is consistent with my previous examinations of countries that attempted to acquire nuclear weapons. The primary reasons that a country might seek to acquire a weapon were first, security concerns in the local region, includ - ing a concern that the United States might withdraw its nuclear protection umbrella; and second, prestige, either regional or international. In addi - tion, Mr. Tobey mentioned a more recent group of concerns in his briefing: non-nation-state terrorists. They might want to acquire a nuclear weapon as leverage, or worse, to actually use it. To meet these challenges, the United States must guard against weak- ening the IAEA and, at the same time, work to strengthen it. The potential

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69 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS role of technical assessments of proliferation resistance in influencing real- world decision-making should rely strongly on the IAEA’s work. Mr. Ed McGinnis encouraged us not to be reactive but to be proactive. As many speakers noted, there is no silver bullet to prevent proliferation. Perhaps the U.S. government should consider following the advice of a utility planner commenting on California energy problems: there is no silver bullet, but there might be some silver BBs. Joseph Pilat There has been little disagreement over the premise that there is proliferation risk associated with civilian nuclear energy programs. How- ever, there have been many disagreements about whether civilian nuclear energy—or at least certain aspects of the fuel cycle—should be used at all. These disagreements have focused on whether the benefits outweigh the risks. They continue today. Uncertainty in the security environment has led to greater concern about terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction than has been seen in the United States since the 1970s. The worst-case scenario, of course, involves widespread nuclear proliferation and terror- ism. Such an outcome is by no means inevitable, but the risks and threats faced today are complex, and the current dynamic security environment is unlike any in the past. The proliferation concerns that need to be considered include the following: Ways civilian nuclear power programs are linked to host-state proliferation and nuclear terrorism; differences between the risks associ- ated with the open and closed fuel cycles; the costs of managing different risks; and balancing the cost of limiting nuclear growth against the cost of not doing so. These concerns are not well understood and are the subject of intense debate. These issues are not new. In the 1970s, projected exponential growth curves for nuclear energy drove a great deal of conversation about pro- liferation and the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, as did the projected growth curves for nuclear energy prior to the events at Fukushima earlier this year. Indeed, since the Acheson-Lilienthal report in the late 1940s (Ache - son and Lilienthal, 1946)4 which divided nuclear activities into categories of “safe” and “dangerous” but stated that a number of “dangerous” activities could be rendered safe via technology, there has been a recur- ring interest in technical fixes for proliferation. Although scientists and 4 The “Acheson and Lilienthal Report” commonly refers to a 1946 report written for the U.S. Department of State by a committee chaired by Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal. The report was entitled Report on the International Control of Nuclear Energy.

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70 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES engineers understood that such technical fixes could be reversed, they judged that such a reversal would have required an effort beyond the capabilities of any non-nuclear-weapons state. However, it is now clear that the Acheson-Lilienthal report was too optimistic and that the situ- ation has changed profoundly with the spread of nuclear capabilities around the world. There is a real need for a systematic and rigorous analysis of the proliferation risk associated with fuel cycle facilities; a good analytical framework can inform nonproliferation policy decisions. Whichever ana - lytical methodology is chosen, the implementation approach will need to be effective, credible, transparent, and cost-effective. There are many hopes and expectations associated with quantitative approaches. If one believes that the most important aspects of prolifera - tion resistance are technical, then the search for quantitative or at least technical solutions becomes critical, and the more quantitative and rigor- ous the methodology, the better. On the other hand, if both intrinsic and extrinsic barriers5 to proliferation are considered to be highly important, the quantitative element may not always be necessary. This is particularly true if a strong emphasis is placed on the extrinsic barriers to proliferation. Quantitative analysis may be desirable for addressing some key sub- issues associated with proliferation risk, but it may not be valuable for addressing many others. At present, there is no comprehensive theory of proliferation. The correlations between potential motivations to prolifer- ate and actual proliferation decisions are often confused and contradic - tory, although it is clear that political issues are highly important both in motivating and preventing proliferation. Therefore, there are likely to be limits to what can be usefully quantified. In addition, as has been noted previously in this report, purely quantitative answers are unlikely to be responsive to policy makers’ needs, and can be misinterpreted, misun- derstood, or misused. Beyond the political, many technical issues can be addressed by analysis but may not be easily quantified. Those that are readily quan- tifiable—such as materials attractiveness—can be important to address certain issues. It is important to understand the uncertainties and limits associated with any analysis of proliferation risk, particularly a quantitative analy - sis. A quantitative analysis can be useful if the terms of reference for the analysis are sound and if the uncertainties and limitations of the analysis are well-understood. For example, a quantitative analysis could be useful for identifying vulnerabilities and improving safeguards. However, such an analysis is not likely to be useful for identifying a superior technology. 5 See Chapter 1 for definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic barriers.

