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Appendix A
Project Statement of Task
IMPROVING THE ASSESSMENT OF PROLIFERATION
RISK OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
An ad hoc committee will conduct a study and prepare a report for
the Department of Energy (DOE) regarding potential research and devel-
opment (R&D) directions for improving the assessment of the host state
proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The study will:
1. Identify key proliferation policy questions capable of being
answered by a technical assessment of the host state proliferation
risk posed by a given nuclear fuel cycle, and discuss the utility
of these questions for informing international nonproliferation
policy decisions;
2. Assess the utility for decision makers of existing and historical
methodologies and metrics used by DOE and others (such as
the International Atomic Energy Agency) for assessing prolifera-
tion risk, both for considering the deployment of these facilities
domestically as well as the implications of deployment outside
the United States;
3. Assess the potential for adapting risk assessment methodologies
developed in other contexts (such as safety and security) to host
state proliferation risk assessments—including both qualitative
and quantitative approaches—their benefits, limitations, and the
challenges associated with adapting these methodologies to pro-
liferation risk assessment;
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80 PROLIFERATION RISK IN NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES
4. Identify R&D and other opportunities for improving the utility
for decision makers of current and potential new approaches to
the assessment of proliferation risk; and
5. Identify and assess options for effectively communicating pro-
liferation risk information to government and industry decision
makers, as well as the public and the NGO community both
within the United States and internationally.
This study will not address the risk associated with the physical
security of the facility or materials against attack, theft, or diversion of
nuclear materials. The study may examine policy options but will not
make specific policy recommendations.
