sets forth initial personnel hiring targets as an important metric in this regard. It underscores, however, that personnel upgrading must be accompanied by agency leadership, an agency-wide written policy on drawing on the nation’s S&T capabilities, available financial resources to prime the pumps of interest in development countries, and an organizational structure that helps ensure that enthusiasm for S&T is captured programmatically.


Material Protection Control & Accountability Programs

The NRC has carried out three studies supported by the Department of Energy (DOE), on the strengths and weaknesses of the department’s cooperative program with Russia on protection, control and accountability of weapons-grade nuclear material (MPC&A program). The reports were as follows: Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997), Protecting Nuclear Weapons Materials in Russia (1999), and Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (2006). Over the lifetime of the MPC&A program, DOE has continuously calculated the quantity of nuclear material of concern that was locked down in secure Russian facilities as its primary metric in judging the success of the program and the impact on non-proliferation. The speed with which the lockdown took place at various facilities was a secondary metric. Eventually, the sustainability of the security upgrades that were installed under the guidance of U.S. experts became a third metric, with sustainability usually measured in terms of Russian financial commitments to supporting and continuing the program and the number of Russian specialists that participated in U.S.-organized training programs.

The first report highlighted the importance of also counting the number of discovered thefts and failed thefts of material as two significant metrics. There were a total of 23 discovered thefts in 1993 and 1994, but zero in 1995 and 1996 from the facilities of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy. Also, subsequent reports emphasized the importance of obtaining data on the number of nuclear security violations reported by Russian inspectors of nuclear facilities as indicators of program effectiveness. DOE did not follow up on these recommendations.

Another important recommendation was for DOE department and its Russian counterpart to adopt a ten-year cost-sharing program as a bridge to sustainability. Under this concept, Russia eventually would pick up all costs for the $2 billion program, which had begun with the United States covering all of the costs. While DOE eventually embarked on a sustainability program that rested on cost-sharing, the long-term U.S. financial commitment was much higher than it would have been had the ten-year program been adopted.

Finally, one of the reports offered the following observations:

There are no good quantitative measures of the effectiveness of U.S. programs to support efforts to upgrade control of sensitive items. First, there is uncertainty as to the effectiveness of existing controls, the security conditions at production and research facilities, and the capabilities of security personnel. In short, there is no good baseline against which to measure progress. Second, it is not possible to separate contributions of the American participation in the program from progress that would have resulted without the Americans. Finally,

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