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71 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS It is not clear that any particular fuel cycle technology can pose significant resistance to a determined state effort. Scenario- or pathway-based analyses may prove helpful, particularly regarding the deployment of an advanced fuel cycle in specific states. Today, the PR&PP methodology (see Chapter 3) has wide acceptance globally, and shows promise; however, it has not been fully tested. While the PR&PP framework does have the capacity to bring in country-specific threats, to date, it has been only exercised using stylized threats. As part of such a scenario- or pathway-based analysis, the concept of formal, structured expert elicitation is highly important. Such processes have done much to ease concerns about the reliability of and potential for misuse of expert judgment. Earlier in the workshop, John Harvey’s brief - ing as well as the follow-up discussions mentioned the idea of red team - ing to better understand proliferation risk. Other approaches to acquire qualitative information on potential proliferator strategies are also pos - sible, such as game theory. COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION Throughout much of the second day, the floor was open for the work- shop participants to comment on the workshop as a whole and on the future directions of proliferation risk assessment. These comments fell roughly into four categories: intent and choices to proliferate; prolifera- tion in a changing world; addressing the disconnects between the techni - cal and policy communities; and opportunities for proliferation risk and resistance assessment. The following sections provide brief summaries of these discussions. Considering Intent and Choices to Proliferate Some workshop participants observed that intent to proliferate and the concept of proliferation resistance are mutually dependent. Doug Shaw (George Washington University) commented that assuming pro- liferation intent to be constant because it is difficult to measure may be dangerous because it is possible that actions taken to respond to the risk of proliferation might influence intent, for example, through the bargain struck in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Similarly, John Creasy (Y-12 National Security Complex) noted that attempting to influence a nation’s actions can sometimes result in the creation of the very situation that one was trying to avoid. He added that this underlines the need to use the right tools and bring the right expert judgment to bear on specific situations.

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72 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES Proliferation in a Changing World In the 21st century, new challenges have appeared for containing the spread of new technologies, particularly the Internet and the existence of a worldwide economy. In this environment, C. Paul Robinson (Director Emeritus of Sandia National Laboratories) suggested that it could be futile to attempt to completely halt the spread of new technologies that could be associated with nuclear fuel cycle facilities. William Charlton (Texas A&M University) added that attempting to contain technology has not worked in the past and is even more unlikely to work in the future. He suggested that the goal should not be to keep a technology secret forever, but rather, to keep it under wraps until a diplomatic solution is reached, or, if necessary, a military solution is brought to bear. On a related topic, John Creasy commented that much of the analy- sis to date on proliferation risk is based on nation-states and third-party actors. However, in the 21st century, massive international corporations exist that countries have no control over. He suggested that it might be worthwhile to consider these organizations’ potential role in proliferation. Addressing the Disconnects Between the Technical and Policy Communities To better address the disconnects between the technical and policy communities, Raymond Wymer (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, retired) suggested that a clear distinction needs to be made between policy and policy implementation. The U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is clear: To, in every way practical, minimize the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. He stated that the problems that are being discussed at the workshop arise with the implementation of that policy, not the policy itself. Although technical assessment cannot provide input to the statement of policy, it can provide input to those who are implementing the policy in specific cases. However, it remains unclear to some in the technical and policy com - munities how to most effectively provide and use technical input. Corey Hinderstein (Nuclear Threat Initiative) commented that she was struck by how far removed the workshop discussions have been from the discus- sions related to the fuel cycle that she has been involved in. She suggested that it could be mutually beneficial if these conversations could be better connected to the types of tools that the workshop participants have been discussing. For example, she suggested that methods that use pathway analyses or decision trees could be useful to policy makers to evaluate where technology choices can be more or less useful. William Dunlop (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) noted that the disconnect between technical analysts and policy makers is not

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73 SUMMARY DISCUSSIONS unique to this workshop or even this problem; it also has existed in other contexts, including the U.S. nuclear weapons program. He suggested that it might be helpful for the technical community, including the Department of Energy (DOE) and universities, to find a way to speak with a single voice to the extent appropriate, providing an actionable input to policy makers. Charles Curtis (Nuclear Threat Initiative) suggested another approach for informing policy with science, engineering, and technical judgment. In his view, the basic question ought to be: What is the strategy from a policy standpoint, and how can science, engineering, and technical judgment inform that strategy? After the Cold War, the nuclear weapons complex faced the challenge of providing continued nuclear deterrence in the absence of testing. In response, the DOE brought together the “Naviga - tors”—the weapons laboratory directors and the heads of the production complex—with the charge of determining the science and technology path required to meet this challenge. He suggested that a similar approach could be used for one possibility for managing the technical input needed to determine how to use technical nonproliferation risk assessment tools. Overall, the many technical and nontechnical complexities associated with proliferation indicate a need for the international relations com- munity and the technical community to actively work together. Joseph Pilat (Los Alamos National Laboratory) commented that some of the best work being done today in international relations is with case studies. Unfortunately, the associated statistical analysis is often not on par with the quality of the case study work. He suggested that it could be helpful for the technical community to work more closely with the international relations community. Opportunities for Proliferation Risk and Resistance Assessment Some of the comments made during the final discussion session reit - erated that there is a need for tools that are useful given policy makers’ constraints and interests, which go beyond the technical considerations only. Jon Phillips (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) suggested that a possible model for proliferation resistance could be the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (USNRC) system for siting decisions. The USNRC separates analyses into two parts when considering whether to allow a nuclear facility to be sited domestically: first, a generic application for a technology must be completed; second, a site-specific application must be completed. This system might be applicable to proliferation resis- tance assessment. The first stage of analysis would discuss the technol - ogy aspects of a facility generically; the second stage would be state- and

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74 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES situation-specific. Such a two-stage approach could allow the technical parts of the problem to be separated from the non-technical. Warren (Pete) Miller (Texas A&M University) posed three questions that would be useful to investigate in more detail in the National Acad- emies study that will follow this workshop, noting that the DOE is cur- rently working on an analysis for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, to allow them to down-select from a myriad of potential technologies. These questions are: • Among the many criteria that need to be considered in making this decision (e.g., cost and waste management), how important should proliferation resistance be? • Should proliferation resistance be removed as a criterion for down-selection, given that the tools cannot currently discriminate between different options for the back end of the fuel cycle? • How can analysis tools be improved or new ones developed to provide more effective differentiation on proliferation risk?