Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 79
Appendix A Project Statement of Task IMPROVING THE ASSESSMENT OF PROLIFERATION RISK OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES An ad hoc committee will conduct a study and prepare a report for the Department of Energy (DOE) regarding potential research and devel- opment (R&D) directions for improving the assessment of the host state proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The study will: 1. Identify key proliferation policy questions capable of being answered by a technical assessment of the host state proliferation risk posed by a given nuclear fuel cycle, and discuss the utility of these questions for informing international nonproliferation policy decisions; 2. Assess the utility for decision makers of existing and historical methodologies and metrics used by DOE and others (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency) for assessing prolifera- tion risk, both for considering the deployment of these facilities domestically as well as the implications of deployment outside the United States; 3. Assess the potential for adapting risk assessment methodologies developed in other contexts (such as safety and security) to host state proliferation risk assessments—including both qualitative and quantitative approaches—their benefits, limitations, and the challenges associated with adapting these methodologies to pro- liferation risk assessment; 79
OCR for page 80
80 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES 4. Identify R&D and other opportunities for improving the utility for decision makers of current and potential new approaches to the assessment of proliferation risk; and 5. Identify and assess options for effectively communicating pro- liferation risk information to government and industry decision makers, as well as the public and the NGO community both within the United States and internationally. This study will not address the risk associated with the physical security of the facility or materials against attack, theft, or diversion of nuclear materials. The study may examine policy options but will not make specific policy recommendations.