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OCR for page 128
7
Concluding Comments
The loss of control over the Macondo well initiated a tragedy of momen-
tous consequences. Eleven workers lost their lives, and the environment and
economy of the gulf region were damaged in ways that are still being assessed.
Furthermore, the blowout and subsequent oil spill severely damaged public con-
fidence in both the offshore oil and gas industry and the federal regulatory proc-
ess. A concerted effort by all participants will be necessary to overcome the re-
putational damage caused by this event. As the nation struggles with the
consequences of dependency on foreign oil, it is appropriate that the risks asso-
ciated with the exploration for and production of oil be factored into political
decisions on where, when, and how to drill. All participants in the industry and
regulatory communities have an obligation (a) to ensure that such considerations
reflect a factual assessment of the risks, not an emotional one, and (b) to do all
that they can to minimize those risks through technology development, person-
nel training, and management systems. Neither objective is likely to be achieved
if the risks and the responsibility for addressing them are not recognized and
accepted.
Envisioning failure is key to the safe development and operation of sys-
tems, particularly systems that incorporate the complexity of a deepwater well.
Risks must be recognized, quantified, and mitigated. Designers, developers,
operators, and regulators must know and understand that the risks are real and
conduct themselves accordingly. If they do not, they face the likelihood of deal-
ing with the consequences of the risks. There is an old saying in the U.S. Navy
that there are only two categories of ship captains—those who have run their
ship aground and those who will—and captains who believe that they belong in
a third category shortly find that they are part of the first!
Neither industry nor U.S. regulators appear to have foreseen the risks of a
Macondo-scale event. Even after the Montara blowout in the West Timor Sea in
August 2009, industry and regulators testified before Congress,1 providing as-
surances concerning the safety of operations in the Gulf of Mexico and the ade-
1
Senate Hearing 111-303, Nov. 19, 2009. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111
shrg55331/html/CHRG-111shrg55331.htm. Most recently accessed Jan. 17, 2012.
128
OCR for page 129
129
Concluding Comments
quacy of the regulatory process. Similarly, the lack of adequate, previously
planned capping and containment techniques evidences a failure to envision an
incident of the type or magnitude experienced at Macondo.
Today, industry and the regulators are both stating their good intentions.
Industry is investing significant resources in capping and containment systems,
and regulators are making significant organizational and process changes. The
question remains as to whether these efforts are a start toward recognition, ac-
ceptance, and active management of the risks inherent in offshore oil and gas
development or whether they represent a transitory response. For the sake of
those who work offshore, those who live near the Gulf of Mexico, and all those
dependent on the U.S. economy, the committee fervently hopes that these efforts
are sustained.
