• Discussing the overlap between these questions and the issues that proliferation resistance and risk assessment methods can address; and
• Discussing ways to increase this overlap.
Following the breakout group discussions, the workshop participants reconvened to review and discuss the major issues brought up during the breakout group sessions. The breakout group chairs, workshop committee members Sharon Squassoni (Center for Strategic and International Security), William Charlton (Texas A&M University), and Charles Forsberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) gave short presentations summarizing the key points made during each of the breakout sessions. These presentations and discussions are summarized in this section.
Minimizing the proliferation risk associated with maintaining nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world involves using both technical and nontechnical approaches. Due to this technical/non-technical dichotomy, two cultures have developed in the nonproliferation community:
• A highly technical culture, focused on maximizing proliferation resistance by considering the design and operation of facilities; and
• A non-technical public policy/political science culture, focused on discouraging and slowing proliferation attempts using domestic and international policy measures.
While policy makers—such as those at NNSA or the State Department—do not typically use highly technical quantitative analyses to inform their policymaking decisions, such input would be possible and would not be unique. In other endeavors, such as Treasury Department activities, technical analysis is used to help formulate and drive policy. However, multiple workshop participants, particularly those working in policy, stated that such analyses would be more useful if the technical analysts working on nonproliferation problem were aware of and considering the types of questions that are important to policy makers. Participants in one breakout group suggested that helpful questions for the technical community to consider would include: (1) who the policy makers are; (2) what questions they are asking; (3) which of those questions are amenable to technical analysis; and (4) how policy makers are putting technical information to use.
A good assessment also needs to account for a broad range of ways in which information could be acquired. It was noted several times in the course of the discussions that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are currently lagging behind many other commercial technologies. This means that